Showing posts with label SAS. Show all posts
Showing posts with label SAS. Show all posts

Thursday, August 02, 2012

The SAS Invade Somalia


Two SAS agents caught carrying out a false flag terror attack in Basra, Iraq, Spetmeber 20th, 2005. They were later broken out of an Iraqi jail by British tanks running its walls down.

Up to sixty commandos of the UK’s elite Special Air Service (SAS) have invaded Somalia. In violation of the UN Charter, Britain’s Attorney General, Dominic Grieve, authorised the commandos to invade the country with the professed aims of quelling the al-Shabaab militia,1 which is battling the UK-created and installed Transitional Federal Government (TFG).

This is an old British ploy: create a proxy militia, use it to wreck a country, and then send in the heavy artillery when it proves too incompetent to finish the job. In 2010, the secret services began training and arming anti-Gaddafi elements (following a botched 1995-6 effort), using Gaddafi’s crackdowns as a pretext for NATO bombing. Ditto Syria.

The press reported that the SAS commandos in Somalia are collaborating with the Kenyan military—which Britain also trains and arms—on the Somalia-Kenya border. Not newsworthy, however, were the quarter of a million Somali refugees living in dire conditions in Kenyan camps, driven from Somalia in 2006-2009 by the scorched-earth tactics of the TFG: that is Britain’s terrorism, so it is unmentionable.2

Also unmentionable is the UK-Kenyan terrorism of SAS-backed air strikes on Somali refugee camps. Daniel Bekele, Africa director at Human Rights Watch, said: “Kenya’s Somalia operation has resulted in apparent attacks on a camp for displaced people and a fishing boat.” On October 30 2011, the Kenyan Air Force, using British weapons and tactical training, bombed an internally displaced persons’ camp near Jilib, Somalia. Médecins Sans Frontières treated 45 wounded people, including 31 children, and confirmed that 5 civilians died as a result.3

Also unmentionable is the fact that the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), which the TFG deposed in 2009 and from which al-Shabaab sprang, was a socialist, non-extremist government, according to US Congressional documents;4 that the ICU eliminated piracy (not with violence but with job creation);5 and that al-Shabaab’s core are MI6-MI5 double-agents, and British fighters in Somali were radicalised by MI5-MI6 agents like Haroon Rashid Aswat and Abu Qatada.6

Most unmentionable of all is that Somalis depend on piracy for survival, because EU vessels are illegally over-fishing their waters, according to unreported House of Lords documents;7 and that according to the Red Cross, nearly one million Somalis depend upon food aid: any increase in UK-led violence could starve hundreds of thousands of people.8

Via: "Axis Of Logic"

Tuesday, July 03, 2012

Plan To Split Army Into Two Forces

Structural Reforms Will Include Expanding Special Operations

By KIM SENGUPTA
TUESDAY 19 JUNE 2012
Courtesy Of "The Independent"


The British Army is to undergo drastic structural reforms in the face of budget cuts and the changing face of conflict. Plans being drawn up will see the force split in two, with greater emphasis placed on undercover special operations, intelligence, surveillance and cyber warfare, The Independent has learned.



A blueprint entitled Army 2020 has been drawn up by Lieutenant General Nick Carter, who has been tasked with the Army's reorganisation while overall numbers are cut by a fifth. It recommends the separation of "Reaction" and "Adaptable" forces, enabling the UK to respond in an emergency while also preparing for longer-term deployment.

In addition to the Carter plan, senior officers – including, it is believed, General Sir David Richards, the head of the military – want to expand the type of combat carried out by the SAS and the SBS as well as Istar (Intelligence Surveillance Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance). They also want to focus on cyber security, which they argue is vital for a "lighter, more agile" type of combat.

Although the scheme will take time to come to fruition, the plans have been heavily influenced by the events of the Arab Spring, the confrontation over Iran's nuclear arsenal and the possibility of an Israeli attack as well as lessons learned from Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya. Senior officers are urging caution over British involvement in Syria and only basic contingency plans have been made for such an operation. 

There is, however, much more planning for the aftermath of a possible Israeli strike on Iran.

One idea that will be considered in expanding special operations is the enlargement of the role of the Special Forces Support Group (SFSG), which is based around members of the 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment and augmented by troops from the Royal Marines and the RAF Regiment. The Group, which backs up the SAS and SBS, may be opened up to recruitment from a wider array of regiments. The proposals will also include expected reductions of five infantry battalions and two armoured regiments, although no regimental cap badges will be lost. The final details have not yet been finalised but, according to defence sources, the Parachute Regiment and the brigades of Guards and Gurkhas will largely escape the cuts. However, Gurkha recruits who joined reinforcement companies – set up to make up a shortfall – will face redundancy.

Two Scottish battalions are set to be axed, but Downing Street is said to be delaying signing this off because it does not want to provide a propaganda boost to Alex Salmond and the SNP with a referendum on independence on the horizon. English regiments, the Yorkshires and the Mercians, and the Royal Tank Regiments are believed to be vulnerable to losing soldiers.

The "Reaction" force, according to confidential documents, will be comprised of three armoured brigades, each with a tank regiment, two infantry regiments and an airborne brigade, commanded by a major general and armed with two regiments of Apache helicopter gunships and Warrior fighting vehicles. One armoured and one airborne battle group will be on standby.

The "Adaptable" force will consist of seven infantry brigades able to deploy for two to three years while maintaining a permanent presence in the Falklands and Cyprus. The days of 13-year commitments – which the Afghan mission will come to by the time it ends – are over, it is felt. "Not only would something like that be logistically impossible in the future, but would show a failure of strategy," said one senior officer.

No less than 30 per cent of the "Adaptable" force is meant to be made up of reservists who will "shadow" regular soldiers in exercises in preparation.


Tuesday, March 08, 2011

The SAS Operation That Went Wrong


The troops knew they were entering a volatile situation Photo: AP


As The Diplomatic Team In Libya Were Rescued By HMS Cumberland After Their Humiliating Capture, The Ministry Of Defence Was Left Trying To Work Out What On Earth Went Wrong.

By Caroline Gammell, and Nick Meo in Benghazi
8:08PM GMT 06 Mar 2011
Courtesy Of "The Telegraph"


When the helicopter touched down outside Benghazi in the early hours of Friday morning, the SAS troops on board knew they were entering a volatile situation.
Tasked with escorting a diplomat to meet rebel Libyan forces and assessing the humanitarian situation on the ground, they did not, however, expect a hostile reception.
With the British Government openly rejecting Colonel Muammar Gaddafi and already in dialogue with opposition leaders, it should have been an uncontroversial visit.
However, the manner of their arrival – in the dead of night, armed with weapons, maps and explosives while dressed in plain black clothing – did little to assuage local panic.
The contingent of seven SAS officers and one MI6 official landed about 20 miles from Benghazi, where local witnesses said warning shots were fired as they arrived. As the soldiers tried to get to a nearby compound, they were quickly surrounded by the local militia who demanded to know who they were and what they were doing.
They tried to bluff their way out of the increasingly tense situation, claiming they were unarmed, which was only made worse when their weapons were discovered.
Realising their cover had been blown and their supposedly discreet mission had been compromised, the soldiers put up no resistance as they were arrested.
Handcuffed and taken to a military base in Benghazi, they were well treated and allowed contact with British diplomats in the troubled country.
As the humiliating news of their arrest started to spread, the paths of diplomatic communication sprang into life.
Richard Northern, the British ambassador to Libya, was purportedly recorded having a conversation with one of the rebel leaders to try and solve the situation.
The tape, played on Libyan state television, showed him pleading for the group, claiming there had been a "misunderstanding" and asking for the opposition to intervene.
Mr Northern said the group was a small advance party of officials hoping to contact anti-Gaddafi forces and assess the humanitarian situation.
He even claimed that the group were planning to look for suitable hotels during the visit.
"I understand there has been a misunderstanding and they have been picked up by security groups who are concerned about their presence and who they are," he said.
"I hope to ask Mr Jalil (Mustafa Abdel Jalil, Col Gaddafi's former justice minister and now senior rebel leader) if he might be able to intervene and clear up this misunderstanding."
Mr Jalil's spokesman told the ambassador the British had made a major error in the manner of their arrival.
"They made a big mistake coming with a helicopter in an open area," he said.
His view was echoed by other rebels in Benghazi, who were puzzled by the way in which the British forces arrived.
Jalil Elgallal, a member of Benghazi's revolutionary media committee, said: "Nobody here was informed of their arrival; it has all been rather peculiar and we don't understand why they turned up like this."
Another rebel source said: "If this is an official delegation, why come with helicopters? Why not say 'we are coming, permission to land at the airport?' There are rules for these things."
By Sunday afternoon, a crisis had been averted as the soldiers were released and their weapons confiscated.
As they were rescued by HMS Cumberland which docked briefly in Benghazi before setting sail to Malta, the Ministry of Defence was left trying to work out what on earth went wrong.

SAS-Backed Libyan Diplomatic Mission Ends In Humiliation
British Special Forces and Intelligence Agents Leave Libya On HMS Cumberland After Being Released By Anti-Gaddafi Rebels

By Martin Chulov, Mark Tran, Amy Fallon and Polly Curtis
Sunday 6 March 2011 18.27 GMT
Courtesy Of "The Guardian"


A British diplomatic effort to reach out to Libyan rebels has ended in humiliation as a team of British special forces and intelligence agents left Benghazi after being briefly detained.
The six SAS troops and two MI6 officers were seized by Libyan rebels in the eastern part of the country after arriving by helicopter four days ago. They left on HMS Cumberland, the frigate that had docked in Benghazi to evacuate British and other EU nationals as Libya lurched deeper into conflict. The diplomatic team's departure marked a perfunctory end to a bizarre and botched venture.
"I can confirm that a small British diplomatic team has been in Benghazi," said William Hague, the foreign secretary. "The team went to Libya to initiate contacts with the opposition. They experienced difficulties, which have now been satisfactorily resolved. They have now left Libya."
Audio of a telephone conversation between the UK's ambassador to Libya, Richard Northern, and a senior rebel leader was later leaked.
Northern suggested in the call that the SAS team had been detained due to a misunderstanding.
The rebel leader responded: "They made a big mistake, coming with a helicopter in an open area."
Northern said: "I didn't know how they were coming."
Despite the failure of the mission, Hague indicated that Britain would continue to try to make contact with the opposition.
"We intend, in consultation with the opposition, to send a further team to strengthen our dialogue in due course," he said. "This diplomatic effort is part of the UK's wider work on Libya, including our ongoing humanitarian support. We continue to press for Gaddafi to step down and we will work with the international community to support the legitimate ambitions of the Libyan people."
According to Guardian sources, the British intelligence and special forces unit were caught near the al-Khadra Farm Company, 18 miles (30km) south-west of Benghazi. A senior member of Benghazi's revolutionary council said: "They were carrying espionage equipment, reconnaissance equipment, multiple passports and weapons. This is no way to conduct yourself during an uprising.
"Gaddafi is bringing in thousands of mercenaries to kill us, most are using foreign passports and how do we know who these people are?
"They say they're British nationals and some of the passports they have are British. But the Israelis used British passports to kill that man in Dubai last year."
Rebel leaders said claimed the captives had been treated well and would be released as soon as the British government vouched for their identity with the rebel command.
The news follows Sunday Times claims that an SAS unit was being held by rebel forces it had approached in an attempt to open up diplomatic channels to opponents of Muammar Gaddafi.
Whitehall sources said on Friday it needed to learn more about the leadership of the anti-Gaddafi forces and find out what logistical support they needed, but would not give arms to the rebels, as an international arms embargo was in place.
British officials during the day declined to comment on reports that special forces were being held but defended the objective of the mission.
The defence secretary, Liam Fox said: "It is a very difficult situation to be able to understand in detail. There are a number of different opposition groups to Colonel Gaddafi in Libya who do seem relatively disparate. We want to clearly understand what the dynamic is here because we want to be able to work with them to ensure the demise of the Gaddafi regime, to see a transition to greater stability in Libya and ultimately to more representative government.
"So getting a picture of that is relatively difficult, as is widely reported. Communications are being interrupted, there are difficulties with mobile phones, with the internet potentially being interfered with.
"So we are trying to build a picture – it's essential that the government does that and it's essential that all western governments do that so we are able to get a clearer idea of what we are able to do in terms of helping the people of Libya."
David Cameron, speaking at the Tory party spring conference in Cardiff, repeated his call for "Gaddafi to go". "On Libya, our strategy is clear," he said. "We will continue to intensify pressure on the regime. We will continue to state clearly that international justice has a long reach and a long memory, and that those who commit crimes against humanity will not go unpunished. We will continue to provide humanitarian assistance to those affected by this crisis, and continue to demand access for aid agencies to reach those in need.
And we will continue to plan, with our allies, for every eventuality. "
The Sunday Times reported Libyan and British sources confirming the SAS unit had been detained by rebel forces it had approached to secure a meeting with a junior diplomat to offer help in their fight against Gaddafi. The mission backfired when rebel leaders in Benghazi objected to foreign interference from governments which had not yet formally recognised them as Libya's legitimate rulers, it said.

Monday, December 15, 2008

Afghan War-Crimes Evidence Removed, U.S. Silent

As Possible Afghan War-Crimes Evidence Removed, U.S. Silent

By Tom Lasseter
Posted on Thursday, December 11, 2008
Courtesy Of McClatchy NewsPapers

DASHT-E LEILI, Afghanistan — Seven years ago, a convoy of container trucks rumbled across northern Afghanistan loaded with a human cargo of suspected Taliban and al Qaida members who'd surrendered to Gen. Abdul Rashid Dostum, an Afghan warlord and a key U.S. ally in ousting the Taliban regime.

When the trucks arrived at a prison in the town of Sheberghan, near Dostum's headquarters, they were filled with corpses. Most of the prisoners had suffocated, and others had been killed by bullets that Dostum's militiamen had fired into the metal containers.

Dostum's men hauled the bodies into the nearby desert and buried them in mass graves, according to Afghan human rights officials. By some estimates, 2,000 men were buried there.

Earlier this year, bulldozers returned to the scene, reportedly exhumed the bones of many of the dead men and removed evidence of the atrocity to sites unknown. In the area where the mass graves once were, there now are gaping pits in the sands of the Dasht-e-Leili desert.

A U.N.-sponsored team of experts first spotted two large excavations on a visit in June, one of them about 100 feet long and more than 9 feet deep in places. A McClatchy reporter visited the site last month and found three additional smaller pits, which apparently had been dug since June.

Faqir Mohammed Jowzjani, a former Dostum ally and the deputy governor of Jowzjan province, where the graves were located, told McClatchy that it's common knowledge that Dostum sent in the bulldozers.

He speculated that Dostum wanted to destroy the evidence because of local political trouble that could have made him more prone to prosecution for the killings.

Last year, Dostum and the then-Jowzjan governor became embroiled in a feud that killed seven people and wounded more than 40. This year, Dostum and his men kidnapped and reportedly beat a rival Afghan leader.

"Maybe General Dostum did it because of a fear of prosecution in the future," Jowzjani said.

Another local Afghan official said that Dostum had begun to worry that the 2001 killings could come back to haunt him. "Everyone in the city (Sheberghan) knows that the evidence has been removed," said the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of worries about being killed for talking about the subject.

"When the crime happened, (Dostum and his commanders) didn't think they would ever be prosecuted," the official said. "But later they began to worry . . . they have taken all the bones and thrown them into the river" that's about half a mile from the graves.

NATO — which has command authority over a team of troops less than three miles from the grave site — the United Nations and the United States have been silent about the destruction of evidence of Dostum's alleged war crimes.

"The truth is that General Dostum went out with bulldozers and dug up those graves," Jowzjani charged. "I don't know why UNAMA" — the U.N. mission in Afghanistan — "hasn't said anything in this regard . . . maybe because of fears about his power, or maybe they made a deal."

Gen. Ghulam Mujtaba Patang, the commander of Afghanistan's national police in the north, said that he knew that the graves had been emptied. He noted that "the digging was done very professionally" and said that U.N. and NATO-led teams in the area were also aware. (While provincial reconstruction teams are led by individual nations, their military components are under NATO command.)

"I don't understand why they didn't secure the area," Patang said in an interview. Perhaps, he said, Western officials "are nervous" about the power that Dostum has locally and don't want to upset local security by pushing him on the matter.

Dostum was unavailable for comment, and one of his senior aides, Gen. Ghani Karim Zada, declined several interview requests.

The Bush administration, too, has remained silent. U.S. officials claimed that they had no knowledge of the deaths of the prisoners in the convoy until the news media revealed them in 2002, and now the administration has remained silent about Dostum's reported effort to destroy the evidence of them, which also would be a major violation of international law.

American officials say that Dostum's alleged war crimes are a matter for the Afghan authorities. But the U.S.-backed government of President Hamid Karzai is weak and depends on American and NATO troops to fight a growing Taliban insurgency that now operates in most of Afghanistan and all but surrounds Kabul, the capital.

However, the fact that U.S. special forces and CIA operatives were working closely with Dostum in late 2001, when the killings took place, has fueled suspicions that the warlord got a free pass.

The U.S. Defense Department has said that it found no evidence of American involvement or presence during the 2001 incident. If there was an investigation, however, its findings have never been made public.

"At the time, we had a handful of special forces and CIA, and there was no way we could have exercised any oversight" of the thousands of detainees under Afghan control, said Joseph Collins, who was then the deputy assistant secretary of defense for stability operations.

When he was asked about the detainees suffocating in metal shipping containers, Collins, who's now a professor at the National War College, said that "I think most people just took for granted what he (Dostum) said: that it was a horrible accident."

McClatchy interviewed eight Pakistani men last year who said that Dostum's gunmen had stuffed them in the containers. The men, mostly low-level Taliban volunteers, said they'd had to climb over dozens of dead bodies to get out of the containers.

"We were all sitting on the dead bodies which were lying on the floor; they were lifeless," said Abdul Haleem, who said that many of the approximately 200 men in his container died. "An arm was sticking up in the air here, a leg was sticking up in the air there."

Another man who said he'd made the trip to Sheberghan in a container full of dead and dying men was Tariq Khan. He said that when Dostum's men shot into the metal box, "some people were shot in the eye; some were shot in the neck."

Dostum offered to take Pierre-Richard Prosper, who was then the U.S. ambassador-at-large for war crimes issues, on a tour of the grave site in late 2002, but Prosper declined. He was pressing a reluctant Afghan government and the U.N. to take the lead in investigating the killings.

"We felt the Afghans needed to play a role," Prosper said in a telephone interview. "If you're a new government, and you want to move forward, you have to deal with the past."

However, no investigation was likely without strong U.S. backing, and Prosper said that he couldn't recall whether Washington ever gave funding for a probe.

Farid Mutaqi, a senior investigator for the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission in the nearby city of Mazar-e-Sharif, said that it was almost impossible to visit the site because of Dostum's power in northern Afghanistan.

Mutaqi said there'd been threats on his life and those of his staff members from Dostum. There are rumors that the site was mined and that Dostum's men would torture or kill people if they were caught researching in the area. At least three Afghans who witnessed the original digging of the mass grave or who investigated it later reportedly were killed, and a handful of others were beaten.

Mutaqi said that he told officials at the United Nations and the local provincial reconstruction team that Dostum's men had disturbed the mass graves this year. They did nothing, he said.

Now, Mutaqi said, "You can see only a hole. In the area around it you can find a few bones or some clothes. The site is gone . . . as for evidence, there is nothing."

A spokesman for the United Nations in Afghanistan, Adrian Edwards, acknowledged in an e-mail statement that the U.N. had known that the graves had been dug up but had kept quiet.

"You're right that we don't always make public statements, but that's because we're in a conflict environment and have to weigh up whether doing so will stall chances of progress against impunity in other areas or put lives at risk," the statement said. "It's a judgment call we constantly strive to get right, and this is not the only instance where the choices we have to make can be extraordinarily tough ones." Edwards noted that the U.N. is awaiting a report about the site by a forensic specialist.

The spokesman for the U.N.'s Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Rupert Colville, said that while he didn't know the details of the digging at the site, "there cannot be impunity for war crimes of this nature and scale . . . it's a real shame."

Spokesmen for NATO and the U.S. Embassy in Kabul denied knowing that the remains of hundreds of men had been removed from the site, and had no further comment.

"We have no information about bulldozers or digging at the site," said Lt. Cmdr. James Gater, a spokesman for the NATO mission in Afghanistan. The U.S. general who heads NATO forces in Afghanistan, Gen. David McKiernan, wouldn't do an interview, Gater said.

U.S. Embassy spokesman Mark Stroh said that he'd checked with several officials at the embassy and "nobody seemed to have any visibility on this." Stroh added that "We don't necessarily monitor all of Dostum's behavior."

A McClatchy reporter, traveling without official escort, took GPS readings of the open pits last month, and a forensic investigator with Physicians for Human Rights, a group contracted by the U.N. to examine the site, confirmed that they were in the same area where the grave site was found in early 2002.

In May 2002, the U.N. announced that a Physicians for Human Rights team had dug a test trench in the area and found 15 bodies, three of which had been exhumed and found to have died recently of asphyxiation

In November 2002, amid the Physicians for Human Rights findings and news reports, a top-secret cable from the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research said that the number of people killed during transport to Sheberghan "may approach 2,000."

The cable also said that while there was no security at Dasht-e Leili, U.N. personnel from Mazar-e-Sharif were monitoring the grave " 'every few days' for signs of tampering." There'd been plans for a detailed forensic investigation of the site in spring 2003.

"The hope had been to do a full exhumation in 2003," said Nathaniel Raymond, a senior investigator at Physicians for Human Rights. "It didn't happen."

The U.N. monitoring of the site stopped. Edwards, the U.N. spokesman, said that he was still trying to reach officials who'd been present to get an explanation. The U.N., NATO, U.S. forces and the Afghan government never took any formal responsibility for patrolling the grave site.

Physicians for Human Rights made several requests to top U.S. officials to secure the mass graves, including an August 2002 letter to then-Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld asking that he "reconsider the position of the Defense Department and assure security at the grave site." Four months later, the organization sent a letter to then-Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz saying that it was crucial to provide a small security detachment.

"From the time we discovered the site in January 2002, we had been advocating privately and publicly to the United Nations, the U.S. and the Afghan government to ensure consistent site protection and protection of forensic evidence," Frank Donaghue, the chief executive officer of Physicians for Human Rights, said in a statement to McClatchy. "And clearly that did not happen."

Dostum has long experience with mass graves being used in the Afghan political arena. In 1997, he revealed the discovery of mass graves of Taliban members killed by a former ally turned rival, Gen. Abdul Malik Pahlawan, in the Dasht-e Leili desert. The grave sites, which Dostum's men brought in international journalists to document, helped cement Pahlawan's exile from the area at the time.

Afghanistan's attorney general, its top law enforcement official, said that given the bad security conditions in the country it was hard to think about investigating possible war crimes.

"So for the time being, we have put these issues off for the future," Mohammed Ishaq Aloko said in an interview at his Kabul office.

Aloko, who's seen as being very close to President Karzai, didn't respond directly to repeated questions about Dostum.

"I believe that those who committed crimes against humanity will be prosecuted one day," Aloko said. Just not anytime soon, he said.

More on this Story

Map locating mass graves

View larger image

ON THE WEB

FOIA documents concerning Dasht-e Leili mass grave in Afghanistan

Physicians for Human Rights

Afghan Massacre: Convoy of Death" video

More on Abdul Rashid Dostum

MORE FROM MCCLATCHY

McClatchy's "Guantanamo: Beyond the Law" project

Profile of former detainee Abdul Haleem

Profile of former detainee Tariq Khan

Related Information:

AFGHAN MASSACRE: THE CONVOY OF DEATH

Produced and directed by Irish filmmaker and former BBC producer Jamie Doran, the film tells the story of thousands of prisoners who surrendered to the US military's Afghan allies after the siege of Kunduz.

According to the film, some three thousand of the prisoners were forced into sealed containers and loaded onto trucks for transport to Sheberghan prison. When the prisoners began shouting for air, U.S.-allied Afghan soldiers fired directly into the truck, killing many of them. The rest suffered through an appalling road trip lasting up to four days, so thirsty they clawed at the skin of their fellow prisoners as they licked perspiration and even drank blood from open wounds.

Witnesses say that when the trucks arrived and soldiers opened the containers, most of the people inside were dead. They also say US Special Forces re-directed the containers carrying the living and dead into the desert and stood by as survivors were shot and buried. Now, up to three thousand bodies lie buried in a mass grave.

Outraged human rights groups and lawyers are calling for an investigation but the U.N. special envoy to Afghanistan refuses any U.N.-backed investigation until the Afghan government can protect witnesses. Two of the witnesses in the film have already been killed.

Sunday, December 14, 2008

Australia's SAS Death Squad Units In Afghanistan

Australian SAS Units Function As Death Squads In Afghanistan

By James Cogan
10 December 2008
Courtesy Of World Socialist Web Site

An Australian Defence Department (ADD) report published in October, and highlighted on November 26 by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation's "Lateline" program, provides a rare account of the shameful operations being performed by the Australian military as part of the US-led occupation of Afghanistan.

The units most involved are from the Special Air Service Regiment (SAS) and the Fourth Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (4RAR), the Army's designated commando battalion. These are highly trained troops and their ostensible role in times of war is to carry out long range reconnaissance, surveillance, harassment or raids on enemy targets. In the so-called "war on terror", they are being used as little more than death squads.

The ADD report presents the findings of an inquiry into a September 17 Australian operation that resulted in the mistaken killing of Rozi Khan, the pro-occupation governor of Chora district in Uruzgan province and a long-time colleague of Afghan president Hamid Karzai. The intended target, codenamed "Musket" by the Australian military, was an alleged member of the Islamist Taliban movement. While much of the mission statement remains censored, it is apparent that a squad was sent out to storm into the man's house in the dead of night and execute him in cold blood.

The possibility for things to go wrong is inherent in such operations in civilian areas, and on September 17, they went terribly wrong. Just days before the hit on "Musket" was ordered, the Taliban had issued threats against residents of a village, which lay on the route being taking by the Australians. Rozi Khan had encouraged the villagers to resist any attack and promised to come to their aid with his armed followers.

As the Australian troops moved close to the village, sentries atop houses spotted them and assumed they were Taliban intruders. Within minutes, dozens of villagers were firing on the Australians from the east, west and north. Khan and his men, alerted by the gunfire, began moving toward the fighting, as did local Afghan police.

Troops in an Australian back-up unit, who had manoeuvred to try and flank what they believed to be Taliban, engaged Khan's group and, the inquiry found, most likely inflicted fatal wounds on the district governor. It was not until a police vehicle arrived that the Australians made efforts to communicate with the men they were attacking.

After realising their mistake, the Australian troops aborted their "Musket" mission—at the cost of two dead and five wounded Afghans. The Defence Department inquiry ruled: "That Rozi Khan was among the casualties is resultant of his unfortunate intervention into a complex situation, albeit with altruistic motives."

The September 17 mission was no isolated incident. It was part of a broader and ongoing operation codenamed "Peeler" that tasks the Australian special forces with "disrupting [i.e., killing or capturing] Taliban leadership or improvised explosive device facilitators".

Not all missions result in the target's assassination. Last month, the alleged Taliban "shadow" governor of Uruzgan, Mullah Bari Ghul, was detained in a raid that was most likely conducted by Australians.

Other missions result in massacres. On November 23, 2007, Private Luke Worsley of 4RAR was killed during an assault on a residence in Chenartu village in Uruzgan. Because of the Australian fatality, details of the incident were made public. The target was Taliban leader Mullah Baz Mohammed, who was expected to be at the house that night.

Australian troops crept up under the cover of darkness, blew the outer doors off the housing compound and rushed in. They left the Daad family—three men, two women and one female child—dead on the floor. A neighbour, Faiz Mohammed, told Time magazine: "There was blood everywhere." Worsley was shot as he entered the house. Mullah Baz Mohammed was not there.

"Lateline" commented that the Defence Department report "prompts questions about the legality and the ethics of targeted killings, even in the dusty and chaotic battleground of Afghanistan".

Tim McCormack of Melbourne University, a professor of Humanitarian Law consulted by the program, provided reassurances. "International law is not pacifist law," he said. "It does allow the killing of enemy combatants and civilians who take a direct part in hostilities—just as it's also legal for the Taliban to hunt down an Australian SAS person or anybody on the Australian side or any of the allied side".

McCormack's remarks, however, serve only to obscure the essential issues. They ignore the thoroughly predatory and, therefore, criminal motives behind the US-led invasion of Afghanistan. The September 11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington were utilised as the pretext to deploy military forces into the desperately impoverished country with the aim of securing long term bases in the very heart of Central Asia, a region rich in untapped resources. Over the past seven years, the Afghan war has evolved into a component of the struggle for regional dominance between the US—supported at present by its European NATO allies—and Russia and China.

The existence of Al Qaeda bases in Afghanistan had nothing to do with the decision to send in troops. Not only did the Bush administration reject offers by the Taliban to hand Osama bin Laden over to a third country if evidence were presented of his involvement in 9/11, but virtually no steps were taken by the US military to prevent the bulk of Al Qaeda simply moving across the border into Pakistan's tribal agencies—where it has largely operated ever since.

Australia's involvement in the war was the result of the most cynical calculations. By sending troops to fight in Afghanistan and then Iraq, the former Howard government hoped to cement Washington's backing for a series of military operations that would secure Australian strategic and economic interests in the South Pacific, as well as a free trade agreement with the United States. The Rudd Labor government is continuing the same policy.

There is a stark difference—both politically and morally—between the activities of citizens resisting the invasion of their country and those of the invading army. Afghans are fighting for the right to determine their own future free from foreign domination. The Australian military in Afghanistan is an instrument of imperialist aggression. It is conducting a campaign of terror throughout Uruzgan province to force the population to accept a US puppet government.

One obvious parallel to the Afghanistan operation is the Vietnam War's Operation Phoenix. Over a five-year period, American and South Vietnamese death squads assassinated tens of thousands of Vietnamese on the grounds they were supporting the Viet Cong (VC) liberation movement. Only the most craven apologist for US imperialism would claim that such atrocities were "legal" on the basis that many of the victims belonged to the VC.

The Labor government repeatedly tries to ennoble the Afghan war with flowery descriptions of Australian soldiers as "heroes" who are "putting their lives on the line for the rest us". The truth is they are killing and maiming people, including entirely innocent civilians, of an oppressed country for a thoroughly reactionary, neo-colonial cause.

Copyright © 1998-2008 World Socialist Web Site - All rights reserved