The War On Democracy

'The War On Democracy' (2007), It explores the current and past relationship of Washington with Latin American countries such as Venezuela, Bolivia and Chile.

The film shows how serial US intervention, overt and covert, has toppled a series of legitimate governments in the Latin American region since the 1950s. 

The democratically elected Chilean government of Salvador Allende, for example, was ousted by a US backed coup in 1973 and replaced by the military dictatorship of General Pinochet. Guatemala, Panama, Nicaragua, Honduras and El Salvador have all been invaded by the United States.

John Pilger interviews several ex-CIA agents who took part in secret campaigns against democratic countries in the region. 

He investigates the School of the Americas in the US state of Georgia, where Pinochet’s torture squads were trained along with tyrants and death squad leaders in Haiti, El Salvador, Brazil and Argentina.

The film unearths the real story behind the attempted overthrow of Venezuela's President Hugo Chávez in 2002 and how the people of the barrios of Caracas rose up to force his return to power.

It also looks at the wider rise of populist governments across South America lead by indigenous leaders intent on loosening the shackles of Washington and a fairer redistribution of the continent's natural wealth.

John Pilger says: 

"[The film] is about the struggle of people to free themselves from a modern form of slavery. These people describe a world not as American presidents like to see it as useful or expendable, they describe the power of courage and humanity among people with next to nothing. They reclaim noble words like democracy, freedom, liberation, justice, and in doing so they are defending the most basic human rights of all of us in a war being waged against all of us."

No More Peaceful!

This is an Egyptian song, in Arabic only, declaring that there will be no more peaceful protests with criminals and murderers (the illegal and unelected regime that was installed by Egypt's military).

Stop Coddling Egypt's Military

The Obama administration should do more to demand that Egypt's military rulers make good on their promise to pursue an inclusive democracy.

It's increasingly evident that the military rulers of Egypt are determined to intimidate and silence their political opponents, whether they are members of the Muslim Brotherhood or secular Egyptians who believe the generals are betraying the spirit of the "Arab Spring." Yet the Obama administration continues to entertain the pious hope that Egypt is on the road to an inclusive democracy.

In recent days the military-backed government has declared the Brotherhood a terrorist organization — blaming it for an attack on a police headquarters for which another group claimed responsibility — and has seized the financial assets of hundreds of Brotherhood activists and other Islamist figures.

But the Brotherhood isn't the only target. Three leaders of the protests in 2011 that toppled President Hosni Mubarak have been sentenced to three years in prison for violating a law that criminalized street protests. And as part of an attempt to deny opposition groups publicity, authorities arrested four journalists from the satellite channel Al Jazeera English and charged them with "broadcasting false news."

The U.S. response to the continued crackdown has been polite to the point of pusillanimity. A State Department spokeswoman said the administration was "concerned" about the designation of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist group and that recent actions by the Egyptian government "raise questions about the rule of law being applied impartially and equitably, and do not move Egypt's transition forward."

Inadequate as that statement is, it's an improvement over some past comments by Secretary of State John F. Kerry. Last summer Kerry suggested that the Egyptian military was "restoring democracy" when it deposed Mohamed Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood member who was chosen president the previous year in a free and fair election. In November, after the U.S. suspended some aid to Egypt and delayed delivery of some weapons systems, Kerry said during a visit to Cairo that the action was "not a punishment."

The sad truth is that U.S. military aid to Egypt is designed not to reward Egypt for adherence to democracy but to shore up the Arab-Israeli peace treaty and suppress terrorism in the Sinai Peninsula and elsewhere.

Even so, the Obama administration could be more consistent and forthright in insisting that the generals make good on their stated desire to follow a path to democracy. Clearly the current policy of trying not to offend them isn't working.

By The Times Editorial Board

U.S. Undermines Democracy In Maldives To Set Up Military Bases

Mohamed Nasheed

... in the second round of presidential elections on November 20. Mohamed Nasheed, the dynamic, young, pro-environmentalist Muslim leader who had led after the first round, lost by a couple of percentage points to the old regime’s candidate, Abdulla Yameen.

As I reported, the impressive Nasheed had been elected back in 2008, but then overthrown in a military/police coup on February 7, 2012. Since then, the old regime had tried to block Nasheed and his reformist, youthful Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP) from making a comeback, including annulling and postponing the election three times, and regularly arresting and jailing his nonviolent supporters.

The rest of the world protested vigorously; the Canadian foreign minister even marched in a pro-democracy demonstration in New York. But the United States was conspicuously quiet. 

The Obama administration accepted the illegal coup in 2012, and issued only feeble admonitions at the more recent pre-electoral maneuvers.

Why the pathetic and embarrassing silence, given that Nasheed and his movement are exactly the kind of forward-looking, democratic Muslims the United States should be supporting every chance it gets?

I had been following the crisis on Twitter (@jamesnorth7), in part because mainstream media coverage was misleading or non-existent. Many Maldivians are fluent in English, and #Maldives was vigorous with debate. So I put the question to them: what explains the disgraceful American policy?

I got immediate and valuable responses. 

Apparently, earlier this year the U.S. government was negotiating with the Maldives about a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which would have led to increased military cooperation between the two countries, possibly including U.S. bases there. Someone leaked a draft of the agreement to the Maldivian press, and the U.S. embassy was forced to concede that such talks were going on, although denying plans for a permanent American base.

This is an extraordinary revelation, completely unreported in the New York Times or elsewhere. 

The U.S. government was willing to set aside its stated principles and negotiate with a regime that came to power in a violent, illegal coup. An administration headed by Barack Obama was prepared to sell out the Maldivians who should be its natural allies, brave people who have risked their freedom and even their lives for democracy, just so it could set up yet another unnecessary U.S. military base at the other end of the world.

General Sisi Murdered His Own Soldiers

By Alaa Sadek


كتب د.علاء صادق على موقع التواصل الاجتماعي عبر الفيسبوك نقلاً عن صفحة كلنا د.علاء صادق: "الفاعل غبي و المخطط أجنبي - جنودنا قتلهم السيسي و لفق الحادث،

و هذا هو الدليل".

الغباء جند من جنود الله، الإنقلابيين قتلوا الجنود و قدموا لنا الدليل بأيديهم.

بعد دراسة و فحص دقيق لصورة الباص التي نشرها الإنقلابيون في محاولة منهم لحبك قصة العملية الإرهابية الأخيرة، المزعومة ضد جنودنا في سيناء انكشف المستور و انقلب السحر على الساحر.

الباص الذي صوروه على أنه باص الجنود باص خرب قديم مركون على جانب الطريق منذ عدة أعوام، و لست أدري ما الذي جعل الباص المزعوم يسير في الرمال خارج الطريق كما هو ليتم تفجيره بزعمهم خارج الطريق و ليس عليه؟!!!

و إليكم تحليل الصورة:

1- إدَّعى الإنقلابيين أن سيارة تحمل 150ك متفجرات اصطدمت بالباص في عملية انتحارية.
بالمرور بقلم الرسم على شاصي الباص تبين عدم وجود أي انبعاج (صورة 1)، و ليس به أي أثر اصطدام من الأمام، و الجوانب ليست منبعجة للداخل، مما يعني استحالة أن تكون السيارة المزعومة صدمت الباص لا من الأمام و لا من الجوانب، كذلك لا أثر لهيكل السيارة المزعومة التي صدمت الباص فهل تبخرت؟!!!

2- يلاحظ اندفاع جزء من سقف الباص لأعلى و اندفاع الجوانب إلى الخارج مما يعني أنه إن كان ثمة انفجار فقد تم بوضع عبوة تفجير داخل الباص و ليس من الخارج (صورة رقم2- الأسهم الحمراء تشير للأجزاء المندفعة للخارج و الخضراء تشير لإتجاه الإنفجار).

3- حقائب الجنود المغدورين التي يفترض أنها كانت بصحبتهم داخل الباص أو في درج الحقائب سليمة و نظيفة مما يعني أنها لم تكن في الباص المزعوم نهائياً و إلا لتمزقت و احترقت (صورة رقم3).

4- لاحظ غوص ثلث العجلة الأمامية في التراب و ارتفاع التراب أمام الباص و إحاطة العشب بزاوية و جانب الباص و عدم احتراق العشب مما يعني أن الباص له عدة سنوات متوقف في هذا المكان( صورة4).

5- في الصور المقربة لجانب الباص لاحظ آثار الصدأ و ليس الحريق مما يؤكد أيضاً وجود هذا الباص منذ عدة سنوات في هذا المكان(صورة 5).

6- الباص مشدود و مثبت إلى الأرض بحبل معدني (واير حديدي)، واضح جداً في الصورة (لاحظ الصورة رقم 6سهم رقم 1 يشير إلى الواير و سهم2 يشير لنقطة الربط بالباص و سهم3 يشير لنقطة التثبيت بالأرض خلف الحقائب)، الأمر الذي يقطع باستحالة صحة الرواية التي يدعيها الإنقلابيين.

الفاعل غبي و المخطط أجنبي.

الإنقلابيين ينفذون أفكار و أساليب الموساد من خلال طرقهم البدائية و عقولهم المتحجرة.
الغباء الذي سلطه الله عليهم من نعم الله علينا و جند الله الذي أعاننا به، و هو الذي يعجل بانكشافهم و زوالهم قريباً جداً بإذن الله تعالى.

السيسي محرك أحاسيسي

By JoeTube

الحرم لا يدوم يا سيسي

Joe is creative and hilarious!

Egypt's Military Regime Builds Memorial To Its Own Massacres

Builders work on a memorial under construction in the center of Cairo's landmark Tahrir Square Photo: AFP/Getty Images

Egypt's military-backed regime is... setting up memorial sculptures at sites of protests where its army and police gunned down demonstrators.

Residents and passers-by in Cairo's Tahrir Square, made famous the world over by the 2011 revolution, have watched... puzzled in recent days as a circular stone creation has begun to take shape in the grass-covered central roundabout.

On Sunday, the authorities announced it would be unveiled on the eve of Tuesday's anniversary of the so-called Mohammed Mahmoud massacre, several days of protests in 2011 when scores of demonstrators against the then interim Supreme Council of the Armed Forces were shot dead on the street of that name that leads away from the Square.

In addition, several more lost eyes to a military police marksman who was later convicted of deliberately targeting them with birdshot.

The memorial is the second in a sequence. Earlier this month, another sculpture consisting of two angular arms, representing the police and army, protecting a silver orb, representing the people, was completed in the square in front of Rabaa al-Adawiya Mosque, where the army killed more than 600 Muslim Brotherhood demonstrators in August.

This sudden outburst of public art has angered those revolutionary youth movements:

"The killer is building a memorial to his victims," said Sally Touma, one youth activist. 

"They kill the people and then celebrate them."

Sisi Should Be Behind Bars Not President Morsi

سياسي ألماني: القفص للسيسي وليس لمرسي

قال السياسي والخبير الإعلامي الألماني البارز يورغن تودنهوفر إن قائد الانقلاب العسكري في مصر عبد الفتاح السيسي أولى بوضعه في قفص الاتهام وليس رئيس الجمهورية المنتخب ديمقراطيامحمد مرسي، واعتبر انقلاب السيسي وإطلاقه الرئيس المخلوع حسني مبارك انتصارا للثورة المضادة بوسائلها غير الديمقراطية وعنفها الدامي.

وقال تودنهوفر الذي شغل سابقا منصب رئيس لجنة التسليح في البرلمان الألماني (بوندستاغ) في بيان نشره على موقعه على شبكة التواصل الاجتماعي "فيسبوك" إن توجيه تهمة القتل لمرسي يعتبر وضعا مقلوبا لأن الرئيس المصري الذي أطاح به الانقلاب شدد دائما على دعوة أتباعه للسلمية في الاحتجاجات.

وأضاف أن محاكمة مرسي مجرد استعراض يظهر أن ما يجري هذه الأيام بالقاهرة يجسد قانون الأقوياء وشرعة المنتصر وليس له علاقة بالعدالة أو إقرار الحق. ورأى أن ما اقترفه السيسي منذ انقلابه في صيف 2013 وإزهاقه لألفي روح فاق ما ارتكبه مبارك من تعد وحشي على المتظاهرين في ثورة 25 يناير/كانون الثاني 2011.

انقلاب مبارك

وذكر تودنهوفر الذي شغل منصب نائب رئيس مجلس إدارة مجموعة بوردا الألمانية العملاقة وعايش ثورة 25 يناير، أن بقايا نظام مبارك ممثلين بجهازه القضائي وقادة جيشه، الذين لم يكونوا مستعدين للتخلي عن ذرة من نفوذهم وسلطانهم، سعوا منذ يومهم الأول بعد سقوط الدكتاتور إلى إعداد ثورتهم المضادة للإجهاز على ثورة ميدان التحرير.

مصريون يتظاهرون أمام سفارتهم ببرلين تنديدا بمحاكمة مرسي (الجزيرة)

وأشار إلى أن نظام مبارك القديم صعّد من مقاومته بعد فوز جماعة الإخوان المسلمين بالانتخابات البرلمانية في ديسمبر/كانون الأول 2011 وانتخاب مرسي رئيسا للجمهورية، ولفت إلى أن هذا التصعيد تبدى في تعطيل الجهاز القضائي علنا لعمل الحكومة، ورفع الجيش المتحكم في معظم الاقتصاد المصري -بلا حياء- لتكاليف الحياة لإثارة عداء المصريين للرئيس مرسي وجماعة الإخوان.

ونوّه السياسي الألماني البارز المنتمي للحزب المسيحي الديمقراطي -الذي تتزعمه المستشارة أنجيلا ميركل- إلى أن الصراع الحالي على السلطة في مصر لم يحسم بعد ويحتاج إلى وقت مثلما احتاجت فرنسا 80 عاما بعد ثورتها لإقامة ديمقراطية مستقرة، وانتظار ألمانيا الغربية 30 عاما وشقيقتها الشرقية السابقة 70 عاما لتحقيق الهدف نفسه.

بديل الدم

وقال تودنهوفر إن التجارب التاريخية للثورات وما يعقبها من ثورات مضادة تظهر أن المصريين تنتظرهم سنوات من الاضطرابات وعدم الاستقرار ليتخلصوا بعدها من الانقلابيين المتوقع عجزهم مثلما عجز مبارك.

وخلص إلى أن البديل الوحيد لتجنيب مصر طريقا دمويا طويلا هو إجراء مفاضلة انتخابية حرة بين مرسي والسيسي.

وأوضح أن هذه الانتخابات ستحدد خيار المصريين الحر بين رئيس ديمقراطي منتخب وانقلابي مستبد، وبين الديمقراطية وسلطة العسكر. وختم بأن هذا يتطلب خيالا وشجاعة يفتقدهما السيسي وامتلكهما المتظاهرون المصريون يوم 11 فبراير/شباط 2011.

Morsy Is The Arab World's Mandela

Why We Must Stand and Support The Muslim Brotherhood's Fight For Democracy.

BY TAWAKKOL KARMAN

We shouldn't be ashamed of standing by people who dream of democracy, justice, and a life with dignity -- this is our duty. Egypt's current regime has ousted the first elected president in the country's history, suspended a constitution that won 60 percent support in a referendum, and completely excluded the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party from political life. There are limited options for those of us who care about Egypt's future: We can either side with civil values and democracy, or with military rule, tyranny, and coercion.

Morsy was not only Egypt's democratically elected president, he is now emerging as the Arab world's Nelson Mandela. The South African leader brought peace and democracy to his country; during Morsy's one-year reign, Egypt enjoyed freedom of expression and the right to demonstrate peacefully, and not a single one of his political opponents were jailed. Even when he was ousted by force, he killed no one, jailed no one, and never resorted to violent resistance. This is unparalleled in the region.

By maintaining this peaceful approach, Morsy and his followers will have a role not less than that of Mandela's African National Congress. Despite being subjected to killing, arrest, and oppression, Morsy's supporters have held fast to the democratic process and prevented Egypt from descending into civil war. The free world must recognize their positive role by supporting them and rejecting the crimes committed against Morsy, his party, and pro-democracy figures.

I am not blind to the shortcomings of the previous government: Before the coup, I supported the June 30 rallies against Morsy. But I had had my eyes set on one objective -- ending the rift within Egyptian society, and building a country led by partnership rather than narrow majority rule. The military takeover aims to uproot the Muslim Brotherhood and its partners, replacing them through brute force with the losers of a democratic ballot.

Democracy can't thrive under military rule -- history is quite clear on this point. In Egypt, this is evident through the terrible violations against rights and freedoms since the coup. The police state is back, and it is even worse than Hosni Mubarak's.

What is happening in Egypt today is very scary: The coup could lead society to lose its faith in democracy, which will give terrorist groups a chance to breathe again. 

As al Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri said in his latest audio message, the Brotherhood won the elections -- and still Morsy was deposed. He concluded that democracy was a dead end, an exclusive right in the West, but one that is not accessible to Islamists.  

By blocking peaceful change and weakening the Islamist groups that participate in the political process, the coup leaders support this stance and do the terrorists a favor.

What happens in Egypt will not stay in Egypt -- the implications of this coup will reverberate over 1,000 miles away, in my home country of Yemen. It is wrong to look at the Arab Spring as an unrelated set of events: The people of the Middle East all rose up against tyranny and justice, and have the same dream of freedom, dignity, and democracy.

All the ousted regimes, as well as the oppressive regimes that have hung on during the Arab Spring, have now blessed Egypt's coup. But it's not too late to reverse this trend: Just as policies of oppression can start in Egypt and then spread to other Arab countries, a blossoming democracy in Cairo can easily spread throughout the Arab world. 

This may be why so many regional and international powers are arrayed against a democratic Egypt. Those who support freedom and democracy in the Middle East, however, should resist the new tyranny in Cairo with all their might.

The Dissident's Toolkit

Want To Topple An Autocrat? Street Demonstrations Are Just One Tool Among Many.

BY ERICA CHENOWETH

Research shows, in fact, that demonstrations are just one of many tools that civil resistance movements can use to effect change. 

Successful movements are those that use a wide array of methods to pressure their state opponents while keeping their activists safe. The demonstration tactic we're used to seeing is just one of many hundreds of tactics available to civilians seeking change -- and successful campaigns for change must use more than just a single tactic.

Maria Stephan and I conducted research on a related but broader question: "When does civil resistance work?" The results of our research show that opposition campaigns are successful when they manage to do three key things: 

(1) attract widespread and diverse participation; (2) develop a strategy that allows them to maneuver around repression; and (3) provoke defections, loyalty shifts, or disobedience among regime elites and/or security forces.

Attracting participation is perhaps the most important of these tasks, since the ability to provoke defections and outmaneuver opponents often depends on whether the movement enjoys large and broad-based support. The most important singular factor for a successful campaign is its participation rate. 

According to the NAVCO data set, which identifies the outcomes of over 300 nonviolent and violent campaigns worldwide from 1900-2006, none of the cases failed after achieving the active and sustained participation of just 3.5 percent of the population -- and some of them succeeded with far less than that. 

Of course, 3.5 percent is nothing to sneeze at. In the United States today, this constitutes over 11 million people. But how do movements get this large in the first place, especially in countries where overt participation in a mass movement is highly risky?

One way organizers can grow their movement is by including tactics that are safer and therefore more attractive to risk-averse participants. 

For example, instead of relying solely on demonstrations or protests, many movements will allow people to participate through "electricity strikes" where people shut off their electricity at a coordinated time of day, or by banging on pots and pans in the middle of the night to signal the power in numbers. 

Engaging in these types of actions may draw in more ambivalent people while also allowing them the opportunity to develop a sense of identity with the movement and its goals. 

In Chile under Pinochet, for example, outright demonstrations against the dictator were far too dangerous. In one instance, Pinochet was so threatened by the subtext of some popular songs that he banned public singing; it didn't take much. But when people began to bang on pots and pans, it let them demonstrate their defiance anonymously in the safety of their own homes. 

As the people's metallic clamor for change became louder and louder, anti-Pinochet organizers and their supporters became emboldened to press for more disruptive and overt action. 

A similar movement is underway in Egypt today, where the "Masmou" movement has led thousands of people to bang on pots and pans inside their homes at 9 p.m. each night to signal that there are viable alternatives to both the al-Sisi government and the Muslim Brotherhood. 

In highly repressive environments there is, indeed, safety in numbers. And actions like this can signal that one is not alone, while making it quite difficult for the government to crack down on participants.

Once people do begin to mobilize, the effects on the internal politics of a tyrannical regime can be intense. 

As Gene Sharp rightly argued, no regime is monolithic. Every leader is 100 percent dependent on the cooperation, obedience, and help of the people that form the regime's pillars of support: security forces, the state media, business or educational elites, religious authorities, and civilian bureaucrats. And when such people begin to reevaluate the regime's role in their long-term interests, they can actually be pulled away from supporting the leader. This is much more likely to happen the more people are mobilized against the opponent.

Why? Because no regime loyalists in any country live entirely isolated from the population itself. They have friends, they have family, and they have existing relationships that will bring with them in the long term, regardless of whether the leader stays or goes. 

As the literary critic Robert Inchausti is credited as saying, "Nonviolence is a wager -- not so much on the goodness of humanity as on its infinite complexity." 

Take an example from the so-called "Bulldozer Revolution," a Serbian people power revolution against Slobodan Milosevic that toppled him in October 2000. In this case, once it became clear that hundreds of thousands of Serbs were descending on Belgrade to demand that Milosevic leave office, policemen ignored the order to shoot on demonstrators. When asked why he did so, one of them said: "I knew my kids were in the crowd."

This policeman wasn't alone in Serbia or elsewhere. We find that, in general, security forces tend to defect much more often when they face nonviolent campaigns (as compared to armed uprisings), particularly as the numbers rise. 

Controlling for other factors, security forces are about 60 percent likely to defect when confronted with the largest nonviolent campaigns and over 30 percent likely with the average-sized nonviolent campaign. 

The defection of security forces occurred within the ranks of the Iranian armed forces during the anti-Shah resistance, within Filipino armed forces during the anti-Marcos uprising, and within the Israeli military during the first Palestinian Intifada, to name but a few examples. And these loyalty shifts can be crucial for the outcomes of these campaigns: They increase their chances of success by over 60 percent.

Of course, demonstrations -- and people power movements in general -- tend to fail as often as they succeed. But when we look at outright failures -- such as Tiananmen Square, the 1956 Hungarian uprising, or the 2007 Saffron Revolution in Burma -- a few patterns become evident:

The failed campaigns never spread to include vast proportions of the population, and failed to shift between highly risky tactics and safer ones. 

But they also failed to establish a long-term strategy to make the campaigns sustainable, which was especially important given the brutality of state repression. 

The average duration of a nonviolent campaign was between two-and-a-half and three years, but few of these campaigns had a long-term strategy, besides the wishful hope that tactical victories might make the regime comply with their demands.

Campaigns of civil resistance are underway in many countries around the world, movement planners must carefully analyze the political effects that tactics like demonstrations have. 

If these tactics fail to increase sympathy for the campaign at home or abroad, diversify the base of participants, and encourage defections among regime elites, then they are not helping the movement's chances of succeeding. 

But rather than abandoning the struggle because demonstrations stop working, movement leaders would do well to appreciate the many other nonviolent methods of protest and noncooperation they can bring to bear against their opponents. 

The campaigns that ultimately succeed will be the ones that fully embrace Sun Tzu's warning that "tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat."

THE METHODS OF NONVIOLENT PROTEST AND PERSUASION 

Formal Statements 
1. Public Speeches 
2. Letters of opposition or support 
3. Declarations by organizations and institutions 
4. Signed public statements 
5. Declarations of indictment and intention 
6. Group or mass petitions 

Communications with a Wider Audience 
7. Slogans, caricatures, and symbols 
8. Banners, posters, and displayed communications 
9. Leaflets, pamphlets, and books 
10. Newspapers and journals 
11. Records, radio, and television 
12. Skywriting and earthwriting 

Group Representations 
13. Deputations 
14. Mock awards 
15. Group lobbying 
16. Picketing 
17. Mock elections 

Symbolic Public Acts 
18. Displays of flags and symbolic colors 
19. Wearing of symbols 
20. Prayer and worship 
21. Delivering symbolic objects 
22. Protest disrobings 
23. Destruction of own property 
24. Symbolic lights 
25. Displays of portraits 
26. Paint as protest 
27. New signs and names 
28. Symbolic sounds 
29. Symbolic reclamations 
30. Rude gestures 

Pressures on Individuals 
31. "Haunting" officials 
32. Taunting officials 
33. Fraternization 
34. Vigils 

Drama and Music 
35. Humorous skits and pranks 
36. Performances of plays and music 
37. Singing 

Processions 
38. Marches 
39. Parades 
40. Religious processions 
41. Pilgrimages 
42. Motorcades 

Honoring the Dead 
43. Political mourning 
44. Mock funerals 
45. Demonstrative funerals 
46. Homage at burial places 

Public Assemblies 
47. Assemblies of protest or support 
48. Protest meetings 
49. Camouflaged meetings of protest 
50. Teach-ins 

Withdrawal and Renunciation 
51. Walk-outs 
52. Silence 
53. Renouncing honors 
54. Turning one's back 


THE METHODS OF SOCIAL NONCOOPERATION 

Ostracism of Persons 
55. Social boycott 
56. Selective social boycott 
57. Lysistratic nonaction 
58. Excommunication 
59. Interdict 

Noncooperation with Social Events, Customs, and Institutions 
60. Suspension of social and sports activities 
61. Boycott of social affairs 
62. Student strike 
63. Social disobedience 
64. Withdrawal from social institutions 

Withdrawal from the Social System 
65. Stay-at-home 
66. Total personal noncooperation 
67. "Flight" of workers 
68. Sanctuary 
69. Collective disappearance 
70. Protest emigration (hijrat) 


THE METHODS OF ECONOMIC NONCOOPERATION: (1) ECONOMIC BOYCOTTS 

Actions by Consumers 
71. Consumers' boycott 
72. Nonconsumption of boycotted goods 
73. Policy of austerity 
74. Rent withholding 
75. Refusal to rent 
76. National consumers' boycott 
77. International consumers' boycott 

Action by Workers and Producers 
78. Workmen's boycott 
79. Producers' boycott 

Action by Middlemen 
80. Suppliers' and handlers' boycott 

Action by Owners and Management 
81. Traders' boycott 
82. Refusal to let or sell property 
83. Lockout 
84. Refusal of industrial assistance 
85. Merchants' "general strike" 

Action by Holders of Financial Resources 
86. Withdrawal of bank deposits 
87. Refusal to pay fees, dues, and assessments 
88. Refusal to pay debts or interest 
89. Severance of funds and credit 
90. Revenue refusal 
91. Refusal of a government's money 

Action by Governments 
92. Domestic embargo 
93. Blacklisting of traders 
94. International sellers' embargo 
95. International buyers' embargo 
96. International trade embargo 


THE METHODS OF ECONOMIC NONCOOPERATION: (2)THE STRIKE 

Symbolic Strikes 
97. Protest strike 
98. Quickie walkout (lightning strike) 

Agricultural Strikes 
99. Peasant strike 
100. Farm Workers' strike 

Strikes by Special Groups 
101. Refusal of impressed labor 
102. Prisoners' strike 
103. Craft strike 
104. Professional strike 

Ordinary Industrial Strikes 
105. Establishment strike 
106. Industry strike 
107. Sympathetic strike 

Restricted Strikes 
108. Detailed strike 
109. Bumper strike 
110. Slowdown strike 
111. Working-to-rule strike 
112. Reporting "sick" (sick-in) 
113. Strike by resignation 
114. Limited strike 
115. Selective strike 

Multi-Industry Strikes 
116. Generalized strike 
117. General strike 

Combination of Strikes and Economic Closures 
118. Hartal 
119. Economic shutdown 


THE METHODS OF POLITICAL NONCOOPERATION 

Rejection of Authority 
120. Withholding or withdrawal of allegiance 
121. Refusal of public support 
122. Literature and speeches advocating resistance 

Citizens' Noncooperation with Government 
123. Boycott of legislative bodies 
124. Boycott of elections 
125. Boycott of government employment and positions 
126. Boycott of government depts., agencies, and other bodies 
127. Withdrawal from government educational institutions 
128. Boycott of government-supported organizations 
129. Refusal of assistance to enforcement agents 
130. Removal of own signs and placemarks 
131. Refusal to accept appointed officials 
132. Refusal to dissolve existing institutions 

Citizens' Alternatives to Obedience 
133. Reluctant and slow compliance 
134. Nonobedience in absence of direct supervision 
135. Popular nonobedience 
136. Disguised disobedience 
137. Refusal of an assemblage or meeting to disperse 
138. Sitdown 
139. Noncooperation with conscription and deportation 
140. Hiding, escape, and false identities 
141. Civil disobedience of "illegitimate" laws 

Action by Government Personnel 
142. Selective refusal of assistance by government aides 
143. Blocking of lines of command and information 
144. Stalling and obstruction 
145. General administrative noncooperation 
146. Judicial noncooperation 
147. Deliberate inefficiency and selective noncooperation by enforcement agents 
148. Mutiny 

Domestic Governmental Action 
149. Quasi-legal evasions and delays 
150. Noncooperation by constituent governmental units 

International Governmental Action 
151. Changes in diplomatic and other representations 
152. Delay and cancellation of diplomatic events 
153. Withholding of diplomatic recognition 
154. Severance of diplomatic relations 
155. Withdrawal from international organizations 
156. Refusal of membership in international bodies 
157. Expulsion from international organizations 


THE METHODS OF NONVIOLENT INTERVENTION 

Psychological Intervention 
158. Self-exposure to the elements 
159. The fast 
a) Fast of moral pressure 
b) Hunger strike
c) Satyagrahic fast 
160. Reverse trial 
161. Nonviolent harassment 

Physical Intervention 
162. Sit-in 
163. Stand-in 
164. Ride-in 
165. Wade-in 
166. Mill-in 
167. Pray-in 
168. Nonviolent raids 
169. Nonviolent air raids 
170. Nonviolent invasion 
171. Nonviolent interjection 
172. Nonviolent obstruction 
173. Nonviolent occupation 

Social Intervention 
174. Establishing new social patterns 
175. Overloading of facilities 
176. Stall-in 
177. Speak-in 
178. Guerrilla theater 
179. Alternative social institutions 
180. Alternative communication system 

Economic Intervention 
181. Reverse strike 
182. Stay-in strike 
183. Nonviolent land seizure 
184. Defiance of blockades 
185. Politically motivated counterfeiting 
186. Preclusive purchasing 
187. Seizure of assets 
188. Dumping 
189. Selective patronage 
190. Alternative markets 
191. Alternative transportation systems 
192. Alternative economic institutions 

Political Intervention 
193. Overloading of administrative systems 
194. Disclosing identities of secret agents 
195. Seeking imprisonment 
196. Civil disobedience of "neutral" laws 
197. Work-on without collaboration 
198. Dual sovereignty and parallel government