Palestine Needs A Political Solution, Not Aid

Activists can often emphasise aid to Palestinians over fighting for their political freedom [GALLO/GETTY]


The Funds Recieved By The Palestinian Authorities Have Cast A Shadow Over The Liberation That People Are Demanding.

By Ben White
Last Modified: 16 Aug 2011 13:50
Courtesy Of "Al-Jazeera"


Part of the Israeli government's response to critics of its Gaza policy is to deny that there is a "humanitarian crisis" in the coastal territory. The implication being that participants in initiatives such as the flotilla are not concerned with "aid" but seek to cause a political "provocation". In a similar vein, recent news of the opening of a five star hotel in Gaza prompted Israel lobby group AIPAC to suggest that the flotilla's real aim was to "delegitimise Israel".

Rather than go into the specifics of Gaza's socio-economic plight - excellent resources can be found at Gisha/Gaza Gateway, PCHR-Gaza, and OCHA - it is important to emphasise a point missing from Israel's propaganda and also neglected by some rights activists: Palestinians are seeking liberation, not aid. The conditions Palestinians are suffering from have political origins and political solutions. This is not a natural disaster; for more than 40 years, Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and West Bank have been subject to a military regime shaped by the priorities of colonial settlement and apartheid control.

Pro-Israel lobby groups in the West like to explain Israel's Gaza policies as first and foremost a response to "terror", and aimed at preventing arms smuggling. Unexplained is why Israel almost entirely prevents Palestinians from exporting goods out of Gaza, why the military enforces a "buffer zone", targeting farmers and fishermen, and why Israel continues to separate Gaza from the West Bank in contravention of their designation as a "Single Territorial Unit".

Furthermore, Israeli officials are on record as framing the siege as a form of collective punishment. In 2008, then PM Ehud Olmert said that there was "no justification" for allowing "residents of Gaza to live normal lives while shells and rockets are fired from their streets and courtyards [at Israel]". The year before, an official in Israel's National Security Council said that the goal of the blockade was to "damage Hamas economic position in Gaza and buy time for an increase in Fatah support". In September 2007, Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz reported on the Israeli military's plans "to limit services to the civilian population in Gaza" in order "to compromise the ability of Hamas to govern".

So this is no secret. Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz noted in May that "the Israeli closure was directed mainly at merchandise, rather than at weapons smuggling". The New York Times wrote that Israel's "goal" meant deliberately "suppressing economic growth in Gaza". A Wikileaks cable described how US officials were repeatedly told by the Israelis that the intention is "to keep the Gazan economy on the brink of collapse without quite pushing it over the edge". Famously, in early 2006, an advisor to Israel's prime minister said that "the idea is to put the Palestinians on a diet".

In other words, the conditions facing Palestinians in the Gaza Strip are a deliberate result of Israeli policies. A similar logic is at work in the West Bank, where economic gains in recent years are built on the weak foundations of foreign aid and conditional Israeli "concessions".

Over the past 20 years, the Palestinian Authority has received around $20bn in donor funds, and in 2010, development assistance accounted for over one third of GDP. In fact, figures for 2009 show that humanitarian aid to the occupied Palestinian territories was US$1.3bn - just behind Sudan. The money disbursed in the oPt between 1993 and 2003 was "the highest sustained rate of per capita disbursements to an aid recipient in the world since the Second World War".

Thus, even after a (modest) "relaxing" of Israeli restrictions and years of Fayyadism and Tony Blair's pet projects, the World Bank can still say - like it did in April - that "the sustainability of economic growth" in the oPt "remains bleak". Aid, the body said, "is what keeps many Palestinians above the poverty line", and - according to the World Bank Country Director for the West Bank and Gaza: "[Israel's] closure regime remains the most substantial obstacle to Palestinian economic viability."

Pouring money into the coffers of a permanently transitional "Authority" is an alternative for Western and Arab powers to actually challenging Israel - enabling the latter "to maintain its occupation and apply security measures, which are the cause of the demise of the Palestinian economy, knowing that donors will relieve the human costs".

Aid not only subsidises Israel's colonial occupation, it also helps perpetuate "the situation in which the Palestinians are a nation of consumers who are unable to produce and unable to compete with the Israeli economy," according to the authors ofAid, Diplomacy And Facts On The Ground.

In the aftermath of the Nakba, Israel was keen for the expelled Palestinians to be seen as a "humanitarian", rather than a "political" issue. Now, the IDF Spokesperson proudly tweets about how many goods Israel "allows" into Gaza. There is no doubt that many Palestinians are in desperate need of assistance - whether in terms of medication, housing, or the basic financial provision to make ends meet. But human rights campaigners and activists should take care not to emphasise aid over freedom.

Ben White is a freelance journalist and writer, specialising in Palestine and Israel. His first book, Israeli Apartheid: A Beginner's Guide, was published by Pluto Press in 2009, receiving praise from the likes of Desmond Tutu, Nur Masalha and Ghada Karmi.

Israel's Changed Agenda?

By Adam Keller
August 19, 2011
Courtesy Of "Information Clearing House"


Israel - Someone in the wild Sinai peninsula took a decision and sent a big, well equipped squad to infiltrate across the border into the Israeli Negev, attack buses and cars and engage in running battles with soldiers and shoot and kill and kill indiscriminately. And presto, in one minute the agenda changed and the public mood changed into a state of emergency and war at the gate and in all communications media there was no more talk of social protests, nothing but terrorism and army and security issues.

It had been a difficult month for Prime Minister Netanyahu – truly, a very hard month. A Prime Minister under siege, caught in a bind. Tent encampments and more tent encampments sprouting up all over the country, demonstrations and protests and more demonstrations. The demands for affordable housing and for Social Justice and for a Welfare State occupy the center stage, and the Free Market economics which Netanyahu had worked so hard to foster since he was Finance Minister are suddenly cast into doubt. What did he not try? He used sticks and he used carrots, he tried to entice the protesters with committees and benefits and rabbits drawn from the hat and he tried to castigate them as Leftists and pampered sushi-eaters, and they went on to protest and demonstrate and extend ever further the tent encampments and get their rallies to the peak of three hundred thousands in Tel Aviv. Just yesterday morning, the protesters arrived at the home of Eyal Gabbai, Nethanyahu's Chef de Bureau, and he spoke forthrightly and made it clear to them that the Free Market system will not change, and there will be no taxation on the rich and there will be no Welfare State in Israel. And these cheeky youths did not accept these clear clarifications from their government, and just announced that they will increase ever more their protests and demonstrations.

How, how to change the focus and move the public agenda in a different direction? Perhaps finally September will come and the Palestinians will go to the UN and demand to have their state and thus help to distract public opinion in Israel? But the big show at the UN is only due on September 20, how to get through another month until then? Besides, would even that change the tendency of public opinion? What if the Palestinians hold mass demonstrations in late September, without any violence, and demand to have some Social Justice, to be free in their country and no longer live under occupation – would this be enough to change the agenda? It might even get a bit of sympathy among Israelis.

But not all is lost, and relief for the harassed Netanyahu came from the usual quarter, out of the deserts of Sinai came the dramatic initiative to change the Israeli public agenda. And it so happened that Israel's fine security services had long since prepared a plan to liquidate Gazan leaders which just needed to be put into operation, and now put into operation it was forthwith, and all at once Israel's Air Force took off for Rafah and made the hit, an instant and huge success, and immediately afterwards could the Prime Minister make a full-blooded patriotic Address to the Nation people over all channels and offer congratulations to the brave soldiers and the valiant pilots and the diligent security operatives and deliver a stern warning to the Palestinians and offer condolences to the bereaved and wish the injured a speedy recovery and how great it felt at last to make a long speech without a single word about social problems, just like in the good old days. And of course, as soon as Gaza was hit, Israelis all over the South knew that the time has come to seek shelter and expect the worst, and indeed the Qassam and Grad rockets were not slow in coming, naturally prompting the Air Force to counter-attack on more Gaza targets and bring on more missiles on Israel the escalation is mutually escalating - and who would now dare demand a cut the in the defense budget in order to promote social causes?

But what the social protest activists do now in their tent encampments? Would they quietly yield to the changed agenda and meekly disappear from the scene? If that's what Netanyahu is counting on, he should think again.

I would like to give the floor to Social Protest activists, with a selection of messages posted in the past twenty-four hours on the Official Housing Protest Facebook Page.
http://www.facebook.com/j14rev
 

Voices From The Grassroots Field

Yigal Cohen: We will not let terrorism beat us!
Ittai Hertzberg: I just read this piece of news:

Deputy Minister Ayoub Kara calls upon demonstrators to dismantle their tents and call off their protest, in solidarity with the wounded in the attack, as "it's time to be united in the struggle against terrorism".
Ayoub Kara, don’t you have another appointment scheduled with neo-Nazis in Austria?
 

Arnon Shaked: How sad, Bibi and his government got a terrorist  attack just in the nick of time. There is only needed a small military operation to make him happy. That's what they think about human life, it's like a game to them.

Yossi Levy: This protest cannot stop, this protest will not stop. We must continue to protest, we must continue to protest. This protest will not stop! [modeled on a well-known Israeli song].

Friends, do not have to bow down low, we can prove that we can go on. Express our respect for the victims, with quiet rallies, go on  going out to  protest. Let the wounded heal and recover and rise up from their beds as patients in a better health system!

Let the soldiers on discharge find a better higher education system.
And a better Israel for all citizens.
Continue! Continue!
.

Tamar Aviyah: We undertake to continue the protest even if military action starts. Protests throughout the country.

Avi Hevroni: Finally, we will have to learn to go on demonstrating even after such events. There is no choice. It can not be stopped. This may sound insensitive but it's not. There is no other way you can keep this issue alive in a country where there is no certainty of tranquility and security.
 

Avishai E. Edenburg: Now is perhaps the most crucial moment for this movement. We all had this cynical thought, that we would fold everything down and go home like good children, when security issues come to the fore. No. We will not fold down, not until our needs are seriously addressed.

Shlomo Ohana: Friends, let's have a moment of silence for the Housing Protest. It was nice while it lasted, but now it's over.

Bikosh Bik: Well, Shlomo, speak for yourself. If you feel OK with the situation as it is, good for you... But you can't decide for others what is good for them and what they will do or not do.
    *
Eshkar Eldan Cohen: Continue the protest, full steam ahead!
What happened today is a tragedy for the families of those killed and wounded. But it also a tragedy when men and women die from illness because of difficulty in purchasing drugs, or when people's  health is damaged because they could not buy proper food, and when disabled people lack what they urgently need, and when people are discharged from hospital prematurely due to shortage of beds in rehabilitation, and when children go to school when  their parents could not afford to buy textbooks, when people die because there were no beds free in Intensive Care – all these are tragedies. The military and government failure in their role to defend the border leads to tragedy. Also their failure to take care of daily needs. So the protest must go on, for those who manage to survive and want to go on living. 

   
Meir Ben-Or: Mr. Prime Minister:

After the attack in the south, probably you will probably send out call-up orders also to the leftists who live in tents and eat sushi, just as you will send them the rightists and the settlers. You will sent us into action in Gaza which would  probably be followed by overall war, and who knows where it would end. I just ask you, Mr. Netanyahu, for one small favor. Just remember us who will go away to fight for you and for Sarah and for all your distinguished colleagues, and to eat dust (instead of sushi). Of course, if we do not come back from this war, then all bets are off and you are exempt from all obligations...


Ashkar Alden Cohen: Do not go to this delirious war. You do not have to!

Neora Barak: Do not stop the protest in any situation. We are not indifferent.  We are consistent and determined, we have patience and we will see who blinks!
Human pain and identification with the families of the victims does not mean giving up the momentum already created. We must not create a dangerous precedent of stopping the demand for social justice. Like it did not contradict the demand for release of Gilead Shalit. Suddenly the government sent a negotiator to Egypt to get him. That was only because the protests put some pepper up their ass.
We should not give up, there is a silent majority looking up with hope at this protest. Do not forget this!


 Elad Shechter: The government wants protest forgotten. They asked the Jerusalem encampment to cancel the demonstrations (which shows how much the government thinks only of its own interests ). So it is important to manifest our presence and show that with all the sorrow and the pain, citizens are struggling also to live in a better country!

Not only does the protest not divide the people - it unites them for the first time in decades. The tents strengthen us against enemies from outside as well as inside. There is no contradiction between defending the country and improving it: before '48 we were able to struggle to formulate an ideology and therefore there is no reason we can't do it today. This is our War of Independence.
If the protest organizers cancel the scheduled actions, we would go on without them!   

Sivan Wolchinsky: That's right! In Kiryat Shmona there will be a march ending with a rally. Certainly one thing does not come at the expense of the other. You have to remember that in the aftermath of such terrorist attacks the state often defaults on its responsibility to provide aid to the wounded, to give them benefits for disability (physical and mental…). Social Security payments could be very hard for them to get, for no justified reason! This is the real test – now more than ever, get to the streets!

Charles Arthur James: I would like to propose a "middle of the road" solution. Both mourning and a protest. On Saturday night we will not hold mass demonstrations. Events will take place in tents, circles of study, lighting candles in memory of those killed and writing letters of support to the wounded, holding hands and creating a human chain along Rothschild Boulevard, and more activities like this. In this we will show that we are united in pain, but do not let terrorism destroy our struggle for a better quality of life here.
      
Eyal Ap: The occupation and the settlements are part of what creates such situations, in which we cannot just go on with "a normal protest" that does not touch upon the conflict. That's why we must demand an end to conflict, demand true security which only peace can give.

Bikosh Bik: Eyal, this is not necessarily .. It is also possible to adopt a protest policy that says that the social and economic situation is no less important than the security situation ... without going into the unresolved debate about the conflict.
 

Matan Bar: We all feel pain and grieving over the deaths of innocents. Our outcry will be the continuation of the protest, despite all. For us, for the dead, and for the mourners. Another "Cast Lead" operation in Gaza? Again an enshrining of the khaki uniforms? Talking of security and silencing the voices on education, equality, welfare? We grieve for and and honor the victims, but we also continue the protest whose hope they also shared. Will will not cooperate with the war drive of Bibi - Barak - Lieberman! We will not run again to kill and die in Gaza under the outworn banner of 'state security'. We will walk in silence at the rally Saturday night, we will remember the dead, and will continue to press our demands upon the ministers and the prime minister!

The protest organizers announce:

We march in silence - the pain of all, the protest of all

On Saturday, August 20 at 9:00 pm, we all march together with the entire Israeli people, from Habima Square to the Charles Clore Garden. It would be a peaceful march with torches and candles, designed to remind the Prime Minister that even in these difficult times, he is still responsible for welfare and health just as he is responsible for security. When the march gets to its destination in the Charles Clore Garden on the Tel Aviv coast, we will all sit on the grass in wide circles or intimate discussion, talk, discuss, argue and  sing – everything quietly, in silent respect for and solidarity with the victims of the criminal terrorist attacks.

This is the pain of all, this is the protest of all of us.

Quietly, but firmly. Because the people which demonstrates is the same people which is hit by the fire of our enemies. And their determined demand for a deep change in the order of economic priorities and for comprehensive social justice does not at all come at the expense of fighting terrorism - on the contrary. A people whose members are responsible for each other, struggle together for the future and strength of the State of Israel, are a strong people who can stand up to all their enemies.

Together with in the circles, honoring us with their presence, will be the best of Israel's artists, their voice devoid of the help of microphones, their guitars not connected to any amplifier. They will sing with us in pain and hope, for all of us have no other country - except the State of Israel.

Millie Duluoz: There is no such thing as a silent protest.


Ori Milstein: That's exactly what they want. Be quiet. We're good kids. God forbid that we should demand defense budget cuts. A silent protest is an oxymoron. Like was said here before, there is no need to apologize, no need to reduce our force.
I'm personally going to cry out when I get there. Otherwise it will simply be a  surrender, a nail in the protest's coffin. If they manage to silence us now, what would happen if riots break out in September?

Hila V Goldstein: Dear firebrands! People were killed today. In the South there is a kind of war. A silent protest is the best now.

Bar Hefetz: It should not be silent and not be in Tel Aviv, it's time to express social solidarity, go the Gaza border communities and cry out that we're not afraid, not afraid of Hamas, and also not afraid of this evil government which is just trying to scare us and silence us. No, don’t be silent!
    *
David Bochris: We undertake to continue the protest even if military operations begin. Protest all over the country!


Ido Daniel: TV stopped talking about the incident and broadcast a miserable  program on cooking ..... And the football games have a moment of silence and the players put on a black band to honor the dead, and then go on playing...  Power is in the continuity, must show that we are continuing!


Gil Orlev: I understand all who are angry that it is to be a silent rally (why quiet? One terrorist attack. Life goes on, including all the junk programs on TV). I want to say on record that I much more sympathize with you than with the other side to the debate. Yet we must not ignore all the people who feel uncomfortable with a shouting rally when such things happen. Do not argue with feelings. There are situations where it is impossible to please everybody. I think the organizers deserve credit for trying to think of everybody and find a creative solution. There is room for two voices. We have a silent action, demanding peace and social justice.

Einat Doz'ovni: I have the experience of a quiet walk with only 200 people, which had a mesmerizing intensity. There is no need to shout in order to be heard.

Star Rajuan: I live in Gan Yavne, I was woken up twice this night by the sound of sirens. I they to keep optimistic also under air raid alarms, I hope you do too.  We will continue to cry out - loudly or silently, each in their own way. To demand both justice and peace.       

Peace will mean that fewer people would be killed. And justice will mean that fewer people will die because they  do not have money for medications, treatments or food.

See also - Israel tent protests called off after Eilat attacks: Organisers of campaign against high living costs cancel weekend's demonstrations to 'join the families in mourning'

Confused Strategy: How the PA Sold Out Palestinian Unity

The PA is of course very vulnerable to threats, despite their insistence to the contrary. Once the US and others start to wave the withholding-of-funds card, any solid PA political program usually falters into perplexing and even self-defeating political babble.

By: Ramzy Baroud
July 15, 2011
Courtesy Of "Iviews"

If you happen to be a Palestinian government employee, chances are you will receive only half your usual salary this month. The other half will only be available when international donors find it in their hearts to make up for the huge shortage of funds currently facing the Palestinian Authority (PA). 

With a deficit standing at around $640 million, the PA government of Prime Minister Salaam Fayyad is experiencing one of its worst ever financial crises. However, the Palestinian economy is not a real economy by universally recognized standards. It survives largely on handouts by donor countries. These funds have spared Israel much of its financial responsibility as an occupying power under the stipulations of the Fourth Geneva Convention. They have also propped up a Palestinian leadership that tries to secure its own survival by serving the interests of major donors. 

The funds, however, are now drying up. This could be due to a political attempt to dissuade PA President Mahmoud Abbas from seeking recognition of a Palestinian state at the UN next September. PA officials have been greatly angered by the shift, blaming donor countries - including Arab countries - for failing to honor their financial commitments.

Yasser Abed Rabbo, Secretary-General of the PLO, spoke of an 'unprecedented' crisis to Voice of Palestine Radio. "The situation has become very complicated for the Palestinian Authority because of the failure of the Arab countries to fulfill their financial promises." 

Fayyad suggested it was an 'irony' that the current crisis comes at a time when the PA had reduced its reliance on foreign aid by almost half - from $1.8 billion in 2008 to $970m - according to the Jerusalem Post. Now, even this half is being slashed, as only $331m of the pledged $970m has been received.

Top PA officials are yet to openly connect the dots between the withholding of funds and the political reality in Palestine. Fayyad insisted that "the crisis does not cast doubt on our preparedness for the establishment of the state," while Abed Rabbo asserted that the crisis would not halt PA efforts to seek an independent statehood along pre-1967 lines.

The PA undoubtedly understands the financial cost of any political adventure that is deemed unfavorable to Israel - especially since they are constantly reminded of the 'historic ties' and 'shared values' that unite Israel and the United States. 

One such reminder was the huge margin at the US House of Representatives in July 2007. It was an "overwhelming 406-6 vote," reported AFP, where US lawmakers "warned the Palestinians that they risk cuts in US aid if they pursue UN recognition of a future state not defined in direct talks with Israel." The message echoed another vote on a similar resolution in the US Senate. 

Such unquestioning support for Israel by the US serves to make life much easier for Israeli diplomats. They now need to focus less on the US than on European countries that have promised to back the PA statehood initiative. 

The PA is of course very vulnerable to threats, despite their insistence to the contrary. Once the US and others start to wave the withholding-of-funds card, any solid PA political program usually falters into perplexing and even self-defeating political babble. The lack of certainty in the PA's political language could be attributed to fear that a single decision to withhold funds coupled with an Israeli decision to hold taxes collected on behalf of the PA, the government would not last for more than mere weeks. 

One ought to remember that the West Bank and East Jerusalem are Occupied Territories. Deprived from even a semblance of territorial sovereignty and presiding over a donation-based national economy, the PA has no political independence outside the permissible margins allowed by the US and Israel, countries that are hell-bent on defeating the Palestinian national project. 

The PA has been grappling with this strange situation since its inception in 1994. Being a guardian of Palestinian national interests and simultaneously satisfying Israel's political interests and US expectations is an impossible feat. That enigma has almost always been settled at the expense of the Palestinians themselves. The latest casualty has been the unity deal signed between Hamas and the PA's ruling party, Fatah, in Egypt on April 27.

The unity was essential for a cohesive political program to be formed towards Palestinian rights and possible statehood. When the agreement was officially signed early May, it was assumed that various committees would be able to quickly finalize the process aimed at setting a date for future elections and bringing to a complete end the four-year feud between the two factions.

However, a counter Israeli strategy was immediately forged. On May 4, as Palestinians celebrated their unity, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu led the counter campaign from London. "What happened today in Cairo is a tremendous blow to peace and a great victory for terrorism," he told reporters (as reported by Reuters). The US echoed Netanyahu's foreboding words, EU countries responded 'cautiously', and the arm-twisting began.

Once again, Abbas and the PA were faced with a dilemma around priorities. National unity in Palestine was to suffer yet another blow. "The Palestinian president does not want to wage two diplomatic battles for recognition of an alliance with the Islamic militants and for a U.N. nod to statehood at the same time," said a PLO official (as quoted by the Associated Press and Ha'aretz).

The UN vote "would be a largely symbolic step that the Palestinians hope will nonetheless improve their leverage against Israel," according to the AP report. 'Symbolic' maybe, but is a priority that Abbas feels comes ahead of urgently needed national unity and a unified political program.

Meanwhile, PA forces - trained and armed by the US and in constant coordination with the Israeli army - reportedly arrested 68 Hamas members in recent weeks, according to a report by Maan News Agency, citing a Hamas statement.

While Abbas is now leading a diplomatic mission to drum up support for his UN initiative, Fayyad is trying to collect funds to prop up the PA economy for a few more months. Meanwhile, Palestinian national unity - without which Palestinians will remain hopelessly fragmented and vulnerable to external pressures and foreign priorities - remains merely ink on paper.

*****

Ramzy Baroud (www.ramzybaroud.net) is an internationally-syndicated columnist and the editor of PalestineChronicle.com. His latest book is "My Father Was a Freedom Fighter: Gaza's Untold Story" (Pluto Press, London), now available on Amazon.com.

Palestinian Activism Energised By Arab Spring

Palestinian factions have united during recent protests to demand the right of return for refugees  [EPA]


Palestinian Activists Adapt Tactics From Uprisings To Their Own Struggle, As Tide Of Pan-Arabism Brings Popular Support.

By Yasmine Ryan
Last Modified: 08 Jun 2011 16:07
Courtesy Of "Al-Jazeera"

Beirut, Lebanon – Palestinian activists are looking to the Arab Spring to bring new energy and methods to their own struggle against Zionism. 

Generations of Palestinian refugees living in squalid camps in Lebanon, Syria and Jordan have been paying close attention as their fellow Arabs have risen up against corrupt and oppressive leaders, as have those living in Gaza, the West Bank and Israel. 

Then, on May 15, Palestinians launched their own movement with a symbolic enactment of the return to Palestine. 

The events' organisers chose to emphasise collective action, rather than the collective sorrow that has tended to mark the date in previous years.

"For the first time, we saw all the Palestinian factions united under one slogan: return to Palestine and carrying the same flag, that of Palestine," a Palestinian activist who goes by the pseudonym of Abu Omar says.

"The old, the young, men, women and children, were all there, sharing the same ambition. I've never seen such a unification, neither have those older than me, I believe. 

"Everyone put their political allegiances aside and focused on their allegiance to Palestine."

The Return To Palestine March Committee has representatives from Hamas, Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and various other factions, along with many independents.

In a symbolic reversal of the flow of people forced to flee Zionist violence in 1948, as many as 40,000 people gathered in the southern Lebanese town in Maroun al-Ras, which lies within walking distance of the boundary with Israel. 

The majority of the protesters travelled by bus from camps across the country, and were joined by Lebanese nationals and foreigners. 

Similar protests were held the same day in Gaza and the West Bank. In Syria, protesters managed to break through the fence near the Druze town of Majdal Shams. 

Israeli soldiers responded to the civilian protests with lethal force, just as security forces have done recently in Tunisia, Libya, Bahrain and Syria. Thirteen protesters in Lebanon and Syria were killed by Israeli fire on May 15. 

The second protest action of the "return to Palestine" campaign was less successful. Organisers agreed to postpone a march that they had planned to mark the "Naksa" anniversary, after the Lebanese army refused to allow protesters to travel to the border area, declaring it a closed military zone.

Naksa Day marks the beginning Israel's occupation of the West Bank, Gaza, East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights when it won the Six-Day War on June 5, 1967.

Israel pressured Lebanon's fragile interim government not to allow Sunday's protest to go ahead, as did the US and several European countries. 

Seeking to maintain good relations with the Lebanese authorities, and to avoid more deaths, the organising committee agreed to call off the march. 

Vida Warde, a Palestinian activist and a member of the committee, said that they had agreed to call off the march entirely because the activists want to keep up the momentum of the May 15 protest, rather than settle for scattered splinter demonstrations.

"We could have protested but it wouldn't have been the same as May 15," she says, adding that the committee respected the decision made by Lebanese authorities regarding Sunday's protest.  

Warde vowed that the march had only been postponed and that there would be an ongoing campaign of large-scale actions, in coordination with activists in Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Jerusalem and the Palestinian Territories. 

The Arab Spring has paved the way for activists elsewhere in the Arab world to turn their efforts to the Palestinian Cause, she said, especially in Egypt. 

"Palestine has always been the Revolution," she said.  

More Lethal Force

Despite the committee's position, some small independent groups attempted to protest at the Lebanese border. The Lebanese army stopped a group of 20 youths who made it to the border town of Kfar Kila. 

Syrian state television reported that 23 Palestinian and Syrian protesters had been killed in the Golan Heights on Sunday, a death toll which Israel disputes. 

Yet Navi Pillay, the UN human rights chief, condemned Israeli security forces for their "excessive use of force" in the Golan Heights, saying they have killed as many as 40 demonstrators in the area in recent weeks.

"However difficult the circumstances, the use of live ammunition against allegedly unarmed protestors, resulting in large numbers of deaths and injuries, inevitably raises the question of unnecessary and excessive use of force," the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights said on Tuesday. 

Binyamin Netanyahu, the Israeli prime minister, blamed Syria for allegedly allowing two border protests to go ahead.

There was also violence on the Israeli side of the border in Majdal Shams on Sunday evening, as Druze and Palestinians youths clashed with Israeli security forces. Casualties were reported too in the West Bank refugee camp Palestinian refugee camp of Qalandia. 

The US state department issued a statement calling for "all sides to exercise restraint", condemning what it termed a "provocative" action by the protesters and stressing Israel's "right to defend itself". 

On Monday, Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of the Lebanon's Hezbollah movement, praised the Naksa protesters on the Golan Heights and rebuked the US's position on the protests.

"What happened yesterday on the anniversary of the Naksa on the Golan Heights reveals that the US administration wants to hijack the Arab revolutions," he said at the opening of a convention on the Iranian supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. 

"What happened also demonstrates Washington's absolute commitment to Israel's security.

"This is Washington which talks about human rights and freedoms," Nasrallah added. 

Subversive Use Of Social Media

Though the Naksa march did not take place as they had originally planned, Palestinian rights activists in Lebanon argue that they scored a tactical victory against the Israeli security apparatus through their innovative use of social media. 

Because their communities are closely-knit, activists have been able to rely on direct human contact in a way that protesters in Egypt and Tunisia could not. They are also distrust online communications, given that so many high-profile activists suspect that their email and Facebook accounts are monitored.

Instead, several sources confirmed, activists involved in the return to Palestine campaign deliberately spread disinformation via Facebook to encourage Israel to invest vast resources in preparation for acts of protests that never would have taken place, with or without the military ban.

Some Facebook pages were entirely fictional, with those involved in the campaign warned in advance.

"People have gotten into the game," says one committee member, who asked not to be identified, explaining that many people posted "outlandish comments that induce a reaction on the Israeli side".

One line of comments, for instance, discussed a fictional plan to fly hot air balloons over the Lebanese border. 

(Jitters about possible incursions into northern Israel led air controllers in Haifa to deploy warplanes and helicopters after they mistook stars for "enemy aircraft" on the eve of the Nakba protests, according to the Israeli military's weekly magazine.)

Having been caught off-guard by the Nakba Day protests, Israel over-prepared for the Naksa anniversary, the activist says. 

Indeed, comments Netanyahu made the day before Naksa Day confirm the high state of alert provoked by the possibility of border protests.

"There are extremist elements around us who are trying to break through our borders and threaten our community and our citizens. We will not allow them to do so," Netanyahu told the Israeli cabinet. 

Additional soldiers and military vehicles were sent to patrol the border, and barbed wire, trenches and other fortifications were set up along the "frontline". 

Snipers lay ready for the unarmed protesters, and significant reserve forces were ready for deployment. 

Al-Karama For Palestinians

Rooting their movement in the spirit of grassroots empowerment that has characterised the Arab Spring, Palestinians have chosen to focus on a single issue, which activists say is non-negotiable. 

They demand the return to Palestine of the hundreds of thousands of people who were forced from their homeland in the ethnic cleansing that took place with the creation of the state of Israel in 1948.  

The latest protests are an extension of a decades-long struggle to exercise that right, a right that has been backed by numerous United Nations resolutions.

What is different with the movement that began on May 15 is the level of co-ordination, and the resulting clarity of the protesters' message.

It is a rallying point that has achieved the exceptional feat of drawing support from across political and religious lines. Overwhelmingly, protesters were willing to caste aside their political alliances and unite under the Palestinian flag. 

On May 15, people chanted, "The people want to return to Palestine," recalling the chant that rang on avenue Habib Bourguiba and in Tahrir Square earlier in the year, "The people want to overthrow the regime".

Palestinians living in the camps share a desire for al-Karama, or dignity, with protesters elsewhere in the Arab world, Abu Omar says, though the underlying causes of their disempowerment are starkly different. 

The limbo which began for so many Palestinians when they were uprooted from their homeland with the creation of Israel has left them with few economic, social, political or civic rights, he says.

The Burj al-Barajneh camp in Beirut where the activist lives with his family offers a snapshot of these conditions: 

20,000 people live in a single square kilometre of crumbling, overcrowded buildings, with scant opportunity of a better life.

"There are four generations here and the population is increasing. The right to Lebanese nationality or to own land is unattainable," he explains. 

The inspiration for the May 15 march on the southern Lebanese border came directly from the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings, Abu Omar says. 

Young Palestinians, invigorated by what they had seen of uprisings elsewhere, have thrown their support behind the movement.

"Tunisia and the other uprisings demonstrated that a people can demand their rights, peacefully," he says. 

"The young, who were lost, are now asserting their right to return. We are working on an action plan until the return."

Pan-Arabism Revived

Aside from the backing of the various Palestinian political factions, the return to Palestine movement has drawn strength from the grassroots Pan-Arabism that has resurged as the Arab Spring spreads across the region. 

All activists interviewed were adamant that the Nakba Day march would not have been possible if Hezbollah had not given the protest its explicit blessing.

The May 15 protest would not have been possible, they say, if the political party had not negotiated with the Lebanese army for protesters to be allowed to travel unhindered to Maroun al-Ras.

Hezbollah also offered some financial support to the protesters, helping to finance the buses that transported refugees from the camps to the border. 

This explicit backing of the Palestinian protesters is all the more significant given the historic tensions that have hindered relations between Palestinian refugees and Lebanese Shia population. 

In Egypt, the opening of the Rafah border crossing has the potential to allow Egyptian nationals a means to protest in solidarity with the inhabitants of Gaza - depending on how free Egyptians will be to travel to Gaza in practice.

The movement has also found backing amongst Lebanese civil society, keen to get involved in the Arab Spring. 

Members of a pan-Arab nationalist youth group in the seaside city of Saida told Al Jazeera that justice for the Palestinian people was a central concern for their group, and one that brought Arabs together across religious or sectarian lines. 

"May 15 renewed the soul of the people," Hussein Shukar, a member of the group, says.

"Our view is that that the Arab nation can only be strong and that we will only be able to control our own resources and our occupied land if we all unite together."

The Untold Story Of The Deal That Shocked The Middle East

Revealed

Exclusive by Robert Fisk
Tuesday, 7 June 2011
Courtesy Of "The Independent"

Secret meetings between Palestinian intermediaries, Egyptian intelligence officials, the Turkish foreign minister, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal – the latter requiring a covert journey to Damascus with a detour round the rebellious city of Deraa – brought about the Palestinian unity which has so disturbed both Israelis and the American government. Fatah and Hamas ended four years of conflict in May with an agreement that is crucial to the Paslestinian demand for a state.

A series of detailed letters, accepted by all sides, of which The Independent has copies, show just how complex the negotiations were; Hamas also sought – and received – the support of Syrian President Bachar al-Assad, the country’s vice president Farouk al-Sharaa and its foreign minister, Walid Moallem. Among the results was an agreement by Meshaal to end Hamas rocket attacks on Israel from Gaza – since resistance would be the right only of the state – and agreement that a future Palestinian state be based on Israel’s 1967 borders.

“Without the goodwill of all sides, the help of the Egyptians and the acceptance of the Syrians – and the desire of the Palestinians to unite after the start of the Arab Spring, we could not have done this,” one of the principal intermediaries, 75-year old Munib Masri, told me. It was Masri who helped to set up a ‘Palestinian Forum’ of independents after the Fatah-dominated Palestinian Authority and Hamas originally split after Hamas won an extraordinary election victory in 2006. “I thought the divisions that had opened up could be a catastrophe and we went for four years back and forth between the various parties,” Masri said. “Abu Mazen (Mahmoud Abbas) asked me several times to mediate. We opened meetings in the West Bank. We had people from Gaza. Everyone participated. We had a lot of capability.”

In three years, members of the Palestinian Forum made more than 12 trips to Damascus, Cairo, Gaza and Europe and a lot of initiatives were rejected. Masri and his colleagues dealt directly with Hamas’ Prime Minister Hanniyeh in Gaza. They took up the so-called ‘prisoner swap initiative’ of Marwan Barghouti, a senior Fatah leader in an Israeli jail; then in the winds of the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, the youth of Palestine on 15 March demanded unity and an end to the rivalry of Fatah and Hamas. Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu had always refused to talk to Abbas on the grounds that the Palestinians were not united. On the 16th, he made a speech saying that he was “thinking of going to Gaza”. Masri, who was present, stood on a chair and clapped.

“I thought Hamas would answer in a positive way,” he recalls. “But in the first two or three days after Abbas’ speech, it gave a rather negative response. He had wanted an immediate election and no dialogue. Hamas did not appreciate this.” Abbas went off to Paris and Moscow – to sulk, in the eyes of some of his associates. But the Forum did not give up.

“We wrote a document – we said we would go to see the Egyptians, to congratulate them upon their revolution. So we had two meetings with the Egyptian head of intelligence, Khaled Orabi – Orabi’s father was an army general at the time of King Farouk – and we met Mohamed Ibrahim, an officer in the intelligence department.” Ibrahim’s father had won renown in the 1973 war when he captured the highest ranking Israeli officer in Sinai. The delegation also met Ibrahim’s deputies, Nadr Aser and Yassir Azawi.

Seven people from each part of Palestine were to represent the team in Cairo. These are the names which will be in future Palestinian history books. From the West Bank, came Dr Hanna Nasser (head of Bir Zeit University and of the Palestinian central election committee); Dr Mamdouh Aker (the head of the human rights society); Mahdi Abdul-Hadi (chairman of a political society in Jerusalem); Hanni Masri (a political analyst); Iyad Masrouji (businessman in pharmacuticals); Hazem Quasmeh (runs an NGO) and Munib Masri himself.

The Gaza ‘side’ were represented by Eyad Sarraj (who in the event could not go to Cairo because he was ill); Maamoun Abu Shahla (member of the board of Palestine Bank); Faysal Shawa (businessman and landowner); Mohsen Abu Ramadan (writer); Rajah Sourani (head of Arab human rights, who did not go to Cairo); ‘Abu Hassan’ (Islamic Jihad member who was sent by Sarraj); and Sharhabil Al-Zaim (a Gaza lawyer).

“These men spent time with the top brass of the Egyptian ‘mukhabarat’ intelligence service,” Masri recalls. “We met them on 10 April but we sent a document before we arrived in Cairo. This is what made it important. In Gaza, there were two different ‘sides’. So we talked about the micro-situation, about Gazans in the ‘jail’ of Gaza, we talked about human rights, the Egyptian blockade, about dignity. Shawa was saying ‘we feel we do not have dignity – and we feel it’s your fault.’ Nadr Asr of the intelligence department said: ‘We’re going to change all that.’

“At 7.0 pm, we came back and saw Khaled Orabi again. I told him: ‘Look, I need these things from you. Do you like the new initiative, a package that’s a win-win situation for everyone? Is the Palestinian file still ‘warm’ in Cairo? He said ‘It’s a bit long – but we like it. Can you pressure both Fatah and Hamas, to bring them in? But we will work with you. Go and see Fatah and Hamas – and treat this as confidential.’ We agreed, and went to see Amr Moussa (now a post-revolution Egyptian presidential candidate) at the Arab League. He was at first very cautious – but the next day, Amr Moussa’s team was very positive. We said: ‘Give it a chance – we said that the Arab League was created for Palestine, that the Arab League has a big role in Jerusalem’.”

The delegation went to see Nabil al-Arabi at the Egyptian foreign ministry. “Al-Arabi said: ‘Can I bring in the foreign minister of Turkey, who happens to be in Egypt?’ So we all talkled about the initiative together. We noticed the close relationship between the foreign ministry and the intelligence ministry. That’s how I found out that ‘new’ Egypt had a lot of confidence – they were talking in front of Turkey; they wanted (italics: wanted) to talk in front of Turkey. So we agreed we would all talk together and then I returned with the others to Amman at 9.0 pm.”

The team went to the West Bank to report – “we were happy, we never had this feeling before” – and tell Azzam Ahmed (Fatah’s head of reconciliation) that they intended to support Mahmoud Abbas’s initiative over Gaza. “We had seven big meetings in Palestine to put all the groups there and the independents in the picture. Abbas had already given us a presidential decree. I spoke to Khaled Meshaal (head of Hamas, living in Damascus) by phone. He said: ‘Does Abu Mazzen (Abbas) agree to this?’ I said that wasn’t the point. I went to Damascus next day with Hanna Nasser, Mahdi Abdul Hadi and Hanni Masri. Because of all the trouble in Syria, we had to make a detour around Deraa. I had a good rapport with Meshaal. He said he had read our document – and that it was worth looking at.”

It was a sign of the mutual distrust between Hamas and Abbas that they both seemed intent on knowing the other’s reaction to the initiative before making up their own minds. “Meshaal said to me: ‘What did Abu Mazzen (Abbas) say?’ I laughed and replied: ‘You always ask me this – but what do you (italics: you) want? We met with Meshaal’s colleagues, Abu Marzouk, Izzat Rishiq and Abu Abdu Rahman. We reviewed the document for six and a half hours. The only thing we didn’t get from Meshaal was that the government has to be by agreement. We told him the government has to be of natiuonal unity -- on the agreement that we would be able to carry out elections and lift the embargo on Gaza and reconstruct Gaza, that we have to abide by international law, by the UN Charter and UN resolutions. He asked for three or four days. He agreed that resistance must only be ‘in the national interest of the country’ – it would have to be ‘aqlaqi’ – ethical. There would be no more rocket attacks on civilians. In other words, no more rocket attacks from Gaza.”

Meshaal told Masri and his friends that he had seen President Bashar Assad of Syria, his vice president Sharaa and Syrian foreign minister Moallem. “He said he wanted their support – but in the end it was the word of the Palestinian people. We were very happy – we said ‘there is a small breakthrough’. Meshaal said: ‘We won’t let you down.’ We said we would communicate all this to Fatah and the independents on the West Bank and to the Egyptians. In the West Bank, Fatah called it the ‘Hamas initiative’ -- but we said no, it is from everybody. After two days, Meshaal said he had spoken to Egyptian intelligence and they like what we have offered.”

The talks had been successful. Meshaal was persuaded to send two of his top men to Cairo. Masri’s team hoped that Abbas would do the same. Four men – two from each side – travelled to Egypt on 22 April. A year earlier, when there was a familiar impasse between the two sides in Egypt, the Moubarak regime tried to place further obstacles between them. Meshaal had fruitlessly met with Omar Sulieman – Mubarak’s intelligence factotum and Israel’s best friend in the Arab world – in Mecca. Sulieman effectively worked for the Israelis. Now all had changed utterly.

On the day Abbas and Meshaal went to Cairo, everyone went except the two rival prime ministers, Fayad and Hanniyeh. Hamas agreed that over the past four years, the Israelis had seized more of Jerusalem and built many more settlements in the occupied West Bank. Meshaal was angry when he thought he would not be allowed to speak from the podium with the others – in the event, he was – and Hamas agreed on the 1967 border, effectively acknowledging Israel’s existence, and to the reference to the ‘resistance’; and to give Abbas more time for negotiation.

If Hamas was in the government, it would have to recognise the State of Israel. But if they were not, they would not recognise anything. “It’s not fair to say ‘Hamas must do the following’, Masri says. “The resistance must also be reciprocal. But as long as they are not in the Palestinian government, Hamas are just a political party and can say anything they want. So America should be prepared to see Hamas ageeeing on the formation of the government. That government will abide by UN resolutions – and international law. It’s got to be mutual. Both sides realised they might miss the boat of the Arab spring. It wasn’t me who did this – it was a compilation of many efforts. If it was not for Egypt and the willingness of the two Palestinian groups, this would not have happened.” In the aftermath of the agreement, Hamas and Abbas’ loyalists agreed to stop arresting members of each side.

The secret story of Palestinian unity is now revealed. Israeli prime minister Netanyahu’s reaction to the news – having originally refused to negotiate with Palestinians because they were divided – was to say that he would not talk to Abbas if Hamas came into the Palestinian government. President Obama virtually dismissed the Palestinian unity initiative. But 1967 borders means that Hamas is accepting Israel and the ‘resistance’ initiative means an end to Gaza rockets on Israel. International law and UN resolutions mean peace can be completed and a Palestinian state brought into being. That, at least, is the opinion of both Palestinian sides. The world will wait to see if Israel will reject it all again.

Profile: Munib Masri

* The Masri family have been in the Palestinian resistance all their lives. As a small boy Munib Rashid Masri, from a respected family of Palestinian merchants, was demonstrating against British rule in Palestine and plans for the creation of Israel.

* Three of his children fought with Arafat's PLO in southern Lebanon during the 1982 Israeli invasion. "All our family believe it is our job to bring Palestine back," he says. "I gave all my life to Palestine."

* He was introduced to Yasser Arafat in 1963 by the PLO leader's deputy, Abu Jihad – Khalil al-Wazzir, later murdered by the Israelis in Tunis – and helped to smuggle money and passports to the guerrillas, but got on well with King Hussain of Jordan.

* With Arafat's permission, he briefly became Jordan's unpaid Minister of Public Works after the collapse of Palestinian forces in Black September in 1970; he rebuilt one of the largest Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan when the fighting ended. Much later, he would three times refuse to be Arafat's prime minister.

* After the Oslo accords were signed in 1993, Masri encouraged 15 Palestinian business people – he was one of them – to set up a $200m company called Padico.

* The investment company is now valued at $1.5bn, running telecoms, tourism and a stock market, responsible for the wellbeing of 27 per cent of the Palestinian economy – and 450,000 Palestinians.

Q & A: The Events That Led To The Historic Handshake

Q: How did the split come about? The rift between Fatah and Hamas, known among Palestinians as "Wakseh", meaning ruin or humiliation, emerged when Hamas won a sweeping majority in the 2006 elections. Hamas ran on a change-and- reform ticket and had garnered broad support through its social programmes. Anger with corruption within Fatah, and frustration with President Mahmoud Abbas's lack of progress on the peace process helped propel them to victory. The election result stunned US and Israeli officials, who had repeatedly said they would not work with a Palestinian Authority which included Hamas, and led to sanctions and a Western-led boycott. Security forces, still under Fatah's control, refused to take orders from the government and the US continued to fund Fatah. In 2007, the two sides briefly formed a unity government but it collapsed as masked gunmen took to the streets of Gaza. A state of emergency was announced and President Abbas dismissed Hamas's Ismail Hanniyeh as Prime Minister, swearing in a new emergency cabinet in the West Bank. Hamas seized control of Gaza, while Fatah held on to the West Bank, leaving a de facto split as both sides traded accusations about the legality of each other's rule.

Q: What was the impact of the rift on the peace process? The split between Hamas and Fatah effectively stalled the peace process, with Israel refusing to negotiate with a divided Palestinian leadership, which was forced to focus on putting its own house in order. However, with both sides reunited the prospect for peace is not necessarily more positive. The "Palestinian Papers", diplomatic cables leaked to Al Jazeera in January, showed Mr Abbas had offered far-reaching concessions during talks with Ehud Olmert's government, but to no avail. It is unlikely concessions so favourable to Israel will make it to the negotiating room again if Hamas has a seat at the table. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who had used the rift as a reason not to negotiate, now says he will not speak to Mr Abbas if Hamas is included in the Palestinian government.

Q: What were the details of the agreement? In Gaza, dozens took to the streets to celebrate the Egyptian-brokered pact, signed on 4 May, which brought an end to four years of bitter rivalry. Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal said he was ready to "pay any price" to reconcile the factions. The deal envisaged a caretaker government with the task of preparing for parliamentary and presidential elections. Egypt has set up a committee to oversee the deal, but the unity government has a rocky road ahead, with potential pitfalls over how to integrate Hamas's military wing into the security services. For years, Egypt sponsored reconciliatory talks in Cairo – but to no avail. It was the renewed vigour of the Arab Spring that finally led to the historic handshake.Loveday Morris

How Hamas-Fatah Unity Could Break Middle East Deadlock

Palestinians celebrate the reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas, in Gaza City. Photograph: Adel Hana/AP


If Palestinian reconciliation holds, it may release all the players, the US and Israel included, from the ossified roles of the process

By Daniel Levy
Thursday 28 April 2011 19.30 BST
Courtesy Of "The Guardian"

For the better part of 20 years, the policies of Fatah (the leading faction within the Palestine Liberation Organisation) have been predictable to the point of tedium. This week in Cairo, in agreeing to a unity and power-sharing deal with Hamas, Fatah surprised. Yes, Palestinian national reconciliation has been tried before, fleetingly and unenthusiastically, following a Saudi-brokered arrangement in spring 2007, and it may again unravel. But this time, Fatah's move appears to be a more calculated and profound break with past practice – and the anticipated opprobrium of the US seems to weigh less heavily.

From the Algiers 1988 decision of the Palestine National Council adopting a two-state solution on the 1967 lines, to the 1993 Oslo Declaration of Principles recognising Israel's right to exist, through to last September's relaunching of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations in Washington, DC, the PLO approach can be reduced to one simple equation: that a combination of an accommodationist Palestinian side, Israeli rational self-interest and US leverage would overcome inbuilt Israeli-Palestinian asymmetries of power and deliver Palestinian independence and de-occupation.

Gaining traction for that formula was a marketing challenge under the military-fatigued Yasser Arafat, but he was replaced over six years ago by the unequivocally peace-credentialled Mahmoud Abbas. And still, the Palestinians kept doubling down on that formula in the face of failure. Fatah pursued negotiations without terms of reference, security coordination with the Israel Defence Forces, institution-building under occupation, and an inexplicable faith in American mediation – even as settlements metastasised across the Occupied Territories, elections were lost to Hamas, and accusations of collaboration grew deafening.

The last roll of this Palestinian dice, Fayyadism (named after Prime Minister Salam Fayyad and predicated on the notion that Palestinian good governance would induce Israeli withdrawal or, at least, international pressure to force that withdrawal) is set to splutter to an ignoble end this September. The two-year programme of building state-readiness will have succeeded, but will then stand helpless against the reality of an immovable Israeli occupation.

The test results are in. The accommodationist PLO equation did not compute.

A centrepiece of that strategy was for the peace process to be an exclusive domain of American mediation. In recent months, the Palestinians have been slowly manoeuvering out of this American cul-de-sac. Abbas refused to continue those September negotiations with Israel when the US failed to deliver an extension of even the limited and partial Netanyahu settlement moratorium. The PLO forced a vote on settlements at the UN security council, despite US pressure, leaving the US alone to cast its veto in a 14-1 vote. Preparations for UN recognition of Palestinian statehood proceed apace (again, in opposition to US policy). Finally, and most dramatically, Fatah has now agreed to this deal with Hamas.

Palestinian division, playing so-called "moderates" against "extremists", had been a cornerstone of US (and Israeli) policy. If the Palestinian unity deal holds – and caution is well-advised with the details yet to be agreed, and with a history of false dawns – that cornerstone will be no more. It would be inaccurate to attribute this development to any radical departure in policy on the part of the Obama administration. Rather, this development is best understood against a backdrop of attrition, combined with new, post Arab Spring regional realities. The attrition part is obvious: there has been relentless growth in Israeli settlements and control of the territories over the years. When Oslo was signed in 1993, there were 111,000 settlers in the West Bank alone; today, that number exceeds 300,000, and 60% of the West Bank and all of East Jerusalem remain under exclusive Israeli control. And then there has been the impunity unfailingly granted to Israel by the US.

What has changed is that, in a region in democratising flux, Egypt no longer plays the role of status quo guarantor and is rediscovering a capacity for enacting regional policy that is independent, constructive and responsive to domestic opinion. The shift in Egypt's outlook was key to delivering the Palestinian reconciliation breakthrough.

The Fatah-Hamas deal will, inevitably, meet with a rocky reception in the US. Congress may move to defund the PA, security assistance may be withdrawn, and official Israeli talking points ("they chose peace with the terrorists over peace with Israel") will be warmly received on Capitol Hill. But will this reconciliation deal, if it holds, really be a negative development for the Palestinians, the US or even Israel?

For the Palestinians themselves, internal unity seems a prerequisite for developing a new national platform and strategy, and for reviving a legitimate, empowered and representative PLO. Unity creates one Palestinian address, the likelihood of a more robust negotiating posture, and provides an on-ramp for Hamas to engage in the political process, should it so choose. Crucial to any strategy will be a Palestinian adherence to international law and, in that context, to non-violence.

The Palestinians would best avoid preemptively cutting any ties to the US, but reduced dependence on the US, including the possible suspension of US aid, could be far from disastrous and might facilitate more productive and challenging Palestinian approaches to attaining their own freedom. Unity, or even a UN vote for recognition, will not in itself constitute a fully-fledged strategy or end of occupation. Huge challenges remain: managing security coordination (internal and external), running a limited self-governing authority that depends on Israeli goodwill to function and, not least, alleviating the closure-induced misery of Gaza. Unity, though, may be a crucial first step in developing a more compelling local and global Palestinian strategy – especially with the new prospect of meaningful Egyptian support.

For the US, Israel-Palestine is a defining national security interest in a critical region of the world. Alongside that, the peculiarities of American domestic politics on anything related to Israel leads the US to box itself in and limit its own manoeuverability on this issue. Too often, the result is American diplomatic impotence.

There might be advantages for the US in having this issue taken somewhat out of its hands, whether via enhanced Palestinian strategic independence, invigorated Egyptian diplomacy, or greater European or UN involvement. Such developments might enhance the prospects of a solution, produce openings for more effective US engagement with Israel, or at least might mitigate the debilitating cumulative impact this issue has on America's standing in the Middle East.

Finally, Israel. It is unlikely that Israel will welcome a more independent, strategic or empowered Palestinian counterpart. Yet, Israel is today more, not less, insecure and uncertain of its future. In many respects, the aggravated asymmetry of the current peace process and strategic floundering on the part of the Palestinians gives Israel a false sense of permanent impunity and has encouraged Israel's most self-destructive tendencies (not least, towards settlement building and intolerant nationalism).

It makes sense to speculate that a course correction by Israel's leaders towards greater realism, pragmatism and compromise might emerge in response to a more challenging, strategic and – one would hope – non-violent Palestinian adversary.