What Is Islamic Democracy?

Islamic Democracy refers to a political ideology that seeks to apply Islamic principles to public policy within a democratic framework. In practice, there are three kinds of political systems in the Muslim-majority countries today; the basis of the distinction between them has to do with how comprehensively Islam is incorporated into the affairs of the state:

1. Secular democracies, in secular states such as Azerbaijan and Turkey, that do not recognize any religion as its state religion and, therefore, does not incorporate religious principles into its public policy and other state affairs.
2. Religious democracies; that recognize Islam as its state religion and a source of legislation, such as Malaysia and Maldives. The application of religious principles into public policy varies from country to country, since Islam is not the only source of law, such as Pakistan.
3. Theocracies; that endeavor to institute Sharia, in full force,^[1] and offers more comprehensive inclusion of Islam into the affairs of the state. Presently, Iran is the only example of an Islamic state in the form of Islamic republics.

The concepts of liberalism and democratic participation were already present in the medieval Islamic world. The Rashidun Caliphate is perceived by its proponents as an early example of a democratic state.

The Three Cs Of Islamic Democracy

The key features of Islamic governance that I have found in Islamic sources – Quran and the Prophetic precedence (Sunnah), and contemporary Muslim discussions on the Islamic State – are Constitution,Consent, and Consultation. Muslims who seek to implement the Shariah are obliged to emulate the Prophet’s precedence and, given the rather narrow definitions of Shariah and Sunnah that most Islamist operate with, there is no escape for them from the three key principles identified here. While these principles need to be explored and articulated in the specific socio-cultural context of different Muslim societies, it is important to understand that they are essential.

Constitution

The compact, or constitution, of Medina that Prophet Muhammad adopted provides a very important occasion for the development of Islamic political theory. After Prophet Muhammad migrated from Mecca to Medina in 622 CE, he established the first Islamic state. For ten years, Prophet Muhammad was not only the leader of the emerging Muslim community in Arabia, but also the political head of the state of Medina. As the leader of Medina, Prophet Muhammad exercised jurisdiction over Muslims as well as non-Muslims. The legitimacy of his sovereignty over Medina was based on his status as the Prophet of Islam, as well as on the basis of the compact of Medina.

As Prophet of God, he had sovereignty over all Muslims by divine decree. But Muhammad did not rule over the non-Muslims of Medina because he was the messenger of Allah. He ruled over them by virtue of the compact that was signed by the Muhajirun (Muslim immigrants from Mecca), the Ansar (indigenous Muslims of Medina), and the Yahud (several Jewish tribes that lived in and around Medina). It is interesting to note that Jews were constitutional partners in the making of the first Islamic state.

The compact of Medina can be read as both a social contract and a constitution. A social contract, a model developed by English philosophers Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, is an imaginary agreement between people in the state of nature that leads to the establishment of a community or a State. In the state of nature people are free and are not obliged to follow any rules or laws. They are essentially sovereign individuals. However, through the social contract they surrender their individual sovereignty to a collective one and create a community or a State.

The second idea that the compact of Medina manifests is that of a constitution. In many ways, the constitution is the document that enshrines the conditions of the social contract upon which any society is founded. The compact of Medina clearly served a constitutional function, since it was the constitutive document for the first Islamic state. Thus, we can argue that the compact of Medina serves the dual function of a social contract and a constitution. Clearly the compact of Medina by itself cannot serve as a modern constitution. It would be quite inadequate, since it is a historically specific document and quite limited in its scope. However, it can serve as a guiding principle to be emulated, rather than a manual to be duplicated. Today, Muslims worldwide can emulate Prophet Muhammad and draw up their own constitutions, historically and temporally specific to their conditions.

Consent

An important principle of the Constitution of Medina was that Prophet Muhammad governed the city-state of Medina by virtue of the consent of its citizens. He was invited to govern, and his authority to govern was enshrined in the social contract. The constitution of Medina established the importance of consent and cooperation for governance.

The process of bayah, or the pledging of allegiance, was an important institution that sought to formalise the consent of the governed. In those days, when a ruler failed to gain the consent of the ruled through a formal and direct process of pledging of allegiance, the ruler’s authority was not fully legitimised. This was an Arab custom that predates Islam, but, like many Arab customs, was incorporated within Islamic traditions. Just as Prophet Muhammad had done, the early Caliphs of Islam, too, practiced the process of bayah after rudimentary forms of electoral colleges had nominated the Caliph, in order to legitimise the authority of the Caliph. One does not need to stretch one’s imagination too far to recognise that in polities that have millions rather than hundreds of citizens, the process of nomination followed by elections can serve as a necessary modernisation of the process of bayah. Replacing bayah with ballots makes the process of pledging allegiance simple and universal. Elections, therefore, are neither a departure from Islamic principles and traditions, nor inherently un-Islamic in any form.

The Quran, too, recognises the authority of those who have been chosen as leaders, and in a sense extends divine legitimacy to those who have legitimate authority.

O you who believe! Obey Allah and obey the Messenger and
those in authority from among you. [Quran 4:59] 

Consultation

The third key principle of Islamic governance is consultation, or Shura in Arabic. This is a very widely known concept, and many Islamic scholars have advanced the Islamic concept of Shura as evidence for Islam’s democratic credentials. Indeed, many scholars actually equate democracy with Shura. 

…and consult them in affairs (of moment). 
Then, when thou hast taken a decision put thy trust in Allah. [Quran 3:159]

[righteous are those] …who conduct their affairs through [shura baynahum] mutual Consultation. [Quran 42:38]

Muslim scholars dispute whether the Quranic injunction for consultation is advisory or mandatory, but it nevertheless remains a divine sanction. Pro-democracy Muslims see it as necessary, and those who fear democratic freedoms and prefer authoritarianism interpret these injunctions as divine suggestions and not divine fiats. The Prophet himself left behind a very important tradition that emphasised the importance of collective and democratic decision making. He said that “the community of Muhammed will never agree upon error.” Consultative governance, therefore, is the preferred form of governance in Islam, and any Muslim who chooses to stay true to his faith sources cannot but prefer a democratic structure over all others to realise the justice and wellbeing promised in Islamic sources.

Conclusion 

There is much in Islamic sources and Islamic tradition that is favorable to making democracy the vehicle for delivering the products of Islamic governance, such as social justice, economic welfare, and religious freedoms. I am convinced that Islam is not a barrier to, but instead a facilitator of, democracy, justice, and tolerance in the Muslim world. That said, for that to happen, Muslims must revisit their sources and re-understand them without a bias against things that they erroneously label as Western. Democracy is inherent to Islamic values and Islamic historical experience.

References 

Al-Raysuni, Ahmad. Al-Shura: The Quranic Principle of Consultation (London: International Institute of Islamic thought, 2011).

El Fadl, Khaled Abou, et al. Islam and the Challenge of Democracy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004).

Esposito, John L., Mohammed A. Muqtedar Khan, and Jillian Schwedler. “Religion and Politics in the Middle East.” Understanding the Contemporary Middle East (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000).

Esposito, John L. and John O. Voll. Islam and Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).

Haykal, M. H. The Life of Muhammad (trans.) Ismael R. Al Faruqi (Indianapolis: NAIT, 1988), pp. 180-83.

Khan, Muqtedar. “Shura and Democracy.” Ijtihad.Org.

Khan, M. A. Muqtedar. Debating Moderate Islam: The Geopolitics of Islam and the West (Salt Lake, Utah, University of Utah Press, 2007).

Khan, Muqtedar Khan. “Islam, Democracy and Islamism after the Counterrevolution in Egypt.” Middle East Policy XXI.1 (2014): 75-86.

Khan, M. A. Muqtedar. “The Islamic States,” in M. Hawkesworth and M. Kogan (Eds.), Encyclopedia of Government and Politics, (London: Routledge Press, 2003).

Siddiqui, A. H. The Life of Muhammad (Des Plaines, IL: Library of Islam, 1991).

By M.A. Muqtedar Khan is Associate Professor in the department of Political Science and Contributors International Relations at the University of Delaware and a Fellow of the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding.

Beware Of The Islamist Trap

By Monte Palmer,
Courtesy Of "Asia Times Online"

Islamists, judging by the use of the term in the global press, is a simplified way of referring to all Muslim groups seeking some form of Islamic rule in the Middle East. 

Like most simplistic expressions, "Islamist," is laden with hidden traps. 

The first Islamist trap is believing that all Muslim groups seeking some form of Islamic rule in the Middle East are of one mind and body. They are not. 

The second Islamist trap is assuming that all groups seeking some form of Islamist rule are inherently hostile to the interests of the United States and its allies. Some are, and some are not. 

The third Islamist trap is thinking that the US and its allies can stop the Islamist surge now sweeping the Middle East by diplomacy, sanctions, and covert action. The verdict on this supposition has yet to be rendered, but the outlook is not promising. 

The fourth and most lethal Islamist trap is the belief that force alone can stop the Islamists. Iraq and Afghanistan suggest otherwise. 

The dangers of assuming that all Islamists are the same is easily illustrated by a brief review of the four main Sunni Islamist currents competing for control of the Middle East. 

Islam Lite 

The most liberal of the four main Islamist currents is Islam Lite, the sarcastic Turkish nickname for the Justice and Development Party that has ruled Turkey within a secular framework for more than a decade. Islam Lite, the most forward looking of the four Islamic currents, has built Turkey into the world's seventeenth largest economy, consolidated Turkish democracy, brought Turkey to the doorstep of membership in the European Union, reaffirmed Turkey membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and established Turkey as the dominant Muslim power in the Middle East and beyond. 

At the regional and international levels, the Justice and Development Party's Islamic agenda includes support for Muslim Brotherhood rule in Egypt, Tunisia, and the Gaza Strip. It also calls for an independent Palestinian state in the Occupied Territories. All have soured Turkey's relations with Israel, but war between the two former allies is not in the picture. 

Partnership with the US and EU is an essential component of Islam Lite. Subservience is not.

... the Islamic Lite model practiced in Turkey does demonstrate that moderate Islamic rule is compatible with democracy and development. Much like Turkey itself, the Justice and Development Party provides an avenue for cooperation and dialogue between the West and Muslim currents throughout the Middle East. 

The Muslim Brotherhood

... the world's largest and most powerful Islamic organization. The Brotherhood now rules in Egypt and Tunisia and exercises profound influence throughout the region. The name may differ from place to place, but they are all Brotherhood offshoots. 

The odds are that it will control most of the Arab Middle East by the end of the decade. 

The foundation of the Brotherhood's success is a vision of Islam that promises Islamic morality, modernity, welfare, honesty, capitalism, stability, and development in a single and seductive package. It is this seductive package that has enabled the Brotherhood to capture the center of the Sunni Islamic community. 

Popular support, in turn, is bolstered by an organizational structure that spans the globe... the Muslim Brotherhood is first and foremost a Muslim organization that places Islam above nationalism. Egypt is the headquarters of the Brotherhood, but its goal is a Middle East dominated by moderate Muslim rule. Brotherhood dominance in one country is used to strengthen Brotherhood influence in others.

In sum, the Brotherhood possesses a forward looking agenda that includes democracy and development within an Islamic framework. The Brotherhood is willing to cooperate with the US and the EU, but only on terms that advance its Islamic agenda. 

The Brotherhood, in common with the Islamic Lite model, pursues its Islamic agenda in a patient and pragmatic manner that avoids violence if possible. 

Salafis 

The salafis are exceptionally conservative Muslims who believe that the Koran and Sunna (sayings and actions of the Prophet Mohammed) should be followed to the letter. This includes accepting the rule of tyrants as the will of God. God will judge the kings and tyrants when the time comes, but that is his call and not theirs. 

While dominant in the Gulf, diverse Salafi currents are emerging as a major force in Egypt and Tunisia, two of the most westernized countries in the Arab world. 

Jihadists

... the Jihadists differ from the mainline Salafis in three key ways. 

First, they have arrogated unto themselves the right to excommunicate Muslim leaders by declaring them to be kafirs or non-believers. Most salafis deem excommunication to be the right of God unless individuals denounce their belief in God and refuse to accept the Prophet Mohammed as his Messenger. 

Second, by excommunicating political leaders for their cooperation with the US, the jihadists are absolved from Koranic scriptures requiring them to support their ruling tyrants and kings. Rebellion and assassination await. 

Finally, it is not enough for the Jihadists to impose strict Islamic law on society. All Muslims societies, in their view, have been so corrupted by their association with the West that they must be totally destroyed and rebuilt in a purely Islamic framework. 

Traps and Consequences

The trap of viewing the main Islamist currents as a cohesive force deprives the West of much needed flexibility in dealing with the competing Islamic movements most likely to dominate the Middle East during the coming decade. 

The trap of viewing the main Islamists currents as being of one mind and body sets the stage for believing that all Islamist currents pose an imminent danger to the US and its allies. The battle lines for an inevitable conflict between Islam and the West have been drawn. Panic and islamophobia soar.

The drawing of battle lines, in turn, unleashes the trap of urgence. Something has to be done, but what? Iraq and Afghanistan have dulled the West's taste for drawn out guerilla wars. 

As former Secretary of Defense Gates framed the issue, "Any future defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big American land army to Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should have his head examined." 

This sets the stage for an endless series of sanctions, covert actions, and drone strikes which stoke extremism, anti-Americanism and, eventually, a new explosion. 

If sanctions and covert actions don't work, the trap of assuming that the US can save the world from the Islamist threat by military force remains. I stress the US, because America's EU allies are bailing out, while Japan, China and Russia are pursuing Middle East agendas at odds with that of the US.

As the proverbial rhyme states:

"For want of a nail a shoe was lost.
For want of shoe a horse was lost.
For the want of a horse the rider was lost.
For the want of a rider a message was lost.
For the want of a message the battle was lost.
For want of a battle the kingdom was lost."

For want of recognizing the complexities of Islamic currents, the Middle East could be lost. 

Egypt: A Second Republic?

After The First Truly Democratic Elections In A Generation, Will Egypt Become A Secular, Religious, Or Military State?



Many issues remain unresolved - the future of the parliament, a constitution still unwritten and a military that seems determined to hold on to control of much of the Government and a substantial segment of the country’s economy.

"This victory lacks many things and is marred in particular by what’s called the additional constitutional declaration – which is unconstitutional,” Abdel-Moneim Aboul-Fotouh, a popular politician and ex-presidential candidate, told Empire.

 
What are the plans of Mohamed Morsi, Egypt's new president? He may have described his vision for the first 100 days, but it will take much more than a vision to make change happen. And it will take more than a one-term presidency to shape the politics of Egypt in the coming years. 

How will Morsi's relationship with the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) play out? Where in all of this debate are the voices of those who led the march in Tahrir? Can the new government live up to the promise of the revolution? And will there be conflict or confluence between the Brotherhood and the military?

The Future Of Islam In Egypt

While many analysts have understandably examined the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi political parties as forces that can shape the Egyptian public’s views on the role of religion in politics in post-revolutionary Egypt, they have completely missed the critical role of Al-Azhar.

By Waleed El-Ansary
First Published: 2012-07-05
Courtesy Of "Middle-East-Online"

CAIRO - With the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohamed Morsi elected president of Egypt, many people are asking what this says about how average Egyptians see the role of religion in public life. The United States especially is watching Egypt with interest right now because of the historically strong relationship between the two countries.

But to understand religion’s role in Egypt, it is crucial to understand that Egypt contains powerful non-partisan religious voices that preclude religious scholars siding with Islamic parties, as occurred in Iran. No doubt, Egypt is still a profoundly religious culture and it is generally socially unacceptable to oppose religion. If Jeffersonian-style democracy – the notion that believers should leave religion at home when publically discussing political questions – is impossible in the Egyptian context, the question is not whether or not religion will manifest itself in the public square, but how.

For Muslim Egyptians, the majority of the population, there are three forces that influence how religion is seen in public life: the Muslim Brotherhood, which supports a civil state but has a highly politicised understanding of Islam; Salafi political parties, such as the Al Nour or Al Asala parties, which emphasise a vision of Islam based on Wahhabi ideology, which is not indigenous to Egypt, and call for the application of Saudi-style laws; and Al-Azhar University, the most prestigious Islamic university in the Arab region and the oldest still-functioning university in the world (founded in 971 in Cairo). Al-Azhar focuses on Islam’s relationship to contemporary political and social issues, but through a different lens, drawing on Islamic intellectual heritage.

While many analysts have understandably examined the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi political parties as forces that can shape the Egyptian public’s views on the role of religion in politics in post-revolutionary Egypt, they have completely missed the critical role of Al-Azhar.

Overlooking Al-Azhar would be a mistake given its thousand-plus year history, unique experience and methodology, renowned research council and sheer number of graduates. While the Muslim Brotherhood has about 600,000 members, Al-Azhar educational institutions currently have two million students (500,000 at the university level and 1.5 million in primary and secondary schools). Moreover, Al-Azhar University graduates are imams or preachers in 110,000 mosques – approximately 80 per cent of the total in Egypt – and the university has 10 million alumni.

The majority of Egyptian Muslims look to the scholars of Al-Azhar University for both spiritual and intellectual guidance, not the Muslim Brotherhood or Salafi groups.

Al-Azhar University’s approach is much more measured and scholarly. Its method is to seek the common good and eschew partisan politics. Because of its deep history, the extent of its influence and its approach, it is crucial to the current political landscape of Egypt and facilitating the smooth transition that is vital to the country’s future.

The religious scholars of Al-Azhar (the ulama) have, in fact, long held the position of intermediaries between the people and the government, often acting as the social conscience of Egypt and custodians of popular sentiment and tradition. Al-Azhar announced at the beginning of this election cycle that it would not institutionally endorse any candidate, since its purpose is to work with all groups to seek the common good.

Most recently, for example, Al-Azhar issued guidelines for the new constitution guaranteeing full citizenship before the law to all members of Egyptian society regardless of religion, race or creed, and challenged questionable campaign practices of Islamic parties, such as asking imams to promote specific parties. The parties publicly changed their campaign practices, acquiescing to Al-Azhar’s authority, even if some of these practices continued less publicly.

The cultivation and strengthening of democratic values requires a legitimacy that is not on offer from any quarter but those who have continuously played this historic role in Egyptian society, that is, the Azhariulama.

It is thus vital to long-term US interests in Egypt and the Middle East North Africa region not only to become more aware of but also to work with institutions like Al-Azhar. This relationship could take many forms, such as scholarships for top Al-Azhar graduates, who represent future religious and intellectual leaders of the Arab world, to leading universities in the United States; cooperation on research and translation of seminal Western and Islamic texts; and ultimately opening a branch of Al-Azhar University within the United States itself.

If the destinies of Islamic civilization and the West are intertwined, it is working with mainstream Muslim institutions like Al-Azhar that holds the greatest promise for achieving mutual understanding and global cooperation.

Waleed El-Ansary is Helal, Hisham and Laila Edris El-Swedey University Chair in Islamic Studies at Xavier University in Cincinnati, Ohio. This article was written for the Common Ground News Service (CGNews).

U.S. Has No Choice But To Deal With Islamic Groups

The victories of Islamic parties in Egypt and elsewhere have forced the United States to embark on an untested strategy to engage.

"From a U.S. perspective, we have no choice but to deal with the Muslim Brotherhood," said Shadi Hamid, a Middle East analyst at the Brookings Doha Center, a think tank in Qatar. "I don't see what the alternative is."

Although the United States has had good relations with regimes where political Islam is prevalent, such as Saudi Arabia, its policy toward Islamist groups that are ousting long-standing regimes or pressuring them to change is evolving.

"There's been a sea change in U.S. policy toward the Brotherhood," said James Phillips, a Middle East analyst at the Heritage Foundation, a think tank.

The Obama administration believes it can work with the Brotherhood as a political force.

"It certainly has become more accepting of the Brotherhood," said Daniel Serwer, a professor at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington and a scholar at the Middle East Institute, a think tank.

The administration may feel it has little choice but to deal with elected Brotherhood leaders in Egypt, a country that had been a Middle East ally for years under dictator Hosni Mubarak, Egypt analysts said.

White House spokesman Jay Carney has said the Obama administration has "broadened our engagement" with emerging parties in Egypt. Administration officials have met with Muslim Brotherhood leaders, and Carney said the White House will judge such leaders on how they act, not on their religious affiliation.

Via: "USA Today"

Welcome To 'Democraship'

By Pepe Escobar
July 4, 2012
Courtesy Of "Asia Times Online"

Let's start with a bomb. Over 10 days ago a new brand of coup d'etat took place in Paraguay against elected president Fernando Lugo. It was virtually unnoticed by global corporate media. 

Anything unexpected? Not really. A March 2009 cable from the US Embassy in Asuncion, revealed by WikiLeaks, [1] had already detailed how oligarchs in Paraguay were busy devising a "democratic coup" in congress to depose Lugo. 

At the time, the US embassy noted political conditions were not ideal for a coup. Key among the plotters was former president Nicanor Duarte (2003 to 2008), severely bashed by progressive South American governments for having allowed US Special Forces in Paraguayan soil to conduct "educational courses", "domestic peacekeeping operations" and "counter-terrorism training". 

This US Special Forces drive was happening decades after "one of our bastards", notorious dictator-general Alfredo Stroessner (in power from 1954 to 1989) had allowed the set up of a giant US-owned semi-clandestine landing strip near the Argentina-Brazil-Paraguay Triple Border - later to become part of the war on drugs, and then the war on terror. 

So it's a no-brainer which was the first government to recognize last Friday's coup plotters in Paraguay: the United States of America. 

Forget About Sharing Our Cake

Progressive Egyptians are now realizing new democracies take years, sometimes decades, of co-existing with the nightmare of dictatorship. It happened, for instance, in Brazil - now universally lauded as a new, global powerhouse. During the 1980s and 1990s, some form of institutional re-democratization was going on. But for years Brazil really did not turn into a full democracy - economically, socially and culturally. It took a long 17 years - until president Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva first came to power in 2002 - for Brazil to start on the road of becoming less outrageously unequal than its rapacious ruling classes always wanted it to be. 

The same historical process is now at work in both Egypt and Paraguay. Both countries suffered dictatorships for decades. When a dictatorship seems to be on its death throes, only political parties linked - or mildly tolerated - by the ancien regime find themselves in the best position to profit from the long, tortuous transition towards democracy. These countries then become what Brazilian political scientist Emir Sader has dubbed "democraships". 

This applies to the Liberal Party in Paraguay and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. In the Egyptian presidential election, we had a former Hosni Mubarak crony against an Ikhwan (Muslim Brotherhood) cadre. It remains to be seen whether the Orwellian SCAF (Supreme Council of the Armed Forces) in Egypt will allow this new "democraship" to turn into a real democracy, and to what extent the Ikhwan is fully committed to the notion of democracy. 

Paraguay was already in a more advanced stage than Egypt. Yet four years after a democratic presidential election, congress was still dominated by two dictatorship-friendly parties, Liberal and Colorado. It was a piece of cake for this bipartisan oligarchy to gang up and take Lugo down. 

A Medium-Rare Impeachment, Please

Lugo was evicted by a coup disguised as an impeachment, processed in only 24 hours. Regime change practitioners in Washington must have been ecstatic; if only we could do that in Syria ... 

This simulacrum had to be concocted by what is the most corrupt senate in the Americas - and that's a huge understatement. Lugo was found guilty of incompetence in dealing with a very murky story linked - inevitably - with an issue that is absolutely key all across the developing world: agrarian reform. 

On June 15, a group of policemen and commandos about to enforce an eviction order in Curuguaty, 200 kilometers from Asuncion, close to the Brazilian border, was ambushed by snipers infiltrated among farmers. The order came from a judge protecting a wealthy landowner, Blas Riquelme, not by accident a former president of the Colorado party and a former senator. 

Through legal shenanigans, he had taken possession of 2,000 hectares that actually belonged to the Paraguayan state. These lands were then occupied by landless peasants, who for some time had been asking the Lugo government to redistribute them. 

The School of the Americas Watch has already documented how enormous tracts of land in Paraguay were actually stolen from farmers and "donated" to military and upper-class cronies during those decades under the Stroessner dictatorship. 

The result in Curuguaty was 17 dead - six policemen and 11 farmers - and at least 50 wounded. It simply doesn't make sense; the elite members of the eviction force, a hardcore unit named Special Operations Group, were trained in counterinsurgency tactics in Colombia - under the right-wing Uribe government - as part of the US-concocted Plan Colombia. 

Plan Paraguay, for its part, was very simple; absolute criminalization of every peasant organization, forcing them to leave the countryside for transnational agribusiness. 

So this was, essentially, a trap. Paraguay's rabid right-wingers - joined to the hip with Washington, for example trying to prevent, by all means, Venezuela's entrance into the Mercosur common market - were just waiting to pounce on a regime that had not, yet, affected its interests, but had opened up plenty of spaces for social protest and popular organization. 

Lugo, a former bishop elected in 2008 with large rural support, might have seen it coming, but he did nothing to stop it. Compared with his power to mobilize people in the streets, he had minimum support in Congress: only two senators. Over 40% of Paraguayans live in the countryside, but they are hardly mobilized. And 30% live under the poverty line. 

The "winners" in Paraguay had to be the usual suspects: the landowning oligarchy - and its concerted campaign to demonize farmers; multinational agribusiness interests such as Monsanto; and the Monsanto-linked media (as in the ABC Color daily, which accused ministers not acting as Monsanto stooges of being "corrupt"). 

Agribusiness giants such as Monsanto and Cargill pay virtually no taxes in Paraguay because of the right-wing controlled Congress. Landowners don't pay taxes. Needless to add, Paraguay is one of the most unequal countries in the world; 85% of land - like 30 million hectares - is controlled by the 2% composing the rural aristocracy, a great deal of them involved in land speculation. 

Thus their Miami Vice-style mansions in Uruguay's hip Punta del Este resort or, for that matter, Miami Beach; the money, of course, is in the Cayman islands. Paraguay is de facto ruled by this cream of the 2% mixing agribusiness with the neoliberal financial casino. 

And by the way, as Martin Almada, a top Paraguayan human-rights activist and alternative Nobel Peace Prize winner, has noted, this concerns Brazilian landowners as well. The wealthiest soya bean producer in Paraguay is a "Braziguayan", double nationality holder Tranquilo Favero, who made his fortune under Stroessner. 

A Coup On The Rocks, Please

 
The Union of South American Nations (Unasur) treated what happened in Paraguay for what it is; a coup. Same with Mercosur. The contrast with Washington's position couldn't be more glaring. Coup plotter Federico Franco is a darling of the US Embassy in Asuncion. 

Argentina, Uruguay, Venezuela and Ecuador won't recognize the coup plotters. Venezuela cut off oil sales to Paraguay. Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff has proposed the expulsion of Paraguay from both Unasur and Mercosur. 

Paraguay is already suspended; this means coup plotter Federico Franco was prevented from attending a key Mercosur meeting last week in Mendoza, Argentina, when the temporary Mercosur presidency would be handed over to Paraguay. The Paraguayan oligarchy - under Washington's orders - was blocking Venezuela's entrance in Mercosur. Not anymore; Venezuela becomes a full member by the end of the month. 

Yet South American progressive governments must be very careful. If Paraguay is expelled from both Unasur and Mercosur, it will inevitably ask Washington for commercial and military help. That could translate into a nightmare - US military bases in Paraguay. 

Paraguay's oligarchs, the media they control, and last but not least the reactionary Catholic church hierarchy, calculate they will extend their power when elections take place in April 2013. 

Lugo was in fact facing a Sisyphean task - trying to steer a weak state, with minimum income from taxes (less than 12% of GNP), and under severe pressure by powerful transnational lobbies and comprador elites. This, by the way, is the structural reality of a great deal of Latin America - and, roughly, one might add, of Egypt. 

On a geopolitical level, what progressives everywhere - from South and North America to the Arab world - should worry about is how, since the June 2009 coup against Manuel Zelaya in Honduras, Latin America is being turned into a giant laboratory testing all sorts of "democratic" coup d'etat mutations. 

Paraguay is one such mutation. Another one was the failed coup against Ecuador's Rafael Correa in September 2010. All these coups are against progressive governments who privilege social advances. 

Not by accident, Correa, who was almost evicted by a coup, said that if it succeeded this time in Paraguay it would "open a dangerous precedent" in the whole region. 

And in terms of poetic justice, nothing beats Correa - the target of a coup - currently studying the possibility of offering political asylum to Julian Assange, whose WikiLeaks revealed, among other things, how the Paraguayan elite was plotting their own coup. 

In Egypt, a military coup happened even before a presidential election. Progressive Egyptians who actually led the Arab Spring must be extremely alert; Paraguay is showing how the rocky road towards democracy may end up in a "democraship". 

Note: 1. See here

Pepe Escobar is the author of Globalistan: How the Globalized World is Dissolving into Liquid War (Nimble Books, 2007) and Red Zone Blues: a snapshot of Baghdad during the surge. His most recent book, just out, is Obama does Globalistan (Nimble Books, 2009). 

Use It Before It's Gone

Giving for the sake of God means more than donating money. Time can be a gift. By offering some of it for a good cause, you diminish none of what you have for yourself. Allah actually puts barakah in your time. 

By: Nour Habib 
February 18, 2012 
Courtesy Of "IslamiCity"

A Few Days ago, my mom came home from work and related a conversation she had there. The talk turned to exercise, and her colleague endorsed walking as a good option, since one can also make use of it for other purposes.

I pray for others while I walk, she said. That way I don't waste the time.

I thought, subhanallah, she is selfless enough to exercise to stay healthy and still put her time to wise use.

And she was not Muslim.

What do we, as Muslims, do with our time? Do we make use of every second? Time, the Sunnah tells us, is the most precious of all worldly commodities, for once it's gone, it never comes back. We need, then, to ensure we don't let it pass in vain. We should make certain that when we stand before Allah for Judgment we can justify how we spent His priceless gift.

The Prophet Muhammad, sallallahu alayhe wa sallam, said: "Take advantage of five, before five! Youth before old age. Good health before sickness. Free time before occupation. Wealth before poverty. And life before death" (Al-Hakim).
In the fast-paced societies we live in, people really do come to feel they have no time. They are working, studying, chauffeuring children, doing business on the cell between errands-running a gauntlet of daily obligations.

Time itself seems to be shrinking- a true sign, in fact, of our approaching Hour of Judgment, according to the Prophet, sallallahu alayhe wa sallam. Days become weeks. Weeks, months. Months, years. Before you know it, a decade's got behind you. And you wonder, What have I done with my life?

In the course of our talk, my mother pointed out her colleague's admirable concern with giving time to others. Walking is no waste of it, of course. It is worship, if properly intended to please God and maintain His grant of health.

Still it is done for one's own benefit. What, my mother asked me, have you done for others?

I answered honestly. Not as much as I would like, though helping others- as countless ahadeeth attest and the Prophet's own glowing example ceaselessly shows-can take on many forms. Teaching people a skill you have, making dawah, organizing masjid events, or just taking the time to talk to others about their problems-all are shapes of volunteerism, of help.

Giving for the sake of God means more than donating money. Time can be a gift. By offering some of it for a good cause, you diminish none of what you have for yourself. Allah actually puts barakah in your time. He blesses it so you get more done with it when you spend it wisely in His path.

Give of your time, and you shall be rewarded. Give of your time, and you shall surely use it more effectively for your own benefit.

When I tell others I have no time, I wonder, What am I trying to achieve? Am I making up selfish excuses about why I can't part with it? Or is it just me trying to persuade myself of this?

Sure, I am busy. But I can't fool myself. There are times when I have nothing to do, or am doing nothing. No doubt, we all "do" some of this. Yet if we reconsider our priorities and refine our attitudes, we will find we have substantial time on our hands. We can choose to put it to some good use, or lose it.

*****

Article provided by Al Jumuah Magazine, a monthly Muslim lifestyle publication, which addresses the religious concerns of Muslim families across the world.

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What If The 'People' Don't Want Democracy?

Polling Data Shows That Many People - From Libya To South Asia - Are Wary Of Democratic Systems. 

By Sarmila Bose 
Last Modified: 20 Feb 2012 11:55 
Courtesy Of "Al-Jazeera"

Oxford, United Kingdom - A survey has revealed that the people of Libya may not be keen on democracy after all. The "Arab Spring" has been celebrated in the Western world as a struggle of democracy against dictatorship. 

Often the implicit assumption was that what the revolutionaries who were trying to overthrow their authoritarian regimes wanted was a Western-style parliamentary democracy. So when only 15 per cent of those surveyed in Libya say they want democracy established in a year, compared with 40 per cent who profess a preference for a "strong leader", it’s a bit of a let-down for Western cheerleaders of the upheavals in the Arab world. Moreover, apparently only about a third of those polled wanted democracy even in five years’ time.

Inside Story - Libya in transition

According to the BBC, one of the academics involved with the poll said that "the survey suggested Libyans lacked the knowledge of how democracy works". As Libyans have just emerged from a long and reportedly oppressive dictatorship, that is probably true, but that very lack of knowledge may just as well have elicited an overly optimistic view of democracy.

The results of democratic government are also apparent from news reports from other countries. Tortuous or seemingly patronising explanations offered for the preferences revealed by the Libyans demonstrate our reluctance to confront the reality that many of "the people" - not just in Libya but everywhere else - may not really want democracy, or may have deeply ambivalent or conflicted attitudes towards democracy, despite its apparent triumph as a political system.

Democracy has emerged as such a compelling political idea in recent decades, that to express anything other than unquestioning devotion to it risks being taken to be political heresy. Amartya Sen wrote that, despite the many momentous events of the 20th century, he had no difficulty in identifying the "emergence of democracy as the pre-eminently acceptable form of governance" as the century's most important development. Democracy does not mean just elections. It includes certain values as well as expectations about the social, political and economic results it might produce. The Libyan survey results seem less awkward when one considers the fact that what people really want is good governance, however delivered. The power of democracy as a form of governance is based on the argument that while it may not be perfect, democracy is most likely to produce the best outcome in terms of governance, compared to the alternatives.

Greater Exposure To Democracy

Libyans certainly have had little exposure to democracy. It is most interesting therefore to compare their responses to questions about democracy with the first ever simultaneous survey on attitudes to democracy conducted a few years ago in five South Asian countries - India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka - which collectively have a lot more experience of democracy than Libya. (State of Democracy in South Asia, Oxford University Press, 2008).

The South Asian survey revealed widespread support for democracy, but also revealed some fractures in the depth of that support. For example, 62 per cent of those surveyed said they preferred democracy to any other form of government, while only ten per cent clearly preferred dictatorship in certain circumstances. However, 28 per cent of respondents - quite a significant proportion - said that it did not matter to people like themselves whether the government was democratic or non-democratic. About a third of respondents, also a high proportion, did not understand the question or did not give any response.

The results are even more interesting - and worrying in terms of support for democracy - when one compares the specific responses in India and Pakistan. Support for democracy was weakest in Pakistan among all five countries surveyed. The authors of the report pointed out that when the survey was conducted, Pakistan was under authoritarian military rule. It is unclear how exactly that influenced the responses. When asked an open-ended question about what democracy meant to them, most people in both India and Pakistan responded very positively to the idea of democracy. Only seven per cent of Indians and eight per cent of Pakistanis described democracy in negative terms.

However, when it came to the question of preferring democracy to other (interpreted as authoritarian) forms of governance, the results were different. While 70 per cent of Indians clearly preferred democracy, only 37 per cent of Pakistanis did so. Similarly, only nine per cent of Indians expressed a clear preference for dictatorship, to 14 per cent of Pakistanis. One may put this down to the relative inexperience of Pakistan with a functioning democracy, as has been suggested in the case of the Libyan survey. However, just as in Libya, the experience of living under dictatorship could also have boosted support for democracy, even if only as an aspirational ideal, especially if the experience of dictatorship had been particularly negative.

Does Democracy Matter?

The third type of response on this question in the South Asian survey provokes us to think even more carefully about interpreting the strength of support for democracy, even after several decades of experience with it. A staggering 49 per cent of Pakistanis said that it did not matter to them whether the government was democratic or not. Even more surprisingly, 21 per cent of Indian respondents also said that it did not matter to people such as themselves whether the government was democratic or dictatorial. Added to the fact that a third of respondents offered no response at all, many people in countries with substantial experience of democracy or with significant experience of both democracy and dictatorship appear to share the Libyans’ ambivalence about democracy as the preferred form of governance.

This ambivalence is probed further in the South Asian survey by a process of elimination of respondents who say they approve of democracy, but would entertain authoritarian rule in some circumstances, do not care one way or the other, or who like the idea of rule by the army or a monarch, a "strong leader", or government by technocratic experts. All five South Asian countries start out with broad support for democracy, but as soon as this process of elimination is applied, unequivocal support for democracy falls away sharply everywhere. Eventually unqualified support for democracy turns out to be in single digits everywhere other than India, and even in India it is a disappointing 19 per cent.

"With all its experience of democracy, nearly 60 per cent of Indians still did not express unequivocal faith in democracy."

Libyans would be interested to know that across the five South Asian countries, two-thirds of respondents also expressed a yearning for the rule of a "strong leader who does not have to bother about elections".

There was also an astonishingly high level of support for the option of military rule, even in India. In Pakistan and Bangladesh, who have both experienced military rule (and hence know its negatives), 60 per cent of respondents endorsed military rule. Even in India, which prides itself in never having allowed the army to venture out of civilian government control in more than sixty years, 23 per cent of respondents approved of army rule. The higher the level of education, the lower was the support for military rule, but as illiterate respondents across the five countries registered a high of 57 per cent support for military rule, even after falling off significantly with levels of education, 22 per cent of those who were graduates and post-graduates were still endorsing military rule.

The South Asian survey classified respondents as "strong democrats", "weak democrats" and "non-democrats". A "strong democrat" was defined as someone who expressed support for rule by elected representatives and always prefers it to non-democratic forms of government, while "non-democrats" equally clearly prefer non-democratic government. Across the five countries, 26 per cent were "strong democrats", while 22 per cent were "non-democrats". The highest proportion of "strong democrats" were in India (41 per cent) and lowest in Pakistan (ten per cent). This means, however, that with all its experience of democracy, nearly 60 per cent of Indians still did not express unequivocal faith in democracy. Indeed, 15 per cent of Indians were clearly categorised as "non-democrats".

Most crucial are the figures for those described as "weak democrats" - respondents who expressed support for democracy, but did not reject various non-democratic forms of government. On average in the five South Asian countries, 52 per cent of respondents were "weak democrats", indicating a worryingly high proportion of ambivalence about democracy, as these are people who could go either way at any crucial moment of decision about regime type. Even in India, 43 per cent of respondents fell in the "weak democrats" category, not that far off from Pakistan, where the proportion was 49 per cent.

Libya’s recent history is very different from the diverse political experience of South Asia, and Libyans being asked about their political preferences have emerged from a long spell of dictatorship with no direct experience of electoral politics. It is true that they do not know "how democracy works", but what is interesting is that their ambivalence and inconsistent responses to democracy is shared by many others who do know "how democracy works", or, indeed, how it doesn’t.

Sarmila Bose is Senior Research Associate, Centre for International Studies, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford. She was a journalist in India for many years. She earned her degrees at Bryn Mawr College (History) and Harvard University (MPA and PhD in Political Economy and Government). 

Dispelling The Hysteria Around Sharia

America Muslim jurist Abed Awad, a Partner at Awad & Khoury, LLP says that while US courts routinely encounter cases where implementing certain principles of Sharia is required, the hysteria surrounding the "intrusive" role of Sharia in US courts is extremely misguided... 

By: Abed Awad 
February 15, 2012 
Courtesy Of "IslamiCity"

In November 2010, Oklahoma voters approved an amendment to the state constitution expressly prohibiting Oklahoma state judges from considering international law or Sharia in their decisions. Munir Awad filed a complaint against the Oklahoma State Board of Elections challenging this, alleging that the anti-Sharia amendment to the Oklahoma Constitution, if certified, would violate the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment of the US Constitution. More specifically, Awad alleged that the amendment targets his religion for negative treatment and creates excessive state entanglement with religion. Stigmatizing him and other Muslims, Awad proffered, the amendment would inhibit the practice of his religion and would prevent a court from probating his Sharia-compliant last will and testament. The US District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma agreed with Awad, issuing a preliminary injunction against the certification of the amendment pending the litigant's claims were adjudicated on the merits. 

Last month, in Awad v. Ziriax, the US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's preliminary injunction but utilized a different constitutional scrutiny standard. The district court below evaluated the plaintiff's claims under the Lemon v. Kurtzman guidelines. Lemon provides that the scrutinized legislation must have a secular purpose that primarily does not inhibit or advance religion and does not foster excessive government entanglement with religion. The Tenth Circuit reached the same conclusion but evaluated the plaintiff's claims under the more stringent standard enunciated in Larson v. Valente. 

Larson held that the three prong test from Lemon was appropriate in cases where religion benefited at the expense of non-religious citizens. However, when one religion is preferred over another, a strict scrutiny evaluation is required (i.e., a legislation that discriminates among religions is valid on only if it is "closely fitted to the furtherance of any compelling interest"). 

The Tenth Circuit held that Oklahoma's "one sentence" stating that "Oklahoma certainly has a compelling interest in determining what law is applied in Oklahoma courts" failed to "identify any actual problem the challenged amendment seeks to solve." Without "any concrete problem, any harm Appellants seek to remedy with the proposed amendment is speculative at best and cannot support a compelling interest." 

Without a compelling interest, the Tenth Circuit concluded it was not necessary to proceed to the "closely fitted" prong of the strict scrutiny test. The Oklahoma amendment was deemed unconstitutional. Be that as it may, the Tenth Circuit made several interesting observations about the closely fitted prong. "Even if the state could identify and support a reason to single out and restrict Sharia law," the Tenth Circuit hypothecated, the amendment is not "closely fitted" as its "complete ban of Sharia law is hardly an exercise of narrow tailoring."

The anti-Sharia movement seeking to legislate its political agenda is directly at odds with a basic principle laid out by the Supreme Court in Larson: "the clearest command of the Establishment Clause" that mandates "governmental neutrality between religion and religion ... The State may not adopt programs or practices ... which aid or oppose any religion ... This prohibition is absolute." 

So, What Is Sharia After All? After briefly describing Sharia, I will use several examples to illustrate the role of Sharia or any religious and/or foreign law for that matter, in a US court. 

Sharia is more than simply "law" in the prescriptive sense, it is also the methodology through which a jurist engages the foundational religious texts (Qur'an and Sunna) to search for divine will. As a jurist-made law, the outcome of this process of ascertaining divine will is called fiqh (positive law), which is the moral and legal anchor of a Muslim's total existence. Everything from the way Muslims eat, to how they treat animals and protect the environment, to the way they conduct commercial trade, to the way they solemnize their marriage and to the way their estate must be distributed at death is governed by Sharia, for Sharia dictates every aspect of an observant Muslim's moral life. Therefore, Sharia is extremely personal to the majority of Muslims regardless of their level of religiosity. 

Of course, this type of relationship with religion applies to most devout Christian, Jews, Hindus and others, for religious principles and laws are very personal to all religious Americans. Whether it is Jews submitting to the jurisdiction of Rabbinic courts, Christians submitting to Christian Conciliation tribunals or US political activists advocating a religious position on abortion, capital punishment, sex education, same-sex marriage and many other issues, religion and religious law has been alive and thriving in the US since its founding. Of course, the role of religious law or religious principles in the US court system continues to be subject to public policy and constitutional constraints. In the end, however, the US Constitution is the law of the land. 

The modern manifestations of Sharia are either a source of legislation or actual nation-state law in the majority of Muslim countries. Sharia is the supreme law of the land in Saudi Arabia. Islamic law is a primary source of the family law codes of Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and many other Muslim countries, and Sharia is the gap filler in almost all of the civil codes of Muslim countries. 

The globalization of domiciles, marriages, divorces, corporations and commercial transactions requires US courts to regularly interpret and apply foreign law - including Islamic law - to everything from the recognition of foreign divorces and custody decrees, the validity of marriages, the enforcement of money judgments or the damages elements in a commercial dispute or negligence matters. 

Sharia is relevant in a US court either as a foreign law or as a source of information to understand the expectations of the parties in a dispute. As an attorney, consultant or expert witness I have handled more than 100 matters involving a component of Sharia or the laws of the Middle East. I will use several examples to explain the actual role Sharia or the laws of the Middle East play in litigation in the US.

A, a New York resident, married B, a UK resident, in a European country. Their marriage was solemnized by a Muslim clergy. The parties live in both countries. They have one child together. B filed for divorce in England. A countered, alleging that their marriage was not legal. Which jurisdiction governs the validity of the marriage and the place of the marriage, UK law or New York law? If New York law governs, the marriage would be valid as long as the marriage was valid under Sharia.

A, an employee of a US corporation negligently caused the death of B in a country utilizing Sharia. The estate of B institutes an action against A in the US. Based on US conflicts of law, the law where the tort occurred would govern the dispute. The court would require expert testimony regarding the tort law of the country using Sharia, which would include issues relating to Sharia.

A, a Saudi company, enters into a joint venture agreement with B, a US company. Their joint venture agreement provides that Saudi law would govern any disputes. A sues B in state court. State court applies Saudi law to the dispute. Saudi law is based on Sharia law. The primary issue of the dispute is then whether Sharia law provides for consequential damages.

A and B are married. They have lived in New York for the past twenty years. A and B are originally from Jordan. While A and B are visiting Jordan, A divorces B. Upon return, A seeks to enforce the Jordanian divorce. The court must determine whether the Jordanian divorce should be recognized. In this circumstance, the state judge must determine whether the Jordanian divorce violated American public policy. Where the wife was not a resident of Jordan, did not participate in the Jordanian proceeding and where the majority of the marital assets are in New York, the court is more than likely to hold that the Jordanian divorce violates New York public policy.

The above examples illustrate Sharia as a foreign law. Sharia, then, is extremely relevant for US judges adjudicating matters within the strictures of our law. Of course, the US judge is applying US conflicts of law to determine the applicable law. In other words, even though the judge is applying a foreign law to the dispute, it is US law that dictates that he apply the foreign law.

Here are two examples of how Sharia is relevant to a US judge not as a foreign law but as a source of information to understand the surrounding circumstances to an agreement or dispute or to clarify an ambiguity or correct a mistake.

A, a New Jersey resident, married B, also a New Jersey resident. Both are Muslim. They had a Muslim Imam solemnize their marriage, which included execution of a Muslim marriage contract. The Muslim marriage contract has a provision called Mahr, which directs the husband to pay the wife the sum of $20,000 in the event of divorce. The wife, A, filed for divorce in the New Jersey Superior Court, seeking the enforcement of the $20,000. The court heard testimony about Muslim marriages, marriage contracts, the meaning of Mahr and related information surrounding the execution of the marriage contract. The judge then considers this information to better understand the expectations of the parties at the time of the marriage and applies New Jersey contract law. The judge enforces the Muslim marriage contract finding it satisfied all of the elements of New Jersey contract law.

Same facts as above, but B, the groom, at the wedding ceremony, for the first time, is asked to sign the marriage contract for $20,000. Embarrassed and pressured before 300 guests, the groom signed the document. In addition, the document was in Arabic, and he does not read or write Arabic. Several years later, the wife filed for divorce and asks for the $20,000. The New Jersey judge finds that there was no meeting of the minds because of the circumstances surrounding the execution of the document. In other words, the marriage contract between these parties did not satisfy all of the elements of a valid contract under New Jersey law.

In sum, most legal experts would agree with the Tenth Circuit's conclusions. Why then is there paranoia around the country? Why are warnings that Sharia threatens the constitutional system still raging and picking up steam? Almost every Republican presidential candidate has affirmed his opposition to the imaginary threat of Sharia. For attorneys and legal experts, the above examples are very simple and first-year law student material. These nuances, unique facts and legal subtleties are absent from the discussion about Sharia in America. Their absence is not an innocent coincidence. It is intentional in order to fuel the misinformation and distortion about Islam and Muslims.

As attorneys, we have an obligation to correct the truth about the role of any foreign law in our system. It is always subject to the limits of the Constitution. That is the law of the land. The politicization of this issue is undermining the integrity of our judicial system and constitutional protections. US judges are equipped with the necessary legal tools to evaluate the legal and factual issues before them without the requirement of bright line rules, especially those that originate out of misinformation, distortion and outright discrimination. 

Abed Awad is a Partner and founding member of Awad & Khoury, LLP, a New Jersey-based law firm. His areas of expertise includes civil litigation, complex matrimonial litigation and international law. He is a renowned Sharia specialist who often testifies as an expert witness in many US cases involving Sharia. He is also the cofounder of a blog dedicated to educating others about Sharia and its role in US courts.