Showing posts with label War On Privacy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label War On Privacy. Show all posts

Thursday, January 02, 2014

Catalog Advertises NSA Toolbox

Entering through the back door: A State Trooper truck is seen in front of the Fort Meade, Maryland headquarters of the National Security Agency.
After years of speculation that electronics can be accessed by intelligence agencies through a back door, an internal NSA catalog reveals that such methods already exist for numerous end-user devices.

When it comes to modern firewalls for corporate computer networks, the world's second largest network equipment manufacturer doesn't skimp on praising its own work. According to Juniper Networks' online PR copy, the company's products are "ideal" for protecting large companies and computing centers from unwanted access from outside. They claim the performance of the company's special computers is "unmatched" and their firewalls are the "best-in-class." Despite these assurances, though, there is one attacker none of these products can fend off -- the United States' National Security Agency.

Specialists at the intelligence organization succeeded years ago in penetrating the company's digital firewalls. A document viewed by SPIEGEL resembling a product catalog reveals that an NSA division called ANT has burrowed its way into nearly all the security architecture made by the major players in the industry -- including American global market leader Cisco and its Chinese competitor Huawei, but also producers of mass-market goods, such as US computer-maker Dell.

A 50-Page Catalog

These NSA agents, who specialize in secret back doors, are able to keep an eye on all levels of our digital lives -- from computing centers to individual computers, and from laptops to mobile phones. For nearly every lock, ANT seems to have a key in its toolbox. And no matter what walls companies erect, the NSA's specialists seem already to have gotten past them.

This, at least, is the impression gained from flipping through the 50-page document. The list reads like a mail-order catalog, one from which other NSA employees can order technologies from the ANT division for tapping their targets' data. The catalog even lists the prices for these electronic break-in tools, with costs ranging from free to $250,000.
In the case of Juniper, the name of this particular digital lock pick is "FEEDTROUGH." This malware burrows into Juniper firewalls and makes it possible to smuggle other NSA programs into mainframe computers. Thanks to FEEDTROUGH, these implants can, by design, even survive "across reboots and software upgrades." In this way, US government spies can secure themselves a permanent presence in computer networks. The catalog states that FEEDTROUGH "has been deployed on many target platforms."

Master Carpenters

The specialists at ANT, which presumably stands for Advanced or Access Network Technology, could be described as master carpenters for the NSA's department for Tailored Access Operations (TAO). In cases where TAO's usual hacking and data-skimming methods don't suffice, ANT workers step in with their special tools, penetrating networking equipment, monitoring mobile phones and computers and diverting or even modifying data. Such "implants," as they are referred to in NSA parlance, have played a considerable role in the intelligence agency's ability to establish a global covert network that operates alongside the Internet.

Some of the equipment available is quite inexpensive. A rigged monitor cable that allows "TAO personnel to see what is displayed on the targeted monitor," for example, is available for just $30. But an "active GSM base station" -- a tool that makes it possible to mimic a mobile phone tower and thus monitor cell phones -- costs a full $40,000. Computer bugging devices disguised as normal USB plugs, capable of sending and receiving data via radio undetected, are available in packs of 50 for over $1 million.

'Persistence'

The ANT division doesn't just manufacture surveillance hardware. It also develops software for special tasks. The ANT developers have a clear preference for planting their malicious code in so-called BIOS, software located on a computer's motherboard that is the first thing to load when a computer is turned on.

This has a number of valuable advantages: an infected PC or server appears to be functioning normally, so the infection remains invisible to virus protection and other security programs. And even if the hard drive of an infected computer has been completely erased and a new operating system is installed, the ANT malware can continue to function and ensures that new spyware can once again be loaded onto what is presumed to be a clean computer. The ANT developers call this "Persistence" and believe this approach has provided them with the possibility of permanent access.

Another program attacks the firmware in hard drives manufactured by Western Digital, Seagate, Maxtor and Samsung, all of which, with the exception of the latter, are American companies. Here, too, it appears the US intelligence agency is compromising the technology and products of American companies.

Other ANT programs target Internet routers meant for professional use or hardware firewalls intended to protect company networks from online attacks. Many digital attack weapons are "remotely installable" -- in other words, over the Internet. Others require a direct attack on an end-user device -- an "interdiction," as it is known in NSA jargon -- in order to install malware or bugging equipment.

There is no information in the documents seen by SPIEGEL to suggest that the companies whose products are mentioned in the catalog provided any support to the NSA or even had any knowledge of the intelligence solutions. "Cisco does not work with any government to modify our equipment, nor to implement any so-called security 'back doors' in our products," the company said in a statement. Contacted by SPIEGEL reporters, officials at Western Digital, Juniper Networks and Huawei also said they had no knowledge of any such modifications. Meanwhile, Dell officials said the company "respects and complies with the laws of all countries in which it operates."

Many of the items in the software solutions catalog date from 2008, and some of the target server systems that are listed are no longer on the market today. At the same time, it's not as if the hackers within the ANT division have been sleeping on the job. They have continued to develop their arsenal. Some pages in the 2008 catalog, for example, list new systems for which no tools yet exist. However, the authors promise they are already hard at work developing new tools and that they will be "pursued for a future release."

Monday, December 16, 2013

Former FBI Agent Mike German On The NSA



Mike German is a 16-year veteran of the FBI, where he served as a special agent in domestic terrorism. His work led him to resign in 2004 after the implementation of the 9/11 Commission’s reforms. He now works for the ACLU, and shared his experiences upholding his oath with The Daily Caller.
Was your work for the FBI what made you decide that their practices weren’t right?
Absolutely. I had been working for the FBI for 16 years and domestic terrorism for 12 years. What I understood was that the rules that are designed to protect privacy also help the government focus on people who are real threats. It works both ways. This idea that we trade our privacy for more security is just false. Spying on you won’t help the government find a terrorist. It’s a waste of resources, a waste of effort that also violates our rights.

What steps did you take to combat the abuse of civil liberties?
I tried to challenge the system from within, but they don’t like that. They made it very uncomfortable, so I finally realized it was time to work on the outside. I went to Congress and Sen. [Chuck] Grassley and Sen. [Patrick] Leahy, and now I work for the ACLU.
Was there a specific incident that occurred that made you want to leave the FBI?
There was a specific case that I was working on, and I’m still not allowed to talk about it in great detail. But it was a case where, again, the way that the government was putting out why they didn’t connect the dots on 9/11 was they didn’t have enough collection before the event. But as the 500-page book by the 9/11 commission shows, they actually had an awful lot information. It’s the mismanagement that causes the problem and it’s that mismanagement that leads not just to intelligence failures, but to violations of rights. Trying to point that out — that it’s really how the government manages its information — is really the important thing for Congress to focus on.
What do you have in mind specifically to manage information better? 
Focus security resources where you have evidence of wrongdoing, and use methods that are transparent and accountable. Name another government program where a lack of accountability leads to effective outcomes — there isn’t one. The intelligence community spends billions of dollars and has no evidence to show its methods are effective. They repeatedly fail, but the response is always to give them more authority and less oversight. No wonder they keep failing. So much of what the intelligence community is doing now is based on myths. The 9/11 failures had nothing to do with criminal investigations and everything to do with mindless intelligence collection (in fact the CIA prevented FBI agents investigating the Cole bombing of getting evidence they sought, leading one agent to write that “one day someone will die” because of their obstruction) yet the reaction was to give more resources to expand intelligence initiatives rather than criminal investigations. Criminal investigations, based on reasonable suspicion and probable cause, supported by criminal prosecutions are effective and have the added benefit of strengthening the rule of law and the legitimacy of government counterterrorism measures.
Multiple terrorists have still reached their targets during the Obama administration. Why do you think people still defend the NSA after their practices clearly haven’t worked?

One of the things that I hear a lot is that “Well, nothing as bad as 9/11 has happened since 9/11.” But that argument would have worked on Sept. 10, 2001. They would have said, “Nothing’s happened in a while, things must be going well.” But what makes things go well is when there’s public accountability and to make sure this is actually what the government is doing. Snowden’s information shows this is not just a violation of our rights, but a waste of resources. Our founders recognized the way to make a safe, secure and free nation, and we need to go back to that.
Can you give a few examples for your assertion that the Bill of Rights is a good guide for police work?
Yes, I actually wrote a book about this called “Thinking Like a Terrorist.” Basically, the Constitution and the Bill of Rights works to improve security by focusing law enforcement resources on criminal activity, rather than activity the police just don’t like, and by limiting the use of techniques that tend to produce unreliable evidence. By protecting behaviors that governments often find threatening, like political organizing by oppositional groups, the First Amendment keeps police away from activities that often get them distracted from crime prevention. By limiting their use of intrusive tools to cases where they have evidence of wrongdoing, verified by an independent magistrate, the Fourth Amendment forces police to focus their efforts appropriately and compels accountability, which makes the police more efficient and effective. By prohibiting coercion, the Fifth Amendment limits false confessions. By requiring counsel, the Sixth Amendment ensures that contrary evidence is discovered and presented to prevent false convictions, which would allow the real bad guys to go unpunished. All of this makes the police more effective, but the real strength of these tools is that they give the citizenry confidence in the legitimacy of police activities, which makes them more likely to cooperate and support government initiatives. Moreover, the lack of these protections make the citizenry angry, leading to less cooperation with the police, or even violence against them.
I often tell a story about a case I worked on as an undercover agent in an anti-government militia group in Washington state. It ended with a six-week trial that was attended by a lot of people who supported the militia group ideologically. One man who was an elder in the group (but didn’t know the defendants and wasn’t involved in the investigation) came up to me after the trial ended, but before the verdict was returned, and asked to shake my hand. He said he sat through the entire trial and was convinced that these defendants would have hurt someone, which would have hurt his movement, so he wanted to thank me for stopping them. Here was someone predisposed to hate the government, thanking the undercover agent who infiltrated the movement because our transparent and open criminal justice process allowed him to see the evidence, appropriately challenged in an adversarial process, and become convinced against his prejudices that the defendants were guilty. That’s how a government demonstrates its legitimacy, which builds a stronger and more stable democracy.

How does violating rules to protect privacy lead to less security, rather than just violations of people’s privacy?
Like I briefly said above, a government that routinely violates the rights of its citizens brews resentment and resistance. If a group has no way of getting its message heard through legitimate means, they will choose disobedience. If the government overreacts to the disobedience it courts more unrest and even violence. This cycle of violence and reprisal is what terrorists try to exploit. They hope their heinous acts of violence provoke an overbroad government response that treats entire communities as suspect, as this unfair discrimination then tends to develop real grievances the terrorist can then exploit. Strict adherence to the law, including defending constitutional rights, inoculates the government against such unfair collective punishment. Unfortunately, some in government fear providing such protection is a weakness, and they tend to play into the terrorists’ hands.

If the point about doing better data mining of a smaller database is true, why are the decision makers so bent on just collecting more data? Do they have a different intelligence philosophy?
It is clear that there is a disconnect between the policy makers and the agents and analysts that actually do the work. The latest Washington Post story about the NSA intercepting content transfers between Google and Yahoo data centers includes a document in which the analysts complain that the volume of useless data from this program is overwhelming them, and request termination of the program. Similarly the [Director of National Intelligence] and FBI continue to try to expand “suspicious activity reporting” programs, even though a George Washington University survey found analysts at the fusion centers that review this material call it “white noise” that impedes their intelligence analysis. In explaining how Umar Farouk Abdulmutaliab slipped through the cracks and almost blew up a plane, [National Counterterrorism Center] NCTC Director Michael Leiter complained that the NCTC receives 5,000 pieces of information a day, and the Webster Commission that reviewed the FBI’s investigation of Maj. Nidal Hasan before the Fort Hood shooting said the investigation was hampered by workload issues caused by a “data explosion” within the FBI. Yet, rather than admit that the collection programs aren’t helping, they continue to argue to expand their agencies’ powers.
Are there career rewards for simply collecting more useless data? Are they really just looking for dirt on domestic political enemies?
They seem to be operating under the premise that they should expand their power and collect all the information they can possibly collect now, just in case it might be useful in the future. Any data management professional would tell you this is a bad idea, but they are not held accountable so there’s no negative consequences for collecting information that isn’t useful. Meanwhile, the agents and analysts are buried under the data explosion. History has repeatedly found that information collected is used in all sorts of ways that weren’t intended when it was originally collected, and agencies and governments always see any opposition to their policies as threats to security, so you can expect that’s the way it will be used.

Sunday, December 15, 2013

The NSA Is Coming To Town



So Encrypt For Goodness Sake

Courtesy of the ACLU

You better watch out,
You better not Skype,
You better log out,
Yeah you better not type,
The NSA is coming to town.

You're making a list, 
They're checking it twice; 
They're watching almost every electronic device, 
The NSA is coming to town.

They see you when you're sleeping
They hear while you're awake
They know who you call and who you write
So encrypt for goodness' sake!

With Congress in the dark and a cloak-and-dagger court
We're lookin' for answers, they're comin' up short
The NSA is coming to town.

They're making a list, 
Checking it twice; 
They're watching almost every electronic device, 
NSA is coming to town
The NSA is coming to town,
The NSA is coming to town.

Tuesday, November 05, 2013

US Is Losing Control Of The Internet



By Duncan Geere

All of the major internet organisations have pledged, at a summit in Uruguay, to free themselves of the influence of the US government.
The directors of ICANN, the Internet Engineering Task Force, the Internet Architecture Board, the World Wide Web Consortium, the Internet Society and all five of the regional Internet address registries have vowed to break their associations with the US government.
In a statement, the group called for "accelerating the globalization of ICANN and IANA functions, towards an environment in which all stakeholders, including all governments, participate on an equal footing".
That's a distinct change from the current situation, where the US department of commerce has oversight of ICANN.
In another part of the statement, the group "expressed strong concern over the undermining of the trust and confidence of Internet users globally due to recent revelations of pervasive monitoring and surveillance".
Meanwhile, it was announced that the next Internet Governance Summit would be held in Brazil, whose president has been extremely critical of the US over web surveillance.
In a statement announcing the location of the summit, Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff said: "The United States and its allies must urgently end their spying activities once and for all."

Friday, November 01, 2013

U.S. Government To Keep Data Of Innocent Americans For 75 Years



By Josh Peterson

... according to a new report by the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law, the phone and Internet data collected on millions of innocent Americans as part of the U.S. government’s counter-terrorism program can be retained “for up to 75 years or more.”

The report by the Brennan Center, demonstrates how information is shared between agencies within the U.S. government, allowing investigators and analysts the ability to find connections between newly collected pieces of information, and those that have already been stored in government databases.

A flowchart for how the data on U.S. persons collected by the NSA is treated — depicted by an infographic created by the Brennan Center — shows that while the agency maintains that the information is deleted after 6 years, the NSA may retain the identity of the U.S. person.
Email addresses and phone numbers are used to query the agency’s database for a match.
“Under certain circumstances,” Levinson-Waldman states, that information is shared with the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and even foreign governments.

With regard to the FBI’s retention of records on Americans, the Brennan Center wrote in a statement to the press, “Suspicious Activity Reports (“See something, say something”) ostensibly related to terrorism are kept in a widely accessible FBI database for 30 years, even if the FBI concludes they have NO nexus to terrorism.”
“Information captured at border searches — including notations regarding those searches — may also be stored in and shared through other databases,” writes Levinson-Waldman in the report.
“For instance, records of searches of electronic devices and detentions — though not copies of the information itself — are entered into the government’s TECS database and stored for up to 75 years,” says Levinson-Waldman.
The TECS is the Treasury Enforcement and Communication System – one of the U.S. government’s terrorism databases.

According to a report by ABC News, the name of Tamarlan Tsarnaev, one of the Boston Bombing suspects, had been entered into the TECS prior to the attack, but expired before he returned from his trip to Russia in June 2012.
“Entries into this database remain active for only a year,” reported ABC News.
Levinson-Waldman’s report, however, also mentions the Department of Homeland Security’s Automated Biometric Identification System, or IDENT, which retains biometric data for up to 75 years, according to a December 2012 privacy assessment impact of the program.

“The records schedules requires US-VISIT to maintain IDENT records in its custody for 75 years or when no longer needed for legal or business purposes, whichever is later (NI-563-08-34),” states the assessment.
The United States Visitor and Immigration Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT), which was part of the Department of Homeland Security, was replaced by the Office of Biometric Identity Management in March 2013.
“We expect the government to collect and share information that is critical to national security, but creating an electronic dossier on every American citizen is inefficient and ineffective,” said Levinson-Waldman.
“We need modern policies that limit how — and with whom — innocent Americans’ data can be shared and stored,” she said.

Sunday, August 18, 2013

The Making Of A Global Security State



The Five Uncontrollable Urges Of A Secrecy-Surveillance World

By Tom Engelhardt

As happens with so much news these days, the Edward Snowden revelations about National Security Agency (NSA) spying and just how far we’ve come in the building of a surveillance state have swept over us 24/7 -- waves of leaksvideos, charges, claims, counterclaims, skullduggery, and government threats.  When a flood sweeps you away, it’s always hard to find a little dry land to survey the extent and nature of the damage.  Here’s my attempt to look beyond the daily drumbeat of this developing story (which, it is promised, will go on for weeks, if not months) and identify five urges essential to understanding the world Edward Snowden has helped us glimpse.   
1. The Urge To Be Global
Corporately speaking, globalization has been ballyhooed since at least the 1990s, but in governmental terms only in the twenty-first century has that globalizing urge fully infected the workings of the American state itself.  It’s become common since 9/11 to speak of a “national security state.”  But if a week of ongoing revelations about NSA surveillance practices has revealed anything, it’s that the term is already grossly outdated.  Based on what we now know, we should be talking about an American global security state. 
Much attention has, understandably enough, been lavished on the phone and other metadata about American citizens that the NSA is now sweeping up and about the ways in which such activities may be abrogating the First and Fourth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.  Far less attention has been paid to the ways in which the NSA (and other U.S. intelligence outfits) are sweeping up global data in part via the just-revealed Prism and other surveillance programs.
Sometimes, naming practices are revealing in themselves, and the National Security Agency’s key data mining tool, capable in March 2013 of gathering “97 billion pieces of intelligence from computer networks worldwide,” has been named “boundless informant.”  If you want a sense of where the U.S. Intelligence Community imagines itself going, you couldn’t ask for a better hint than that word “boundless.”  It seems that for our spooks, there are, conceptually speaking, no limits left on this planet.
Today, that "community" seeks to put not just the U.S., but the world fully under its penetrating gaze.  By now, the first “heat map” has been published showing where such information is being sucked up from monthly: Iran tops the list (14 billion pieces of intelligence); then come Pakistan (13.5 billion), Jordan (12.7 billion), Egypt (7.6 billion), and India (6.3 billion).  Whether you realize this or not, even for a superpower that has unprecedented numbers of military bases scatteredacross the planet and has divided the world into six military commands, this represents something new under the sun.  The only question is what?
The twentieth century was the century of “totalitarianisms.”  We don’t yet have a name, a term, for the surveillance structures Washington is building in this century, but there can be no question that, whatever the present constraints on the system, “total” has something to do with it and that we are being ushered into a new world. Despite the recent leaks, we still undoubtedly have a very limited picture of just what the present American surveillance world really looks like and what it plans for our future.  One thing is clear, however: the ambitions behind it are staggering and global.
In the classic totalitarian regimes of the previous century, a secret police/surveillance force attempted, via every imaginable method, including informers, wire tappers, torture techniques, imprisonment, and so on to take total control of a national environment, to turn every citizen’s life into the equivalent of an open book, or more accurately a closed, secret file lodged somewhere in that police system.  The most impressive of these efforts, the most global, was the Soviet one simply because the USSR was an imperial power with a set of disparate almost-states -- those SSRs of the Caucasus and Central Asia  -- within its borders, and a series of Eastern European satellite states under its control as well.  None of the twentieth-century totalitarian regimes, however, ever imagined doing the same thing on a genuinely global basis.  There was no way to do so.
Washington’s urge to take control of the global communications environment, lock, stock, and chat room, to gather its “data” -- billions and billions of pieces of it -- and via inconceivably powerful computer systems, mine and arrange it, find patterns in it, and so turn the world into a secret set of connections, represents a remarkable development.  For the first time, a great power wants to know, up close and personal, not just what its own citizens are doing, but those of distant lands as well: who they are communicating with, and how, and why, and what they are buying, and where they are travelling, and who they are bumping into (online and over the phone).
Until recently, once you left the environs of science fiction, that was simply beyond imagining.  You could certainly find precursors for such a development in, for instance, the Cold War intelligence community’s urge to create a global satellite system that would bring every inch of the planet under a new kind of surveillance regime, that would map it thoroughly and identify what was being mappeddown to the square inch, but nothing so globally up close and personal.
The next two urges are intertwined in such a way that they might be thought as a single category: your codes and theirs.
2. The Urge To Make You Transparent
The urge to possess you, or everything that can be known about you, has clearly taken possession of our global security state.  With this, it’s become increasingly apparent, go other disturbing trends.  Take something seemingly unrelated: the recent Supreme Court decision that allows the police to take a DNA swab from an arrestee (if the crime he or she is charged with is “serious”).  Theoretically, this is being done for “identification” purposes, but in fact it's already being put to other uses entirely, especially in the solving of separate crimes.
If you stop to think about it, this development, in turn, represents a remarkable new level of state intrusion on private life, on your self.  It means that, for the first time, in a sure-to-widen set of circumstances, the state increasingly has access not just -- as with NSA surveillance -- to your Internet codes and modes of communication, but to your most basic code of all, your DNA.  As Justice Antonin Scalia put it in his dissent in the case, “Make no mistake about it: As an entirely predictable consequence of today’s decision, your DNA can be taken and entered into a national DNA database if you are ever arrested, rightly or wrongly, and for whatever reason.”  Can global DNA databases be far behind?
If your DNA becomes the possession of the state, then you are a transparent human being at the most basic level imaginable.  At every level, however, the pattern, the trend, the direction is the same (and it’s the same whether you’re talking about the government or giant corporations).  Increasingly, access to you, your codes, your communications, your purchases, your credit card transactions, your location, your travels, your exchanges with friends, your tastes, your likes and dislikes is what’s wanted -- for what’s called your “safety” in the case of government and your business in the case of corporations.
Both want access to everything that can be known about you, because who knows until later what may prove the crucial piece of information to uncover a terrorist network or lure in a new network of customers.  They want everything, at least, that can be run through a system of massive computers and sorted into patterns of various potentially useful kinds.  You are to be, in this sense, the transparent man or transparent woman.  Your acts, your life patterns, your rights, your codes are to be an open book to them -- and increasingly a closed book to you.  You are to be their secret and that “you” is an ever more global one.
3. The Urge To Make Themselves Opaque
With this goes another reality.  They are to become ever less accessible, ever more impenetrable, ever less knowable to you (except in the forms in which they would prefer you to know them).  None of their codes or secrets are to be accessed by you on pain of imprisonment.  Everything in the government -- which once was thought to be “your” government -- is increasingly disappearing into a professional universe of secrecy.  In 2011, the last year for which figures are available, the government classified 92 million documents.  And they did so on the same principle that they use in collecting seemingly meaningless or harmless information from you: that only in retrospect can anyone know whether a benign-looking document might prove anything but.  Better to deny access to everything.

In the process, they are finding new ways of imposing silence on you, even when it comes to yourself.  Since 2001, for instance, it has become possible for the FBI to present you with aNational Security Letter which forces you to turn over information to them, but far more strikingly gags you from ever mentioning publicly that you got such a letter.  Those who have received such letters (and 15,000 of them were issued in 2012) are legally enjoined from discussing or even acknowledging what’s happening to them; their lives, that is, are no longer theirs to discuss.  If that isn’t Orwellian, what is?
President Obama offered this reassurance in the wake of the Snowden leaks: the National Security Agency, he insisted, is operating under the supervision of all three branches of the government.  In fact, the opposite could be said to be true.  All three branches, especially in their oversight roles, have been brought within the penumbra of secrecy of the global security state and so effectively coopted or muzzled.  This is obviously true with our ex-professor of Constitutional law and the executive branch he presides over, which has in recent years been ramping up its own secret operations.
When it comes to Congress, the people’s representatives who are to perform oversight on the secret world have been presented with the equivalent of National Security Letters; that is, when let in on some of the secrets of that world, they find they can’t discuss them, can’t tell the American people about them, can’t openly debate them in Congress.  In public sessions with Congress, we now know that those who run our most secret outfits, if pushed to the wall by difficult questions, will as a concession respond in the “least untruthful manner” possible, as Director of National Intelligence James Clapper put it last week. 
Given the secret world’s control over Congress, representatives who are horrified by what they’ve learned about our government’s secrecy and surveillance practices, like Democratic Senators Ron Wyden and Mark Udall, can only hint at their worries and fears.  They can, in essence, wink at you, signal to you in obscure ways that something is out of whack, but they can’t tell you directly. Secrecy, after all.
Similarly, the judiciary, that third branch of government and other body of oversight, has, in the twenty-first century, been fully welcomed into the global security state’s atmosphere of total secrecy.  So when the surveillance crews go to the judiciary for permission to listen in on the world, they go to a secret court, a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance (FISA) court, locked within that secret world.  It, in turn, notoriously rubberstamps whatever it is they want to do, evidently offering no resistance whatsoever to their desires.  (Of the 6,556 electronic surveillance requests submitted to the court in Obama’s first term in office, for instance, only one was denied.)  In addition, unlike any other court in America, we, the American people, the transparent and ignorant public, can know next to nothing about it.  And you know perfectly well why: the overriding needs of secrecy.
What, though, is the point of “oversight” if you can’t do anything other than what that secret world wants you to do?
We are, in other words, increasingly open to them and they are increasingly closed to us. 
4. The Urge To Expand
As we’ve known at least since Dana Priest and William Arkin published their stunning series, “Top Secret America,” in the Washington Post in 2010, the U.S. Intelligence Community has expanded post-9/11 to levels unimaginable even in the Cold War era.  Then, of course, it faced another superpower, not a small set of jihadis largely located in the backlands of the planet.  It now exists on, as Arkin says, an “industrial scale.”  And its urge to continue growing, to build yet more structures for surveillance, including a vast $2 billion NSA repository in Bluffdale, Utah, that will be capable of holding an almost unimaginable yottabyte of data, is increasingly written into its DNA.
For this vast, restless, endless expansion of surveillance of every sort and at every level, for thenearly half-million or possibly far more private contractors, aka “digital Blackwater,” now in the government surveillance business -- about 70% of the national intelligence budget reportedly goes to the private sector these days -- and the nearly five million Americans with security clearances (1.4 million with top security clearances, more than a third of them private contractors), the official explanation is "terrorism."  It matters little that terrorism as a phenomenon is one of the lesser dangers Americans face in their daily lives and that, for some of the larger ones, ranging from food-borne illnesses to cars, guns, and what’s now called “extreme weather,” no one would think about building vast bureaucratic structures shrouded in secrecy, funded to the hilt, and offering Americans promises of ultimate safety.
Terrorism certainly rears its ugly head from time to time and there’s no question that the fear of some operation getting through the vast U.S. security net drives the employees of our global security state.  As an explanation for the phenomenal growth of that state, however, it simply doesn’t hold water.  In truth, compared to the previous century, U.S. enemies are remarkably scarce on this planet. So forget the official explanation and imagine our global-security-state-in-the-making in the grips of a kind of compulsive disorder in which the urge to go global, make the most private information of the citizen everywhere the property of the American state, and expand surveillance endlessly simply trumps any other way of doing things.
In other words, they can’t help themselves.  The process, the phenomenon, has them by the throat, so much so that they can imagine no other way of being.  In this mood, they are paving the way for a new global security -- or rather insecurity -- world.  They are, for instance, hiking spending on “cybersecurity,” have already secretly launched the planet’s first cyberwar, are planning for more of them, intend to dominate the future cyber-landscape in a staggering fashion, continue to gather global data of every sort on a massive scale, and more generally are acting in ways that they would consider criminal if other countries engaged in them.
5. The Urge To Leak
The massive leaks of documents by Bradley Manning and Edward Snowden have few precedents in American history.  Daniel Ellsberg’s Pentagon Papers leak is their only obvious predecessor.  They are not, however, happenstances of our moment.  They are signs of what’s to come.  If, in surveillance terms, the urge to go global and impose ultimate secrecy on both the state’s secrets and yours, to prosecute whistleblowers to the maximum (at this point usually via the Espionage Act or, in the case of Manning, via the charge of “aiding the enemy,” and with calls of “treason” already in the air when it comes to Snowden), it’s natural that the urge to leak will rise as well.
If the surveillance state has reached an industrial level of operations, and ever more secrets are being brought into computer systems, then vast troves of secrets exist to be revealed, already cached, organized, and ready for the plucking.  If the security state itself goes global, then the urge to leak will go global, too.
In fact, it already has.  It’s easy to forget that WikiLeaks was originally created not just for American secrets but any secrets.  Similarly, Manning uploaded his vast trove of secrets from Iraq, and Snowden, who had already traveled the world in the service of secrecy, leaked to an American columnist living in Brazil and writing for a British newspaper.  His flight to Hong Kong and dream ofIcelandic citizenship could be considered another version of the globalizing impulse. 
Rest assured, they will not be the last.  An all-enveloping atmosphere of secrecy is not a natural state of being.  Just look at us individually.  We love to tell stories about each other.  Gossiping is one of the most basic of human activities.  Revealing what others don’t know is an essential urge.  The urge, that is, to open it all up is at least as powerful as the urge to shut it all down.
So in our age, considering the gigantism of the U.S. surveillance and intelligence apparatus and the secrets it holds, it’s a given that the leak, too, will become more gigantic, that leaked documents will multiply in droves, and that resistance to regimes of secrecy and the invasion of private life that goes with them will also become more global.  It’s hard from within the U.S. to imagine the shock in Pakistan, or Germany, or India, on discovering that your private life may now be the property of the U.S. government.  (Imagine for a second the reaction here if Snowden had revealed that the Pakistani or Iranian or Chinese government was gathering and storing vast quantities of private emails, texts, phone calls, and credit card transactions from American citizens.  The uproar would have been staggering.)
As a result of all this, we face a strangely contradictory future in which ever more draconian regimes of secrecy will confront the urge for ever greater transparency.  President Obama came into officepromising a “sunshine” administration that would open the workings of the government to the American people.  He didn’t deliver, but Bradley Manning, Edward Snowden, and other leakers have, and no matter how difficult the government makes it to leak or how hard it cracks down on leakers, the urge is almost as unstoppable as the urge not to be your government’s property.
You may have secrets, but you are not a secret -- and you know it.
Tom Engelhardt, co-founder of the American Empire Project and author of The United States of Fear as well as a history of the Cold War, The End of Victory Culture (just published in aKindle edition), runs the Nation Institute's TomDispatch.com. His latest book, co-authored with Nick Turse, is Terminator Planet: The First History of Drone Warfare, 2001-2050
Follow TomDispatch on Twitter and join us on Facebook or Tumblr. Check out the newest Dispatch book, Nick Turse’s The Changing Face of Empire: Special Ops, Drones, Proxy Fighters, Secret Bases, and Cyberwarfare.
Copyright 2013 Tom Engelhardt

Thursday, August 01, 2013

FBI: Drones Are In Use In America

FBI Director Robert Mueller revealed that the bureau uses drones to conduct surveillance on U.S. soil.
Asked by Sen. Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa) if the FBI was following in the footsteps of the Drug Enforcement Agency and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms in pursuing the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, Mueller said yes. The vehicles are used in very narrow circumstances for surveillance, he said.
Asked if the bureau had developed a set of policies governing drone use and privacy protections, however, Mueller said that such a process was just starting.
"We are in the initial stages of doing that," Mueller said, emphasizing that the FBI drone program was in the nascent stages. "I will tell you that our footprint is very small. We have very few of limited use, and we're exploring not only the use, but the necessary guidelines for that use."
He added that drones were used "in a very, very minimal way, and very seldom."
Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.), a supporter of the recently revealed data collection program of the National Security Agency, told Mueller that drones represent a dire threat to Americans' privacy.
"I think the greatest threat to the privacy of Americans is the drone, and the use of the drone and the very few regulations that are on it today, and the booming industry of commercial drones," Feinstein said.
Pressed on what protections the FBI has in place to protect privacy, Mueller said the main safeguard is the way the drones are used.
"It is very narrowly focused on particularized cases and particularized needs," Mueller said. "That is the principal privacy limitation we have."
UPDATE: 5:37 p.m. -- News of the FBI's drone program also alarmed Sen. Mark Udall (D-Colo.), an Intelligence Committee member who has been critical of government surveillance. He found it troubling that the FBI had not yet developed a policy to govern its drone use.
"Unmanned aerial systems have the potential to more efficiently and effectively perform law enforcement duties, but the American people expect the FBI and other government agencies to first and foremost protect their constitutional rights," Udall said in a statement. "I am concerned the FBI is deploying drone technology while only being in the 'initial stages' of developing guidelines to protect Americans' privacy rights. I look forward to learning more about this program and will do everything in my power to hold the FBI accountable and ensure its actions respect the U.S. Constitution."

Monday, July 22, 2013

27 Quotes About U.S. Government Spying

Edward Snowden

Edward Snowden informs us that:

#1 "The majority of people in developed countries spend at least some time interacting with the Internet, and Governments are abusing that necessity in secret to extend their powers beyond what is necessary and appropriate."
#2 "...I believe that at this point in history, the greatest danger to our freedom and way of life comes from the reasonable fear of omniscient State powers kept in check by nothing more than policy documents."
#3 "The government has granted itself power it is not entitled to. There is no public oversight. The result is people like myself have the latitude to go further than they are allowed to."
#4 "...I can't in good conscience allow the US government to destroy privacy, internet freedom and basic liberties for people around the world with this massive surveillance machine they're secretly building."
#5 "The NSA has built an infrastructure that allows it to intercept almost everything."
#6 "With this capability, the vast majority of human communications are automatically ingested without targeting. If I wanted to see your e-mails or your wife's phone, all I have to do is use intercepts. I can get your e-mails, passwords, phone records, credit cards."
#7 "Any analyst at any time can target anyone. Any selector, anywhere... I, sitting at my desk, certainly had the authorities to wiretap anyone, from you or your accountant, to a federal judge, to even the President..."
#8 "To do that, the NSA specifically targets the communications of everyone. It ingests them by default. It collects them in its system and it filters them and it analyzes them and it measures them and it stores them for periods of time simply because that's the easiest, most efficient and most valuable way to achieve these ends. So while they may be intending to target someone associated with a foreign government, or someone that they suspect of terrorism, they are collecting YOUR communications to do so."
#9 "I believe that when [senator Ron] Wyden and [senator Mark] Udall asked about the scale of this, they [the NSA] said it did not have the tools to provide an answer. We do have the tools and I have maps showing where people have been scrutinized most. We collect more digital communications from America than we do from the Russians."
#10 "...they are intent on making every conversation and every form of behavior in the world known to them."
#11 "Even if you're not doing anything wrong, you're being watched and recorded. ...it's getting to the point where you don't have to have done anything wrong, you simply have to eventually fall under suspicion from somebody, even by a wrong call, and then they can use this system to go back in time and scrutinize every decision you've ever made, every friend you've ever discussed something with, and attack you on that basis, to sort of derive suspicion from an innocent life."
#12 "Allowing the U.S. government to intimidate its people with threats of retaliation for revealing wrongdoing is contrary to the public interest."
#13 "Everyone everywhere now understands how bad things have gotten — and they’re talking about it. They have the power to decide for themselves whether they are willing to sacrifice their privacy to the surveillance state."
#14 "I do not want to live in a world where everything I do and say is recorded. That is not something I am willing to support or live under."
#15 "I don't want to live in a world where there's no privacy, and therefore no room for intellectual exploration and creativity."
#16 "I have no intention of hiding who I am because I know I have done nothing wrong."
#17 "I had been looking for leaders, but I realized that leadership is about being the first to act."
#18 "There are more important things than money. If I were motivated by money, I could have sold these documents to any number of countries and gotten very rich."
#19 "The great fear that I have regarding the outcome for America of these disclosures is that nothing will change. [People] won't be willing to take the risks necessary to stand up and fight to change things... And in the months ahead, the years ahead, it's only going to get worse. [The NSA will] say that... because of the crisis, the dangers that we face in the world, some new and unpredicted threat, we need more authority, we need more power, and there will be nothing the people can do at that point to oppose it. And it will be turnkey tyranny."
#20 "I will be satisfied if the federation of secret law, unequal pardon and irresistible executive powers that rule the world that I love are revealed even for an instant."
#21 "You can't come up against the world's most powerful intelligence agencies and not accept the risk."
#22 "I know the media likes to personalize political debates, and I know the government will demonize me."
#23 "We have got a CIA station just up the road – the consulate here in Hong Kong – and I am sure they are going to be busy for the next week. And that is a concern I will live with for the rest of my life, however long that happens to be."
#24 "I understand that I will be made to suffer for my actions, and that the return of this information to the public marks my end."
#25 "There’s no saving me."
#26 "The only thing I fear is the harmful effects on my family, who I won't be able to help any more. That's what keeps me up at night."
#27 "I do not expect to see home again."
Would you make the same choice that Edward Snowden made?  Most Americans would not.  One CNN reporter says that he really admires Snowden because he has tried to get insiders to come forward with details about government spying for years, but none of them were ever willing to...
As a digital technology writer, I have had more than one former student and colleague tell me about digital switchers they have serviced through which calls and data are diverted to government servers or the big data algorithms they've written to be used on our e-mails by intelligence agencies. I always begged them to write about it or to let me do so while protecting their identities. They refused to come forward and believed my efforts to shield them would be futile. "I don't want to lose my security clearance. Or my freedom," one told me.
And if the U.S. government has anything to say about it, Snowden is most definitely going to pay for what he has done.  In fact, according to the Daily Beast, a directorate known as "the Q Group" is already hunting Snowden down...
The people who began chasing Snowden work for the Associate Directorate for Security and Counterintelligence, according to former U.S. intelligence officers who spoke on condition of anonymity. The directorate, sometimes known as “the Q Group,” is continuing to track Snowden now that he’s outed himself as The Guardian’s source, according to the intelligence officers.
If Snowden is not already under the protection of some foreign government (such as China), it will just be a matter of time before U.S. government agents get him.
And how will they treat him once they find him?  Well, one reporter overheard a group of U.S. intelligence officials talking about how Edward Snowden should be "disappeared".  The following is from a Daily Mail article that was posted on Monday...
A group of intelligence officials were overheard yesterday discussing how the National Security Agency worker who leaked sensitive documents to a reporter last week should be 'disappeared.'
Foreign policy analyst and editor at large of The Atlantic, Steve Clemons, tweeted about the 'disturbing' conversation after listening in to four men who were sitting near him as he waited for a flight at Washington's Dulles airport.
'In Dulles UAL lounge listening to 4 US intel officials saying loudly leaker & reporter on #NSA stuff should be disappeared recorded a bit,' he tweeted at 8:42 a.m. on Saturday.
According to Clemons, the men had been attending an event hosted by the Intelligence and National Security Alliance.
As an American, I am deeply disturbed that the U.S. government is embarrassing itself in front of the rest of the world like this.
The fact that we are collecting trillions of pieces of information on people all over the planet is a massive embarrassment and the fact that our politicians are defending this practice now that it has been exposed is a massive embarrassment.
If the U.S. government continues to act like a Big Brother police state, then the rest of the world will eventually conclude that is exactly what we are.  At that point we become the "bad guy" and we lose all credibility with the rest of the planet.