Israel 4th From Bottom Of Peace Index

By Jessica Elgot
From The Jewish Chronicle
July 31, 2009
Courtesy Of The Jewish Community Online

Israel has been placed a dismal 141st out of 144 on a list of the world’s most peaceful countries, beating just Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia.

Countries which ranked higher in the 2009 Global Peace Index included Sudan, Zimbabwe, Lebanon, North Korea, and Iran.

The index was compiled by the think-tank Vision of Humanity, with the data compiled and analysed by the Economic Intelligence Unit.

The survey is endorsed by ex-United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Anan, the Dalai Lama, Archbishop Desmond Tutu and former US President Jimmy Carter.

Each country is given a score based on 23 different indices which measure the “peacefulness” of the country.

Israel scored poorly for a high level of “organised conflict”, and poor relationships with its neighbours. It was also given a very low score for the perceived level of “respect for human rights.” Israelis were also given low marks for their “perception of distrust in others”.

But the country scored better marks for political stability and low criminal violence, and even higher marks for charitable donations to the UN and hospitality to foreigners.

Israel has always fared poorly in this particular index: it ranked fifth from last in 2008, and just third from last in 2007.

Last updated: 10:41am, July 31 2009

Israel Suffered Massive Cyber Attack During Gaza Offensive

By Anshel Pfeffer,
Haaretz Correspondent
Last update - 07:25 15/06/2009
Courtesy Of Haaretz NewsPaper

Hackers launched an unprecedented attack on Israel's Internet infrastructure during the January military offensive in the Gaza Strip, and briefly paralyzed government sites, government officials said last week.

The attack, which focused on government Web sites, was executed by at least half a million computers.

Due to its resemblance to the attack launched on Georgia on the eve of its war with Russia last summer, Israeli officials believe it may have been carried out by a criminal organization from the former Soviet Union, and paid for by Hamas or Hezbollah.

Tehila, the body that manages the government's Web sites, managed to protect Israel's cyber infrastructure and fix most sites within 5 to 20 minutes, an official said.

But the Home Front Command's site, which instructs citizens how to protect themselves from attacks, was down for three hours, according to a senior official at command headquarters. The IDF Spokesman said service was suspended for only half an hour.

Cyber attacks on Israel are not new: Every time the conflict with the Palestinians flares up, Israeli Web sites suffer a barrage of virtual assaults. During the fighting in Gaza, however, the attack was unusually severe, consisting of four waves - each stronger than the last, and peaking at 15 million junk mail deliveries per second.

The source of the attack is still unknown. "Perhaps it's a genius hacker working alone who activated a program that took over hundreds of thousands of computers as a platform to launch the attack," said Tehila director Boaz Dolev. "But it certainly might have been carried out by
an organization."

"We need a uniform standard for all the country's major governmental and economic organizations to ensure that next time there's a big cyber attack, the economy isn't paralyzed completely," added a Defense Ministry official. "There's still a lot of work to be done in this area.

Taking The Prince Of Peace Seriously

Christianity and War, and Other Essays Against the Warfare State
by Laurence M. Vance (Vance Publications, 2008); 432 pages.

Post by Thomas E. Woods Jr.,
Posted April 3, 2009
Courtesy of The Future Of Freedom Foundation

Several years ago, Congressman Sam Johnson (R-Texas) told parishioners at Suncreek United Methodist Church in Allen, Texas, something he had said to President George W. Bush: “Syria is the problem. Syria is where those weapons of mass destruction are, in my view. You know, I can fly an F-15, put two nukes on ’em and I’ll make one pass. We won’t have to worry about Syria anymore.”

Johnson later claimed he’d been joking. But the congregation wasn’t laughing — it was roaring with cheers and applause.

These were all Christians, you understand — you know, people who are supposed to be concerned about the wrongful taking of innocent human life.

It’s not just Protestants; a substantial number of Catholics are guilty of the same cavalier attitude toward war, which is ipso facto just if waged by the U.S. government. They will spend their time tracking down whatever slivers of evidence they can find in support of their leaders’ war propaganda, a practice they would have laughed at if they’d observed it in the Soviet Union. As a Catholic myself I have been mortified to think that a neoconservative death cult is what is being projected to the non-Christian world as Christianity.

This is why the second edition of Laurence Vance’s Christianity and War, and Other Essays Against the Warfare State (which is nearly four times as long as the first edition) is at once both good news and bad news. The good news is the book itself, which eviscerates the self-justifying nonsense that passes for moral reflection among so many Christian supporters of war. The bad news is how rare such a book is these days: a theologically conservative Christian’s powerful, unrelenting case against war, militarism, and an eagerness to believe whatever propaganda will promote war and cast those politicians who support it in a favorable light. And it is to conservative Christians that Vance directs the bulk of his appeal, since it is they, he finds, who most readily adopt the war propaganda that emanates from Washington.

It’s one thing to describe someone as a voice crying in the wilderness, but that doesn’t quite capture Laurence Vance and his work. Vance is a voice crying in a soundproof sarcophagus on the moon.

Vance is no pacifist and would not oppose Christian participation in the armed forces if the U.S. military were actually used for defensive purposes. But that has not been the case for quite some time, which is why two of the essays in this collection are provocatively entitled “Should a Christian Join the Military?” and “Should Anyone Join the Military?”

To those who urge participation in the state’s wars on the grounds that Christians must obey the powers that be — an objection Vance evidently encounters quite a bit — Vance counters with the admonition to obey God rather than men. No one is exempt from moral censure on the grounds that he was just obeying orders. The issue is whether the orders are morally acceptable or not, and that question is not answered by anti-intellectual demands of obedience. Vance demands to know whether, on the grounds that one must obey the powers that be, such critics would kill their own mothers if ordered to do so by the state. I’m not sure I want to hear the answer.

Vance raises another good point: what about the soldiers of the enemy country? Are evangelicals prepared to say that those men are to be honored and respected as well, since they too are obeying the powers that be, namely their own rulers?

Evangelicals cite that verse, incidentally, not because they need to persuade themselves of the need to support the war, but in order to bully other Christians into doing so. Most evangelicals need little biblical encouragement to follow a position on war they have already adopted on other grounds. Apparently determined to live down to the Washington Post’s famous description of evangelicals years ago as “poor, uneducated, and easily led,” they can’t sign on fast enough to whatever immoral, harebrained military intervention their leaders urge them to support. Anyone who reacts otherwise must be a “liberal” who “hates America.”

As for those who appeal to the Old Testament to prove divine sanction for war (for instance, the late Jerry Falwell in a bizarre article called “God Is Pro-War”), Vance joins other anti-war Christians in the obvious reply: “God commanded the nation of Israel in the Old Testament to fight against heathen nations (Judges 6:16), but George Bush is not God, and America is not the nation of Israel.”

Blind Faith In Caesar

Not just among Christians but among conservatives more generally, all critical thinking and curiosity cease when the subject turns to war. Moral relativism and utilitarianism, which Christians supposedly oppose, take the place of serious moral argument. Vance describes the position simply: “Killing someone you don’t know, and have never seen, in his own territory, who was no threat to anyone until the United States invaded his country, is not murder if the U.S. government says he should be killed.” Behavior that Christians would never support in any other context suddenly becomes perfectly acceptable, even praiseworthy, simply because the state has declared that a war is under way. (That’s what Voltaire meant when he said, “It is forbidden to kill; therefore all murderers are punished unless they kill in large numbers and to the sound of trumpets.”) Many even seem to suspect the Christian orthodoxy of those who raise the subject of war as a moral question.

It was not always so. Vance includes an essay on the evolution of the Southern Baptists, who in the past have issued compelling statements about the moral and material catastrophes of war. These beautiful statements in behalf of peace weren’t merely the perfunctory preambles that good taste demands before bringing out the war drums, as is so often the case today. Consider this single paragraph from a 1940 statement:

Because war is contrary to the mind and spirit of Christ, we believe that no war should be identified with the will of Christ. Our churches should not be made agents of war propaganda or recruiting stations. War thrives on and is perpetuated by hysteria, falsehood, and hate and the church has a solemn responsibility to make sure there is no blackout of love in time of war. When men and nations are going mad with hate it is the duty of Christ’s ministers and His churches to declare by spirit, word, and conduct the love of God in all men. In time of war it is our Christian responsibility to prepare for peace. We would, therefore, urge our churches to think and work toward a Christian social order in which a just and lasting peace can be realized.

A Commitment To Principle

Now to be sure, Vance’s is not the most elegant English prose you will ever read; there is little subtlety in his sledgehammer style. But there is nothing subtle about the subject matter, either, and if anyone can be excused some understandable exasperation, it is Vance, who has so often been shunned and condemned in Christian circles for his rational thinking and aversion to propaganda. (The typographical errors, which I’m sure will be corrected in the next printing, are less excusable; the United States is described as a “rouge” nation twice on the same page, for instance.)

The foreword to the second edition of Christianity and War is written by Mike Reith, a retired major in the U.S. Air Force. Reith was resistant upon reading Vance’s work for the first time, but he finally had to admit to himself that Vance had the better of the argument.

Most describe it as a “loss of innocence” — that moment of enlightenment when we discover a painful truth of life. My loss of innocence is still ongoing. Vance has caused me to open my eyes. The result has been a discovery of the wonderful truths and economics of libertarianism, and a correction and deepening of my faith in and understanding of Christianity, and most importantly, the orthodox, historical, and biblical views of war.

“This book,” Reith concludes, “is a clarion call that challenges the modern American church, the military member, and all citizens as to their beliefs concerning the historical and moral aspects of warfare. For me, it was literally life changing.”

Few authors ever receive an endorsement like that. Fewer still actually deserve it. Vance’s book is refreshingly — at times even shockingly — radical, but I am unable to identify any flaws in his unrelenting exposition. He says what all Christians, especially those who boast of their fidelity to the Bible, should be saying. I am not just delighted with Christianity and War. I am grateful for it.

Thomas E. Woods Jr. is the New York Times bestselling author of eight books, most recently Who Killed the Constitution? The Fate of American Liberty from World War I to George W. Bush (with Kevin R.C. Gutzman). Visit his website: www.ThomasEWoods.com.

This article originally appeared in the November 2008 edition of Freedom Daily.

U.S. Weapons At War 2008

Beyond The Bush Legacy

By William D. Hartung, Frida Berrigan,

New America Foundation | December 2008
Courtesy Of The New America Foundation

The United States, which entered into over $23 billion in Foreign Military Sales (FMS) agreements in fiscal year (FY) 2007 and $32 billion in FY 2008 (see table 1), is the world's largest arms supplier. U.S. exports range from combat aircraft to Pakistan, Morocco, Greece, Romania, and Chile to small arms and light weapons to the Philippines, Egypt, and Georgia. In 2006 and 2007, the United States sold weapons to over 174 states and territories, a significant increase from the beginning of the Bush administration when the number of U.S. arms clients stood at 123.[1] While many of these sales were relatively small deals licensed commercially by the State Department, a number of important new states were added or restored to the U.S. client list, including the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, East Timor, Indonesia, Iraq, Afghanistan, India, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan.

Arms transfers are undertaken for a variety of rationales. On the strategic side of the ledger, weapons exports and military training can be utilized to increase interoperability (the ability to fight together in a coalition) among U.S. and allied forces; to reward partners in the fight against terrorism, including countries fighting alongside U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Iraq; to gain access to foreign military bases; and to strengthen allies against internal and/or external threats. Politically, arms and training can be used as leverage for everything from gaining preferential access to oil and other strategic resources to persuading other countries to vote with the United States in international and regional bodies like the United Nations and the Organization of American States. In the domestic economic sphere, the arms trade is a source of income and jobs for key localities, a way to lower the costs of weapons purchased by the U.S. military, and a means of maintaining a larger U.S. defense industrial base than would be possible without these foreign sales. Whether arms transfers are the best tools for achieving these objectives is a matter of debate, but there is no question that the United States utilizes them in hopes of achieving these goals.

Table 1
U.S. Foreign Military Sales Agreements, FY 2002 through FY 2008 (dollars in billions)

FY 2002	FY 2003	FY 2004	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2008
$12.0	$12.6	$13.2	$9.6	$18.1	$19.1	$32.0

Sources: U.S.Department of Defense, Defense Security Assistance Agency, Historical Facts Book, as of September 30, 2007; and Eric Lipton, "With Push from White House, Arms Sales Jump," New York Times, September 14, 2008.

There is less concern in policymaking circles about the negative impacts of arms sales, from fueling conflict to enabling major human rights abuses. In the case of the United States, this is true despite the fact that U.S. law calls for curbs on sales to countries engaged in a "gross and consistent" pattern of human rights abuses or to countries using U.S. weapons for aggressive purposes.[2]More often than not, these reasonable requirements are set aside in favor of the short-term strategic, political, and economic objectives set out above. This tendency has been even stronger since the 9/11 attacks, with limits on arms sales and security assistance to certain client nations being lifted in the name of winning support for the U.S. campaign against terrorism.

The purpose of this report is to look at the risks entailed by U.S. arms sales, with a focus on sales to the developing world, since this is where the vast majority of conflicts are to be found. There is much to criticize in the behavior of all of the major suppliers of arms, but as the world's number one arms exporting nation (see table 2, below), the United States and U.S. arms sales policy deserve special scrutiny.[3]

Table 2
Arms Transfer Agreements with the World by Supplier, 2000-07 (current dollars in millions)

Nation	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	TOTAL 2000-07
United States	17,483	11,487	13,067	14,548	12,674	12,939	16,905	24,860	123,963
Russia	6,700	5,600	5,700	4,500	5,400	7,200	8,700	10,400	54,200
United Kingdom	600	600	700	600	6,400	2,800	3,100	9,800	24,600
France	4,600	4,200	500	2,500	2,200	8,000	500	1,800	24,300
Germany	1,200	1,200	1,000	1,500	1,700	1,700	1,900	1,500	11,700
China	600	1,200	400	500	700	2,500	800	3,800	10,500
Italy	200	1,100	400	600	600	1,400	900	900	6,100
All Other European	4,100	2,700	4,400	2,100	6,500	5,800	5,200	4,400	35,200
All Other	2,500	2,600	2,100	1,700	2,600	2,200	2,300	2,500	18,500
TOTAL	37,983	30,687	28,267	28,548	38,774	44,539	40,305	59,960	309,063

Source: Congressional Research Service, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2000-2007, October 23, 2008.
Note: The Congressional Research Service figures differ from the Pentagon numbers cited in Table 1 for a variety of reasons; most notably the CRS figures are by calendar year rather than the U.S. fiscal year (October 1 through September 30) used by the Pentagon.

The Biggest Recipients of U.S. Weapons and Training

If we take an expansive view of the developing world, as defined by the Congressional Research Service and other U.S. government agencies, the top recipients of U.S. arms fall into two categories: 1) major oil-producing states or rapidly growing nations that can afford to pay for expensive systems like fighter planes and tanks, and 2) nations that receive U.S. weaponry on subsidized terms because of their perceived value as strategic partners. Of the top ten U.S. arms recipients in the developing world (see table 3) five- Pakistan, Israel, Iraq, Egypt and Colombia-rely on U.S. government subsidies for all or part of the funds needed to purchase U.S. weapons. The remaining four countries on the top ten list-Saudi Arabia, Korea, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Singapore-pay for U.S. weaponry out of their own pockets.

Table 3
Top 25 U.S. Arms Recipients in the Developing World, FY 2006 and FY 2007

Country by Rank	Amount of Weapons Received Combined Total for FY 2006 and FY 2007 (dollars in millions)
1. Pakistan	$3,662.4
2. Saudi Arabia	$2,511.3
3. Israel	$2,070.1
4. Iraq	$1,416.7
5. Korea	$1,246.8
6. United Arab Emirates (UAE)	$983.5
7. Kuwait	$878.7
8. Egypt	$845.0
9. Colombia	$575.1
10. Singapore	$492.7
11. Jordan	$473.6
12. Bahrain	$307.5
13. Thailand	$164.0
14. Philippines	$156.1
15. Brazil	$95.4
16. India	$92.3
17. Malaysia	$68.7
18. Oman	$57.1
19. Chile	$53.8
20. Morocco	$52.3
21. Argentina	$44.0
22. Lebanon	$41.9
23. Indonesia	$37.3
24. Yemen	$18.1
25. Tunisia	$16.6

Source: U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Historical Facts Book, as of September 30,2007, published in 2008.

Note: Figures in this table cover only agreements under the Pentagon's Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, the largest U.S.government arms transfer program.

U.S. Assistance Channels

In addition to the growing number of countries receiving U.S. weapons and military assistance since September 11, 2001, there has also been a proliferation of aid channels. Before the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the vast bulk of U.S. assistance went through programs like the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program or the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, both of which are authorized by the Department of State and implemented by the Pentagon. In addition to vastly increasing the amount of military assistance available to potential U.S. arms clients, the new post-9/11 programs have shifted the balance in the provision of foreign and security assistance from the State Department toward the Pentagon. Table 4 gives an overview of the funding provided by major U.S. security assistance programs, highlighting programs initiated after 9/11.

Table 4
Major U.S. Security Assistance Programs as of 2008

"Traditional" Programs	Funding 2002-08 (dollars in billions)
Foreign Military Financing (FMF)	$33.8
International Military Education and Training (IMET)	$ 0 .6
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE)	$ 4.1
Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI)	$ 4.7
Economic Support Fund (ESF)	$25.9
Traditional Programs Total	$69.1 billion
Programs Initiated Since 2001
Train and Equip Funds (T&E) for Iraq and Afghanistan	$28.8
Global Train and Equip (T&E) Funds, Section 1206	$ 0.5
Coalition Support Funds (for allies in Iraq and Afghanistan)	$ 6.6
Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP)	$ 3.7
Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP)	$ 0.1
Nontraditional Programs Total	$ 39.7 billion
ALL SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS TOTAL	$108.8 billion

Sources: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations, FY 2003 through FY 2009 editions; and, for nontraditional programs, Cindy Williams and Gordon Adams, Strengthening Statecraft and Security: Reforming U.S. Planning and Resource Allocation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Security Studies Program Occasional Paper, June 2008.

In monetary terms, the creation of a series of new aid programs authorized and implemented by the Pentagon has resulted in a massive increase in the resources available for arming and training foreign military forces-nearly $40 billion in funding for programs that did not exist before 9/11. In addition to this new funding, the traditional security assistance programs cited in table 4-Foreign Military Financing, the Economic Support Fund (ESF), the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI), and the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement program (INCLE)-grew by over a third from FY2002 to FY2008, with funding increasing from $7.4 billion to $11.2 billion.

As for the balance of supervisory and budgetary power between the State Department and the Pentagon, the Department of Defense went from a position of having little or no authorizing power before 2001 to controlling 35 percent of all security assistance issued between 2002 and 2008. Whether Defense or State funds a particular program is more than just a bureaucratic distinction. Some human rights conditions on aid cover only State Department programs, so that programs funded by the military can continue even when programs funded by the State Department have been cut off. This obviously sends mixed signals to the foreign governments that Washington is trying to influence. This distinction is further exacerbated by the fact that the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee-which oversee State Department-funded programs-have more experience in providing oversight for security assistance programs and are more likely to raise questions about the impact of a given program on human rights or regional stability. By contrast, the House Armed Services Committee and the Senate Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Defense, which govern Pentagon-funded security assistance programs, are less likely to pursue these questions in depth.[4]

There are also issues of management capabilities between the State Department and the Pentagon. For example, the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), a flexible program that gives U.S. commanders in the field money to spend on everything from compensating families for damage done to their homes during searches by U.S. forces to improving local sewer systems, has been effective in addressing particular needs of key communities on a timely basis. This in turn has engendered goodwill toward U.S. military personnel. But there have been serious questions raised about the sustainability of CERP over the longer term as larger development projects have begun to be funded through the program. The benefits of these "one-shot" investments are often negated by an inability or unwillingness to monitor their progress, with the result that in some cases additional CERP funds have been needed to re-do projects. The Pentagon was never meant to be a development agency, and funding anything other than small-scale local efforts through CERP risks wasting scarce resources.[5]

Finally, there tends to be much more transparency in programs funded by the State Department than in Pentagon programs that serve similar functions. Pentagon programs are often presented as lump sums in budgetary documents without details as to how the monies are to be disbursed. For example, it was only after the Center for Public Integrity, a nongovernmental organization, filed Freedom of Information Act requests for breakdowns on the recipients of the Pentagon's Coalition Support Fund (CSF) program that this information was made public.[6]

The future direction of both aid levels and the division of control between State and Defense over security assistance will be determined to some degree by the situations in Iraq and Afghanistan. But certain programs, like the Pentagon's Section 1206 initiative - one of the new military aid programs introduced since 9/11 -- are growing independently of the course of spending on Iraq or Afghanistan. And programs like CERP that were designed specifically for use in Iraq and Afghanistan are being "globalized" by the creation of parallel programs such as the Combatant Commander's Initiative Fund (CCIF). This suggests that the battle for control and monitoring of security assistance funding will continue beyond the end of these conflicts.

The vast bulk (over 83 percent) of the security assistance distributed by the Bush administration for FY2002 through FY2008 went to just five countries, all in the Middle East or South Asia (see table 5).

Table 5
Top Five Recipients of U.S.Security Assistance, FY2002 to FY2009 (dollars in millions)

Country	FY 2002-06	FY 2007	FY 2008a	FY 2009b	Total
Afghanistan	$11,520.2	$9,085.6	$4,502.6	$4,656.2	$29,764.6
Iraq	$14,400.4	$7,469.1	$3,801.9	$ 2,300.0	$27,980.5
Israel	$14,219.7	$2,460.2	$2,380.6	$2,550.0	$21,610.5
Egypt	$9,994.4	$1,757.7	$1,705.9	$1,505.4	$14,963.4
Pakistan	$7,600.8	$616.6	$738.5	$798.4	$9,754.4
Total	$57,735.5	$21,389.2	$13,129.5	$11,810	$104,073.4

Sources: U.S.Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY 2004 through FY 2009 editions; International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, Collateral Damage: Human Rights and U.S. Military Aid Since 9/11,Center for Public Integrity, May 2007; and U.S. Department of Defense, "Global War on Terror" supplemental budget requests, FY 2003 through FY 2009 editions.
^aFY 2008 figures are estimates.
^bFY 2009 figures are as proposed in the administration's budget.

U.S. Weapons at War

U.S. arms and military training played a role in 20 of the world's 27 major wars in 2006/07 (see table 6). The dollar value of U.S. weapons transfers and weapons orders destined for zones of conflict during that two-year period was $11.2 billion. The biggest recipients were Pakistan ($3.7 billion), Turkey ($3.0 billion), Israel ($2.1 billion), Iraq ($1.4 billion), and Colombia ($575 million). Nations receiving less than $5 million in transfers included Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, Uganda, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Haiti. But since the figures in table 6 include only transfers under the Pentagon's Foreign Military Sales program, these relatively modest numbers do not represent the full scope of security assistance provided to these nations (for example, see our profile of Nigeria).

Table 6
U.S. Arms Sales to Nations at War,2006/07 (in current dollars)

Nation	Foreign Military Sales FY 2006	Foreign Military Sales FY 2007	Total
Africa
Algeria	--	--	--
Burundi	--	--	--
Chad	$1,816,000	$100,000	$1,916,000
Cote d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast)	--	--	--
Democratic Republic of the Congo	$1,255,00	$1,464,000	$2,719,000
Ethiopia	$8,852,000	$3,200,000	$12,052,000
Kenya	$1,600,000	$3,853,000	$5,453,000
Nigeria	$253,000	$724,000	$977,000
Somalia	--	--	--
Sudan	--	--	--
Uganda	$3,017,000	--	$3,017,000
Asia
Afghanistan	$1,727,000	--	$1,727,000
Burma (Myanmar)	--	--	--
India	--	$92,334,000	$92,334,000
Nepal	$100,000	$200,000	$300,000
Pakistan	$3,475,245,000	$187,156,000	$3,662,401,000
Philippines	$30,578,000	$125,502,000	$156,080,000
Sri Lanka	$1,400,000	$310,000	$1,710,000
Thailand	$75,576,000	$88,439,000	$164,015,000
Europe
Russia-Chechnya	--	--	--
Turkey	$967,776,000	$2,033,629,000	$3,001,405,000
The Americas
Colombia	$139,463,000	$435,617,000	$575,080,000
Haiti	$200,000	$835,000	$1,035,000
Middle East
Iraq	--	$1,416,752,000	$1,416,752,000
Israel	$1,004,631,000	$1,065,541,000	$2,070,172,000
Lebanon	$1,684,000	$40,154,000	$41,838,000
Yemen	$4,143,000	$14,056,000	$18,199,000

Source: U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Security Assistance Agency, Historical Facts Book, as of September 30, 2007 and Project Ploughshares, Armed Conflicts in 2007, at http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/ACRText/ACR-TitlePage.html.

Thirteen of the top 25 U.S. arms recipients in the developing world in 2006/07 were either undemocratic governments or regimes guilty of major ongoing human rights abuses (see appendix). This is a one-third reduction in the number (18) of top U.S. recipients that fit these categories when we last surveyed these trends in 2005, but the number of such recipients contrasts sharply with the Bush administration's pro-democracy rhetoric. The majority of the undemocratic and/or human-rights-abusing governments armed by the United States are in the Middle East (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Jordan, and Bahrain) and South Asia (Afghanistan and Pakistan). Although the administration's motivations for arming these nations-protecting oil flows, supporting antiterrorism efforts, or promoting coalition partnerships in theaters of war-are not without merit, the rationales for making these sales and their effectiveness in achieving U.S. policy goals need to be reconsidered. For example, does arming the Saudi regime make it easier or harder for Riyadh to move toward a more open, more stable political system that will keep that nation's oil on the world market uninterrupted by internal or external conflict? Will U.S. weapons supplied to Iraqi and Afghan forces end up in the right hands or disappear into local black markets where they could just as easily end up in the possession of anti-U.S. rebels, insurgents, and terrorists? Has the U.S. decision to arm and support Ethiopia in its recent war against Somalia helped to stabilize or destabilize the Horn of Africa?[7] These and other questions will be addressed as appropriate in the country profiles that follow.

Country Profiles: U.S. Arms Recipients, 2006/07

The 13 countries profiled here have been chosen because they represent important aspects of U.S. arms transfer policies, and serve as proving grounds for measuring the efficacy of current approaches to weapons exports. The profiles are organized by region, beginning with Africa. The countries profiled are Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Georgia, Turkey, the Philippines, Thailand, Iraq, Israel, Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, and Colombia.

• Africa
• Eurasia
• East Asia and the Pacific
• Near East
• Central and South Asia
• Western Hemisphere

Conclusion and Recommendations

U.S. arms sales policy is in disarray. As the size, scope, and sophistication of U.S. transfers has increased during the Bush administration, so have the risks.

When the vast bulk of U.S. arms transfers to the developing world go to human rights abusers and undemocratic regimes, it does real and substantial damage to the reputation of the United States as a force for democracy and the rule of law. This in turn undermines the ability of Washington to promote cooperation in other areas of national need, from the coordination of intelligence and law enforcement, to promoting economic growth, to curbing climate change. While some of these objectives-particularly those in the economic and environmental spheres-should be of mutual interest to all countries, Washington's ability to play a leadership role is hampered by its role as the world's leading arms trafficking nation.

In addition, arming repressive regimes is more likely to promote instability than it is to foster stability. Arms transfers can serve as a U.S. government "seal of approval" for governments engaged in unacceptable behavior, not to mention being used as tools of internal repression and instruments of warfare with neighboring states. This concern is underscored by the fact that U.S. weapons are present in fully half of the major armed conflicts currently under way worldwide. And in some potential conflicts-between India and Pakistan, Pakistan and Afghanistan, and Turkey and the Kurdish region of northern Iraq, forces on both sides are receiving U.S. arms and training.

These negative consequences of runaway arms transfers are exacerbated by the fact that there has been a proliferation of new aid and training programs run by the Pentagon without much transparency or accountability. Until these programs are reformed, the ability of Congress to play a meaningful role in overseeing the weapons trade will be severely undermined.

All of this is not to say that arms transfers do not have security benefits, particularly in the realm of fostering military cooperation. But the level and types of exports provided to specific countries need to be subjected to much more careful scrutiny, including consideration as to whether the same benefits might be obtained through nonmilitary forms of engagement.

Accordingly, we make the following recommendations:

• The next administration should follow the leads set by the Reagan, Carter, and Clinton administrations by putting forward a new arms transfer policy directive within its first six months in office. The directive should establish clearer criteria for arms transfer decision making that strike a balance among military, political, economic, human rights, and nonproliferation objectives.

• Congress should establish common standards of transparency and accountability for all arms transfer and security assistance programs, including required reporting on amounts disbursed, countries served, and weapons systems and training provided.

• The president and Congress should reverse the trend toward situating security assistance programs within the Pentagon budget. The State Department is better equipped to mesh the competing interests that U.S. foreign and military policies are meant to address.

• The president and the Congress should endorse and/or ratify key international initiatives like the global ban on anti-personnel land mines, the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and a global arms trade treaty.

Notes

[1] Figure derived by the authors from U.S.Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Historical Facts Book as of September 30,2006; and U.S. Department of State, CongressionalBudget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY2009 ed., PM Annex, “TitleIV Supporting Information.”

[2] The human rights language is containedin section 502 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

[3] To cite just one egregious example--China’s role in arming the government of the Sudan--see William D. Hartung, Deadly Traffic: China’s Arms Trade with theSudan (Washington, DC: New AmericaFoundation, August 5, 2008).

[4] On this point, see George Withers, Adam Isacson, LisaHaugaard, Joy Olson, and Joel Fyke, “Ready, Aim, Foreign Policy: How thePentagon’s Role in Foreign Policy Is Growing, and Why the Congress, and theAmerican Public—Should be Worried,” a joint project of the Center forInternational Policy, the Latin America Working Group Education Fund, and theWashington Office on Latin America, March 2008.

[5] Dana Hedgpath and Sarah Cohen, “Money asa Weapon,” Washington Post, August 11, 2008.

[6] International Consortium ofInvestigative Journalists, “Collateral Damage: Human Rights and U.S. MilitaryAid Since 9/11,” Center for Public Integrity, May 2007, http://projects.publicintegrity.org/militaryaid/.

[7] On the impact of the U.S.-backedEthiopian invasion of Somalia,see Nicholas D. Kristof, “The Endorsement from Hell,” New York Times, October 25, 2008.

Appendix

Protecting Human Rights, Safeguarding Democracy?
The Records of the Top 25 Recipients of U.S. Arms in the Developing World