Showing posts with label Counter-Guerrilla Warfare. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Counter-Guerrilla Warfare. Show all posts

Wednesday, July 17, 2013

Hezbollah Applies New Training Practices In Syria

This video grab from al-Manar shows Hezbollah fighters practicing in an urban warfare training site. (The Daily Star/Al-Manar grab)
This video grab from al-Manar shows Hezbollah fighters practicing in an urban warfare training site. (The Daily Star/Al-Manar grab)

By Nicholas Blanford

BEIRUT: The 17-day assault on Qusair marked the first time that Hezbollah has launched a major offensive operation in an urban environment, putting into practice new training techniques taught to the group’s fighters since 2006. The fighting in Qusair provides potential insights into how Hezbollah could plan to exploit its relatively new urban warfare skills in a future confrontation with Israel.

Full details of the battle have yet to emerge, but Hezbollah apparently spearheaded the assault on the ground, using some 1,200 elite special forces fighters, backed by Syrian army artillery and air power, according to Hajj Abbas, a Hezbollah combatant who spent a week fighting in the town.

Hezbollah commanders were given tactical control over the attack on Qusair. The town was split into operational sectors and code numbers were assigned to locations and objectives, in keeping with customary Hezbollah practice. The technique allowed Hezbollah to use open radio communications – some of which was intercepted, recorded and uploaded to the Internet by rebel forces – without the opposition necessarily understanding what was being communicated.

Prior to the assault, the rebels constructed extensive defenses, including digging tunnels, erecting barricades, booby-trapping buildings and lacing the terrain with roadside bombs.

Hezbollah engineers were employed to help clear some of the booby traps to allow the fighters to advance.

“The engineers saved us a lot of headaches and time. They could clear a building then tell us that building No. 3 or building No. 4 was cleared and we could move in,” said Hajj Abbas, using his nom de guerre as he was not authorized to speak to the media.

The Hezbollah units were no more than five or three men each and progress was slow. 

They knocked holes in the walls of buildings for access to avoid potentially booby-trapped doors and windows.

Hajj Abbas likened the terrain to a Palestinian camp due to the density of the houses and narrow streets, a marked contrast to the rural hills and valleys of south Lebanon where he gained his first combat experience more than a decade ago.

“It was a difficult environment for us at first because we don’t know the area. The buildings are different, the terrain is different. But we are well-trained soldiers and we are trained to adapt, so we just got on with it,” Hajj Abbas said.

He admitted that the rebel mortar fire was a “big problem.” The Hezbollah units attempted to draw as close as possible to their enemy so that the rebels would halt the mortar fire out of fear of hitting their own side.

In the 1990s, when Hezbollah was daily battling Israeli troops occupying south Lebanon, fighting was restricted to rural areas. Hezbollah fighters had to learn the art of stealth, camouflage and reconnaissance in a difficult environment of dense woodland, steep rocky hills and valleys, as well as cope with hazards such as snakes and wild boar.

In 2006, Hezbollah fought much of the war inside villages and towns, but in a defensive capacity to thwart Israeli attempts to capture ground.

However, since 2006, learning urban warfare skills – both defensive and offensive – has become an important part of Hezbollah’s overall training, augmenting the traditional hit-and-run guerrilla tactics.

The fighters receive training in mock urban sites in Iran and smaller facilities in Lebanon. 

In early March, Al-Manar television broadcast an audio recording of the voice of Imad Mughniyeh, Hezbollah’s military commander who was assassinated in February 2008.

Accompanying his comments on jihad was footage of Hezbollah fighters training at camps in the Bekaa Valley. One brief segment showed Hezbollah men storming an “Israeli home” – a small roofless cinder block building decorated in the colors of the Israeli flag.

The building was one of several that comprised a simple urban warfare training site. The segment only lasted a few seconds but it was significant because it strengthened a veiled reference by Sayyed Hasan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s secretary-general, that in the next war Hezbollah units could be dispatched into northern Israel.

Hezbollah fighters have privately hinted at that possibility since the end of the 2006 war. 

In February 2011, Nasrallah said that in the event that war was imposed on Lebanon, “the resistance leadership might ask you to lead the resistance to liberate Galilee.”

Hezbollah describes its strategy as one of “defensive resistance,” in other words defending Lebanon by using resistance, or guerrilla, techniques, rather than relying on the capabilities of the Lebanese Army.

But in the next war, it is possible that there will be a further iteration in Hezbollah’s military evolution where the group employs offensive resistance techniques to seize and hold ground inside Israel, very different from the traditional hit-and-run practices of the 1990s.

Fresh from victory in Qusair, Hezbollah is expected to press on in Syria to new objectives. Aleppo has been cited as a major target for Hezbollah and the Syrian army.

The rebel-held areas around the towns of Yabrud and Nabk lying on the highway midway between Damascus and Homs also are speculated as likely candidates for Hezbollah’s attention. Returning that area to regime control would help seal Lebanon’s eastern border and neutralize Arsal as a logistical support hub for the Syrian rebels.

Regardless, Hezbollah appears prepared for a long commitment in Syria. That will ensure that the post-2006 generation of Hezbollah recruits, who have had no experience fighting Israeli troops unlike their older comrades, will emerge from the Syria war combat-hardened in urban and rural environments.

Sunday, March 18, 2012

Algeria Conflict Shapes US Military Strategy

By Mathieu Rabechault and Dan De Luce 
Source: "AFP" 
Courtesy Of "Google News"


WASHINGTON — The French military experience in Algeria 50 years ago has left an indelible mark on a new generation of US officers, who have tried to apply the lessons of the conflict to the fight against insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq.
As France marks the 50th anniversary of a war that remains a bitter memory, the strategy and tactics employed by French forces have enjoyed a revival inside the US military.
After quickly toppling regimes in Baghdad and Kabul, American commanders were caught off guard by virulent insurgencies in both countries that posed a challenge to a force trained only for conventional combat.
"It is not unfair to say that in 2003, most Army officers knew more about the US civil war than they did about counterinsurgency," John Nagl, a retired colonel who served in Iraq, wrote in the foreword to the army's manual on irregular warfare.
Facing a politically savvy adversary seeking to exploit resentment of foreign troops, US military officers saw parallels in the Algerian war.
In August 2003, the Pentagon organized the showing of the 1966 film "The Battle of Algiers," the Gillo Pontecorvo movie that recounts operations in the Casbah, including the torture of guerrillas by the French.
"How to win a battle against terrorism and lose the war of ideas. Children shoot soldiers at point-blank range. Women plant bombs in cafes. Soon the entire Arab population builds to a mad fervor. Sound familiar?" read a Pentagon flyer for the screening.
Encouraged by senior officers such as General David Petraeus, who served as commander in Iraq and Afghanistan before leading the CIA, the French counter-insurgency doctrine honed in Algeria was gradually rediscovered and promoted.
Petraeus oversaw the writing of a new field manual for counter-insurgency in 2006 that drew heavily on the Algeria era and one French strategist in particular, Lieutenant Colonel David Galula, author of "Counterinsurgency: Theory and Practice."
Galula's book, published first in the United States in 1964, enjoys prominent references in field manual 3-24 and is cited as a "classic" in the bibliography.
"Of the many books that were influential in the writing of Field Manual 3-24, perhaps none was as important as David Galula's 'Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice,'" Nagl wrote.
Reflecting Galula's ideas, American troops conducted sweeps through urban areas, sought to cut off insurgents from the population, trained local forces and pored over intelligence to identify the leaders and motivations of the insurgency.
US strategists also frequently cite "Modern Warfare" by Colonel Roger Trinquier, a veteran of the Algeria war who was critical of his own army's slow adaptation to new tactics.
Trinquier, however, openly advocated torture as a means of extracting vital information from guerrillas. The US counter-insurgency manual explicitly prohibits abusing prisoners, saying the practice plays into the hands of insurgents and undermines America's "moral legitimacy."
Both Trinquier and Galula "captured with considerable nuance the conduct of counter-insurgency operations of that day, and a good bit of the way those operations were conducted remains instructive and relevant," Petraeus wrote in an email to AFP.
As head of the Command and General Staff College, Petraeus ordered the purchase of the English translation of Galula's work and had a copy issued to every one of the more than 1,200 students at the college, he said.
Petraeus and other soldiers have found kindred spirits among their French counterparts in the Algerian war, at least as they are portrayed by French writer and journalist Jean Larteguy in his 1960 novel "The Centurions."
The book, which enjoys a near cult following among American officers, portrays the trials of French paratroopers in Indochina and Algeria who learn to fight insurgents in spite of their own military's bureaucratic mindset.
"For our sort of war," the main character Pierre Raspeguy says, "you need shrewd, cunning men who are capable of fighting far from the herd, who are full of initiative too... who can turn their hand to any trade, poachers and missionaries."
Director of the Pakistan Afghanistan coordination cell, Major General Ben Hodges told AFP in an email he had first read the "excellent book about the French experience coming out of Indochina and then going into Algeria" as a cadet at West Point in the late 1970s.
"I decided to read it again because of my recent deployment to Afghanistan... Some very thought-provoking parts to the story and the impact on the soldiers involved."

Monday, January 11, 2010

The COIN Myth

Part I

By Jeff Huber,
January 11, 2010
Courtesy Of Anti-War News

The U.S. military’s fabled counterinsurgency field manual (FM 3-24) is an authoritative-sounding 281-page volume of balderdash. Even the legend of its origin is a fabrication. Gen. David Petraeus, former commander of forces in Iraq and now in charge of Central Command, supposedly "wrote the book," but the book was actually hammered together from plagiarized material in 2004 by Dr. Conrad Crane and others at the Army War College.

This was during the time frame that "King David" Petraeus was in charge of training Iraqi security forces, a tour during which he lost track of about 190,000 AK-47 rifles and pistols and other combat equipment that without question wound up in the hands of militants. The part of the manual Petraeus "wrote" was his signature on the manual’s endorsement letter when he was in command of the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center in 2006.

There’s nothing new in the military about generals taking credit for the hard work of underlings, of course, especially when the general in question is a fast-rising self-promotion genius like "Teflon General" Petraeus. And plagiarism is so common in military publications that it’s the norm, not the exception. Like I used to say in my active-duty days, if you really think the brass want you to think out of the box, you’re out of your mind. Military doctrine is loaded with copy-and-paste palaver that goes back decades, sometimes more than a century, reflecting the expert perspective of experts who died so long ago that nobody can tell you who they were. That way, nobody swings in the wind for having an original idea that doesn’t work out.

That’s much of the reason we nearly always execute tactics and strategies that apply to wars other than the ones we’re actually fighting. Our present counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine is a perfect example. It is inadequate in many ways, but four aspects of it are particularly at odds with today’s conditions on the ground.

Bastard Stepchildren

The COIN manual states, "The primary objective of any COIN operation is to foster development of effective governance by a legitimate government."

We have clearly failed to meet this objective in either Iraq or Afghanistan, and we’re not likely to achieve it in either country unless we stick around with a six-digit troop presence long enough to influence the local gene pools.

Iraq’s Shi’ite-controlled government, led by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, is a catastrophe. As Baghdad Operations Command Advisory Team chief Col. Timothy Reese recently noted, "The ineffectiveness and corruption of [Iraqi government] ministries is the stuff of legend." The anti-corruption campaign is a farce, nothing more than a Maliki campaign tool. Iraq’s government is failing to improve its electrical infrastructure and its oil industry. There has no progress in resolving the Kirkuk situation. Sunni militiamen are not being transitioned into government service as promised. Sunni reconciliation is "probably going backwards." Political violence and intimidation is "rampant in the civilian community as well as military and legal institutions." A recent study by Transparency International rates Iraq as the fifth most corrupt country in the world. That makes it almost as corrupt as Afghanistan.

Afghanistan is the second most corrupt country in the world, surpassed in this category only by Somalia, a country that can hardly be said to have a government at all. Though Afghan President Hamid Karzai held on to power by stealing two elections, the Obama administration tripped all over itself in declaring him the "legitimate" leader of Pakistan. Karzai is a former warlord who has blood ties to the Afghan opium industry. Obama has told Karzai better clean up his act, to begin a "new chapter," but if our president really believes Karzai’s going to change, he needs to step away from the hookah.

Army Training, Sir

The COIN manual emphasizes the need to use host nation forces in a variety of roles, either as the "hold" force in a clear, hold, and build strategy; as part of a "combined force"; or as the main force supported in a "limited" degree by U.S. forces. The problem with the theory is that it assumes a certain level of competence and integrity, or at least a potential to become competent and integral, on the part of the host nation forces, virtues we see little of in the security forces of Iraq and Afghanistan.

Col. Reese notes of Iraq’s army that, "If there ever was a window where the seeds of a professional military culture could have been implanted, it is now long past." Corruption in the officer corps, he says, is "rampant," as are cronyism and nepotism. Laziness is "endemic," and lack of initiative is "legion." Reese describes the "ineffectiveness" of Iraq’s army and national police force as "near total."

Mohammed Hussein, the Iraqi head of the newsroom of the New York Times Baghdad bureau, laments, "Some will probably say that the government got rid of the sectarian violence … [but] after six years we have the same results as if there were still a sectarian war going on: Iraqis are being killed in cold blood."

Worse news: it looks like Iraq’s police and army have been infiltrated by militants. Maliki himself revealed that more than 45 members of his security forces were involved in the December Baghdad bombings that killed 112 people.

Speaking of untrustworthy, Afghan forces are a full-blown Wild West show. In a recent confrontation between Afghan and Western troops, an Afghan soldier, who was refused access to a landing pad where a helicopter was about to set down, raised his rifle and started squeezing the trigger, wounding two Italian soldiers and killing an American Army combat medic. When U.S. company commanders meet with their Afghan counterparts, they wear body armor and helmet, and an armed security detail tags along.

David Wood of Politics Daily describes numerous other accounts of Afghan forces attacking and killing or wounding U.S. and NATO forces.

When it comes to combat, the Taliban routinely kick the uniformed Afghan forces’ teeth in. The hapless Afghan army commanders complain that the police are on the Taliban’s payroll. The police and the Taliban are "from the same area" says Gen. Abdul Rahman Rahmani. "They collude with each other."

Gen. Stanley McChrystal, commander of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, says that mission success “will require trust-based, expanded partnering" with the Afghan army and police force.

It sounds like Stan the Man needs to step away from the hookah, too.

In Part II: The search for intelligent life in our intelligence apparatus.

Read more by Jeff Huber

Wednesday, April 15, 2009

The Accidental Guerrilla

And The Deliberate Interventionist

By Michael Scheuer,
April 15, 2009
Courtesy Of Anti-War News

The Australian soldier and anthropologist Dr. David Kilcullen’s new book – The Accidental Guerrilla, Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (Oxford, 2009) – is receiving a good deal of attention as the manual with which the Obama administration will forge a successful conclusion to the U.S.-NATO campaign in Afghanistan. The title, The Accidental Guerrilla, refers to those locals living in an insurgent environment who pick up weapons and fight counterinsurgent forces because of tribal mores, because they like to fight, because the West has invaded, or because they are intimidated by what Kilcullen claims to be the limited number of dedicated insurgents or jihadists, in the case of Iraq, Afghanistan, or other Muslim locales. This being the case, Kilcullen argues, the U.S.-NATO goal in Afghanistan should be to split the “accidental guerrillas” away from the jihadists. Echoes of Kilcullen’s thesis can already be heard in public statements by Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair, Afghanistan guru Bruce Reidel, and others who have claimed that up to 75 percent of the Afghan insurgents can be peeled away from the Taliban and its allies and brought over to Karzai’s regime.

Kilcullen writes well, and his book contains a great deal of vital information on the complexities and importance of tribalism in the Afghan and Iraqi insurgencies, as well as some interesting but extraneous data on Islamist and other violence in East Timor, Indonesia, and southern Thailand. The Accidental Guerrilla is a book that seems sound if you read it fast, but which on reflection is a deeply flawed recipe for more and longer-lasting U.S.-led intervention that promises no permanent success.

The book is framed, unfortunately, by Kilcullen’s social scientist side. Like most social scientists who have acceded to the title of “terrorism expert” – one thinks of Fawaz Gerges and Mary Habeck, although neither is remotely in the Australian’s league – Kilcullen does not like the problem the United States confronts: an increasingly well-organized Salafi insurgency that professes an attractive ideology – especially for young Muslims – and whose influence and violence are spreading in many areas of the world. So instead of writing a book on how to deal with the reality of a growing Salafi movement, Kilcullen simply redefines the enemy into something that is less daunting, but also nonexistent. For Kilcullen, America’s Islamist foes can be defined as a relatively small number of takfiris who are enemies of Muslims and Westerners and who can be beaten once the accidental guerrillas are eliminated from the equation.

Now, if the United States were confronted by takfiris – Sunni Muslims who eagerly kill other Muslims they decide are not practicing Islam correctly – it would be in high clover. A wholly takfiri enemy would be an extremely limited body of men which would have almost no popular appeal or growth potential, given that would-be members who fall short of religious perfection would be killed. In the 1990s in Sudan, for example, takfiri gunmen twice tried to kill Osama bin Laden because he was not a “good enough Muslim.” And the only genuine strategic threat to al-Qaeda since 2001 was its own commander in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, himself a takfiri, who readily killed any Shi’ites or Sunnis who did not measure up to his religious requirements. The transitory U.S. success in Iraq’s Anbar province that Kilcullen superbly describes occurred precisely because Zarqawi’s takfiri ways caused a rebellion against al-Qaeda forces by local Sunnis, forcing al-Qaeda’s dispersal northward or into the Levant. Bin Laden sent a veteran and talented Salafi Egyptian jihadist, whose war name is Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, to take Zarqawi’s place and try to rebuild a sense of shared purpose between al-Qaeda and Iraq Sunni mujahedin. That work has been painfully slow and difficult from al-Qaeda’s perspective, but the now unraveling “success” of the surge suggests Muhajir is making some limited progress. The bottom line on this issue is that all Americans and their allies should pray for ever greater number of takfiris in the field, because a U.S.-led victory over a takfiri enemy would be as certain as a U.S.-led victory over the Salafi movement is now unthinkable.

The great bulk of The Accidental Guerrilla’s recommendations, therefore, pivot off what I believe is a wrong definition of the Islamist enemy we confront. Indeed, the author’s failure to adequately analyze the religious motivation of the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and their allies significantly undermines the book’s value. Kilcullen has taken a large and still growing Salafi enemy and reduced it to a quite limited and potentially manageable number of takfiri religious fanatics whose ability to put significant numbers of fighters in the field rests solely on their ability to intimidate other Muslims via a “fight-or-die” ultimatum. Given this limited but deadly enemy, Kilcullen’s recipe for U.S. success in Afghanistan is to prolong our military intervention, but to refocus it on extracting the accidental guerrillas from the insurgent mix by focusing on reconstruction, Westernization, and the panoply of activities that fall under the concept of nation-building. “The ultimately decisive mission set is what we might call ‘military assistance,’” Kilcullen writes.

"This set of tasks aims to restructure the threat environment over the long term so that we hardwire the enemy out of it, deny them a role, reduce the recruiting base, and attack the conditions that generate the threat. This is the truly decisive activity…. But in [the] future we may need to apply ‘assistance by militaries’ or even by the whole of our government, to the whole of an at-risk society. … This means that cooperation with aid agencies, educators, departments of foreign affairs and state, intelligence services, economic development agencies – truly full-spectrum assistance – is required. This is the truly decisive activity at which we will need to become highly proficient if we are to break the accidental guerrilla cycle." (p. 289)

Clearly, the foregoing is intervention and Westernization – for the latter, Kilcullen uses “creating the rule of law” – with both a vengeance and a very long on-the-ground timeframe. Even if we accept that the intricate and expensive program of cooperative military-political-social activities proposed by Kilcullen is possible in theory, there is absolutely no reason to believe such a program can be achieved in Afghanistan. Why?

First, the insurgents we confront in Afghanistan are not takfiris. They are mostly Salafis who have shown a remarkable ability to accommodate and work with approaches to religious practice that differ from their own. We have yet to run into an Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Afghanistan and, if we do, the Taliban or al-Qaeda will kill him to avoid another Anbar-like scenario. Therefore, the most basic premise of The Accidental Guerrilla – that the insurgents are takfiris – is inapplicable to Afghanistan.

Second, the U.S.-led coalition’s time in Afghanistan is quickly running out. The Karzai regime is terminally corrupt and incompetent, and we are already in the eighth winter of the war. Kilcullen’s proposed method of operation requires: (a) an almost 180-degree shift from the U.S.-NATO approach now being used; (b) a far greater foreign military and civilian presence to implement it; and (c) a commitment of substantial financial resources over an extended period of time. While the West could certainly change horses in the manner Kilcullen suggests, the shift would be pointless because the Afghan insurgency has already become as much a popular nationalist reaction to foreign occupation as it is a Salafi insurgency; there is not, Messrs. Blair, Reidel, and other Obama officials notwithstanding, a mass of accidental guerillas yearning to be separated from the Taleban-led coalition. Indeed, there would be no better way to ignite an ever broader anti-foreign Afghan nationalist insurgency than to follow Kilcullen’s recommendations that we patiently extend our already far too long occupation.

Overall, Kilcullen has written an informative and in many ways useful and insightful book. To his credit, he has caveated his theories to try to dissuade readers from believing that they can be applied and expected to work in all locales and situations. That said, The Accidental Guerrilla is a study explicitly written with an eye toward influencing the Obama administration’s Afghan policymaking, both parties in Congress, and Gen.David Petraeus, the book’s amazingly pure, courageous, brilliant, and knightly hero. Unfortunately, this lot has proven repeatedly that it is consistently able to ignore caveats, miss nuances, and fall deeply in love with any plan that even remotely justifies U.S. interventionism. Odds are that in the future much blame will be laid at Kilcullen’s feet for the defeat of the U.S. and NATO in Afghanistan, blame that would be better placed at the door of America’s rabid, bipartisan interventionists who are now reinforcing failure in an already lost war.

Tuesday, January 06, 2009

The Cult Of Counterinsurgency

A quiet revolution in the U.S. military has resurrected Vietnam-era strategies to fight the war on terrorism. Retired Lt. Col. John Nagl makes counterinsurgency seem so appealing that it's easy to forget its dark side.
By Tara McKelvey
November 20, 2008
Courtesy Of The American Prospect

John Nagl's memories of Vietnam are vague, at best. He was, after all, only two years old during the 1968 Tet offensive and was in grade school in Omaha, Nebraska, during the fall of Saigon. It is perhaps for this reason that Nagl, a former tank commander turned military strategist, does not see Vietnam as a symbol of dishonor, the way older military officers do. Rather, the Vietnam War is a subject to be studied: Nagl's acclaimed book, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, explores lessons from the American experience in fighting an insurgency in Vietnam. He's been one of the foremost proponents of applying those same techniques in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The Vietnam War, he writes, shows the importance of understanding tribal loyalties, working to improve the lives of civilians, and training local forces. Many of these lessons were forgotten in the decades following Vietnam. Nagl believes this is an oversight, and he has worked harder than almost anyone to bring these fundamental tenets of counterinsurgency into the military mainstream. Indeed, he has helped turn things around so dramatically that now counterinsurgency not only is seen as a legitimate and honorable pursuit but has become the guiding doctrine of the U.S. military.

Nagl (pronounced like "boggle," he says), who led a tank platoon in the first Gulf War and fought in Anbar Province in 2003 and 2004 (23 soldiers from his unit were killed), retired from the military this summer and is a senior fellow at the Washington think tank Center for a New American Security. The 42-year-old Rhodes scholar is armed with missionary zeal, an arsenal of quotations about military strategy, and Red Bull-ish energy on the conference circuit. He is constantly tapping his feet, twirling his pen, and slamming his hand on tables when he talks. (An admitted self-Googler, he is adept at self-promotion.)

Nagl has so successfully popularized counterinsurgency in the military and the general public that he is known as the doctrine's Johnny Appleseed. One Pentagon insider says his achievements can be attributed "solely" to his ability to flirt. But, sitting at an outdoor patio table above Pennsylvania Avenue on a late summer morning, Nagl denies the charge. "I am shocked, shocked," he says, jokingly explaining that he finds it "appalling and demeaning and absolutely untrue." Then he leans back in his chair, takes off his glasses, and shakes his head slowly. "A man's got to do what a man's got to do," he says.

To that end, Nagl has helped rewrite the U.S. Army/Marine Corps counterinsurgency field manual, which is currently being used in Iraq. He believes that a new-and-improved counterinsurgency strategy will lead the United States to victory in Iraq and Afghanistan -- and will ensure peace and stability in those countries and elsewhere in the world. In different venues, ranging from television studios to meetings with government officials, he has outlined tactics and reviewed his own battle-tested strategies of counterinsurgency, and he is widely recognized as one of the main reasons that the doctrine holds sway in Baghdad, Ramadi, and, most importantly, in Washington.

Counterinsurgency means, more or less, an attempt to defeat guerilla fighters who hide among a civilian population over an extended period of time (the word "guerilla" comes from the Spanish term for "small war"). These types of "low-intensity conflicts," as they are known, were fought by the French in Algeria, the British in Malaysia, and the Soviets in Afghanistan. The current U.S. strategy includes a heady mix of politics and military might and is based on French and English doctrine from the 1950s and 1960s, as well as lessons from Vietnam. Counterinsurgency has a special allure for liberal writers and thinkers because it offers a holistic approach, emphasizing efforts to win the hearts and minds of local people, and attempts to transform formerly autocratic governments into ones that respect human rights, women's education, and the rule of law. At least, these are the goals. Whether or not the strategy has been successful, or whether it even has the potential to succeed, is a matter of debate. Skeptics say that despite a sophisticated veneer, counterinsurgency is warfare of the nastiest, most brutal kind, and it lasts for years and years.

After John F. Kennedy became president, one of his first questions was "What are we doing about guerilla warfare?" Thanks in part to Nagl's success in promoting counterinsurgency doctrine, the new president will not need to ask. John McCain and Barack Obama have been trying to outshine each other with their praise of Gen. David Petraeus, who implemented counterinsurgency tactics in Iraq. Both candidates have also endorsed a proposal for a military advisory corps, a program promoted by Nagl that will ensure the U.S. continues to use counterinsurgency tactics around the world. It's clear to anyone who has spent time in military and foreign-policy circles: The debate is over. Counterinsurgency is here to stay.

***

Iraq didn't start out as the test case for Nagl's favored military strategy. In the early days, counterinsurgency tactics were only used on an ad-hoc basis. Some commanders tried to build relationships with local civilians in order to track down insurgents; other units descended into lawlessness and violence. It wasn't until several horrific incidents made headlines -- namely the Abu Ghraib scandal of 2004, followed by the killings of Iraqi civilians at Haditha in 2005 -- that the military began to re-evaluate its conduct and to attempt to implement a doctrine that would address some of these issues.

The wanton violence among some units as well as the dismal state of the war prompted Petraeus (himself a student of Vietnam-era counterinsurgency tactics) and others to devise a program to coordinate counterinsurgency efforts. In February 2006, Petraeus hosted a workshop, co-sponsored by Harvard's Carr Center for Human Rights, in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, to revise the U.S. Army/Marine Corps counterinsurgency field manual. During those meetings, Nagl and other experts laid out the strategy for an intellectually challenging kind of warfare in which civilian and military activities are integrated, allowing soldiers and Marines to cooperate with humanitarian workers in an effort to win over the local population. It's a strategy that employs anthropological tools such as graphs that map social networks in local communities. The field manual represents a dramatic shift in the way the U.S. sees its military and its role in the Middle East and other places around the globe.

"The Army could have issued a document that says ?What to do in Iraq -- now,'" says Edward Luttwak, a senior associate at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies. "They didn't do that. What the field manual prescribes is to make a vast political and economic effort to change Iraq, and the implication is ?This is what we should be doing around the world.'"

Perhaps the biggest post-Vietnam test of counterinsurgency doctrine has been the deployment of approximately 20,000 additional troops to Iraq in 2007 -- the effort known as "the surge." A precipitous drop in violence followed, and proponents of the surge were quick to claim that it had worked. But the reality is much messier and more complex. The Washington Post's Bob Woodward says the reduction in violence is due to a program known as High-Value Targeting, or the capture or killing of insurgent leaders, as well as the number of troops. Nearly everyone gives credit to the Anbar Awakening (the U.S. is paying approximately 100,000 individuals known as the Sons of Iraq about $300 a month to keep the peace, and Sunni tribal sheikhs make millions more through U.S. contracts) and to a pullback by the militia led by Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. These disparate elements, some coordinated by the military and some coincidental, have come together and tamped down the bloodshed.

While these various factors are still the subject of some debate among foreign-policy experts, the conventional wisdom in Washington is that the situation in Iraq has improved largely because of the new approach. In many ways, it does not even matter whether or not this is true. Counterinsurgency, as promulgated by Nagl and other military scholars, has become the accepted answer to what had seemed to be an intractable problem, and in a short period of time, the doctrine has become such a powerful force that it is cast in near-biblical terms. As David Kilcullen, a friend of Nagl's and a special adviser for counterinsurgency to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, recently explained during a panel discussion at the National Press Club, there is "B.C. -- before COIN" and "A.D. -- After Dave" (as in Petraeus). According to Nagl and other supporters, the reduced violence in Iraq is a sure sign that counterinsurgency can work. A new president should be able to take the lessons learned in Iraq and, after adapting them slightly, apply them to Afghanistan, then Pakistan, the Philippines, Colombia, Somalia, and elsewhere.

Critics such as Col. Gian Gentile, an associate professor of history at West Point and an Iraq veteran, argue that counterinsurgency tactics not only divert resources from other types of military training but also alienate civilian populations on a massive scale. "We could lose our edge in our ability to conduct other kinds of operations," warns Gentile. If China does something dramatic, the U.S. may be in trouble with its troops and resources bogged down in counterinsurgency efforts.

The new president could stop the buildup of troops in Afghanistan -- an effort that could be called a "pre-surge" -- and redirect the resources of the military toward more conventional warfare. But that seems unlikely. Many high-ranking military advisers are true believers in the doctrine. Skeptics like Gentile are in the minority. "It's not like I'm a dweeb who has to sit off by himself," he says, but he acknowledges that "the intellectual climate of the Army is pretty much stuck in counterinsurgency."

***

John Nagl does not like the word "colonialism," at least when it comes up during discussions about counterinsurgency. "It is such a bad word," he says, explaining that the U.S. has an important role to play in the world. "Madeline Albright got in a lot of trouble for the phrase ?The United States is the indispensable nation.' But to a large extent that's true."

Many people say Iraq is a lesson: This kind of thing will not -- should not -- happen again. But Americans have sworn off intervention before, most recently after the 1993 "Black Hawk Down" incident in Somalia, and since then the U.S. has been involved in a new conflict (Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan) roughly every two years. It's a pretty safe bet that the strategy Nagl promotes, whether it is called neocolonialism or counterinsurgency, will be applied in various regions over the next several years, with the incoming president's oversight.

Counterinsurgency is known as a thinking man's war, and it has attracted some of the country's best and brightest. In many ways, the doctrine comes across as refreshingly law-abiding, a product of a post-Abu Ghraib era. The field manual, as Nagl and other supporters point out, has a chapter on morals and values. Counterinsurgency is big on hearts and minds. In the wake of the Iraq War, no wonder it has been embraced.

The doctrine is so appealing and intellectually fascinating that it has its own subculture in Washington. There are rock stars (Nagl and Kilcullen, who were celebrated on a now-defunct military gossip blog for their personalities as much as the doctrine they espouse); a celebrity couple (Kilcullen and Janine Davidson, author of the forthcoming book The Fog of Peace); a guru (Petraeus); a cult-classic film (Battle of Algiers); and a magazine (Small Wars Journal). Many in the counterinsurgency movement are, like Nagl, too young to have fought in Vietnam. They see counterinsurgency as a doctrine that has been unfairly vilified.

Among all of these major players, Nagl stands out. His detractors call him a show-off. But most everyone, including Nagl's skeptics, agrees that he has played a key role in establishing counterinsurgency as a dominant military strategy. "It took a lot chutzpah and a lot of intellect to do what he did," says Lt. Col. Conrad C. Crane, a retired Army officer and the chief author of the counterinsurgency field manual. "He's an important force in the intellectual ferment that produced this."

One of the most enduring legacies of the doctrine may be its scope: It is an all-encompassing effort that requires various parts of government, and it extends beyond the traditional role of the armed forces. Counterinsurgency, as Nagl explains, is "80 percent political, 20 percent military." (He is quoting David Galula, "the Clausewitz of counterinsurgency," a French army officer who wrote about Algeria.) What happens on the battlefield may matter less than how this joint military-civilian project unfolds in Washington.

The new president, Nagl says, will have to work to achieve a balance among the State, Treasury, and Agriculture departments and other agencies that are needed in this effort. State Department employees, for example, have been asked to join provincial reconstruction teams that provide medical, engineering, and other assistance for rebuilding Iraq. The president will also be dealing with a military that has, for better or worse, become counterinsurgency-centric. Three of the most prominent officers who support the counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq were promoted to brigadier general in July. Not to mention Petraeus, who was recently named head of Central Command, which oversees all military operations in Central Asia, the Middle East, and East Africa. The president will have to figure out how to implement the new doctrine, or else incur the wrath of some powerful military men who have invested their lives in it.

When asked about the cost of the new counterinsurgency model, Nagl shrugs. "Losing wars is really expensive, and sons of bitches flying airplanes into our buildings is really fucking expensive," he says. "So let's not do that anymore."

Administration of the counterinsurgency doctrine could be modeled on the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support, or CORDS, a program that coordinated military and civil affairs in the late 1960s in an effort to defeat the insurgency in Vietnam. Nagl talks about creating a new position, senior director for counterinsurgency, on the National Security Council in order to oversee the effort. A tough job, he admits. "You need somebody really persuasive." It is not hard to figure out who he might have in mind.

***

Outside a trailer at the Marine Corps' Center for Irregular Warfare in Quantico, Virginia, a thermometer shows 101 degrees. The place looks hastily thrown together, and it smells of wood from railings secured along a walkway outside the trailer. This training center is part of an ambitious campaign to teach counterinsurgency tactics to a new generation of soldiers and Marines. On other training grounds across the country, the military has built mock Iraqi villages, complete with "real Iraqis," as one Marine tells me, hired by private contractors. Soldiers in the dusty hills of Yakima, Washington, and in the swamps of Louisiana are being trained in the doctrine. And counterinsurgency academies have been established in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Through these efforts, the military is approaching counterinsurgency in a systematic way. Troops are studying manuals on cultural awareness and learning the basics of Islam. They are also learning how to fight in a civilian environment.

On a September morning, three Marines are sitting around a table in a conference room at the Center for Irregular Warfare. The chairs rumble when an MH-60 helicopter flies over the building. The three men, Col. Daniel Kelly, Col. Nick Marano, and Lt. Col. Tommy Scott, are all working on programs to train Marines in irregular warfare. Kelly, a barrel-chested man in desert boots, and Marano, who has dark hair and bushy eyebrows, have both served in Iraq and do not seem like bookish types. Yet over mugs of coffee, they argue passionately about the differences between counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, as defined by military doctrine. "Counterinsurgency is more holistic," says one. "Counterterrorism involves broader reach of power," explains another. The Marines are engaged, openly and passionately, in a discussion set in an empirically based field of study. Yet somehow they remind me of the guys in Reservoir Dogs -- jewelry thieves who join in a textual analysis of Madonna's "Like a Virgin" while sitting in a diner.

Nothing against the Marines at the Center for Irregular Warfare -- all three seem smart, friendly, and law-abiding -- but their conversation illustrates how the science of counterinsurgency can seem absurd. The difference between counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, for example, may be more political than semantic. Counterterrorism is "the long war," as the global war on terrorism is now called, and counterinsurgency is part of this effort. But semantics do matter. When Marines break down the door of a house in Baghdad, they could find an insurgent or a terrorist, depending on what they choose to call the captured suspect. That designation has serious implications. As one human-rights advocate explains, U.S. officials call people terrorists when they want to make them sound really bad -- or send them to Guantánamo.

Like counterterrorism, counterinsurgency may also involve dirty tactics. In Reservoir Dogs, the guys at the diner are in a shady business. If you are involved in counterinsurgency, chances are you, too, will encounter barbarism. Americans have been tortured, mutilated, even crucified, in Iraq and Afghanistan. Nagl tells me that he believes journalists should carry a gun in certain parts of Iraq -- to use on themselves if they are captured. Some argue that the behavior of America's enemies, whether they're called terrorists or insurgents, has been so savage that the U.S. must also engage in unconventional tactics. As Vice President Dick Cheney famously explained, Americans must go to "the dark side." In counterinsurgency, things are done in shadows. This is part and parcel of the doctrine, and the new president will have to figure out where to draw the line.

In Vietnam, "the dark side" of counterinsurgency was a clandestine project known as Operation Phoenix. It involved getting rid of Viet Cong leaders "by any means necessary," as Nagl writes in Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare. Through Operation Phoenix, which was part of the CORDS program, 20,587 Vietnamese were killed. Nagl admits that Operation Phoenix incurred "human-rights violations." Not to mention "a huge amount of controversy" says Carter Malkasian, director of the Stability and Development Program at the Center for Naval Analyses, a military think tank, and co-editor of Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare.

"There are some drawbacks," says the 33-year-old Malkasian, "but it's considered to be worthwhile." And that is why the underlying ideas of Operation Phoenix have worked their way back into the U.S. military. The Iraq-era version of this is known as High-Value Targeting. It involves house raids, sometimes called "snatch missions," which used to be carried out by Special Forces only. Now just about all troops conduct them. U.S. and NATO air strikes in Afghanistan have increased, and so have civilian deaths, which tripled between 2006 and 2007, according to Human Rights Watch.

"If you kill a very large number of civilians, you'll cow a population," Malkasian says. "But it's the wrong thing to do." On the phone, his voice is measured, as if he were conducting a cost-benefit analysis. You get the feeling that Malkasian, like many of the people who are involved in counterinsurgency campaigns, is open to all sorts of possibilities.

And, yes, it is possible for counterinsurgency to succeed, says Luttwak of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. It depends on how much "blood and treasure" you put into it. Few people know as much about irregular warfare as Luttwak does -- and he is not impressed by what he has seen in the Middle East. Luttwak, 65, who is the author of Coup d'État: A Practical Handbook, says U.S. troops should pull out of Afghanistan. "What the fuck are we doing there?" he asks. "Much better to abandon it and do occasional punitive expeditions as opposed to counterinsurgency and its enormous costs. I've been to Afghanistan. Basically, you'd have to kill every single Afghan and take all the children and put them in boarding school, preferably in England."

Luttwak has come to the conclusion that the U.S. doctrine of counterinsurgency is doomed, largely because nearly all counterinsurgency campaigns end in disaster. Other critics say the current policy is less about making the world safe for democracy than it is about making the world safe for U.S. economic and political interests. The specter of Vietnam -- with all its disappointments, bloodshed, and suffering -- looms.

Finishing up his coffee, Nagl tells me that he is an admirer of British novelist Graham Greene. "He does a wonderful job of showing that motivations are not simple and that the best of intentions go awry," he says. "In The Quiet American, he delves into America's guilt and shows how, with the best of intentions, it was responsible for profoundly screwing up in Vietnam. There are obviously parallels with our actions both in Iraq and Afghanistan."

But, Nagl says, he believes that today Americans can do things better. And that, more or less, is where the conversation ends.

Tara McKelvey, a senior editor at the Prospect, is a research fellow at NYU School of Law's Center on Law and Security and the author of Monstering: Inside America’s Policy on Secret Interrogations and Torture in the Terror War.