Jaguar Attacks Caiman

When a jaguar pounces, sometimes one bite is all it takes to get a meal. National Geographic has exclusive video of a jaguar taking down a caiman in Brazil's Pantanal wetlands, photos of which went viral earlier this month. Luke Dollar, a conservation scientist who helps manage National Geographic's Big Cats Initiative, explains the hunt and explosive moment of predation.

Read the article from National Geographic News:
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/ne...

VIDEOGRAPHERS: Kedar Hippalgaonkar and Parul Jain
NARRATOR: Luke Dollar
EDITOR: Will Halicks
SPECIAL THANKS: Jason Kurtis
RESEARCH: Joe Lemeris

Dolphin Assisted Fishing

Laguna is a Brazilian city located in the southern state of Santa Catarina.

An interesting collaboration has developed in Laguna: a pod of bottlenose dolphins drive fish towards fishermen who stand at the beach in shallow waters. Then one dolphin rolls over, which the fishermen take as sign to throw out their nets. The dolphins feed on the escaping fish. 

They were not trained for this behavior; the collaboration has been going on at least since 1847. The phenomenon – which also occurs in parts of West Africa but nowhere else in the world – has for years attracted marine biologists and natural historians to Laguna to study the bizarre, communal relationship.

Via: Fishing Rod Cases

Bandeirantes

The bandeirantes (Portuguese pronunciation: [bɐ̃dejˈɾɐ̃tʃis], "followers of the banner") were composed of Indians (slaves and allies), caboclos (people of Indian mixed with white), and whites who were the captains of the Bandeiras. Members of the 16th–18th century South American slave-huntingexpeditions were called bandeiras (Portuguese for "flags"). Though their original purpose was to capture and force amerindians into slavery, the bandeirantes later began to focus their expeditions on finding gold, silver and diamond mines. They ventured into unmapped regions in search of profit and adventure. From 1580–1670 the Bandeirantes focused on slave hunting, then from 1670–1750 they focused on mineral wealth. Through these expeditions, the Bandeirantes also expanded Portuguese America from the small limits of the Tordesilhas Line to roughly the same territory as current Brazil. This expansion discovered mineral wealth that made the fortune of Portugal during the 17th and 18th centuries.

The first Bandeira was in 1628, organized by Antonio Raposo Tavares. This bandeira raided 21 Jesuit villages in the upper Paraná Valley. They captured about 2,500 natives. A bandeira tactic was to set native tribes against each other in order to weaken them, and then to enslave both of them.

As a result of the Bandeiras, the Capitaincy of São Vicente became the basis for the vice-kingdom of Brazil and encompassed current states of Santa Catarina, Paraná, São Paulo, Minas Gerais, Goiás, Tocantins and both Northern and Southern Mato Grosso. With the few outlying Spanish settlements and missions overrun, the defacto control over most of what is now Brazil was recognised by the Treaty of Madrid in 1750.

Despite the fact that the Jesuit missionaries were the chief opponents of the Bandeirantes, priests accompanied the Bandeira for two reasons: 1. to shrivethe dying and the dead, 2. to ease the conscience of the men.

In the beginning, the main focus of the bandeirantes was to enslave natives. They carried this out by disguising themselves as Jesuits, often singing mass to lure the natives out of their settlements. However, more often they relied on surprise attacks. If luring the natives with promises didn’t work, the bandeirantes would surround the settlements, and set them alight in order to force out the natives. The natives would be captured and placed into a large outdoor pen, until there were enough of them enslaved to justify a trip back to the coast, where they would be sold as slaves. It could be weeks or months until this was the case, and so hundreds of captives died of exposure. On the journey to the coast, the captives would be stripped, and tied to a long pole to prevent them from trying to flee the group.

There were over 2.5 million Indigenous peoples in Brazil in 1500. By the middle of the 18th century, the number had dropped to between 1 million and 1.5 million. Many tribes living close to the Atlantic coast intermixed with Portuguese or died of diseases. Others had fled into the interior, and their flight created an ever-greater need for slaves, one that was not entirely satisfied by importing them from Africa. Native slaves sold for about $30–$40, while the imported African slaves sold from $100–$500. The bandeirantes were able to sell many native slaves due to their cheap price, and hence made a large profit.

Info Via: "Wikipedia"

Photo by Armando Cuellar

Sculpture by Victor Brecheret

Location: Just across the Ibirapuera Park, Sao Paulo, Brazil.

Iran's New Revolutionary Politics

By Chris Zambelis
June 19, 2010
Courtesy Of "Asia Times Online"

Brazil's decision, along with fellow non-permanent United Nations Security Council member Turkey, to vote against the latest United States
-led efforts to impose harsher sanctions against Iran on June 9 aimed at stymieing the Islamic Republic's nuclear program, reflects a sea-change in global geopolitics characterized by a decline in US power and the return of multi-polarity.

Brazil's refusal to support UN Security Council Resolution 1929 came on the heels of a successful joint Brazilian-Turkish attempt to win Iranian agreement on May 17 to enter into a uranium exchange pact designed to allay concerns about Tehran's nuclear ambitions and to avert a more serious escalation of regional tensions.

Brazil's bold drive to inject itself into the center of one of the most contentious issues in international affairs, coupled with its move to join Turkey in overtly challenging the dominant US-led diplomatic paradigm when it comes to dealing with Iran, are emblematic of Brasilia's aspirations of achieving a great-power status commensurate with what it perceives to be its true diplomatic, economic and military strength.

Brazil's venture into Middle East diplomacy should therefore be considered in the context of its steady ascent to international prominence. Brazil's diplomatic defense of Iran, however, also highlights the significance of Tehran's bond with the South American powerhouse.

While many observers continue to marvel at Brazil's emerging stature as a player in Middle East diplomacy, another significant, albeit far less understood, geopolitical trend with major implications occurring in the US's backyard in the Western hemisphere has grabbed headlines in recent years.

Iran has undertaken its own ambitious mission in recent years to expand its influence across Latin America and the Caribbean, a region where it has traditionally maintained little or no meaningful diplomatic, economic or military presence until fairly recently. The expanding Iranian-Brazilian interface, as well as Iran's growing multifaceted contacts with Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Cuba, Guyana, among a host of other nations in the Americas, reflect Iran's commitment to assert itself as a player in its own right in the Americas.

Reports of Tehran's ties to Islamist militants allegedly operating in the region and their sympathizers within the region's Middle East diaspora and local Muslim communities continue to dominate the treatment of Iran's inroads into the Americas in media and foreign policy circles.

Not surprisingly, many followers of Middle East and Latin American and Caribbean affairs continue to view Iran's foray into the Americas through a security prism. Iran's track record of exporting its revolutionary Islamism throughout the greater Middle East in the 1980s and 1990s, argue many observers, including its support for Islamist militants opposed to the US-led status quo in the region, and Iran's support in Lebanon of Hezbollah, which is implicated in attacks against Israeli and Jewish targets in Argentina in the 1990s, should to serve as the template on which to assess Tehran's intentions in the Americas.

The fact that Iran has reached out to vocal opponents of the United States in the region, namely Venezuela, Cuba, among others, along with traditionally close allies of Washington, has also raised alarm bells. Based on this view, Iran's expanding presence in the Americas constitutes a direct threat to US and regional security, a recurring theme in official US policy circles.

United States Defense Secretary Robert Gates voiced concern over what he described as Iran's "subversive activity" in the region during testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on January 27, 2009. Prior to embarking on her February 28 to March 5, 2010, tour of regional capitals, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton opined before the Senate Appropriations Foreign Operations Sub-committee that Iran would be "at the top" of her agenda during her trip.

An April 2010 report by the US Department of Defense also stated that members of the Quds Force (Jerusalem), an elite special operations unit within Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), are also present in the Americas, especially in Venezuela.

The argument that Iran's growing presence in the Americas constitutes a security threat, however, fails to acknowledge the pragmatism guiding Iran's activities in the region, not to mention the open arms in which Tehran is being received.

The flurry of high-level bilateral meetings between Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad and his counterparts in places such as Venezuela, Brazil, Cuba, Nicaragua, Ecuador and Bolivia in recent years, with reciprocal visits by regional leaders to Tehran that culminated in a range of political, economic, energy, cultural, military and scientific agreements, are a case in point.

In addition, diplomatic exchanges and growing business contacts between Iran and partners in Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay, Peru and Mexico, coupled with the opening of new Iranian embassies, also illustrate the rapid development of the Islamic Republic's relations with the region.

Data issued by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2009 and analyzed by the Latin Business Chronicle concluded that the volume of trade between Iran and the wider region topped an estimated US$2.9 billion, approximately triple the trade volume between 2007 and 2008; Brazilian trade with Iran came in at $1.3 billion during the same period, a dramatic 88% increase from 2007.

Brazil is Iran's largest source of exports from Latin America. The Iranian Red Crescent Society also dispatched tons of disaster relief aid and a team of doctors following the devastating earthquake that struck Haiti on January 12 this year. Iran has also promised hundreds of millions in economic aid and low-interest loans to Nicaragua, Bolivia and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.

Forward Defense Diplomacy

Myriad factors drive Iran's strategy in the Americas. As a country that continues to be subject to a sustained US-led campaign to isolate it in the international arena, Iran has made it a strategic priority to cultivate a wide network of bilateral relations to undermine attempts to box it in.

Iran has also worked diligently to shore up its diplomatic clout in the face of threats of attack by the United States and, in particular, Israel
, over its nuclear program. In this context, Iran's strategy to expand its ties to the Americas serves two main purposes: first, it allows Iran to better insulate itself and critical sectors of its society - especially its economy - from an increasingly rigid sanctions regime, thereby allowing it to weather US pressure to change its behavior; second, by cultivating a diverse network of relationships, including relations predicated on lucrative business dealings and delicate diplomacy with governments that have fallen out of favor with Washington, Iran works to ensure that as many of countries as possible have a vested interest in continued dealings with Iran.

This aspect of Iran's strategy enables it to count on the support of countries that would previously have had no direct stake in whether Iran is placed under sanctions. A policy of diplomatic diversification, in essence, guides Iran's approach to the Americas.

The heavy US military presence in the greater Middle East has also profoundly shaped Tehran's strategic calculus when it comes to its strategy toward the Americas. The existence of a US-led alliance network composed of a nuclear-armed Israel and pro-US Arab regimes has left Iran, for all intents and purposes, hemmed in and potentially vulnerable to attack.

Iran's eastern and western frontiers, for instance, are flanked by tens of thousands of US troops in Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively, as well as a growing US military footprint in neighboring Pakistan.

The regional landscape is also dotted by US military bases and a robust deployment of naval forces in the Gulf. United States security guarantees for Iran's neighbors add another level of anxiety in Tehran. United States strategy toward Iran is designed to contain and ultimately undermine Iranian influence through a policy of strategic encirclement.

With this in mind, Iran's inroads into the Americas represent a form of forward defense diplomacy, essentially a means through which the Islamic Republic can counter the United States by effectively employing soft power in a region considered by Washington to be in its own exclusive sphere of influence.

Return Of Revolution

Iran's push into the Americas would have never have materialized without the active encouragement of eager partners in the region. Yet how did the Islamic Republic manage to win so much goodwill from the Caribbean to the Southern Cone?

Iran's diplomatic achievements cannot be understood without taking into account the tectonic shift to the left that saw an eclectic mix of leftist populists of various stripes take over the reins of power throughout the hemisphere beginning in the late 1990s. United in their skepticism toward US foreign policy and eagerness to charter independent paths for their countries away from the neo-liberal economic orthodoxies preached by Washington, the rise of a new revolutionary politics determined to defy the US-led status quo in the region has provided Iran with a receptive audience for its overtures and an ample supply of friends.

A new form of revolutionary politics in the Americas imbued with an anti-imperialist discourse directed toward the United States has meshed well with Iranian foreign policy. Despite the Shi'ite Islamist character of the clerical regime, Tehran has adopted a realistic approach in its diplomacy toward the Americas that emphasizes anti-imperialism, popular struggle, social justice and the preservation of national independence and sovereignty through South-South solidarity.

Iran has also effectively used institutions such as the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) to make inroads among NAM members in Latin America. The overlap between the revolutionary discourse out of Tehran and regional capitals such as Brasilia, Caracas, La Paz, Havana, Managua and Quito, for instance, is remarkable, thus providing Iran with valuable diplomatic cover on a range of issues, especially its nuclear program.

Iran has honed its skills as a source of resistance in the Middle East, where it is joined by Syria, Hezbollah, Hamas in Gaza (and occasionally Turkey and Qatar) in a front of resistance against US allies Israel and the bloc of pro-US Arab regimes led by Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Iran is comfortable in this role.

The overextension of US forces and diplomatic resources to the greater Middle East and East Asia and the emphasis on counter-terrorism in recent years has also relegated Latin America to the proverbial sidelines in terms of foreign policy and security priorities in Washington, thus providing Iran, along with other players such as China and Russia, with ample room to maneuver. This confluence of circumstances is sure to encourage greater contacts between Iran and Latin America in the coming years.

Chris Zambelis is an author and researcher with Helios Global, Inc, a risk management group based in the Washington, DC area. He specializes in Middle East politics. The views expressed here are the author's alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of Helios Global, Inc.

(Copyright 2010 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved.)

Rebalancing The World

The Brazilian/Turkish Initiative

By Richard Falk
May 30, 2010
Courtesy Of "Information Clearing House"

It may turn out that May 17, 2010 will be remembered as an important milestone on the road to a real new world order. Remember that the phrase ‘new world order’ came to prominence in 1990 after Iraq’s invasion and annexation of Kuwait. It was used by George W. H. Bush, the elder of the two Bush presidents, to signify the possibility after the end of the Cold War to find a consensus within the UN Security Council enabling a unified response to aggressive war. The new world order turned out to be a mobilizing idea invoked for a particular situation. The United States did not want to create expectations that it would always be available to lead a coalition against would be breakers of world peace. The whole undertaking of a ‘new world order’ disappeared from diplomacy right after the First Gulf War of 1991. What one wonders now is whether the Brazilian/Turkish effort to resolve the Iran nuclear crisis with the West is not expressive of a new world, this time a ‘real new world order.’

May 17th was the day that the Brazilian/Turkish initiative bore fruit in Tehran, with Iran agreeing to a ten-point arrangement designed to defuse the mounting confrontation with the United States and Israel with regard to its enrichment facilities. The essence of the deal was that Iran would ship 1200 kilograms of low enriched uranium (LEU) to Turkey for deposit, and receive in return 120 kilograms of uranium enriched to 20% for use in an Iranian nuclear reactor devoted to medical research. The agreement reaffirmed support for the Non-Proliferation Treaty, as well as acknowledged Iran’s right under the treaty to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, which meant the entire fuel cycle, including the enrichment phase.

The bargain negotiated in Tehran closely resembled an arrangement reached some months earlier in which Iran had agreed to turn over a similar amount of low enriched uranium to France and Russia in exchange for their promise of providing fuel rods that could be used in the same medical research reactor. That earlier deal floundered as Iran raised political objections, and then withdrew. The United States had welcomed this earlier arrangement as a desirable confidence-building step toward resolving the underlying conflict, but it wasted no time repudiating the May 17th agreement, which seemed so similar.

Why the discrepancy in the American response? It is true that in recent months Iran has increased its LEU production, making 1200 kg of its existing stockpile amount to 50% of its total rather than the 80% that would have been transferred in the earlier arrangement. Also, there were some unspecified features in the May 17th plan, including how the enriched uranium would be provided to Iran, and whether there would be a system of verification as to its use. In this regard, it would have seemed appropriate if genuinely troubled by this for Washington to request Iran to transfer a larger quantity of LEU and to spell out the details, but this is not what happened.

Instead of welcoming this notable effort to reduce regional tensions, the Brazilian/Turkish initiative was immediately branded as an amateurish irrelevance by the American Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton. She insisted that the concerns about Iranian nuclear enrichment be left exclusively in the hands of the ‘major powers,’ and immediately rallied China and Russia (in addition to France and the United Kingdom) to support a fourth round of punitive sanctions that were to be presented to the UN Security Council in the near future. It now appears that the five permanent members of the Security Council will support this intensification of sanctions that is expected to call for an arms embargo on heavy weapons, travel restrictions on Iranian officials, a boycott of banks and companies listed as linked to Iran’s nuclear and missile programs, and authority to search ships to and from Iran suspected of carrying prohibited items. Such a resolution if implemented would certainly increase tensions in the Middle East without any discouragement of the Iranian nuclear program. Indeed a new round of sanctions would almost certainly increase Iran’s incentives to exercise its full rights under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and complete its development of the complete fuel cycle as has been previously done by several other parties to the treaty, including Japan, Germany, and The Netherlands.

Given the generally constructive character of the agreement reached in Tehran, the uncompromisingly hostile reaction in Washington can only be understood in one of two ways, neither of which is reassuring. If the U.S. Government, with or without Israeli prodding, had already resolved to impose sanctions, then any development that seems to cast doubt on such a coercive approach would be regarded as unwelcome. The evidence strongly suggests that the United States was determined to go forward with additional sanctions. This made the Brazil/Turkey initiative seem like a deliberate obstruction that was essentially resented as it has been reported that American leaders tried in talk Brasilia and Ankara out of making any independent steps to resolve the crisis.

Perhaps, the more weighty explanation of the hostile response has to do with the changing cast of players in the geopolitical power game. If this reasoning is correct, then the United States angry response was intended to deliver a reprimand to Brazil and Turkey, warning them to leave questions pertaining to nuclear weapons in the hands of what Hilary Clinton called ‘the major powers.’ In effect, the non-Western world should have no say in shaping global security policy, and any attempt to do so would be rebuffed in the strongest possible terms.

Yet the world of 2010 is very different from what it was in the late 20th century. Globalization, the decline of American power, and the rise of non-Western states have changed the landscape. This process has recently accelerated as a result of the world economic crisis, and the difficulties in the Euro zone. As the famous Bob Dylan 1960’s song goes, “The times, they are a-changing.” Recall that it was not long ago that the G-8 was scrapped in favor of the more inclusive G-20. Recently, as well, much attention has been given to the rise of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) countries. What seems most at stake in this attempt to supersede and nullify the Iran deal is banishing the Brazilian and Turkish intruders from the geopolitical playing field. For the West to claim that the Security Council remains representative of the arrangement of power in 2010 is ludicrous. The identity of the five permanent members has not been altered since 1945, which is a misguided effort to overlook the fundamental shifts in world power that have taken place in recent decades. Both Brazil and Turkey were elected to be non-permanent two year members of the Security Council, which both governments interpret as conferring a special responsibility to work for peace and justice in the world. AS the May 17th agreement shows, these governments possess the political will to make a difference in world politics.

Further, this is not just a childish ploy to grab a few headlines and tweak the old guard. The confrontation with Iran is exceedingly dangerous, agitated by Israel’s periodic threats of launching a military attack and reports of pushing the United States in an escalating direction. Such a strategy of tension could easily produce a devastating regional war, disrupting the world economy, and causing widespread human suffering. Both Brazil and Turkey have strong national interests in working for regional peace and security, and one way to do this is to calm the diplomatic waters with regard to Iran’s contested nuclear program. The fact that Iran seems prepared to go ahead with the agreement, at least if the UN refrains from further sanctions, strongly favors giving the deal a chance to succeed, or at worst, working to make it more reassuring to those countries that suspect Iran of secretly planning to become a nuclear weapons state.

The concern about Iran seems genuine in many quarters, given the inflammatory language sometimes used by President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad and considering the repressive internal practices in Iran. At the same time, even in this regard the United States leadership has rather dirty hands. While insisting that Iran cannot be allowed to do what several other non-nuclear states have already done in conformity with Non-Proliferation Treaty, the United States has acknowledged that it has been engaged in a variety of military activities under Pentagon auspices within Iranian territory. (For confirmation see Mark Mazzeti, “U.S. Is Said to Expand Secret Actions in Mideast,” NY Times, May 24, 2010). Also, it is impossible to overlook the dispiriting silence that has long insulated Israel’s nuclear weapons arsenal from scrutiny and censure, as well as the closely related refusal of the Western powers to back proposals put forward by Egypt and others for a nuclear free Middle East.

Back in 2003 Donald Rumsfeld, then Secretary of Defense, made headlines by contrasting ‘Old Europe’ (especially France and Germany) that he denigrated as decadent because it opposed the invasion of Iraq, and ‘New Europe’ that was the flourishing wave of the future in Eastern Europe that favored American policy. Now it is Old Europe that is again partnering with the United States, and so restored to the good graces of Washington. In this sense, Brazil and Turkey are being treated as trespassers who refuse to absent themselves from any further engagement in Middle East diplomacy.

Perhaps, we are witnessing the passing of an era in world politics, which has not yet been acknowledged. It is two decades since Charles Krauthammer, writing in Foreign Affairs, declared that “The immediate post-Cold War world is not multipolar. It is unipolar. The center of world power is the unchallenged superpower, the United States, attended by its Western allies.” The abrupt rejection of the Brazil/Turkey initiative can probably best understood as a nostalgic clinging to the ‘unipolar moment’ long after its reality has passed into history.

Turkey has already demonstrated the enormous gains for itself and the region arising from the pursuit of an independent and activist foreign policy based on resolving conflicts and reducing tensions to the extent possible, with benefits for peace, stability, and prosperity. Not all of its initiatives have met with success. It tried to encourage the world to treat Hamas as a political actor after it fairly won elections in Gaza back in January 2006, but was rebuffed by Washington and Tel Aviv. Similarly, it brought to bear its mediating skill in trying to broker a peace deal between Israel and Syria, only to have the process break down after a series of promising negotiating rounds. Maybe also the Brazil/Turkey initiative will be effectively beaten down, but that would not mean it was not worth trying, or that such governments should not keep trying to supplant war and militarism with diplomacy and cooperative international relations. Outside of Western diplomatic circles it is already widely appreciated that the May 17th agreement reveals the exciting reality of a new geopolitical landscape in which the countries of the global South are now beginning to act as subjects, and no longer content to be mere objects in scenarios devised in the North. At some point this reality might well be christened as the ‘real new world order’!

Richard Falk , Professor Emeritus of International Law at Princeton University and author of “Crimes of War: Iraq” and “The Costs of War: International Law, the UN, and World Order after Iraq” Also, current UN Rapporteur for Palestine.

Obama's Letter Exposes Forked Tongue On Iran

By Steve Hynd
May 28, 2010
Source: "NewsHoggers" --May 27, 2010
Courtesy Of "Information Clearing House"

Via Robert Naiman, it appears that President Lula of Brazil has decided to shine some light on the Obama administration's machinations on Iran. He has finally released the full text of Obama's 20th April letter to Brazil about the proposed TTR fuel swap deal and the entire thing appears today in Brazilian Foreign Policy.

The letter reads, in part:

The letter also specifically mentions the compromise of using Turkey as the location for Iran's fuel to be held "in escrow".

I would urges Brazil to impress upon Iran the opportunity presented by this offer to "escrow" its uranium in Turkey while the nuclear fuel is being produced.

This letter's authenticity is not disputed by the White House. It exposes the Obama administration's forked-tongue response to the Brazil and Turkey brokered swap. The White House is now in full spin mode, but the spin has already been undercut by the release of the letter's full text. Of late, Hilary Clinton has been the main vehicle for the White House's double-talk, which is now entirely aimed at closing down opportunities to find a negotiated settlement to the Iran nuclear issue no matter what the new National Security Strategy might say. But Obama must also bear the burden of blame, his is the desk where the buck stops.

The New Premier League Of Global Powers

The Iran Nuclear Deal

Brazil and Turkey are determined to pursue diplomacy and compromise – even if it means upsetting Washington

By Simon Tisdall
Wednesday 19 May 2010 16.59 BST
Courtesy Of "The Guardian"

The furious row between the Obama administration and the leaders of Brazil and Turkey over how best to handle Iran's nuclear ambitions, following this week's controversial "uranium swap" deal in Tehran, reflects a more fundamental and widening disagreement over how the world should be run in the 21st century.

On Iran, as on other issues that it regards as critical to its security and national interest, Washington expects to have its own way – and is accustomed to getting it. If necessary, it stands ready to impose its will. This is what secretary of the state, Hillary Clinton, tried to do this week by whipping the UN security council into line.

Brazil and Turkey, two leading members of a new premier league of emerging global powers, have a quite different approach. They stress persuasion and compromise. In the case of Iran, instead of ultimatums, deadlines and sanctions, they prefer dialogue. It helps that neither country feels threatened by Tehran.

Lula da Silva, Brazil's popular president, typifies this outlook. He gave Clinton fair warning earlier this year that it was "not prudent to push Iran against a wall". More broadly, Lula has championed the cause of emerging countries, challenged the rich world's assumptions at theCopenhagen climate summit, and bearded the US over Cuba and Hugo Chávez.

Lula speaks for a world that was formed in the west's image but is increasingly rejecting its tutelage and its ideas. China and India are the foremost members of this pack. But their leaders' overriding priority is to build up their countries' economic strengths. For most part, Beijing avoids open fights with the Americans and their west-European allies. The time will come when that will change – but not yet.

Reacting angrily to Clinton's implied suggestion that somehow they had been suckered into the uranium deal by the crafty Iranians, Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti, Brazil's ambassador to the UN, said Brazil would not co-operate with US-initiated security council discussions on a new resolution. Without unanimity in the council, new sanctions are even less likely to be honoured or effectively implemented than is already the case now.

Brazil's foreign minister, Celso Amorim, also warned Washington to think again. "We have a chance to achieve a peaceful, negotiated solution [with Iran]. Those who turn down that possibility, or who think that sanctions or other measures would get us closer, they'll have to take responsibility for that." Such robust language is an eloquent expression of the changing power dynamic between the old superpower and its new rivals.

Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey's prime minister and, like Lula, the leader of an emerging regional power, has a more direct interest in what happens in Iran. The two countries have a common border and a common belief that the Middle East has seen too much interference by foreign powers. Ankara does not want a nuclear-armed Iran any more than it wants a nuclear-armed Israel. In fact, it seeks to empty the region of all weapons of mass destruction.

But Erdogan is increasingly resistant to the US way of doing things, whether it is turning a blind eye to Israel's Gaza depredations, lecturing Turkey on Armenian history, or maintaining double standards on nuclear weapons. Like most Turks, Erdogan opposed the invasion of Iraq. He has led a rapprochement with Syria, another American bete noire. And he suggested this week that Washington was behaving arrogantly in dismissing the Iran deal.

"This is the time to discuss whether we believe in the supremacy of law or the law of the supremes and superiors," he said. "While they [the US] still have nuclear weapons, where do they get the credibility to ask other countries not to have them?" Yet despite his obvious anger, Erdogan still answered Clinton's criticism that the timeline for the uranium swap was "amorphous". Iran was expected to fulfil its part of the deal within one month, otherwise it would "be on its own", he said.

Ahmet Davutoglu, Turkey's foreign minister, made clear Ankara's opposition to further sanctions – and that he was not worried about upsetting the Americans. "We don't want any new sanctions in our region because it affects our economy, it affects our energy policies, it affects our relations in our neighbourhood," he said. Without Turkish co-operation, any new measures will struggle to have an impact.

That may prove to be the case anyway. Overlooked in the furore is the consideration that, thanks to stiff Chinese and Russian opposition, the proposed new sanctions, even if agreed as drafted, are fairly weak. This is nothing like the "crippling" package promised by Clinton, is largely voluntary or non-binding in nature, and will have no effect on Iran's oil and gas sales – its main source of income.

Supplementary, tougher measures are expected from the EU at a later date while individual countries, such as the US and Britain, may take additional, unilateral steps. So what the US would like to portray as the international community's united front against Iran is likely to boil down, in reality, to a narrowly-based coalition of the willing involving Washington and a handful of west-European states.

This week's symbolically significant attempt by Brazil and Turkey to do things differently, and the divisions the subsequent row exposed, suggests this already rickety traditional international security architecture, maintained and policed by a few self-appointed countries, cannot hold much longer. Power is shifting away from the west. You can almost feel it go.

Humiliating Turkey and Brazil

Giving The Finger To Iran

By Gary's Choices
May 19, 2010
Courtesy Of "Information Clearing House"

Well, that didn’t take long.

In my previous note (yesterday) I wondered if we were smart enough to declare victory and take yes as an answer from Tehran. Today, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, announced that a new package of sanctions against Iran had been approved by the major powers and would be sent to the UN Security Council later in the day.

In case anyone overlooked the significance of this action, which followed by one day the announcement by Brazil and Turkey of the successful conclusion of their negotiations with Iran, she added: “I think this announcement is as convincing an answer to the efforts undertaken in Tehran over the last few days as any we could provide.”

Take that, Tehran! But it turns out that this lifted middle finger was not limited to Iran. Only hours before Clinton’s announcement, the foreign minister of Turkey held his own press conference. Obviously unaware of what was about to happen, he described in some detail not only the tortuous negotiation process with Iran, but his perception that he was acting directly on behalf of the United States.

According to Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, he had been in “constant contact” with Clinton herself and with national security adviser James Jones, while his prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, had face-to-face encouragement from President Obama in December and April.

The objective of Turkey and Brazil was to persuade Iran to accept the terms of an agreement the United States had itself promoted only six months ago as a confidence-building measure and the precursor to more substantive talks. There were twelve visits back and forth between the Turk and his Iranian counterpart, some 40 phone conversations, and eighteen grueling hours of personal negotiations leading up to the presentation of the signed agreement on Monday.

“What they wanted us to do was give the confidence to Iran to do the swap. We have done our duty,” said Davutoglu, calling the deal an important step for regional and global peace. “We were told that if Iran gives 1,200 kg without conditions, then the required atmosphere of trust would be created [to avoid sanctions]. So if we do all these things, and they still talk about sanctions … [it] will damage the psychological trust that has been created.”

The Turks and Brazilians, who felt they had “delivered” Iran on the terms demanded by the United States, were surprised and disappointed at the negative reactions from Washington. Little did they know that their success in Tehran, which had been given a 0-30 percent chance just days earlier, came just as the Americans were putting the final touches on a package of sanctions to be presented to the UN Security Council. The Tehran agreement was as welcome as a pothole in the fast lane, and the Americans were not reluctant to let their displeasure be known.

The five major powers had made up their minds (without consulting other members of the Security Council that currently includes both Turkey and Brazil), and these two mid-level powers were told in so many words to get out of the way.

The gratuitous insult aside, which approach do you believe would most likely result in real progress in slowing or halting Iran’s nuclear program? We have been imposing ever-greater sanctions on Iran for more than fifteen years. When we started they had zero centrifuges; today they have in excess of 9,000. To those who believe that one more package of sanctions will do what no other sanctions have done so far, I can only say I admire your unquenchable optimism.

More likely the Turkish ambassador to the UN had it about right when he said quite plainly about sanctions, “They don’t work.”

Would a negotiating track do better, perhaps mediated by two middle-level powers who have built up some credibility with Iran, like Algeria when it finally engineered the end to the US-Iran hostage crisis in 1980-81? We’ll never know. Tonight the hardliners in Iran (and their American counterparts) are celebrating.

The Iranian hardliners had already begun asking questions about the deal, fearful that Iran had given away too much. Now they don’t have to worry since everyone knows that Iran will never be willing or able to negotiate under the threat of sanctions.

For the Revolutionary Guards it is a huge bonus. As foreign companies are driven away, the Guards progressively take over more and more of the economy. And as restrictions on trade grow, so do their opportunities to manage the immensely profitable smuggling routes. Like their American counterparts, but for different reasons, they thrive on an environment of threat and isolation.

The presidents of Turkey and Brazil have been humiliated. But the Great Powers are confident that their lesser cousins know their place and will show deference when the chips are down. They’ll do what they have to do. They always do.

Don’t they… ?

Iran Agrees to Nuclear Fuel Swap - WSJ.com

May 17, 2010 -- What to make of the new nuclear agreement by Turkey and Brazil with Iran?

Perhaps the main point is to be reminded of the moral from the old folk tale: Be careful of what you wish for, since you just might get it. The United States took a rather righteous position that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the West had made Iran a remarkably generous offer, and when it was rejected they had no choice but to go all out for sanctions.

There are those in Washington (but also in Paris and London) who were fully committed to passing a strong sanctions resolution in the United Nations Security Council next month, and this is a blow to them and all the intense diplomatic work they have done in the past five or six months. Clearly, it will be immensely more difficult, if not impossible, to get a sanctions resolution if this deal is on the table.

According to preliminary information, the agreement provides that Iran will, within a month, ship 1240 kg of roughly 5 percent low enriched uranium (LEU) to Turkey where it will be held in escrow for up to a year until Iran is provided with 120 kg of fuel cells (uranium enriched to near 20 percent) to replace the nearly exhausted fuel of the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) that makes medical isotopes. This represents more than half of the 2065 kg of LEU that Iran had produced as of February according to the IAEA, and it greatly reduces Iran’s capability to produce enough fissile material for a bomb.

We should all be reminded of the original purpose of the agreement. It was intended as a confidence-building measure that would open the way to more substantive discussions of other issues. The original offer that Iran provisionally accepted in October tacitly accepted Iran’s right to enrich uranium; in return Iran would give up control over a significant portion of its existing stash of LEU. Even low enriched uranium can be further enriched to create bomb-grade (roughly 90+ percent) highly enriched uranium (HEU) that is required for a bomb. The October agreement would have created an environment conducive to at least minimal mutual trust and the beginning of serious negotiations.

Note to negotiators: In the past six months, Iran has not used its LEU to build a bomb, even without an agreement.

Iran has set up a special line of centrifuges to enrich uranium to the 20 percent required for the TRR. But that line is small, separated from its other enrichment facilities, and under inspection of the IAEA. The move to enrich some uranium to 20 percent was obviously intended as a pressure tactic to drive the West back into negotiations, since Iran does not have the capability to manufacture fuel cells for the TRR.

We should also be reminded that Iran did not reject the original deal: they proposed amending it. Basically, when the Iranian negotiators came home with the proposed deal, they were attacked from all sides – including members of the Green Movement – for being suckers. Their opponents pointed out that they were going to rely on the word and good will of Russia (where the LEU would be enriched to 20 percent) and France (where the fuel cells would be fabricated). Iranians from left to right argued that both of these countries had repeatedly cheated Iran on nuclear issues: Russia by delaying endlessly the completion of the nuclear power plant at Bushehr, and France by refusing to grant Iran rights to the Eurodif enrichment facility partially owned by Iran since the days of the shah. Why, they asked, should we believe that this agreement will be any different?

Instead, they proposed that the swap of LEU for the fuel cells should happen on Iranian soil, probably in stages and within a fixed period of time. That idea was rejected by the United States and its negotiating partners.

The new bargain appears to be a compromise in which the LEU would physically be removed from Iran and held in escrow in Turkey for up to a year, in which time the fuel cells would be manufactured and delivered to Iran. The new bargain also appears to go much further in formally recognizing the legitimacy of Iran’s independent enrichment program. That should not be a surprise given the fact that Brazil, one of the parties to the bargain, has its own enrichment facility similar to Iran’s and in fact concealed its details for some time.

So where does that leave us?

Essentially, it takes us back to last October. The one big difference is that Iran has more LEU now than it did then. But the reality is that Iran will keep producing LEU unless a new agreement is reached to persuade them to stop. If we had completed the agreement of a swap in October, Iran would have the same amount of LEU as it has now. If we wait another six months for negotiations, Iran will have still more LEU.

In short, this agreement is largely symbolic and limited in its practical effects. If the West accepts the deal as worked out by Brazil and Turkey, and if a new round of negotiations begins – on both the nuclear and other major issues – then this could be a breakthrough. If the West turns it down, or if the two sides do not use it to negotiate some of the major issues that separate them, then nothing much will have been accomplished.

The next step is up to the United States and its negotiating partners.

Although angst is high among the sanctions-at-all-costs crowd, this path to a nuclear swap deal was fully endorsed by the United States and was the centerpiece of the justification for sanctions. One way to respond at this point may just be to declare that our threat of sanctions worked: Iran has capitulated and we accept yes as an answer.

Hmmm…are we that smart?

Copyright Gary's Choices

'Iran Entitled To Nuclear Program'

Brazil President Meets Ahmadinejad, Calls Relations "Strategic."

By JPOST.COM STAFF AND ASSOCIATED PRESS
16/05/2010 18:45
Courtesy Of "The Jerusalem Post"

Brazilian President Luis Inacio Lula da Silva met with Iranian leaders on Sunday, and called the relationship between the two countries “strategic.”

Speaking in defense of Iran’s right to “independently navigate its course” to seek development and improvement, Silva stressed that a peaceful nuclear research program was within Iran’s sovereign rights.

Silva, who is in Iran for the Summit of the Group of 15 developing nations, spoke following meetings with Iran’s president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and its supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

The Brazilian president went on to say that there were those who hoped his visit would fail.

Ahead of the visit, sources in the US State Department called Silva's visit the last chance for Iran to prevent the next round of sanctions against it. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton predicted that Silva's mediation effort would not succeed, saying new sanctions are the only way to bring Iran around to cooperation.

Brazil Hopes To Enrich Nuclear Material For Iran

Silva is reportedly trying to revive a UN-backed proposal in which Iran would ship its stockpile of enriched uranium abroad to be processed further and returned as fuel rods that could not be processed beyond its lower, safer levels, which are suitable for use in the Teheran research reactor.

Iran initially accepted the deal but then balked and proposed changes rejected by the world powers negotiating with Teheran.

Brazil may be hoping to supplant Russia in the original UN proposal as the state that processes the nuclear material for Iran.

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Israel's Nuclear Weapons

Nuclear Threat Is From Israel NOT Iran

Ezer Weizman once said "The nuclear issue is gaining momentum [and the] next war will not be conventional." From the 1950s the US trained Israeli nuclear scientists and providing nuclear technology, including a small 'research' reactor in 1955 under the 'Atoms for Peace' program. The French built a uranium reactor and plutonium reprocessing plant in the Negev desert, called Dimona. The Israelis lied, stating it was "a manganese plant, or a textile factory". In return for uranium, Israel supplied South Africa with the technology and expertise that allowed the white supremacist regime to build the "apartheid bomb".

In 1979 US satellite photographs revealed the atmospheric test of a nuclear bomb in the Indian Ocean off South Africa, Israel's involvement was quickly whitewashed by a carefully selected scientific panel, kept in the dark about important details. Israeli sources have since revealed "there were actually three tests of miniaturised Israeli nuclear artillery shells".

Mordechai Vanunu worked as a nuclear technician at Dimona. A supporter of Palestinian rights, Vanunu believed it was his duty to warn the world about the danger Israel posed. In 1986, he smuggled out photographs showing that the plant was producing enough plutonium to make 10 to 12 bombs a year, and that at least 200 miniaturised bombs had been built.

Iran Accepts Nuclear-Fuel Swap Deal

BREAKING

UPDATED ON: Monday, May 17, 2010
14:57 Mecca time, 11:57 GMT
Courtesy Of "Al-Jazeera"

Monday's deal was agreed after 18 hours of negotations [AFP]

Iran has signed an agreement brokered by Brazil to ship low-enriched uranium to Turkey in exchange for nuclear fuel for its power plant, according to official media.

The deal agreed on Monday would oblige Iran to send Turkey 1.2 tonnes of uranium under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), beginning next month.

In exchange, Iran would receive - within a year's time - 120kg of highly-enriched nuclear fuel rods through a still to be negotiated agreement with the so-called Vienna Group.

The Vienna Group refers to the four parties of the United States, Russia, France and the IAEA.

Iran would then - as per the terms of the agreement- use the nuclear fuel rods for its Tehran medical research reactor.

The move aims to ease Western concerns over Iran's nuclear programme, and stave off a possible new round of sanctions by the United Nations.

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the Iranian president, signed the deal on Monday following a breakfast with his Brazilian counterpart Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the Turkish prime minister.

After the deal's announcement, Ahmadinejad called on the permanent members of the UN Security Council, as well as Germany, to relaunch dialogue over Iran's nuclear programe.

"It is time for the 5+1 countries to enter talks with Iran based on honesty, justice and mutual respect," he said.

'Constructive Path'

It was not immediately clear whether the terms of the deal would fully satisfy the demands made by the Security Council members.

Ahmet Davutoglu, Turkey's foreign minister, first announced a breakthrough in the talks late on Sunday, after what he said was "almost 18 hours of negotiations".

In depth

Full text: The Iran, Turkey, Brazil declaration Video: World leaders 'must engage Iran' Empire: BRIC: The new world order

Speaking after Monday's formal signing, Davutoglu said there was no longer any justification for more UN sanctions on Iran.

"The swap deal, signed by Iran today, shows that Tehran wants to open a constructive path ... There is no more ground for new sanctions and pressures," he said.

The plan calls for Turkey to be the conduit for the fuel swap, but as Iran's neighbour doesn't possess the technology to enrich uranium, it would instead hold the material as a guarantee.

John Large, an independent nuclear consultant, said that guarantee may not be enough reassurance for the international community to agree to hand over fuel rods to Iran.

"Turkey has no facilities whatsoever. It is not a nuclear country, so it has no enrichment facilities, and of course, it doesn't really have any storage facilities," he said.

"This deal has to be guaranteed in terms of storage security and transportation security."

The IAEA, the UN's nuclear watchdog group, would also insist on carrying out various tests on the transferred material in order "to make sure that it is low enriched uranium of the quality required for exchange," Large said.

Manouchehr Mottaki, the Iranian foreign minister, said in the event the deal is not implemented, Iran's uranium would have to be returned straight away.

"Based on the agreement signed this morning, if the swap does not take place, then Turkey will be obliged to send back our dispatched uranium immediately and unconditionally," he said.

Iran has also not agreed to halt its low-level uranium enrichment, and confirmed plans to continue.

Brazil Mediation

Lula had flown in to broker the deal, in what was called a last-ditch mediation attemptbefore new sanctions were imposed.

The US and Russia had warned that the chances of success were weak but on Sunday, Erdogan postponed a trip to Azerbaijan to join the negotiations.

Iran has previously been reluctant to allow its stockpile of uranium to leave the country before receiving the nuclear fuel, saying that the exchange must take place simultaneously inside the country.

Last week, however, Mohsen Shaterzadeh, Iran's ambassador to Brazil, said that an exchange in another country might be acceptable.

Brazil and Turkey, both non-permanent members of the UN Security Council, have resisted US-led efforts to push through new sanctions against Iran over its failure to accept repeated ultimatums to stop uranium enrichment activity.

The US and its allies say that Iran wants highly enriched uranium to make an atomic weapon, but Tehran says its programme is simply designed to meet its civilian energy needs.

Lula has in the past defended Iran's nuclear activities, saying Tehran has the right to atomic energy, and has repeatedly said sanctions would be counter-productive and ineffective.

Source:

Al Jazeera and agencies

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Welcome To The Brazil - Iran Axis

By Pepe Escobar
November 26, 2009
Courtesy Of Asia Times Online

President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva from Brazil and President Mahmud Ahmadinejad from Iran. What is this - the new axis of evil? No - Luladinejad is a new axis of business.

As Ahmadinejad was coming from a visit to the Brazilian parliament in Brasilia on Monday, Lula was waiting for him, virtually alone. The embrace by Lula was sudden, spontaneous, extremely warm; it's fair to assume Ahmadinejad was not expecting it. Those who saw it interpreted it as a graphic message.

Ahmadinejad did mean business: he traveled with 200 Iranian businessmen. In the long run, Brazil wants to export to Iran not only meat, grains and sugar, but also trucks and buses. And Iran wants to invest heavily in the oil industry, petrochemicals, agriculture, minerals and real estate. Lula will visit Iran in March or April 2010, also with a business caravan.

Lula and Ahmadinejad signed agreements on energy, trade and agricultural research in the latest round of what is becoming an increasingly warm embrace between Latin America and the Middle East.

The meat of the matter was, of course, nuclear energy. US President Barack Obama admitted at the Group of 20 gathering in London this year that Lula "is the man" - and opinion polls back him up, with the Brazilian leader at present the world's most popular political leader, with an approval rating of 79%; Obama has just slipped below 50%. So what is "the man" saying? He's saying that Brazil supports Iran's access to "peaceful nuclear energy".

When Lula talks, world leaders do listen; nor is he shy about running through a roll call of those he "advises" on how to behave with Iran.

"I told Obama, I told [French President Nicolas] Sarkozy, I told [German Chancellor] Angela Merkel that we will not get good things out of Iran if we corner them. You need to create space to talk." This is not only Lula talking - it's BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) talk. Carefully balancing his act, Lula at the same time defended the rights of "a safe and secure state of Israel".

Lula's key formula regarding the Iranian nuclear dossier is "nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament must walk side-by-side". For Brazil and the other BRIC countries, - it's the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that should solve the Iranian nuclear dossier, not the United Nations Security Council.

Brazil, which holds the seventh-largest uranium reserves in the world, enriches uranium for its own nuclear energy program, and no one is accusing it of building a nuclear bomb. Brazilian foreign policy has always been strongly against unilateral sanctions on Iran. In Lula's words, "It's simple. What we advocate for us, we advocate for others as well."

Ahmadinejad, who repeatedly referred to Lula as "my friend", sang in tune. He even admitted on Brazilian TV that Iran and Brazil, "... can build partnerships to build nuclear plants." Or as the headline splashed on the cover of Tuesday's edition of the Tehran-based Iran Daily newspaper proclaimed, "Nuclear Cooperation Possible With Brazil".

Let's play ball

Ahmadinejad's whirlwind tour of five countries in Africa and South America - Hugo Chavez's Venezuela and Evo Morales' Bolivia are included in the itinerary - means South America especially is seen as a business escape route for Iran do dodge more Western sanctions. For the leadership in Tehran - the Supreme Leader, the Revolutionary Guards Corps and the Ahmadinejad political faction - Brazil is now regarded as a business partner and as a strategic partner.

This is South-South dialogue in action, multipolar world style. Iran sees Brazil as a possible mediator vis-a-vis its intractable problems with the United States and Europe. Brazil for its part wants a permanent seat in the UN Security Council (Iran supports it) and more than welcomes more "soft power" influence in the Middle East.

Iran is not as "isolated" as Western propaganda would like people to believe. For instance, Iran is very much alert to preserving its rights in the Caspian Sea, it is advancing its energy deals with China, and it is busy changing from dollars to euros.

Right in the middle of a non-stop demonization campaign of Ahmadinejad as the "new Hitler" - after Saddam Hussein's demise - it would be naive to expect Western corporate media to pay attention to what Ahmadinejad actually said in Brazil - that Iran is definitely willing to buy enriched uranium abroad - but the country won't allow suppliers to set the terms. Referring to the latest IAEA plan to defuse the Iranian nuclear power stand-off, under which Iran would send the bulk of its low-enriched uranium to Russia and France to be further processed for use in a medical reactor in Tehran, Ahmadinejad said "no independent country would accept this proposal".

So the key question now to be debated under the deal brokered by IAEA director general Mohamed ElBaradei between the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany, and Iran, is about the volume of enriched uranium that should leave Iran for Russia, and then to France, and then return to Iran as nuclear fuel. Iran is not completely satisfied this is a 100% guaranteed deal.

Ahmadinejad made a startling admission at his press conference in Brazil. He said, "We have the conditions to enrich uranium at 20% and we have the legal right to do it. But to create an atmosphere of cooperation, we are ready to buy nuclear fuel."

Even before the Luladinejad get-together, US corporate media had hit the hysteria button, warning that Lula "may lose global influence" (Los Angeles Times) just by talking to Ahmadinejad, and warning that the meeting would "chill Brazil's relations with the US and damage its growing reputation as a global power" (New York Times).

They still don't get it.

Obama for his part sent a letter to Lula reminding him of Washington's deep mistrust of Iran. Lula will place a call to Obama to discuss his meeting with Ahmadinejad. It would be quite absurd for Lula to take morality lessons from Washington, given that the US has reactivated its Fourth Fleet, is it announced early last year (the fleet covers the waters around the Caribbean, and Central and South America), plans to deploy a new set of military bases in Colombia, and hardly condemned the June military coup in Honduras.

The fact is the Middle East is coming to Brazil. Former Moldovan bouncer Avigdor Lieberman, the Israeli foreign minister, was in Brazil and Argentina four months ago. Israeli President Shimon Peres was there last week. Same with Palestinian Authority head Mahmoud Abbas. Translation: Brazil, as one of the key emerging actors in the global South, along with the other BRIC countries, may have a much more balanced shot at global diplomacy than the heavy-handed US and Europe.

Doing things the Brazilian way involves a certified amount of swing. For example, during his radio show this past weekend, Lula even proposed a soccer match next March between Brazil - favorites to win next summer's World Cup - and a mixed Israeli-Palestinian team. So what if the UN takes a cue from Lula, and sponsors a tournament including the UN-5 - the US, Russia, China, France and Britain - plus Germany, plus Brazil and Iran? Remember those Cold War days when ping-pong politics broke the ice between the US and China? Seriously, maybe the time is now for some real political soccer.

Pepe Escobar is the author of Globalism: How the Globalized World is Dissolving into Liquid War (Nimble Books, 2007) and Red Zone Blues: a snapshot of Baghdad during the surge. His new book, just out, is Obama does Globalistan (Nimble Books, 2009).

He may be reached at pepeasia@yahoo.com.

(Copyright 2009 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved.)