By M K Bhadrakumar
May 3, 2011
Courtesy Of "Asia Times Online"
The thesis was just about gaining ground that the bitter legacy of the Arab spring is going to be the reawakening of the rough beast of sectarianism in the Muslim Middle East. Sectarian strife, it was prophesied, would lead to a Sunni-Shi'ite confrontation involving Saudi Arabia and Iran.
That specter helped deflect attention momentarily from the existential threat posed by the Arab spring to the authoritarian regimes of the Middle East. It also helped the United States to distract the Arab street while Western intervention is under way in another oil-rich Muslim country, and to reinvent the containment strategy toward Iran. Most important, it gave the Barack Obama administration in Washington a fig-leaf with which to cover up the comprehensive failure of the Middle East peace process.
Arab Spring Is For Real
However, Riyadh and Washington didn't factor in that in the shadows of the Egyptian pyramids the Sphinx was bestirring, expounding visions of the shaking up of the established order in the Middle East. The interim agreement between the Palestinian groups brokered by the ''new Egypt'' in tacit collaboration with Iran and Syria threatens to become the leitmotif of the Arab spring.
Saudi Arabia in principle ought to be celebrating that its Palestinian brothers are forging unity at a historic moment, but are instead stunned into silence. President Obama quickly postponed his ''historic'' Middle East policy speech, originally scheduled for this week, in order to read the tea leaves.
As things stand, the rival Palestinian factions Fatah and Hamas will sign an agreement in Cairo on Wednesday to form an interim government leading to fresh elections in a reconciliation deal brokered by the Egyptian military leadership. The deal provides for an interim government of ''neutrals'' approved by the rival factions, which will set the stage for elections within a year to form a ''unity'' government.
The agreement apparently finds a way around the five sticking points that have so far thwarted political unity between Gaza and the West Bank - a date for elections, an acceptable supervisory body for overseeing polls, formation of a unity government, resuming talks on reforming the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and security issues. The presidential and parliamentary elections will be held simultaneously and Fatah and Hamas would form a committee to oversee them.
The unity government would comprise technocrats and will be headed by a prime minister acceptable to both Fatah and Hamas. The political prisoners in Gaza and the West Bank will be released and a ''social reconciliation'' programme initiated. Reform of the PLO has been a key demand by Hamas, which Fatah now accepts. An interim committee will lead the PLO until it is ''reformed'' and its decisions will be binding. Security issues, another tricky item, are also sought to be resolved by a joint committee of Fatah and Hamas.
Needless to say, it is too early to express optimism. But, as Massimo Calabresi of Time Magazine wrote, ''The most important marriage of the week was in Palestine, not London. True, the odds of a lasting relationship between the internationally recognized leaders of the Palestinians, Fatah, and the internationally designated terrorist group, Hamas, aren't great - it's not clear whether the union will actually be consummated. But even a short fling has the potential to upturn Arab-Israeli affairs, shift US interests in the Middle East and play a role in the 2012 [US presidential] election.''
The Sphinx Is Stirring
The upheaval in the Middle East provided the backdrop for this reconciliation and, evidently, something has changed in the scheme of things. Both Fatah and Hamas understood the need to be responsive to popular opinion that favors Palestinian unity. The Palestinian National Authority (PNA) President Mahmoud Abbas, in particular, saw the writing on the wall as throngs of young people in the West Bank borrowed the chants of the Egyptian revolution to demand Palestinian unity.
On February 17, Obama strongly pressed Abbas during a 55-minute phone call to withdraw the resolution in the United Nations General Assembly demanding that Israel stop its settlement activities. Obama said the move jeopardized America's US$475 million assistance for the PNA. But Abbas was undeterred and in a subsequent interview with Newsweek slammed the vulnerability and impotence of Obama's policy.
As for Hamas, put simply, developments in Syria are extremely worrisome. At the same time, it places trust in the ''new Egypt''. A top Hamas leader Ezzat al-Rashq told the German news agency Deutsche Presse-Agentur, ''The collapse of Mubarak's regime restored Egypt to its place in the heart of the region and revived the regional spirit which is helping the Palestinian reconciliation take place.''
In a gesture that was much more than symbolic, the Hamas leaders were received in the Egyptian foreign ministry rather than in the ''safe houses'' of the intelligence - as used to be the case during the Hosni Mubarak regime. The Egyptian interim head of state Field Marshal Mohamed Tantawi (who is also the leader of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces) received the Hamas leaders. The Hamas leader Taher Nounou was quoted as saying, ''When I was invited to the meeting in the Foreign Ministry, that was something different, and this is what the agreement grew out of.''
Egyptian Foreign Minister Nabil el-Araby told the visiting Palestinian leaders that he didn't want to talk about the ''peace process'' but wanted instead to talk ''about the peace''. Quite obviously, the revisionist thesis about the ultimate legacy - or the ''new great game'' - of the Arab spring being a Sunni-Shi'ite war doesn't apply to Egypt. Egypt's warming at the same time to (Shi'ite) Iran and (Sunni) Hamas represents a tectonic shift that is undeniably ''secular''; it traverses the great sectarian schism in the world of Islam; and it is leagues away from the archaic geopolitics built around ''isolating'' Iran in the region that Saudi Arabia and the US were hoping to perpetuate.
No More A Poodle…
What is becoming apparent is that Egypt is reclaiming the regional influence it abjectly surrendered when it became a poodle of the US and a collaborator of Israel following the 1979 peace treaty. The spokesperson of the Egyptian foreign ministry told the New York Times, ''We are opening a new page. Egypt is resuming its role that was once abdicated.''
The profundity of the shift in the Egyptian policies is that the military is spearheading the process with the full realization that this is also the collective wish of Egyptian society, its elites and professionals as well as the working class, and the secular-minded as well as the observant Muslim masses. Even the strategic community, as practitioners of realpolitik, feel enthralled that an independent path bestows flexibility to Egypt's policies and earns respect for the country as a regional power when Cairo speaks or acts.
The New York Times noted, ''Egypt's shifts are likely to alter the balance of power in the region, allowing Iran new access to a previously implacable foe and creating distance between itself and Israel.'' No sooner than the news appeared about the Fatah-Hamas accord, Tehran scrambled to welcome it. Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi said the agreement is the ''first great achievement of the great Egyptian nation on the international scene''.
Tehran estimates that the Egyptian leadership is seeking to gain leverage over Israel. Egypt appears to have coordinated with Iran in efforts to bring reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas. According to the Middle East analyst of the US think tank Stratfor, Tehran's backing for the deal and the fact that Hamas is headquartered in Damascus imply that ''Syria also decided to allow the reconciliation to go through''.
The Egypt-Iran rapprochement has indeed gained traction. Starting with the granting of permission (disregarding US and Israeli protests) for the unprecedented passage of two Iranian warships through the Suez Canal in February, Cairo moved purposively and by the beginning of April, Egyptian Foreign Minister was already reaching out for closer diplomatic ties with Iran.
Israel's worst fears about the meaning of the Egyptian revolution seem to be coming true.
The latest Egyptian announcement in the wake of the Fatah-Hamas accord, that it will reopen the Rafah crossing with Gaza permanently, has set alarm bells ringing in Israel. (An Egyptian security team is preparing to visit Gaza). An unnamed senior Israeli official told Wall Street Journal on Friday that recent developments in Egypt could affect Israel's ''security at a strategic level''. The chief of staff of the Egyptian armed forces General Sami Anan promptly warned Israel against interfering with Cairo's plan to open the Rafah border crossing with Gaza, saying it was not a matter of concern for Israel.
Again, the Egyptian military leadership's decision on Rafah reflects a collective wish of the domestic public opinion which empathizes with the sufferings and hardships of the people of Gaza. (A recent poll by US-based Pew Research Center found that 54% of Egyptians want Egypt's peace treaty with Israel to be annulled.) In the circumstances, what will worry Israel (and the US) most is whether the surprise Fatah-Hamas agreement brokered by Egypt is linked in some way to the Palestinian plan to push at the General Assembly session in New York in September for UN recognition for a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza.
Such an apprehension is not unwarranted. The Wall Street Journal commented last week, ''In the more than two months since … Mubarak abdicated … Egypt has reached out to Iran, questioned the price on a contract to export natural gas that is crucial to Israel's energy needs, and won major diplomatic victories with Hamas.''
To be sure, the Israeli reaction to the Fatah-Hamas accord has been predictably harsh. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said, ''The Palestinian Authority must choose either peace with Israel or peace with Hamas. It cannot have both, because Hamas aims to destroy the state of Israel and says so openly.'' A group of American congressmen also warned against the reconciliation plan. The US House of Representatives foreign affairs committee's chairwoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen said in a statement that US taxpayers' money cannot be spent on terrorists who threaten the US and its ally Israel. Netanyahu reportedly endorses that view.
... No More Backroom Deals
However, Obama is keeping his thoughts to himself. It is apparent that while the Arab spring shows no traces of ''anti-Americanism'' as such, the new successor regimes are almost certain to be responsive to popular wishes and aspirations and that is going to debilitate the US regional strategies.
At the very least, as Helena Cobban, a long-time expert on the region and author, blogged, ''What is true as a general rule in the region is that the kind of sordid backroom deals that regimes like Mubarak's, that of successive Jordanian monarchs, or others have struck with Israel in the past - that is, arrangements to quash Palestinian movements that go far beyond the formal requirements of the peace treaties - have become considerably harder for these Arab parties to uphold, given the long overdue and very welcome emergence of strong movements calling for transparency and accountability from Arab governments.''
That is to say, any digressions in the nature of stoking the fires of Sunni-Shi'ite sectarian passions may work only momentarily in the developing regional milieu. This became amply clear when Egyptian Prime Minister Essam Abdulaziz Sharaf chose the occasion of a meeting last week with the Kuwaiti Amir Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir al-Sabah to shrug off the paranoia about Iran whipped up by Saudi Arabia and firmly asserted Cairo's resolve to expand ties with Iran. He said, ''Egypt is trying to begin a new chapter in ties with Iran, which is one of the world's important countries.''
Simultaneously, Egyptian government spokesman Ahmed al-Saman said Cairo is determined to resume relations with Iran and no third party can pressure Cairo into changing the decision. A visit by the Egyptian foreign minister to Tehran could be on cards.
The Saudis resurrected the specter of a Shi'ite crescent under Iran's leadership. But it takes two to tango. Iran prefers to set its eyes on far higher goals than the leadership of a Shi'ite world. Damascus, Cairo and Baghdad - the heart, brain and soul of Arab politics - aren't falling for the Saudi clarion call, either, that Salafism is in mortal danger from militant Shi'ism.
Meanwhile, not only for the Saudis but for all Arab governments, the crunch time comes if and when they are called upon to recognize a unified Palestinian state under a ''unity'' government, which would mean a number of things - recognition of Hamas; adjusting to a major Israeli-Egyptian rift and the new Egyptian-Iranian-Syrian proximity; and daring a strategic defiance of the US. The stunning geopolitical reality of the ''new Middle East'' is that the Egyptian intelligence brokered the Palestinian reconciliation without consulting the US and Israel - or Saudi Arabia.
Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service. His assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.
(Copyright 2011 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved.)
Showing posts with label Arab Unity. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Arab Unity. Show all posts
Friday, May 06, 2011
Palestinian Reconciliation Sends Shock Waves
By Victor Kotsev
April 30, 2011
Courtesy Of "Asia Times Online"
TEL AVIV - When Palestinian President Mahmud Abbas directed harsh accusations against United States President Barack Obama and his team in what looked like a carefully prepared public relations stunt (letting "Newsweek into his personal space" for five days, as the magazine put it), the writing was already on the wall.
"It was Obama who suggested a full settlement freeze," Abbas told Newsweek's Dan Ephron. "I said OK, I accept. We both went up the tree. After that, he came down with a ladder and he removed the ladder and said to me, jump. Three times he did it." Among other criticism, Abbas complained about the "impolite" way in which Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak was pushed out, and about the recent American veto on a United Nation Security Council resolution draft which would have condemned Israeli settlement construction. [1]
There were indications for over a month that something big was brewing (see my article Jerusalem bomb seeds gathering conflict, Asia Times Online March 24, 2011). Few, however, expected Wednesday's announcement that a Palestinian reconciliation agreement had been forged with Egyptian mediation between rival factions Fatah and Hamas, and a national unity government was to be announced soon. Those taken by surprise reportedly included the Israelis, the Americans, the Turks, and indeed most of the international community.
While the announcement of a vague Palestinian unity deal falls far short of speculations that the Palestinian Authority would rush a declaration of independence (the meeting of the Quartet for the Middle East scheduled for mid-April was in fact postponed), it is certainly a big step in the direction of independence. According Israeli analyst Ron Ben-Yishai:
Hamas, meanwhile, appeared set on keeping up with its hardline image. "Our program does not include negotiations with Israel or recognizing it," commented one of its leaders, Mahmud az-Zahar. "It will not be possible for the interim national government to participate or bet on or work on the peace process with Israel." These comments throw a shadow on Abbas' assertion that he would continue to be in charge of the peace talks.
One compelling interpretation of Abbas' actions, in line with the Newsweek interviews, is that he finally lost faith in Washington. Up until now the possibility remained open that he would choose to isolate and disregard Hamas as he pushed for a recognition of Palestinian statehood at the UN in September; the campaign has already started, and so far it was conducted without the militant rulers of the Gaza Strip.
This option had its allures, not least since the Palestinian Authority, dominated by Abbas' Fatah party, has a lot more international legitimacy than does Hamas; the latter's failure to accept the Quartet Principles and use of terrorist tactics could undermine the PA's case that it is offering peace.
However, the American administration's refusal to abandon Israel at the UN Security Council, coupled with pressure from Egypt, seems to have tipped the scales and pushed him into a more confrontational stance. Abbas apparently calculated that his legitimacy with the rest of the international community - specifically at the General Assembly of the UN - would be improved by the move, and that he had less to lose than to gain.
What appears odd, however, is that he does stand to lose quite a bit - not least in financial assistance from the United States. It is hard to imagine that Abbas would embark on such an adventure without having secured alternative sources of funding to make up for the loss. European and Persian Gulf donors top the list of suspects, and it is important to watch the behavior of Saudi Arabia, which is rumored to be quite active throughout the Middle East recently.
The precise parameters of the agreement are unclear - and possibly are not finalized yet. Different sources have written about "a government of experts" that would rule both the West Bank and Gaza, about integration of security services, about the release of prisoners, and general elections within a year. How exactly any of these stipulations is to be achieved is another matter; not only is the devil in the details, but these details have managed to derail repeated attempts at reconciliation for at least two years now.
The basic outlines of the deal are nothing new - Egypt had drafted them in 2009. What is new is that Egypt was able to apply pressure efficiently on both sides. This is partly a result of the Arab uprisings - in the face of Hosni Mubarak, Abbas lost an ally, while Hamas' main base in Syria is endangered due to the escalating unrest there. Both were weakened, making them more amenable to compromise.
In addition, Egypt applied some carrots - for example, it promised to open "permanently" its border crossing with Gaza at the town of Rafah, effectively ending the blockade on the strip. It is unclear what Abbas received, but some analysts speculate that he would retain the greater share of power in the new government.
For the Palestinian president, a major risk is that the deal might collapse, as previous agreements with Hamas have collapsed - many Palestinians [3] and Israeli observers [4] are reportedly skeptical that it will last long. This would leave Abbas once again without full legitimacy but further isolated from both the United States and Israel. Hamas will beyond doubt reap enormous benefits from the opening of the Rafah crossing; once the border opens, Egypt is unlikely to close it again due to domestic pressure.
The militant organization could also use the reconciliation to strengthen its position on the West Bank and eventually to try to take it over, as it did in Gaza. The Palestinian Authority and Israel have worked together to prevent such a scenario over the past years, arresting numerous Hamas activists.
In light of all the uncertainties surrounding the deal, it is hard to completely rule out the possibility that it is an elaborate bluff of some sort (perhaps in order to extract concessions from the United States and Israel or to suit the needs of an external power). Even in this case, however, it will have a profound effect on the regional relationships.
Israel's reaction will be particularly important. Israeli politicians across the board ruled out the possibility of talks with Hamas, unless the latter "undergoes a deep and fundamental change". The greatest fear of the Jewish state is that Hamas will re-establish terror bases in the West Bank, from where it could strike at the Israeli heartland. A secondary problem is that if a Palestinian unity government gains international legitimacy, this would come at Israel's expense. Thus, Israel cannot be expected to stand by passively for long.
A number of apocalyptic scenarios circulate. If the agreement is implemented and Hamas forces are integrated into the security apparatus in the West Bank, this would mean the end of security cooperation with Israel (and also the United States). While some analysts have spoken about a third intifada (Palestinian uprising), however, and the peace process is buried for the near future, violence is not necessarily imminent.
The initial Israeli response, at least, was non-violent. On Friday morning, the Israeli daily Ha'aretz reported that Israel planned to "launch a diplomatic campaign, with particular emphasis on the European Union, to thwart international recognition of the unified Fatah-Hamas government".
It is important to note that aside from dangers, the reconciliation deal also carries some important benefits for the Benjamin Netanyahu government, and strengthens its security-related arguments both domestically and internationally. According to Israeli journalist Aluf Benn:
In addition, now that the Rafah crossing is about to open, Israel will face a greater danger from smuggled weapons into the Strip, but will also have another option open to deal with Hamas. It could seek to disengage from Gaza fully, cutting off electricity, food and fuel supplies, and leave Egypt to deal with the situation. A number of Israeli politicians and analysts have advocated this course of action, and it is important to note that it would also allow the Jewish state greater military freedom there, since it would no longer have the status of an occupying power according to international law.
Overall, the Palestinian reconciliation deal is a major gambit, especially for Abbas. If implemented, it would have a profound and complex impact on the basic relationships in the Levant, and in the Middle East in general. Even before it has been signed, it is sending shockwaves throughout the region.
Notes
April 30, 2011
Courtesy Of "Asia Times Online"
TEL AVIV - When Palestinian President Mahmud Abbas directed harsh accusations against United States President Barack Obama and his team in what looked like a carefully prepared public relations stunt (letting "Newsweek into his personal space" for five days, as the magazine put it), the writing was already on the wall.
"It was Obama who suggested a full settlement freeze," Abbas told Newsweek's Dan Ephron. "I said OK, I accept. We both went up the tree. After that, he came down with a ladder and he removed the ladder and said to me, jump. Three times he did it." Among other criticism, Abbas complained about the "impolite" way in which Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak was pushed out, and about the recent American veto on a United Nation Security Council resolution draft which would have condemned Israeli settlement construction. [1]
There were indications for over a month that something big was brewing (see my article Jerusalem bomb seeds gathering conflict, Asia Times Online March 24, 2011). Few, however, expected Wednesday's announcement that a Palestinian reconciliation agreement had been forged with Egyptian mediation between rival factions Fatah and Hamas, and a national unity government was to be announced soon. Those taken by surprise reportedly included the Israelis, the Americans, the Turks, and indeed most of the international community.
While the announcement of a vague Palestinian unity deal falls far short of speculations that the Palestinian Authority would rush a declaration of independence (the meeting of the Quartet for the Middle East scheduled for mid-April was in fact postponed), it is certainly a big step in the direction of independence. According Israeli analyst Ron Ben-Yishai:
The Palestinian president has been granted renewed political legitimacy for his rule in the Palestinian street, because formally his term as president ended a while ago. Now, Abbas is the president in every why, until the next elections are held. This also enables him to appear at the United Nations as a legitimate representative of the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank and demand recognition of a Palestinian state ... The unity deal take away an important bargaining chip from Israel, which has consistently told UN members that Abbas only represents the West Bank.To expand on these observations, the reconciliation move signals also that Abbas made a very specific choice of his path to Palestinian independence, most likely forsaking his relationship with the United States. While the White House issued a muted response, supporting Palestinian reconciliation but expressing concern that Hamas "is a terrorist organization which targets civilians", members of the US Congress bluntly threatened to cut aid to the Palestinian Authority if the deal is implemented. [2]
Hamas, meanwhile, appeared set on keeping up with its hardline image. "Our program does not include negotiations with Israel or recognizing it," commented one of its leaders, Mahmud az-Zahar. "It will not be possible for the interim national government to participate or bet on or work on the peace process with Israel." These comments throw a shadow on Abbas' assertion that he would continue to be in charge of the peace talks.
One compelling interpretation of Abbas' actions, in line with the Newsweek interviews, is that he finally lost faith in Washington. Up until now the possibility remained open that he would choose to isolate and disregard Hamas as he pushed for a recognition of Palestinian statehood at the UN in September; the campaign has already started, and so far it was conducted without the militant rulers of the Gaza Strip.
This option had its allures, not least since the Palestinian Authority, dominated by Abbas' Fatah party, has a lot more international legitimacy than does Hamas; the latter's failure to accept the Quartet Principles and use of terrorist tactics could undermine the PA's case that it is offering peace.
However, the American administration's refusal to abandon Israel at the UN Security Council, coupled with pressure from Egypt, seems to have tipped the scales and pushed him into a more confrontational stance. Abbas apparently calculated that his legitimacy with the rest of the international community - specifically at the General Assembly of the UN - would be improved by the move, and that he had less to lose than to gain.
What appears odd, however, is that he does stand to lose quite a bit - not least in financial assistance from the United States. It is hard to imagine that Abbas would embark on such an adventure without having secured alternative sources of funding to make up for the loss. European and Persian Gulf donors top the list of suspects, and it is important to watch the behavior of Saudi Arabia, which is rumored to be quite active throughout the Middle East recently.
The precise parameters of the agreement are unclear - and possibly are not finalized yet. Different sources have written about "a government of experts" that would rule both the West Bank and Gaza, about integration of security services, about the release of prisoners, and general elections within a year. How exactly any of these stipulations is to be achieved is another matter; not only is the devil in the details, but these details have managed to derail repeated attempts at reconciliation for at least two years now.
The basic outlines of the deal are nothing new - Egypt had drafted them in 2009. What is new is that Egypt was able to apply pressure efficiently on both sides. This is partly a result of the Arab uprisings - in the face of Hosni Mubarak, Abbas lost an ally, while Hamas' main base in Syria is endangered due to the escalating unrest there. Both were weakened, making them more amenable to compromise.
In addition, Egypt applied some carrots - for example, it promised to open "permanently" its border crossing with Gaza at the town of Rafah, effectively ending the blockade on the strip. It is unclear what Abbas received, but some analysts speculate that he would retain the greater share of power in the new government.
For the Palestinian president, a major risk is that the deal might collapse, as previous agreements with Hamas have collapsed - many Palestinians [3] and Israeli observers [4] are reportedly skeptical that it will last long. This would leave Abbas once again without full legitimacy but further isolated from both the United States and Israel. Hamas will beyond doubt reap enormous benefits from the opening of the Rafah crossing; once the border opens, Egypt is unlikely to close it again due to domestic pressure.
The militant organization could also use the reconciliation to strengthen its position on the West Bank and eventually to try to take it over, as it did in Gaza. The Palestinian Authority and Israel have worked together to prevent such a scenario over the past years, arresting numerous Hamas activists.
In light of all the uncertainties surrounding the deal, it is hard to completely rule out the possibility that it is an elaborate bluff of some sort (perhaps in order to extract concessions from the United States and Israel or to suit the needs of an external power). Even in this case, however, it will have a profound effect on the regional relationships.
Israel's reaction will be particularly important. Israeli politicians across the board ruled out the possibility of talks with Hamas, unless the latter "undergoes a deep and fundamental change". The greatest fear of the Jewish state is that Hamas will re-establish terror bases in the West Bank, from where it could strike at the Israeli heartland. A secondary problem is that if a Palestinian unity government gains international legitimacy, this would come at Israel's expense. Thus, Israel cannot be expected to stand by passively for long.
A number of apocalyptic scenarios circulate. If the agreement is implemented and Hamas forces are integrated into the security apparatus in the West Bank, this would mean the end of security cooperation with Israel (and also the United States). While some analysts have spoken about a third intifada (Palestinian uprising), however, and the peace process is buried for the near future, violence is not necessarily imminent.
The initial Israeli response, at least, was non-violent. On Friday morning, the Israeli daily Ha'aretz reported that Israel planned to "launch a diplomatic campaign, with particular emphasis on the European Union, to thwart international recognition of the unified Fatah-Hamas government".
It is important to note that aside from dangers, the reconciliation deal also carries some important benefits for the Benjamin Netanyahu government, and strengthens its security-related arguments both domestically and internationally. According to Israeli journalist Aluf Benn:
The Palestinian reconciliation deal, if realized, heralds the takeover of the Palestinian national movement by Hamas, providing Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu with an escape from the rut he has fallen into because of the deadlock in the peace process. This is just what Netanyahu needed to unite the Israeli public behind him and thwart international pressure to withdraw from the West Bank. ... From here on, the pressure will mount on [leader of the opposition Kadima party] Tzipi Livni to join an Israeli unity government to stand against the Palestinians and international community. When Mahmoud Abbas joins Hamas, Kadima cannot say it has a peace partner and cannot propose an alternative policy. Why should Kadima stay in opposition now? ... The reconciliation has also saved Netanyahu's trip to Washington to speak at the AIPAC [American Israel Public Affairs Committee] convention and in Congress. He no longer has to line the trip with concessions to the Palestinians. The pressure is off.Indeed, Netanyahu's relationship with Washington might just have taken a turn for the better. If Obama wants to be re-elected as president, and he does, he cannot afford to be seen supporting Hamas against Israel. The European Union, as the Palestinian news agency Ma'an observes, is "more open than [the] US on [the] unity deal", but even there Netanyahu could gain some traction. Alternatively - though unlikely - Hamas could mitigate its stance and renounce violence, which would grant it international legitimacy, but would also serve the Jewish state well.
In addition, now that the Rafah crossing is about to open, Israel will face a greater danger from smuggled weapons into the Strip, but will also have another option open to deal with Hamas. It could seek to disengage from Gaza fully, cutting off electricity, food and fuel supplies, and leave Egypt to deal with the situation. A number of Israeli politicians and analysts have advocated this course of action, and it is important to note that it would also allow the Jewish state greater military freedom there, since it would no longer have the status of an occupying power according to international law.
Overall, the Palestinian reconciliation deal is a major gambit, especially for Abbas. If implemented, it would have a profound and complex impact on the basic relationships in the Levant, and in the Middle East in general. Even before it has been signed, it is sending shockwaves throughout the region.
Notes
1. The Wrath of Abbas, Newsweek, April 24, 2011.
2. Congress says will halt US aid if PA merges with Hamas, Ynetnews, April 28, 2011.
3. Ramallah residents wary of unity deal, Ynetnews, April 28, 2011.
4. Gov't officials skeptical about Hamas-Fatah agreement, Jerusalem Post, April 28, 2011.
Victor Kotsev is a journalist and political analyst based in Tel Aviv.
(Copyright 2011 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved.)
2. Congress says will halt US aid if PA merges with Hamas, Ynetnews, April 28, 2011.
3. Ramallah residents wary of unity deal, Ynetnews, April 28, 2011.
4. Gov't officials skeptical about Hamas-Fatah agreement, Jerusalem Post, April 28, 2011.
Victor Kotsev is a journalist and political analyst based in Tel Aviv.
(Copyright 2011 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved.)
Wednesday, May 04, 2011
Washington Fumbles Palestinian Unity
After secret talks that gave way to a Fatah and Hamas reconciliation, American politicians are already threatening to cut funding to the Palestinian Authority - despite not even reading the terms of their agreement [EPA]
America's Stalwart Support Of Israel Is Once Again Derailing Peace Negotiations Before They Even Start.
By MJ Rosenberg
Last Modified: 28 Apr 2011 17:35
Courtesy Of "Al-Jazeera"
Any doubt about how the United States makes its policies on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict should be dispelled by the Obama administration's near-instant reaction to the Fatah-Hamas reconciliation announcement: it is determined to be fully in sync with prime minister Netanyahu.
Without even hearing the details of the agreement, the White House, as reported in the New York Times, "all but dismissed" it:
| The White House, which has been debating how best to revive peace talks ahead of an address to Congress next month by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, all but dismissed the proposed reconciliation by reiterating the longstanding American designation of Hamas as a terrorist organisation that has never expressed a willingness to recognise Israel, let alone negotiate with it. "As we have said before, the United States supports Palestinian reconciliation on terms which promote the cause of peace," Tommy Vietor, a spokesman for the National Security Council, said in the administration's only public response. "Hamas, however, is a terrorist organisation which targets civilians." He added that any Palestinian government had to accept certain principles announced by international negotiators known as the Quartet: the United Nations, the European Union, the United States and Russia. They include renouncing violence, abiding by past agreements with the Israelis and recognising Israel's right to exist. Hamas has never agreed to those conditions. |
Then Congress spoke. Gary Ackerman, the ranking Democrat on the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, and a pro-Netanyahu stalwart, weighed in on the agreement:
| "It calls into question everything we have done," Representative Gary L. Ackerman, Democrat of New York, said in a telephone interview. He later issued a statement saying the United States would be compelled by "both law and decency" to cut off all aid. "I don't think there is any will on the part of the administration or the Congress to provide funds to a government that is dominated by a dedicated terrorist organisation," he said. |
On a roll, Ackerman then said that the deal "will be paid for with the lives of innocent Israelis". Ackerman, like most of his colleagues, never seems to notice all the innocent Palestinians who die at Israeli hands (many, many more than the number of Israelis who are killed by Palestinians), as evidenced by his cheerleading for the Gaza war. Nor did he care that he did not know the terms of the Fatah/Hamas agreement.
Of course, Ackerman's statement is typical of the congressional response. In fact, one of the reasons that AIPAC cutouts like Ackerman are first to issue press releases on any matter related to Israel is to set the tone for their colleagues by indicating what the right (i.e., politically safe) position is.
But the position itself is dead wrong.
The right position would be to simply wait and see what the Hamas-Fatah agreement says. Already today, Haaretz is reporting that, under the terms of the agreement, president Mahmoud Abbas will be handling negotiations for any new unity government. (As usual, the Israeli view of events in its own region is not as stridently "pro-Israel" as in Washington.)
Considering that even prime minister Netanyahu has repeatedly praised Abbas for his commitment to peace, it is just possible that Hamas will, following Abbas's lead, change its position in coming days.
Unfortunately, the US reaction to the Hamas-Fatah agreement makes any such change less likely.
In fact, the administration's demand that Hamas recognise Israel in advance of any negotiations with Israel could well ensure that there won't be any. So could our demand that it accept all previous agreements negotiated by the Palestinian Authority.
All of these issues would naturally be addressed in the context of negotiations. Demanding that Hamas accept them in advance – a position devised by the Israeli government and then pushed on the United States and the European Union – is an act of diplomatic sabotage.
There is only one demand we should make of Hamas, that it cease all acts of violence. Hamas has, in fact, lived up to that commitment during various cease-fire periods with Israel. In partnership with Fatah, it would likely do so again.
In any case, a mutual cease-fire is a reasonable demand, one that would facilitate negotiations. But the people issuing demands in Jerusalem and in Congress seem to have no interest in negotiating. Their goal is delivering for Israel which, of course, is a way of delivering for their campaigns.
This is the third time in the last few months that the combination of Netanyahu and the lobby (including, of course, its congressional allies) have successfully pressured the administration to do its bidding.
Of course, Ackerman's statement is typical of the congressional response. In fact, one of the reasons that AIPAC cutouts like Ackerman are first to issue press releases on any matter related to Israel is to set the tone for their colleagues by indicating what the right (i.e., politically safe) position is.
But the position itself is dead wrong.
The right position would be to simply wait and see what the Hamas-Fatah agreement says. Already today, Haaretz is reporting that, under the terms of the agreement, president Mahmoud Abbas will be handling negotiations for any new unity government. (As usual, the Israeli view of events in its own region is not as stridently "pro-Israel" as in Washington.)
Considering that even prime minister Netanyahu has repeatedly praised Abbas for his commitment to peace, it is just possible that Hamas will, following Abbas's lead, change its position in coming days.
Unfortunately, the US reaction to the Hamas-Fatah agreement makes any such change less likely.
In fact, the administration's demand that Hamas recognise Israel in advance of any negotiations with Israel could well ensure that there won't be any. So could our demand that it accept all previous agreements negotiated by the Palestinian Authority.
All of these issues would naturally be addressed in the context of negotiations. Demanding that Hamas accept them in advance – a position devised by the Israeli government and then pushed on the United States and the European Union – is an act of diplomatic sabotage.
There is only one demand we should make of Hamas, that it cease all acts of violence. Hamas has, in fact, lived up to that commitment during various cease-fire periods with Israel. In partnership with Fatah, it would likely do so again.
In any case, a mutual cease-fire is a reasonable demand, one that would facilitate negotiations. But the people issuing demands in Jerusalem and in Congress seem to have no interest in negotiating. Their goal is delivering for Israel which, of course, is a way of delivering for their campaigns.
This is the third time in the last few months that the combination of Netanyahu and the lobby (including, of course, its congressional allies) have successfully pressured the administration to do its bidding.
The first came when the United States was forced to stand all alone at the United Nations and veto a resolution condemning Israeli settlements (a resolution that embodied the Obama administration's own policy).
The second was when the administration said that it would oppose any Palestinian declaration of statehood at the United Nations this coming fall.
It appears that the administration has little interest in playing the role of "honest broker", at least until after Election Day 2012. And after that, there is the 2014 congressional election. And then the 2016 presidential election. And so it goes.
Meanwhile, as General David Petraeus famously warned us last year, the perception that the United States is in Israel's pocket "presents distinct challenges to our ability to advance our interests… Arab anger over the Palestinian question limits the strength and depth of US partnerships with governments and peoples" in the Middle East.
But, hey, that's only the national interest he's talking about. What does a General know about politics?
It appears that the administration has little interest in playing the role of "honest broker", at least until after Election Day 2012. And after that, there is the 2014 congressional election. And then the 2016 presidential election. And so it goes.
Meanwhile, as General David Petraeus famously warned us last year, the perception that the United States is in Israel's pocket "presents distinct challenges to our ability to advance our interests… Arab anger over the Palestinian question limits the strength and depth of US partnerships with governments and peoples" in the Middle East.
But, hey, that's only the national interest he's talking about. What does a General know about politics?
MJ Rosenberg is a Senior Foreign Policy Fellow at Media Matters Action Network. The above article first appeared in Foreign Policy Matters, a part of the Media Matters Action Network.
Sunday, March 27, 2011
Middle Eastern Security Must Safeguard All States
By Mkhaimar Abusada
Friday, March 25, 2011
Courtesy Of "The Daily Star"
The Arab Peace Initiative of 2002 stipulates that the Arab countries “consider the Arab-Israeli conflict ended, and enter into a peace agreement with Israel, and provide security for all the states of the region.” This, in exchange for a complete Israeli withdrawal from all Arab territories occupied in June 1967, a “just solution” to the Palestinian refugee problem based on United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194, and the establishment of a sovereign independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital.
The issue of security is considered a significant value to all states in the region, but more essential to Israel. The question is what do we mean by “security”? Who will provide security to whom? The Arab countries to Israel or vice versa? Does Israel need Arab protection? Can the Arab countries guarantee the security of Israel? Who is threatening the existence and the stability of the other?
Security can be defined as a degree of protection against danger, damage, loss, and criminal activity. Security is also defined as freedom from risk, danger, or freedom from doubt, anxiety, and fear. It means confidence and safety, or the state of being secure.
The clause “provide security for all the states of the region” affirms that the Arab countries collectively will provide security for all the states of the region, but specifically to Israel. The significance of the clause emanates from Israeli propaganda that it is surrounded by radical Arabs and fanatical Muslims who wish to throw the Jews into the sea. Therefore, the Arab countries promise to provide security to Israel.
But, turning back to the Arab-Israel conflict, insecurity originates from occupation and repression that breed hate and revenge across the Middle East. The roots of violence and acts of revenge can be minimized once dignity and respect is restored to all individuals of the region. It is not my intention to repeat old mantras that the Israeli occupation of Arab land is the source of instability in the region, but it must not be neglected.
Providing security shall mean educating the people of the region in the culture of peace, forgiveness, dignity and respect for all. It also must include prohibition of incitement in school curriculum, the media, and by political leaders. Ending the occupation, solving the refugee problem, and the establishment of a Palestinian state shall not be the end game, but rather acceptance of the other and normalizing relations can be the bricks of permanent security, stability and coexistence.
It is very doubtful that the Arab states, themselves no longer immune from internal crises, can guarantee their own security. The Arab countries frequently turn to the United States and their Western allies for assistance in combating violence and terrorism on their own soil. Yemen and other Gulf countries have very recently sought help from the United States to fight against Al-Qaeda and its operatives, as well as the use of U.S. intelligence to prevent terror attacks.
The Middle East is changing very rapidly all around. Old regimes that were considered very stable and immune from revolution and internal threats have collapsed. Other regimes are on their way to either adopt political reforms or vanish, just like Tunisia and Egypt.
The name of the game is change and political reform across the Middle East. Democracy, respect for human rights, and rule of law are the new slogans of the Arab youth. There is no doubt that these principles will provide security and stability for all the people of the region. Occupation, repression and dictatorship are no longer tolerated across the region.
Security for all states of the region can be provided through education and coexistence. I doubt that stockpiling of weapons and ammunition or even nuclear weapons can guarantee the security of all states of the region. It can deter some countries or semi-state actors from threatening each other, but teaching the culture of peace can save money, time, and provide security.
The Arab Peace Initiative needs to be revised. All countries in the region need to cooperate and provide security to all states in the region. The Arab countries as well as Israel are not immune from acts of violence, therefore it must be a collective effort by the whole region. A new approach must be designed to safeguard the principles of human dignity and respect for all.
Mkhaimar Abusada is a professor of political science at Al-Azhar University in Gaza. This commentary first appeared at bitterlemons-api.org, an online newsletter.
Friday, March 25, 2011
Courtesy Of "The Daily Star"
The Arab Peace Initiative of 2002 stipulates that the Arab countries “consider the Arab-Israeli conflict ended, and enter into a peace agreement with Israel, and provide security for all the states of the region.” This, in exchange for a complete Israeli withdrawal from all Arab territories occupied in June 1967, a “just solution” to the Palestinian refugee problem based on United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194, and the establishment of a sovereign independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital.
The issue of security is considered a significant value to all states in the region, but more essential to Israel. The question is what do we mean by “security”? Who will provide security to whom? The Arab countries to Israel or vice versa? Does Israel need Arab protection? Can the Arab countries guarantee the security of Israel? Who is threatening the existence and the stability of the other?
Security can be defined as a degree of protection against danger, damage, loss, and criminal activity. Security is also defined as freedom from risk, danger, or freedom from doubt, anxiety, and fear. It means confidence and safety, or the state of being secure.
The clause “provide security for all the states of the region” affirms that the Arab countries collectively will provide security for all the states of the region, but specifically to Israel. The significance of the clause emanates from Israeli propaganda that it is surrounded by radical Arabs and fanatical Muslims who wish to throw the Jews into the sea. Therefore, the Arab countries promise to provide security to Israel.
But, turning back to the Arab-Israel conflict, insecurity originates from occupation and repression that breed hate and revenge across the Middle East. The roots of violence and acts of revenge can be minimized once dignity and respect is restored to all individuals of the region. It is not my intention to repeat old mantras that the Israeli occupation of Arab land is the source of instability in the region, but it must not be neglected.
Providing security shall mean educating the people of the region in the culture of peace, forgiveness, dignity and respect for all. It also must include prohibition of incitement in school curriculum, the media, and by political leaders. Ending the occupation, solving the refugee problem, and the establishment of a Palestinian state shall not be the end game, but rather acceptance of the other and normalizing relations can be the bricks of permanent security, stability and coexistence.
It is very doubtful that the Arab states, themselves no longer immune from internal crises, can guarantee their own security. The Arab countries frequently turn to the United States and their Western allies for assistance in combating violence and terrorism on their own soil. Yemen and other Gulf countries have very recently sought help from the United States to fight against Al-Qaeda and its operatives, as well as the use of U.S. intelligence to prevent terror attacks.
The Middle East is changing very rapidly all around. Old regimes that were considered very stable and immune from revolution and internal threats have collapsed. Other regimes are on their way to either adopt political reforms or vanish, just like Tunisia and Egypt.
The name of the game is change and political reform across the Middle East. Democracy, respect for human rights, and rule of law are the new slogans of the Arab youth. There is no doubt that these principles will provide security and stability for all the people of the region. Occupation, repression and dictatorship are no longer tolerated across the region.
Security for all states of the region can be provided through education and coexistence. I doubt that stockpiling of weapons and ammunition or even nuclear weapons can guarantee the security of all states of the region. It can deter some countries or semi-state actors from threatening each other, but teaching the culture of peace can save money, time, and provide security.
The Arab Peace Initiative needs to be revised. All countries in the region need to cooperate and provide security to all states in the region. The Arab countries as well as Israel are not immune from acts of violence, therefore it must be a collective effort by the whole region. A new approach must be designed to safeguard the principles of human dignity and respect for all.
Mkhaimar Abusada is a professor of political science at Al-Azhar University in Gaza. This commentary first appeared at bitterlemons-api.org, an online newsletter.
Thursday, March 24, 2011
At Last, Arabs Seize The Right Moment
By Rami G. Khouri
Wednesday, March 23, 2011
Courtesy Of "The Daily Star"
In the past 10 days I have been in Beirut, Damascus, Doha, and now Amman, and in a few days I will be in Abu Dhabi then Dubai. This hectic travel schedule has provided useful opportunities to gauge popular and elite sentiments on the ground during this historic moment of almost revolutionary change in the Arab world.
This extraordinary week of events in several Arab countries clarifies what was not clear when the first citizen revolt took place in Tunisia starting in December. The Arab countries can now be classified into three broad groups in terms of how they react to the demands of their citizens for serious reform or the removal of the leadership.
One group includes countries where strong protests will overthrow the leader and his ruling clique, as happened in Tunisia and Egypt and will happen soon in Yemen. A second group comprises a few countries whose leaders will fight back using all military means to crush the uprising against them, as has happened in Libya and Bahrain. The third group includes countries where protests and calls for radical reform will elicit the government’s willingness to discuss specific reforms and negotiate changes, as in Jordan, Oman and others to date. An emerging pattern indicates that the nature and character of the leader and the degree of legitimacy he enjoys are important factors in determining which of the three options a head of state chooses to respond to the demonstrations against his regime.
This week of momentous events has included: the constitutional referendum in Egypt; international airstrikes against the pro-Gadhafi units of Libya’s armed forces; the escalating opposition that promises to remove Ali Abdullah Saleh from his position as president of Yemen; the first demonstrations in several parts of Syria; the erratic forward movement of the national dialogue committee in Jordan; the reassertion of control by the Bahraini armed forces with the backing of Saudi Arabian and Emirati troops; growing demonstrations in Gaza calling on the two main Palestinian factions of Fatah and Hamas to unite; and street demonstrations in Lebanon calling for a non-sectarian governance system.
The variety of responses by different Arab governments contrasts vividly with the congruence of grievances and demands across the entire Arab region. It is now clear that what we are witnessing is a pan-Arab citizen revolt that comprises a core set of demands related to several common issues: the rights of citizens, the limits and accountability of state power, and government decision-making mechanisms based on credible participation by citizens. The modern Arab world that was born around 1920 has now been profoundly challenged by its own citizens, who are fed up with living in systems that do not respect their rights or adequately provide for their basic needs on jobs, security, equal opportunity and simple human dignity.
The most intriguing thing that happened this week has been the apparent congruence between militarized American and European foreign policy and the majority sentiments among Arab public opinion – both of which wanted to come to the aid of the Libyans fighting for their freedom against regime of Moammar Gadhafi. Much controversy surrounds the Arab League’s decision to approve a no-fly zone over Libya imposed by foreign powers, and the subsequent airstrikes against Libyan military assets and facilities. Yet I cannot shake off the satisfaction of seeing Arab popular sentiment and Western foreign military policy coming together in the service of the shared goal of protecting Libyan civilians who have rebelled against Gadhafi.
This is almost as historic as the Arab revolt itself. We should monitor this matter carefully, to identify the consequences of Arab-American-European congruence after so many decades of tension and outright opposition between Arab and Western parties.
The demonstrations in Syria that resulted in several deaths are also a potential milestone. Syria for the Levant is similar to Egypt for the whole Arab world – a lynchpin country that influences events in many other lands around it. Should the Syrian demonstrations continue and spread and result in significant policy or personnel changes in Damascus, the impact on the region would be enormous. This would be especially felt in Lebanon and Palestine, and would affect Iran’s posture in and links with the Arab world.
The widespread extent and profound nature of the challenges to many Arab regimes by their own people represent nothing less than the first real process of national self-determination that the Arab world has ever experienced. This is a right that the Arabs should have enjoyed when their states were created decades ago, but they were denied that right. So now they have decided simply to seize it for themselves.
Rami G. Khouri is published twice weekly by THE DAILY STAR.
Wednesday, March 23, 2011
Courtesy Of "The Daily Star"
In the past 10 days I have been in Beirut, Damascus, Doha, and now Amman, and in a few days I will be in Abu Dhabi then Dubai. This hectic travel schedule has provided useful opportunities to gauge popular and elite sentiments on the ground during this historic moment of almost revolutionary change in the Arab world.
This extraordinary week of events in several Arab countries clarifies what was not clear when the first citizen revolt took place in Tunisia starting in December. The Arab countries can now be classified into three broad groups in terms of how they react to the demands of their citizens for serious reform or the removal of the leadership.
One group includes countries where strong protests will overthrow the leader and his ruling clique, as happened in Tunisia and Egypt and will happen soon in Yemen. A second group comprises a few countries whose leaders will fight back using all military means to crush the uprising against them, as has happened in Libya and Bahrain. The third group includes countries where protests and calls for radical reform will elicit the government’s willingness to discuss specific reforms and negotiate changes, as in Jordan, Oman and others to date. An emerging pattern indicates that the nature and character of the leader and the degree of legitimacy he enjoys are important factors in determining which of the three options a head of state chooses to respond to the demonstrations against his regime.
This week of momentous events has included: the constitutional referendum in Egypt; international airstrikes against the pro-Gadhafi units of Libya’s armed forces; the escalating opposition that promises to remove Ali Abdullah Saleh from his position as president of Yemen; the first demonstrations in several parts of Syria; the erratic forward movement of the national dialogue committee in Jordan; the reassertion of control by the Bahraini armed forces with the backing of Saudi Arabian and Emirati troops; growing demonstrations in Gaza calling on the two main Palestinian factions of Fatah and Hamas to unite; and street demonstrations in Lebanon calling for a non-sectarian governance system.
The variety of responses by different Arab governments contrasts vividly with the congruence of grievances and demands across the entire Arab region. It is now clear that what we are witnessing is a pan-Arab citizen revolt that comprises a core set of demands related to several common issues: the rights of citizens, the limits and accountability of state power, and government decision-making mechanisms based on credible participation by citizens. The modern Arab world that was born around 1920 has now been profoundly challenged by its own citizens, who are fed up with living in systems that do not respect their rights or adequately provide for their basic needs on jobs, security, equal opportunity and simple human dignity.
The most intriguing thing that happened this week has been the apparent congruence between militarized American and European foreign policy and the majority sentiments among Arab public opinion – both of which wanted to come to the aid of the Libyans fighting for their freedom against regime of Moammar Gadhafi. Much controversy surrounds the Arab League’s decision to approve a no-fly zone over Libya imposed by foreign powers, and the subsequent airstrikes against Libyan military assets and facilities. Yet I cannot shake off the satisfaction of seeing Arab popular sentiment and Western foreign military policy coming together in the service of the shared goal of protecting Libyan civilians who have rebelled against Gadhafi.
This is almost as historic as the Arab revolt itself. We should monitor this matter carefully, to identify the consequences of Arab-American-European congruence after so many decades of tension and outright opposition between Arab and Western parties.
The demonstrations in Syria that resulted in several deaths are also a potential milestone. Syria for the Levant is similar to Egypt for the whole Arab world – a lynchpin country that influences events in many other lands around it. Should the Syrian demonstrations continue and spread and result in significant policy or personnel changes in Damascus, the impact on the region would be enormous. This would be especially felt in Lebanon and Palestine, and would affect Iran’s posture in and links with the Arab world.
The widespread extent and profound nature of the challenges to many Arab regimes by their own people represent nothing less than the first real process of national self-determination that the Arab world has ever experienced. This is a right that the Arabs should have enjoyed when their states were created decades ago, but they were denied that right. So now they have decided simply to seize it for themselves.
Rami G. Khouri is published twice weekly by THE DAILY STAR.
Monday, March 21, 2011
A 'Teaching Moment' For Arab Americans?
Rather than marginalising one another even abroad, Arab Americans should take a page out of the revolutions sweeping the Arab world [CC - Matthew Dailey]
Arab Americans Should Look Beyond Their Differences and Come Together As Revolutionaries Of The Mideast Came Together.
By Khaled A. Beydoun
Last Modified: 19 Mar 2011 17:44
Courtesy Of "Al-Jazeera"
The revolutions sweeping through the Arab world and North Africa captured the world's attention.
Will the Arab and national Diasporas in the West mobilise to help their countries of origin through processes of reform?
Those of us who care about the futures of our homelands should work together, in solidarity with the young leaders spearheading progressive change in the region.
As an Egyptian American with family who marched into Tahrir Square and faced the force of police batons and gunfire, the revolution that commenced on January 25, 2011 had as much a personal slant as it did a political one.
This is true for many Americans, whose ancestral homelands are currently experiencing the sort of democratic awakening, or dawn, they believed impossible just several months ago.
Blaming The 'Other'
The United States is home to an eclectic and diverse population of Americans who are originally from the Arab world and North Africa – from as far east as Bahrain, and as westward as Mauritania.
Like the region they hail from, Americans from the Arab world are diverse and eclectic, but also disconnected and divided.
Those of us in the Americas, Europe and elsewhere share common narratives of displacement and struggles against the forces that drove us and our parents from the region.
The success of organic and popular revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, the unfolding movements in Bahrain, Yemen, and Libya, and the call for reform in Sudan, Algeria, Saud Arabia, Palestine and other nations, represents a burgeoning spirit of cross-national affinity built upon a common call for reform.
Dictators holding on to a precarious brand of control have perpetuated regional disunity by blaming domestic uprisings on others, such as "meddling" Tunisians or Egyptians in the words of Libya's head, Muammar Gaddafi.
A Different Tale
The people on the ground are telling a different tale, one of solidarity and inter-regional linkages. A frequent symbol of this is the conjoining of different national flags – Tunisia or Egypt's usually – in protests and online forums.
The names of other countries' leaders, deposed or soon-to-be deposed, are used in chants and slogans to drive home the same point – the need for reform.
This new-found unity in purpose – the fight for peoples' rights – should not turn us blind to the diversity of the region.
The rich array of ethnic and religious communities makes calling these uprisings "Arab" or "Muslim" very difficult.
North African states boast indigenous Berber nations, who faced considerable persecution (particularly in Algeria), while Egypt is home to a vibrant Coptic community that has also endured considerable discrimination and violence before Mubarak was unseated, and after, sadly.
The Egyptian Muslims who rose up to protect their Coptic brothers and sisters in the face of attacks represent the type of solidarity we should all strive for.
Arab identity is also particularly contentious in Sudan and Lower Egypt, home to Nubian and African populations that preceded the incursion of Arabs.
Ethnic, religious and sectarianism is most pronounced in Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq, where an amalgam of peoples were consolidated after the introduction of the nation state into the region by western powers.
The remaining Arab nations cannot be classified as ethnically or religiously homogeneous, whether because of indigenous populations or the presence of large numbers of non-Arab guest workers.
Americans who hail from the Arab world and North Africa embody the region's heterogeneity. We have important differences in racial and ethnic ancestry, complexion, dialect, religion, and with regards to the latter, sectarian and confessional affiliation.
To speak of Americans from the Arab world and North African in singular terms may expedite social or political convenience, but it establishes a distorted image of these Diasporas as homogeneous and currently politically united. This representation is inaccurate.
Political Integration Undermined
A range of factors undermined the political integration, and unity, of these Diasporas.
First, the platform has been dominated by Arab Americans, specifically from the Levant countries and Egypt, who have prioritised their national concerns and marginalised the others. For example, while Palestine is a central cause, these revolutions expose the problems of Arab repression as well.
Second, one cannot overlook the latent role of racism, or a pigmentocracy that privileges those with lighter skin, as a dividing line. In the Middle East and North Africa, as with some other regions, a premium is put on those of lighter skin colour. This is retrograde and destructive, and has no place in modern thinking.
Third, religion is a critical factor: Christians from the region generally have an easier time assimilating, while their Muslim counterparts – particularly amid today's rising tide of Islamophobia – are being pushed toward America's societal fringes. At the same time, some Muslim political movements have unfairly treated the region's Christians as the enemy and the region as monolithically Muslim.
We have to move from this politics of difference to a unity of purpose. Today's movements for change should lead us.
If the diverse peoples of Tunisia and Egypt can organise across ethnic and religious lines to topple their repressive governments, then Americans who originate from the region can also come together politically to promote a more promising future in their adopted country.
Furthermore, the peoples' victories in Tunisia and Egypt have surely inspired the swelling movements throughout the region. There is a proliferating spirit of oneness among nations in the Arab World. Yet, some resist it.
Indeed, Lebanese-Americans should champion the cause of democratic reform in Sudan, and Egyptian Americans must be not turn a blind eye to the calls for change in Bahrain, and so forth.
A New DAWN
Americans from the Arab world should not only emulate that spirit of unity, but also actively work in order to further the interests of their brethren at home.
Those living in America can support the people back home by pushing for sustainable democracies and reform throughout their region of origin. Our organisation offers a venue for solidarity action.
The organisation I co-founded, Democracy in the Arab World Now (DAWN), will embrace our differences in identity for the sake of a higher goal – building better societies.
Our platform avoids the divisions that have held back the countries and the region's people from working together. It embraces the spirit of the reformers on the region's streets.
DAWN aims to bring together leaders from the various Diaspora communities in the United States, and provide them with a broader audience to address their respective nation's crisis or domestic concerns. In addition, we hope to translate experiential parallels into lasting bonds, where Lebanese, Sudanese, and Tunisian Americans, for instance, can speak to the media, Congress, and other venues of influence with a common chorus, instead of disjointed and less organised solo positions.
We are not Arabist, nor religionist, nor do we prioritise the need for reform in one country against the other. We could be said to be proceduralist.
Our main goal is supporting the processes of reforms in the region so that governments better represent all the peoples' in their borders, from the country's natives, to refugees and guest workers.
Governments that rule by repression and demagoguery have no right to rule – and our objective is to galvanise our Diasporas under this common banner.
Those in the Diasporas of all stripes, hues and political positions who trace their ancestry back to the region, should follow the lead of the reformers back home.
By working together, we can overcome the divisions and the top-down political structures and ideologies that have kept us all down, and promote a new dawn for the region – and our communities in the United States.
Khaled Beydoun is an attorney and co-founder of Democracy in the Arab World Now.
Tuesday, March 15, 2011
'Where Are The Arabs?'
If Arab states do not act now, when the last Libyan rebel lies bleeding in the desert, his final words
may well be: 'Where are the Arabs?' [GALLO/GETTY]
If Arab States Are Serious About Ending Gaddafi's Menace To His People, They Must Take The Lead In Helping The Rebels.
By Robert Grenier
Last Modified: 13 Mar 2011 08:35 GMT
Courtesy Of "Al-Jazeera"
It was August of 1982. For seven weeks, Beirut had been sealed off, under attack by Israel from land, sea and air. Water and electricity supplies were cut. The Israelis had secured the airport and much of the southern suburbs. The Syrians had been defeated, their air force wiped from the Lebanese skies. Chairman Arafat and the PLO were seemingly at the mercy of their enemies, utterly dependent upon the international community to arrange an evacuation of their fighters which would bring an end to the carnage. Isolated and alone, all the leader of the Palestinian movement could do was look into the cameras and plead: "Where are the Arabs?"
In January of 1991, a nominally extensive international coalition of armed forces, led by the US but including many of the Arab countries, stood poised in northern Saudi Arabia to drive Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. It might have seemed that much of the Arab world was unified, and had engaged the United States and the international community in their cause to liberate a brutally occupied Arab country.
But in many of the Arab capitals, and to a seeming majority in the Arab street, the armies massed in the Saudi desert were anything but a sign of Arab strength and unity. For in point of fact, the Arab countries had had comparatively little to do with organising this UN-authorised, largely Western coalition. Many Arab nationalists from across the region asserted strenuously that the Arabs should not rely upon the Americans to sort out their difficulties, arguing in favour of an "Arab solution" to the crisis. In fact, however, this was mere posturing: An Arab solution to the crisis would have amounted to meek acquiescence in Saddam Hussein’s intra-Arab aggression. Those Arab countries most threatened by Saddam were not about to entrust their fate to regional Arab councils. They did not wish one day to be left, alone, to make the entreaty: "Where are the Arabs?"
Today, in the deserts along the coast of Libya, patriots are fighting to liberate themselves and their country from over 40 years of brutal, arbitrary misrule. Although tribal and other social divisions are no doubt playing a role in determining the fault lines of the civil war progressively settling over Libya, the primary motivating principles of the rebels have been clear: A desire for personal liberty, dignity and collective social empowerment. In this they have been transparently inspired by the courage of their brothers and sisters in Tunisia, in Egypt, and in many other parts of the Arab world. But as they attempt to withstand the onslaught of Muammar Gaddafi's better-armed loyalists, and as those rebels most hard-pressed repeatedly plead for at least limited outside assistance, well they might ask: "Where are the Arabs?"
Passivity and Diffidence
A new day is dawning in the Arab world. The revolutions underway have only just begun, and there is much to be sorted out in the countries where the democratic wave has taken hold. The response of other regional regimes, under less acute and immediate pressure, but still grappling with the challenge of socio-political changes now set perhaps inexorably in motion, remains very much to be seen. For all that its common outlook is rapidly evolving, the Arab world has a long way to go in coming to a firm consensus about what forms of rule will meet its minimum standards of acceptability.
Nonetheless, the latest indications of Arab intent in the context of Libya are positive, if as yet insufficient. A clear message has been sent by both the GCC and the Arab League that Gaddafi's brutality toward his people is not acceptable, and has effectively delegitimised his government. The Arab nations have taken a clear stand in favour of a UN Security Council-imposed no-fly zone, and for urgent outreach to the National Transitional Council in Benghazi.
So far, perhaps, so good. Still, troubling signs of traditional passivity and diffidence remain. The Arabs are deferring action to the international community without suggestions as to how that action should be implemented, and with no firm commitment for their own direct involvement. The Arab League ministers aver that a no-fly zone should only be for the purpose of protecting Libyan civilians, and should end as quickly as possible. They continue to express concern over foreign intervention, while requesting precisely that. Their ambivalence is palpable.
At the same time, evidence is mounting that the international fixation on a no-fly zone may be a distraction from more urgently-needed action, and may in fact be counter-productive. First of all, it is not at all clear how great a threat is posed by Gaddafi's air strikes, per se. While the military situation remains confused, it seems more likely that Gaddafi's armour and artillery pose the more lethal danger to both rebel and civilian targets.
Moreover, imposition of a no-fly zone would be no simple task. Security Council agreement is far from assured: The Council is divided, and the Chinese, in particular, will do what they can to avoid approving international interference in internal Libyan affairs, out of fear of the negative precedent it might set for themselves. While others might well participate, the US, clearly, would have to take the lead.
Following its doctrine, the US would need to attack Libyan air defences first; the potential for significant collateral damage is considerable. The Americans would also require a helicopter-borne "combat search and rescue (CSAR)" capability to be in place for downed pilots before they would willingly act. And there are not nearly enough aircraft in theatre, yet, for an effective no-fly effort. Finally, it may simply be too much to suppose that the Americans, already engaged militarily in two Muslim countries, should now intervene in a third, when the risk to their already weak regional standing from those who may advocate international action now, but will no doubt quickly criticise any missteps, is so great.
Taking The Lead
If the Arab League is serious about ending Gaddafi's menace to his people, they should focus on providing the National Transitional Council with the means to defeat him and his loyalist forces. The US, the EU and NATO have all made clear that they will only act with a clear legal mandate and with regional support. Therefore, it is up to the Arab nations to take the initiative.
It is very likely that the softness in the Arab League stance is a reflection of the divisions between those members on either side of the "democratic revolutionary" divide. Hobbled by the need for consensus, the League as a whole has gone about as far as it is capable; it is unlikely to take the tough decisions and hard actions necessary to counter Gaddafi's resurgence. Those whose commitment to support of the rebellion is notably strong - Egypt and the GCC countries in particular - must be prepared to take the lead from here.
First, they should move quickly to recognise the Council in Benghazi as the legitimate government of Libya, and immediately request modification of the current UN arms embargo to exclude its forces. Meanwhile, a rapid assessment of the rebels' military requirements is needed; these would likely include ammunition, anti-armour weapons, and perhaps rockets or artillery. It is clearly within the capabilities of at least some of the Arab countries to provide these rapidly by air, most likely with logistical assistance from the US or NATO. In this context, it would become far easier, and more palatable, for the US and NATO to provide overhead intelligence, perhaps off-shore jamming of Libyan military communications, and other forms of assistance to the transitional government.
We can begin to imagine that such an Arab-led initiative on behalf of the Libyans could help to build a new, cooperative relationship with America and the West - one which flows from Arab empowerment and collective resolve, and not, as in the past, from Arab weakness.
The time has come, in short, for the Arab regimes to demonstrate regionally and internationally the will and courage to act demonstrated by many of their own citizens domestically. Otherwise, they run the risk, in what is supposed to be a transforming Middle East, that when the last Libyan rebel lies bleeding in the desert, the boot of a pro-Gaddafi thug upon his neck, his last gasp will be: "Where are the Arabs?"
Robert Grenier was the CIA's chief of station in Islamabad, Pakistan, from 1999 to 2002. He was also the director of the CIA's counter-terrorism centre.
Sunday, March 06, 2011
A Middle East Without Borders?
Could the short-lived United Arab Republic serve as an example of cross-border union? [GALLO/GETTY]
The Nation State Is Ripe For Change and People Power Offers New Opportunities For Mapping The Future Of The Region.
By Mohammed Khan
Last Modified: 05 Mar 2011 15:00 GMT
Courtesy Of "Al-Jazeera"
The modern geography of the Middle East was carved out by British and French colonialists whose sole interest was in sharing the spoils of war between themselves and in maintaining their supremacy over the region in the early part of the 20th century.
The contours of the region, with its immaculately straight lines (see maps of Algeria, Libya, Egypt and Sudan) are much the same today as when they were first drawn up, despite decades of cross-border encroachment and conflict.
Never has an imported concept been so jealously guarded by ruling families and political elites in the Middle East as that of the nation state, together with the holy grail of international relations theory, state sovereignty.
The artificialness of the borders in question is not in doubt. Take a look at any map of the Middle East prior to the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement between Britain and France (when the division of the region was finalised with no consideration for the thoughts of the people that lived in it) and you will be hard pressed to find many physical boundaries between, say, Syria to the north-east and Morocco to the west.
What you may find, however, are free-flowing train routes spanning the region. A relic of the old Hejaz Railway, which connected Damascus to Medina, still stands (dilapidated) in the centre of the Syrian capital. It once transported pilgrims to the Muslim holy city in modern-day Saudi Arabia without the need for cumbersome visas and frustrating bureaucrats. But that was obviously some time ago.
Trial and Error
Over the course of recent history, Arab leaders have attempted to foster closer unity in the Arab world whether in the form of the 22-member Arab League - "to safeguard the independence and sovereignty [of Arab states]" - or the six-state Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) - as a political, economic and security union in response to the Islamic revolution in Iran.
However, the sanctity of the state itself, and its borders, has been absolute within these blocs.
Possibly the greatest experiment in cross-border union, one which admittedly lasted barely three years, began in 1958, when under a wave of Nasserism sweeping the region, Egypt and Syria (and for a very short period, Iraq) established the United Arab Republic (UAR).
Gamal Abdel-Nasser's demagoguery and penchant for power, however, and the subsequent economic tumult felt in Syria, soon saw an end to that project in 1961.
Theoretically, Egypt and Syria became one, as part of the UAR. Under a single leadership (with devolved power), the UAR was supposed to foster a spirit of togetherness and spur other countries in the region to join up and expand the union.
That the project failed was in no way a reflection of the Egyptian and Syrian peoples' desire to forge a single alliance. Together with the then Yemen Arab Republic, the formation of a United Arab States was also mooted.
That was the last we heard of a pan-Arab national project.
Arguably, the 1990s and the 2000s were the decades of cross-border post-nationalism, especially with the rise of Islamic movements as major political actors whose ideology was premised on Islamic ideals that transcended national borders.
Analyse closely the manifestos of some of these movements, however, and also consider their specific origins, and it soon becomes clear that their political ambitions were, and are, ingrained firmly in the states in which they emerged.
As such, the Islamic Salvation Front was a dominant actor in Algeria and Algeria alone, while the Muslim Brotherhood's focus is on political reformation in Egypt. The Brotherhood's offshoots are similarly specifically state-centric.
These movements may well have ideological underpinnings that aim to replicate the glory days of the early Caliphates or the Ottoman Empire, but realism has dictated that they focus their energies within specific national confines. This is unlikely to change anytime soon.
All For One
Given this recent history, then, is the idea of a borderless Middle East still viable? It may well be when you consider that the globalised nature of the world, in its present form, has thrown up possibilities in the region that would have been inconceivable barely a few years back.
More precisely, the political convulsions that the region is undergoing right now have revealed glaringly the extent to which the problems and, potentially, the solutions to the Arab world's ills are remarkably similar. The political, economic and social suffocation that the people of Tunisia and Egypt have endured, before popular revolutions swept the countries' dictators from power, were near identical. The political, economic and social ailments suffered in Libya, Algeria, Bahrain, Yemen and now Oman are of the same vein.
Obviously, the causes of political unrest across these states are much more nuanced and cannot be reduced to generalisations. However, the future, unsurprisingly, is with the youth, the very demographic that is taking the lead in battling corruption and autocracy and one that is communicating, encouraging and helping others across borders in the spirit and language of togetherness.
Sure, this does not by itself denote that borders are now irrelevant. What it does suggest, however, is that political and economic issues and opportunities cannot be dealt with simply within the confines of borders any longer. The pent-up frustrations of the Arab youth, the economic inequalities, the demands for better representation extend across the entire region. A single voice is emerging in search of a single value: Freedom.
A single political authority is certainly not about to emerge out of the current political turmoil. But such an authority is not necessary. An appropriate governance model for the Arab world to emulate would be that of the European Union (EU). The 27-nation political and economic union is borderless in the sense that its people can live, work and travel in member countries without much hindrance.
Sovereignty is still paramount in the EU but the federalisation of political and economic power is to the benefit of hundreds of millions of Europeans. Granted, the recent economic and financial crisis has called into question the viability of the EU, or more specifically, the single European currency, but the political will remains resolute in defence of the union.
We can probably find a plethora of reasons why a real political and economic union would not work in the Arab world. Take a look at the GCC, for example, a bloc of around 40 million people: After a decade of trying, it is still unable to form a currency union. How are we then to expect over 200 million people to agree on a federally-based political and economic union?
But, this would be to dismiss the thrust towards a common set of goals in the Arab world. Borders are increasingly irrelevant in this new equation. The means of mass communication, interdependency, pan-regional media, ease of access through improved infrastructure, the identification with a cause rather than a country, all suggest that the political awakening in the region may be conducive to a completely different set of political and economic realities.
The nation state as we know it, as it was imposed on the region by colonial powers, is ripe for change. The unleashing of people power has now opened up new possibilities for mapping the Arab world's future. While protesters across the region have been waving their respective national flags, the cause for which they are fighting and risking their lives extends well beyond their immediate borders.
Mohammed Khan is a political analyst based in the UAE.
Wednesday, February 23, 2011
Gulf States Must Repay Egypt Favour
Egypt sent forces to defend Kuwait in the 1991 Gulf War. Now the wealth Gulf states should repay the favour with development assistance to the new government, author says [Reuters]
Wealthy Arab Countries Should Support Cairo In This Time Of Need, 20 Years After Receiving Gulf War Assistance.
By Sultan Al Qassemi
Last Modified: 17 Feb 2011 10:06 GMT
Courtesy Of "Al Jazeera"
Perhaps no other region in the world counts on Egypt as a friend and ally as the Gulf States do.
It is a relationship that goes back decades but peaked in the aftermath of Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, when Egypt provided 35,000 troops for the Gulf War of 1991.
It was in fact the third largest contingent after the US and the UK. A few months after Kuwait's liberation, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE and Qatar forgave $6bn in debt that Egypt owed them.
Gulf citizens also have a deep bond towards Egypt and Egyptians since the days of Gamal Abdel Nasser.
Scores of past and current cabinet ministers in the Gulf have been educated in Egyptian colleges and universities. Ghazi Al Gosaibi, the late Saudi minister of labour and former ambassador to Britain, studied in Egypt and in 1994 published the Apartment of Freedom, one of the finest pieces of literature chronicling the lives of Gulf students dabbling in the sexual and political freedoms of 1960's Nasserist Cairo.
Military Balance
Despite some fears, it is very much in the interest of the six Arab Gulf States to have a strong democratic Egypt emerge once again as an anchor country in the Arab world.
Egypt, with its significant military power, is the only Arab power that can balance the military strength of Iran and Israel. Egypt's army has almost 500,000 active soldiers, with another 500,00 reserves and 400,000 paramilitary troops. The force is considered to be the largest in Africa and the tenth largest in the world. The sooner Egypt regains its role at the forefront of the Arab world as a leading democratic power, the sooner it can play a role in securing Arab interests.
The Arab Gulf States are also home to a significant number of Egyptian immigrants who have contributed to the growth of these economies, especially in the medical and academic fields. According to the latest figures from the Egyptian ministry of foreign affairs and quoted by Jordan's Al Rai newspaper, around 70 per cent or 4.2m of Egypt's six million worldwide emigrants live in the Arab Gulf States. About $1.5bn was transferred from Kuwait by Egyptians living there and another $1bn from Saudi Arabia in the 2009-2010 fiscal year.
Saudi investors own an astounding 1.6 million apartments and residential units in Cairo, Alexandria and Mediterranean resorts, making them the largest property owners after the Egyptians themselves.
Additionally, Kuwait's investments in Egypt are estimated at between $10 and $15bn in sectors as varied as tourism, services, industry and agriculture. But this isn't about the numbers, which help put things into context. Egypt's relationship with the Gulf States, as well as with the rest of the Arab world, is as invaluable as it is intangible.
The relationship went through cycles that in some periods descended into a proxy war between Egypt and Saudi Arabia during Abdul Nasser's backing for socialists who deposed the Yemeni monarchy in the 1960's.
Yet even then, thousands of Gulf citizens lived in Egypt and studied in its universities in complete security. This resulted in an entire generation of Gulf civil society leaders, businessmen, academics, engineers, doctors and ironically, rulers of the Gulf, who are a product of the education system in post-monarchical Egypt.
Looking To The Future
Qatar was perhaps the only Gulf state that was happy to see the end of the Mubarak regime. After all, Egyptian born anti-Mubarak religious scholar Sheikh Yousef Al Qaradawi, considered to be amongst the most influential Islamic scholars and highly regarded by the Qatari Emir himself, now serves as Dean of Islamic Studies at the University of Qatar.
Sheikh Al Qaradawi has been instrumental through his sermons - and Al Jazeera Arabic - in encouraging Egyptians to revolt against the Mubarak regime.
While Qatar itself became the first country in the world to react positively with a swiping statement that said: "The State of Qatar looks forward that Egypt would restore its leading role in the Arab and Muslim world", hinting at the decline that Egypt witnessed in the decades under the successive NDP governments.
And yet this revolution did not come at a low price in terms of human life or financial losses. Initial reports estimate that the economic cost of the peaceful 18-day Egyptian uprising stood at $30bn.
During the peaceful uprising, Saudi's King drew sharp criticisms for offering to cover any shortfall that Egyptian finances would face, should the US withhold aid.
Shortly thereafter, a diplomatic source told an Egyptian newspaper that Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait were in talks to assist Egypt with as much as $5bn. The Arab Gulf States are comfortably able to afford such large sums.
Despite the global financial crisis, the Gulf States' GDP is expected to remain high due to the soaring price of oil, which crossed the $100 mark this month for the first time since 2008. Due to high energy prices, it is estimated that Kuwait and Saudi Arabia will each register a budget surplus of $20bn this year, while Qatar registered a $5bn surplus in just three months.
What is required today from the energy-rich Arab Gulf States is for them to take the initiative and collectively assist Egypt in its time of need, as they did two decades ago. The Gulf finance and development ministers must call for an urgent summit with their Egyptian counterparts in order to understand fully the situation and provide the necessary assistance.
Egypt must not be left to seek assistance from the World Bank, IMF or China, which might be tied to medium and long-term geopolitical conditions.
Twenty years ago, 35,000 Egyptians made the journey across the Red Sea to stand by their Gulf brethren. Today half a dozen Gulf finance ministers must pay back the favour.
Sultan Sooud Al Qassemi is a non-resident fellow at the Dubai School of Government.
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