German Intelligence Watching Politicians

More than one-third of the far-left Left Party's parliamentarians are under observation by Germany's domestic intelligence agency, SPIEGEL has learned. Much larger than previously thought, the operations cost nearly 400,000 euros a year. Critics worry it's disproportionate to surveillance of the right-wing extremist NPD party.

January 23, 2012 
Courtesy of "Der Spiegel Online"

Germany's opposition far-left Left Party is under more intense surveillance from domestic intelligence than previously thought, SPIEGEL has learned. Information from the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) reveals that 27 Left Party parliamentarians are being observed -- more than one-third of the party's 76-strong parliamentary group.

Another 11 members of state parliaments around the country are also being watched, SPIEGEL has learned. The agency has declined to release the politicians' names, as it would "run counter to the operative aims of the observation."

Concern about the Left Party's democratic pedigree is not new. The party formed in 2007 when a successor party to the East German communist party joined a leftist group from Western Germany. There have been numerous reports since then of party figures who were affiliated with the East German secret police, the Stasi, prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall.

The BfV is reportedly watching not just radical party members, but also a number of more moderate members, including almost all of the Left Party's leading figures in parliament. Among the targets are leader Gregor Gysi, deputy chairwoman Sahra Wagenknecht, and members of the party's parliamentary committee Dietmar Bartsch and Jan Korte.

But it's the inclusion of Steffen Bockhahn, a member of the parliamentary committee that oversees the country's intelligence agencies' budgets, that is raising eyebrows. His surveillance is particularly sensitive because in December 2011, the parliamentary research service determined that "because of the special job description of the committee … only very extraordinary circumstances could justify the surveillance of a member."

'Questions About Proportionality'

According to a Jan. 4, 2012 document from the Interior Ministry, the BfV employs seven workers for the "handling of the Left Party" with personnel costs of some €390,000 ($504,000) per year. By way of comparison, more than 10 domestic intelligence agents are conducting surveillance on members of the neo-Nazi National Democratic Party (NPD), at a cost of some €590,000 each year.

The BfV stresses that the Left Party politicians are not "under surveillance," but being "observed," during which no "intelligence service methods" are used. Instead, only public sources such as newspapers or speech manuscripts are analyzed, it says.

Still, Left Party parliamentary group leader Gregor Gysi reacted angrily to the news. "The parliamentarians are there to control the domestic intelligence agency. It is shameless that they think they can monitor a third of the parliamentarians in the Left Party faction," he told daily Mitteldeutsche Zeitung on Sunday. "Now it has finally become clear that the domestic intelligence agency is nuts."

The environmentalist Green Party has also expressed concern over the BfV measures, as the agency has recently come under fire for investigative errors in the case against the Zwickau neo-Nazi terror cell, which is thought to have murdered at least 10 people since 2000.

Comparing BfV efforts against the far-left and far-right inspires "questions about the sense and proportionality of the measures," said Volker Beck, a senior member of the Greens' parliamentary group. "The measures seem disproportionate when compared to the expenditures for measures against the NPD."

An Ominous Parallel

By Jacob G. Hornberger
Hornberger’s Blog Index
Thursday, April 2, 2009
Courtesy Of The Future Of Freedom Foundation

What was momentous about the 9/11 attack was not the attack itself, given that there had been other terrorist attacks in response to U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East (e.g., the 1993 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, the USS Cole, and U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania) but rather how U.S. officials used the 9/11 attack to assume “war on terrorism” powers. They were able to accomplish that through a clever sleight of hand in which they unilaterally converted terrorism from a crime to an act of war, enabling them to claim what were essentially dictatorial powers to wage war on terrorism.

It was a bold, revolutionary move that has transformed the relationship between the federal government and the American people.

As most everyone knows, because of the 9/11 attack the president and the Pentagon now wield the full power to wage war on terrorism all over the world, including here in the United States, given that the entire world is the battlefield in the war on terrorism.

That means that the president and the Pentagon now wield the power to do everything they’re doing in Iraq and Afghanistan here in the United States. Warrantless searches and seizures. Arbitrary arrests. Indefinite detentions. Kidnapping and rendition. Torture. Gun confiscation and gun control. Denial of trial by jury. Denial of due process of law.

It’s now all permissible so long it’s being done as part of the war on terrorism, a war that most everyone concedes is perpetual in nature. While this Damocles sword, by and large, has been sheathed for the time being here in the United States, if the U.S. were to face terrorist retaliation here at home for what U.S. troops are doing in Iraq and Afghanistan, everyone knows that President Obama and the military now possess the power to unsheathe the sword here at home should circumstances necessitate it.

Where did U.S. officials get the idea of using the 9/11 terrorist attack as a justification for assuming war on terrorism powers that ignore constitutional restraints and guarantees? One distinct possibility is that they got it from history, specifically German history.

In February 1933, terrorists committed an arson attack on the German parliament, a pivotal event in German history that became known as the Reichstag fire. The German police arrested and charged an immigrant named Marinus van der Lubbe and four of his associates, all of whom were communists.

Charging that Germany was now facing the twin threats of communism and terrorism, the German chancellor persuaded the German parliament to suspend civil liberties and to give him emergency powers. The suspension of rights was declared to be temporary, but given that communism and terrorism continued to threaten the national security of Germany, the suspension turned out to be permanent in nature.

What’s interesting is the contrast by which war on terrorism powers were acquired in each country in response to the terrorist threat to national security.

In Germany, the chancellor acquired his powers by persuading the German parliament to enact what became known as the Enabling Act.

Here in the United States, the president didn’t go to Congress to acquire his war on terrorism powers but instead did so by simply securing secret legal opinions from his legal advisors stating that since the U.S. government was now at war against the terrorists, the president could ignore constitutional restraints on power so long as he was operating in his role as a military commander-in-chief.

Ironically, the suspects in the German terrorist attack were put on trial in a German court, given that Germany viewed terrorism as a crime, not an act of war (as did the United States prior to 9/11). At the trial, some of the defendants were acquitted. In anger and outrage, the German chancellor established a special court known as the People’s Court that would have jurisdiction over future cases involving terrorism and treason, which would ensure that the terrorists would no longer be set free by the regular courts. The People’s Court was where Hans and Sophie Scholl and other members of the White Rose were put on trial and sentenced to die.

One can’t but wonder whether Germany’s People’s Court isn’t the inspiration for those U.S. officials who call for special courts, rather than U.S. federal courts, to try suspected terrorists here in the United States.

Since the war on terrorism is perpetual in nature, the obvious question arises: If the American people wish to restore the situation to where it was prior to 9/11 — that is, in which terrorism is treated as a crime and where the president and the Pentagon are once again subject to constitutional constraints in terrorism cases — how do they accomplish that?

That’s a good question.

Perhaps another question should first be asked and answered, however: How badly do Americans wish to restore their rights and freedoms and how badly do they wish to restore a limited-government republic to our land?

The answer to the second question might help answer the first.

Hornberger’s Blog Archives

German Agents Helped Pave The Way Into Iraq

"Those Guys Are Heroes"

By John Goetz, Marcel Rosenbach and Holger Stark
December 16, 2008
Courtesy Of Der Spiegel

The German government has long denied that its intelligence agents in Baghdad provided meaningful help prior to and during the US invasion of Iraq. US military personnel, though, have told SPIEGEL a vastly different story.

He would make the perfect witness. The tall, slim retired US general has nothing but good things to say about the Germans. He says they are "reliable" and extremely trustworthy. Most of all, though, he knows things that German parliamentarians would like to know.

But General James Marks is not a witness, nor is he ever likely to be one. The German parliamentary committee charged with investigating the German foreign intelligence service, the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), prefers to question Germans in its effort to find out what role the agency played during the Iraq war. Those asked to testify tend to be government employees and, therefore, dependent on the government. Americans have not thus far been summoned. Indeed, no effort to do so has been made.

Still, a man like Marks would have a lot to say. He could talk about the spring of 2003, when he was sitting in a windowless, air-conditioned briefing room at the US military's Camp Doha in the Kuwaiti desert, reading the reports of two BND agents who held out in Baghdad during the war. And he could talk about how the information provided by the Germans was incorporated into the situation reports he presented in daily videoconferences to General Tommy Franks, head of the US invading forces, and sometimes to then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.

In the spring of 2003, Marks headed up the military intelligence efforts both before and during the American campaign. It was his job to ensure that the 115,000 US troops didn't run into any surprises as they advanced toward Baghdad. All information relevant to the war ended up on his desk. By virtue of this position, Marks, more than almost anyone else, knows how important the reports provided by the two Germans were for the American war effort.

German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier will testify before the parliamentary investigative committee on Thursday. When the Iraq war began in early 2003, Steinmeier was head of Germany's secret services as well as being then-Chancellor Gerhard Schröder's chief of staff. Schröder, for his part, owed his re-election in September 2002 primarily to his tough opposition to US plans to invade Iraq.

Rewriting History?

In February 2003, Schröder promised Germany's lower house of parliament, the Bundestag, that there would be "no direct or indirect participation in a war." And yet, by that point, his right-hand-man Steinmeier had already secretly approved the deployment of the two BND agents to Baghdad. The details of this mission began to be revealed in January 2006. And since then, the same questions have been asked repeatedly, and not just in the parliamentary investigative committee.

What was the assignment given to the two men? Did the information they provided support the American war effort? Was German government criticism of the United States just one side of the coin? Did Schröder's and Steinmeier's BND secretly help the Americans militarily?

For Steinmeier, nothing less than his political credibility is at stake. He is the most prominent of Schröder's close associates still in power today, and he will challenge Chancellor Angela Merkel as the Social Democrats' candidate for chancellor in general elections next fall. Is Steinmeier now trying to rewrite part of history?

Since January 2006, Steinmeier, now Germany's vice chancellor and foreign minister, has stated that the government's political standard for the BND's mission in Baghdad was clear: No "active support" of combat operations in Iraq. He has also said: "If an embassy or a hospital was prevented from being hit, then it can't be called a double standard. In that case, it was about saving innocent human lives."

The current governing coalition, which pairs Steinmeier's Social Democrats (SPD) with Merkel's Christian Democrats (CDU), also stuck to the same official line in its report on the Baghdad mission: "No support for the US's offensive, strategic aerial war. No transfer of information with direct relevance to the US's tactical air and ground war effort." Berlin has also insisted: "The responses the BND provided to US requests for information satisfied these criteria." According to the classified, censored part of the report, the information coming from the BND agents was not suitable for US purposes.

But according to US military officials involved in the Iraq war, these statements have little to do with reality. SPIEGEL spoke with more than 20 active and retired American soldiers both from Central Command (Centcom) -- which coordinates US military activity in the Middle East, Egypt and Central Asia -- and from the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) in charge of the ground forces in the invasion of Iraq. Among those spoken to were critics of the Bush administration, who cannot be accused of wanting to shift political responsibility to Germany. All of them dealt with the reports filed by the German agents. They analyzed the information and put it to use.

'Living On Another Planet'

A number of senior US military officials were confronted a second time with the content of selected reports. The pictures that the respondents drew of the relevance of the German contributions were largely similar. Colonel Carol Stewart, who was a member of the intelligence team at Centcom, then run by General Tommy Franks, says: "Anyone who claims that these reports did not play a role for combat operations is living on another planet."

The history of the BND mission goes back to the fall of 2002. At the agency's headquarters just outside of Munich, the idea developed to remain in Baghdad during the war in order to obtain a perspective independent of that provided by the Americans. According to one memo, the German Foreign Ministry, which was intimately involved early in the process, was "initially skeptical" about the project. But in mid-December 2002, then Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer gave his consent.

On Feb. 11, 2003, two agents using the cover names Reiner Mahner and Volker Heinster traveled across the desert from the Jordanian capital Amman to Baghdad. First though the agency negotiated a secret deal with the Americans. Under the arrangement, selected reports from the Iraqi capital would also be sent to the Americans. In return, the Germans were permitted to send one of their intelligence agents to Centcom in Qatar, the US war operations headquarters. The BND sent Bernd P., code name "Gardist."

The operation quickly gained in importance, according to former BND division head Ludwig Mundt, from whose unit the agents were sent. Mundt is a veteran of the intelligence community and has seen many governments come and go. But he cannot recall a time when an administration in Berlin was this interested in a secret services operation.

Photographs, GPS Data and 130 Reports

On Feb. 27, an incident occurred that demonstrates that the BND's role in Baghdad could not have been as marginal as it claims today. On that day, Johannes H., the BND agent (or "resident") in Baghdad at the time, sent an extremely important message to his counterparts with the Iraqi intelligence service. The core of the message consisted of only one sentence, but it was practically an ultimatum: "The United States and Great Britain consider Iraq's refusal to destroy the Samud II missiles to be a casus belli."

When the Iraqis hesitated, the BND agent told them that the Latin term means "cause for war." Suddenly they understood the message. "Both men seemed very concerned," the station chief noted in a memo for BND headquarters. The Iraqis had suggested that their boss was likely to "take the message directly to IRQ President Saddam Hussein."

The delivery of this explosive news was one of the resident's last official actions. After that, the new special team took over the BND's Baghdad operations. The two new agents were trained soldiers. Mahner was a lieutenant colonel and had served in the German Air Force, and Heinster was a paratrooper. The BND duo began making reconnaissance trips. Using a secure satellite line, they transmitted about 130 reports, including photographs and GPS data, to BND headquarters. They reported sandbag positions and machine gun nests and, after reporting the positions of Iraqi troops near their own location, they requested that "Special Forces be used to fight these troops; no rockets, and definitely no artillery."

Part 2: Germany's Role in US Combat Decisions

To this day, the two men deny knowing that their reports were forwarded to the Americans. But such a request seems to counter those denials. After all, decisions on the deployment of Special Forces and artillery were entirely up to Centcom, the American headquarters.

On the ninth day of the war, the two BND agents reported: "Air force officers' club severely hit, although soldiers are preparing for defense in the ruins." The report was sent to Qatar on the same day. A short time later, the Americans attacked the same target a second time. On April 1, the pair, known as a Special Deployment Team or SET, reported that the air force officers' club was "hit again and completely destroyed." This report was also forwarded to Centcom on the same day, at 11:28 a.m.

DPA

Baghdad on the evening of March 21, 2003. Germany has long denied having played any kind of a military role.

Were these reports relevant to the Americans' conduct of the war? Horst Henning Sch., an agent stationed at BND headquarters at the time, was responsible for deciding what information could be passed on to "Gardist" and to the Americans. He told the Bundestag investigative committee that almost no information was supplied to the Americans, and that the information that was provided was worthless. Sch. chose a bold simile in his testimony before the committee: "Gardist," in a manner of speaking, "played a strong game of poker with few aces in his hand."

The Americans interviewed by SPIEGEL could tell the Bundestag committee a different story about the relevance of the BND reports. In their view, these reports even played a role in critical combat decisions, such as that relating to commencement of the ground offensive.

'Reliable Agents On The Ground'

Marks, the general in military intelligence, recalls receiving hundreds of reports from other agencies every day in his top-secret e-mail box. He classified the information coming from the Germans as coming from "eyes on the ground." It was exactly the kind of information that Marks felt he didn't have enough of. In addition to the search for the alleged weapons of mass destruction, the general was interested in the situation surrounding Iraq's oilfields and the defense of Baghdad.

The oil was of particular concern to the US military in Kuwait and Qatar. They were determined to prevent Saddam Hussein from destroying his oil facilities, as he had done 12 years earlier in the first Gulf War. Any information about possible sabotage was given priority within Marks' 400-man operation.

The American intelligence group was all the more agitated when, on Feb. 25, it received information indicating that Iraqi forces had begun burning "massive amounts of crude oil" at the al-Dora refinery in Baghdad. "The IRQ side apparently hopes that this will obstruct US satellite reconnaissance," the German agents wrote. On March 5, they reported: "There is credible information to suggest that the oil pumping station near Kirkuk was prepared for blasting." The explosive reports came from Mahner and Heinster, the two BND agents.

Eleven days after their arrival, they got into their Jeep, together with the BND resident, and drove on Iraq's Highway No. 8 to Hilla, about 70 kilometers (44 miles) south of Baghdad. As they drove south, the Germans saw Soviet-made T-72 combat tanks dug into position along the highway, various sandbag positions and machine-gun nests on the roofs of government buildings. The agents took a number of photographs.

Invasion, Fast-Forward

In the report they prepared after the trip, they also described plumes of smoke coming from the airport and the al-Dora refinery. A short time later the information, photographs included, became available to the Americans in Kuwait.

Several members of General Marks' staff remember the reactions triggered by the German reports.

"The March 5 report was especially important to us," says a senior member of the oil reconnaissance team, who works for a security agency today and therefore wishes to remain anonymous. The reports and the increased monitoring of the facilities that ensued, he says, resulted in substantial changes to and acceleration of the war plans.

Air reconnaissance of the facilities was immediately stepped up, says the former oil reconnaissance team member. On March 19, when a drone provided the first images of flames coming from burning oilfields, thus reinforcing the Germans' warnings, Marks hurried to the commander of the ground troops, David McKiernan. "What counts now," he said, with some urgency, "is the element of surprise. Let's advance on the ground first and secure the oil."

Centcom Commander Franks agreed. A few hours later, he gave 140,000 coalition troops their marching orders. As a result, the ground war began earlier than planned, and Franks' decision went down in US military history as "G before A," or "ground before air." By March 21, the US Marines reported that their mission had already been accomplished. They had crossed the border without encountering significant resistance, and had taken control of Iraq's central oil fields. "The Germans and their reliable information played a significant part in the war beginning earlier than planned," says Marks.

According to several American military officials, the Baghdad BND agents' reports also played a role in a second strategic war issue, centering on the Baghdad international airport, known as Saddam Airport at the time. In this case, the German information again apparently contributed to the US Army's decision to jettison its original plan.

'Saved American Lives'

Because of its strategic importance, US military leaders in Kuwait had had a 10-meter (33-foot) model of the airport made. Plastic soldiers represented the Iraqi troops, and a color-coding system was used to identify high-risk areas. Centcom had planned a surprise attack. Using the model, the commanders had developed a plan in which Special Forces and parts of the 82nd Airborne Division would take the airport with paratroopers from the air.

Mahner and Heinster were also interested in the airport. On Feb. 16, they and the BND resident completed one of their first reconnaissance trips to the area. As they wrote in their report, they discovered Roland anti-aircraft systems on a "manmade hill," which they photographed from their car.

A few days later, during a second reconnaissance rip, they noticed freshly dug oil ditches. The Iraqi forces had begun to "lay smoke screens near Saddam Airport," they reported on Feb. 24. That report went to "Gardist" at US operational headquarters in Qatar the next day. Marks remembers both the photo taken by the Germans and the fact that the information about the air defense systems was incorporated into the model at Camp Doha.

In the decisive pre-war phase, the commander of ground troops brought together the air-landing specialists and reconnaissance experts in front of the model to work through all options. After two hours of simulation, the general decided to call off the operation, because of the high risk involved. To this day, Marks is convinced that the information about the air defense positions and quickly ignitable oil ditches made it clear to the commander that going ahead with the original plan could have led to the deaths of thousands of paratroopers.

The German team, Marks says today, "saved American lives" through their efforts -- the lives of soldiers, he means, not the civilians that Steinmeier and the BND still talk about today.

The BND's dangerous Baghdad operation was kept secret for a long time. It was only during a visit by US members of Congress, including Connecticut Senator Joe Lieberman, to American headquarters in Baghdad in early 2004 that the matter was briefly discussed. A Republican had complained that Berlin had let the coalition down during the war.

Colonel Carol Stewart recalls that she pointed out that the Germans had contributed to "Operation Iraqi Freedom" with their reports. "Liebermann was surprised," says Stewart, who says she had a similar reaction during the war. "I knew that the Germans were against the war, and that's why I was surprised that they played such a positive and helpful role for us during the war." Stewart has nothing but praise for the BND agents, noting that they were courageous and "did excellent work." Retired General Marks says, referring to the BND agents, "those guys are heroes."

Part 3: An Incorrect Denial

The same view was held in BND headquarters and in Berlin, at least as long as the mission was kept under wraps. Then Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer and Chancellery Chief of Staff Steinmeier, who met Mahner and Heinster on various occasions, congratulated and thanked them for their work. But when the first reports about the BND cell became public in January 2006, a quarrel quickly erupted in Berlin.

August Hanning, president of the BND during the Iraq war and now a deputy in the Interior Ministry, argued for an assertive position: "The Iraq war, after all, did not lead to the suspension of our alliance with the Americans. We continue to work closely together."

PHOTO GALLERY: GERMAN AGENTS IN IRAQ

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Click on a picture to launch the image gallery (6 Photos)

In January 2006, Hanning argued internally for a self-assured approach, refusing to apologize for or even downplay the case. "We were interested in information about the progress of the war," he told close associates, "and we wanted to have our own information in the field. That's why we needed the two agents, and of course we exchanged information with the Americans." Hanning was aware that the cooperation with US intelligence was much closer than the anti-war rhetoric of the Schröder government indicated. "The reality and the public's impression," he said, "are not the same."

Steinmeier and Ernst Uhrlau have taken a significantly different approach to the subject. Steinmeier has become foreign minister and thus entered the top echelon of German politics. Uhrlau has since replaced Hanning as head of the BND.

Incorrect Denial

In mid-January 2006, when the first media inquiries about the BND's Baghdad operation started coming in, Uhrlau consulted with his staff and then with the Chancellery. For the first time, the charge was raised that the BND may have supplied military information to the Americans. The agents, it was claimed, had provided the US military with a supposed location for Saddam Hussein, which allegedly led to the bombing of a restaurant, killing 12 civilians. Based on everything we know today, this charge is false.

Uhrlau was in favor of a forceful denial and had his staff prepare a press release that went beyond the specific restaurant-related claims. The statement said that the parties to the conflict "were not provided with any target documentation or coordinates for bombing targets."

The approach taken by the BND president was controversial within his own agency, where some senior staff members advised restraint. "We will never be able to withdraw from a statement like this," they argued. The new agency president, they said, had no idea what surprises the BND files had in store for him. But Uhrlau ignored their warnings and insisted that the BND issue a denial, in writing.

Still, before he issued the denial, Uhrlau asked Merkel's Chief of Staff Thomas de Maizière and the Chancellery intelligence coordinator Klaus Dieter Fritsche. But they were unfamiliar with the files, and de Maizière and Fritsche had to take Uhrlau at his word. They voiced there concerns during a number of meetings. But eventually the Chancellery officials told Uhrlau that, if it was correct, he could go ahead and issue the official denial.

The denial was issued, but it was not correct.

Uhrlau's public relations staff provided the German news agency DPA with the following quote: "The goal was to save human lives." The BND agents, Uhrlau's staff said, provided information about buildings that were not to be bombed under any circumstances. "Civilian facilities, daycare centers, embassies and the like," the BND spokesmen said, "the goal being to protect human life. Military information was not provided. This did not happen. We deny it."

So there was no information of a military nature.

Medals For The Germans

Steinmeier added his own twist to the message. When SPIEGEL reported, on Jan. 14, 2006, that military information about oil ditches had been sent to the US military, the news agencies reported: "Steinmeier denies SPIEGEL report about BND legwork." He said he would "resist attempts to rewrite history." Internally, Steinmeier complained about "a campaign," and confidants say they recall that the minister feared serious political consequences, up to and including the possibility of his resignation.

Later, Steinmeier issued the following prescribed terminology, which remains valid today. He said that the government's political instructions to the BND "precluded active support of combat operations" in Iraq. But Steinmeier's problem was that the supposed instructions were not issued in writing, an unusual approach for a bureaucracy known for its otherwise thorough documentation of even the most minor details.

When Hanning testified before the investigation commission, he referred to the situation as a "balancing act" and conceded that he had relied on the relevant department manager, but argued that he had had no reason to question what he had been told. Does this mean that, in the end, it was a minor department manager at the BND who ultimately thwarted the Schröder government's anti-war course? Were Hanning, Uhrlau and Steinmeier guilty of nothing more than a failure to properly supervise lower-ranking staff?

Or is the official account by those in power at the time just as questionable as the attempts to downplay the US Army's awarding of its Meritorious Service Medal to the Baghdad agents and "Gardist" by arguing that this medal is awarded to "non-combatants?"

"Total nonsense," says James Marks, who manages a large Pentagon contracting firm today. "This medal is one of the highest honors we award to foreign nationals."

He knows what he is talking about. Marks himself has been awarded the Meritorious Service Medal -- four times.

Translated from the German by Christopher Sultan

RELATED SPIEGEL ONLINE LINKS

• US General on Berlin Agents in Baghdad: 'The Germans Were Invaluable to Us' (12/16/2008)

• Covert Cock-Up: Germany's Failed Spy Mission in Kosovo (12/01/2008)

• The Real Story of 'Curveball': How German Intelligence Helped Justify the US Invasion of Iraq (03/22/2008)

Germany's Failed Spy Mission In Kosovo

The ineptitude of three agents in Germany's foreign intelligence agency has endangered one of the organization’s most important operations: building up its secret network of informants in Kosovo. It has also strained diplomatic relations between the two countries.

By SPIEGEL Staff
December 12, 2008
Courtesy Of Der Spiegel

The company is located in one of the better neighborhoods of the Kosovo capital of Pristina, in a large single-family house on a hill overlooking the valley at the edge of town. The white building is surrounded by a wrought iron fence. On a pole near the front entrance hangs a sign with the engraved company logo -- the letters LCAS -- and below that, three bands of color: black, red and gold.

A Mitsubishi Pajero with Munich license plates is parked behind the fence. The curtains are closed, and halogen spotlights with motion detectors have been installed under the eaves. A pair of garden shears is lying in front of the door, and there is a grill on the deck. The rear side of the property, with its neatly mowed lawn, is also fenced in.

The Germans moved in last fall and have always been very friendly, says the neighbor, Hajredin Shale, who also noted that one of them regularly went jogging. But he didn't see much of the three men. He says they lived alone, had no visitors, spoke no Albanian, and never said much more than hello.

Now, Shale's opportunity to get to know his neighbors better has passed. On Saturday, the three men left Pristina on a special flight headed for Berlin. Soon, the trio -- Robert Z., Andreas J. and Andreas D. -- will face a committee of German parliamentarians who have taken an interest in their case. Most likely, they will never return to Kosovo.

Faces On The Front Pages

And why should they? They entered the country as agents of the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), the German foreign intelligence agency. The operation ended with the trio on the evening news and their faces plastered across the front pages of German newspapers. Such attention is hardly a boon for the careers of secret agents.

Police arrested the three Germans nearly two weeks ago under suspicion of throwing explosives at the office of the EU Special Representative in Kosovo on Nov. 14. The release of the three Germans from custody marks the end of an unusual diplomatic spat between Germany and the tiny new Balkan nation. At times, the tone sharply transgressed the usually staid diplomatic tenor, says a member of the Kosovo government. At one point, Chancellor Angela Merkel's chief of staff, Thomas de Maizière, warned in a phone call to Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi, that Berlin might consider discontinuing its subsidies.

It remains to be seen how the scandal will affect long-term relations between Berlin and Pristina. However, one thing is already clear. Thanks to the inept behavior of its agents, Germany's foreign intelligence service may have irreparably damaged one of its most important operations.

For a number of years, Kosovo has been a major operational area for the BND. In addition to being politically unstable and located not far from Germany's borders, it is a hotbed of organized crime with links to Germany and is a country where numerous German police officers and soldiers are stationed.

There are no less than three BND departments focusing on Kosovo, including Department Five, responsible for organized crime, the same department that certified in 2005 that Prime Minister Thaçi is a key figure in a Kosovar-Albanian mafia network. At the time, the confidential report was quickly leaked to the media. Thaçi has never forgiven the Germans for that.

Reconnaissance Information

Department Two, responsible for telecommunications surveillance, is also active in the Balkans. In the late 1990s, this section launched operation "Mofa99," in which the Germans tapped phone conversations between members of the controversial Kovoso Liberation Army (KLA). The operation was so successful that a number of German technicians were stationed for years in the Macedonian Interior Ministry to work on "Mofa99." Since then, the BND has maintained an extensive network of informants among high-ranking functionaries of the KLA and the Kosovar administration.

When the intelligence agency wanted to sound out the situation for Germany's armed forces, the Bundeswehr, BND President Ernst Uhrlau authorized an additional operation in 2006. Department One was assigned the task of “force protection,” gathering as much information as possible to guarantee the security of troops on the ground. Pristina was selected as the base of operations for this top-secret mission. Top brass at the BND were pursuing two objectives: maintaining contacts with informants and gathering reconnaissance information.

The operation was handled by Department 11A, which, according to the secret resource allocation scheme of the BND, is responsible for “supporting Bundeswehr operations and coordinating strategic military reconnaissance.” The preparations could begin.

On April 12, 2007, two men, who identified themselves as "Michael Hohenstein" and "Rolf Hagen," registered the company LCAS Logistics-Coordination & Assessment Service Hohenstein & Hagen GmbH at the district court in Munich. The two Bavarians indicated that the purpose of the company was to provide “logistical services,” which is not entirely a lie. The company supposedly has only two employees, and is located in an office park with modern glass and steel buildings on the southern edge of Munich, in Ottobrunn.

The building at Alten Landstrasse 23 presents an ideal front for organizations working undercover. There are roughly a dozen computer and design companies, two law firms and a map manufacturer in this unobtrusive office building. A different company can be found behind each door along the long hallway. They all share a small kitchen and the restrooms, but otherwise have nothing to do with each other.

Top-Secret Mission

A sham company like LCAS blends in perfectly. Nobody knows who works here -- or if any work is being done. The sign on the door has now been removed. A young computer specialist from the other side of the hall says that the company has moved, but adds that he has almost never seen anyone there. The office looks, though, as if it has been used. There is a computer on the desk, and a Kandinsky print is hanging on the wall. That's enough to provide a cover for the top-secret Pristina mission of the BND.

This is where the operation began in September, 2007. On Oct. 5, 2007, LCAS was officially registered with startup capital of €2,500 ($3,175) under registration number 70453415 in the Kosovar capital, and the owner was listed as the parent company in Ottobrunn. The company has no turnover, pays no taxes, and keeps such a low profile that the director of a German employment agency says today: “If this company was active here, I would have known about it.” But the last thing that the young businessmen from Bavaria wanted was publicity for their company.

A total of 11 BND agents were stationed at different times in Pristina. They established contacts, investigated the situation and engaged in cloak and dagger operations -- all under the cover of LCAS. Usually, two to three agents were operating simultaneously on location. The last team consisted of Robert Z., Andreas J. and Andreas D. who, like many of their colleagues, had been reassigned from the Bundeswehr to the German foreign intelligence service.

• Part 2: Embarrassing Questions for the BND

Robert Z., 47, is an experienced agent who has served on a number of foreign missions. He was born in Constance and lives in Baden-Württemberg. He lives an inconspicuous life here with his wife and daughter. The neighbors know that he served in the Bundeswehr, “but only in the reserves.” Actually he does “something with computers,” they say. But his dual identity is revealed on his letter box, where both his real name and codename are visible.

Z. and his colleagues were part of a mission so secret both the Kosovar government and the official BND attache stationed at the German Embassy in Pristina knew nothing of it. The German ambassador was likewise in the dark.

On Friday, Nov. 14, around 5:30 p.m., an explosive device was detonated in front of the headquarters of the EU mission, known as EULEX. News agencies quickly reported the attack. BND headquarters and Department One in Pullach, near Munich, were alerted. They asked the trio in Pristina to find out what had happened and file a report for the next “intelligence situation” session at the chancellery in Berlin, where a top-flight group of German security officials meets every Tuesday. As BND President, Uhrlau has to personally report on major incidents, and he likes to be armed with exclusive knowledge.

So the three men hopped in their Mitsubishi on that Friday evening and drove off. Shortly before 9 p.m., Andreas J. got out of the vehicle near the scene of the blast to take some pictures. While his two colleagues waited in the car, the agent climbed into the neighboring building, a construction site, which offers an excellent view of the crime scene. But he wasn't alone: Apparently, other intelligence services were keeping the area under surveillance.

Confiscated A Notebook

As he left the building, the BND agent was stopped by a Danish United Nations peacekeeper who asked him what he was doing there. Andreas J. tried to talk his way out of the situation by explaining that he works for the security firm LCAS. He said that he just wanted to take a quick look at the scene of the attack. They were joined by a German UN official. J. was then asked to hand over his passport, and was searched. Investigators also confiscated a notebook.

This highly unfortunate incident raises a number of embarrassing questions for the BND. Why did the agency send its top-secret undercover agents to the scene when any rank amateur would have realized that there was a considerable risk of running into a police patrol? Why wasn’t the BND resident dispatched on this job? And why did J. take along his notebook, with all its confidential contents, and break every rule of covert operations?

In the confiscated documents, investigators found the names of Kosovo Prime Minister Thaçi and notes about the situation in Kosovo. For Berlin, the BND notebook represents an important piece of the puzzle, perhaps the key to understanding the case. Was it the notes that attracted the interest of political circles close to Prime Minister Thaçi?

In any case, that night the police let Andreas J. go after he named his two partners as witnesses. They could confirm that he was in his office when the explosion occurred, he said.

The next day, Saturday, Andreas J. was allowed to pick up his passport. It looked as if everything had been cleared up. But the next Wednesday the three men were unexpectedly arrested around 9 p.m., placed in a small cell, and intensively questioned. At the same time, authorities searched the LCAS company premises. Shortly thereafter, the BND had to admit the true identity of the three agents, threatening an end to one of the agency’s most important operations.

The incident jeopardizes the BND’s network of informants, which is more extensive in Kosovo than in most countries around the world. Berlin intelligence officials fear that the Kosovo government may now arrest large numbers of informants who have provided the BND with valuable information.

The only small satisfaction for the Germans must be that in Pristina the Kosovars are also looking for a scapegoat for the whole mess. An aide to Prime Minister Thaçi says that at least one important head will roll.

RENATE FLOTTAU, JOHN GOETZ, CONNY NEUMANN, HOLGER STARK, ANDREAS ULRICH

RELATED SPIEGEL ONLINE LINKS

• Kosovo Spy Scandal: German Agents May Come Home (11/26/2008)

• Spy Scandal: German Intelligence Officers Detained in Kosovo (11/24/2008)

• German Spy Scandal: Kosovo Claims to Have Video of 'Terrorism' (11/25/2008)