The Arab Spring A long march

The Moderate Islamists Of The Muslim Brotherhood Have Won Much Ground But Look Far From Comfortable In Power 

Feb 18th 2012 
AMMAN, CAIRO AND GAZA 
Courtesy Of "The Economist"

A FLUSH of green is spreading across the Arab world, but not because its vast deserts are shrinking. Green is the colour of Islam and Islamist movements have reaped the biggest harvest of the Arab spring. Not all stripes of Koran-led politics have flourished equally. In the Sunni Muslim heartlands stretching from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf, neither violent extremists in the mould of al-Qaeda, nor proponents of Iranian-style theocracy, nor woolly Islamist liberals have fared especially well. Instead, the prize is going to groups linked to the centrist Muslim Brotherhood, committed to evolutionary rather than revolutionary change, and more concerned with questions of Islamic identity and ethics than with imposing rigid God-given rules.

Parties aligned to the Brotherhood now dominate politics in both Egypt and Tunisia, having captured nearly half of parliamentary seats in post-revolutionary elections. Seeking to avoid the fate of those countries’ fallen presidents, King Muhammad VI of Morocco has empowered his own country’s Brothers by appointing the head of their Justice and Development Party as prime minister. Islamist militias were among the most effective in Libya’s revolutionary war. Like-minded armed groups look set to play a similar role in Syria as it slides towards civil war.

In this section

• »A long march
• An offensive regime
• Flying-carpet diplomacy
• A sea of riches
• Turning tables

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Related topics

• Religion
• Islam
• Fatah
• Tunisia
• Kingdom of Jordan

The Brothers, known to Arabs as the Ikhwan, are hardly newcomers to the political scene. Their political arm in Jordan, the Islamic Action Front, has been the country’s strongest party for decades, playing the role of a loyal opposition. Their wing in Iraq, the Islamic Party, worked with both Saddam Hussein and the American occupiers after 2003. Branches in Algeria, Bahrain, Kuwait and Yemen have maintained substantial parliamentary representation since the 1990s. The National Islamic Front, the Ikhwan’s political vehicle in Sudan, backed a military coup in 1989 and was rewarded with a slew of cabinet posts. Palestine’s Islamic Resistance Movement, better known by its Arabic acronym Hamas, grew out of a Brotherhood charity in the West Bank and Gaza which sought and obtained recognition from Israel in the 1970s. It beat the main nationalist Palestinian party, Fatah, in 2006’s elections and then, when its reconciliation government with Fatah failed to win Western recognition, seized control of the Gaza Strip. Hamas’s survival, despite Israeli attacks and global opprobrium for its resort to terrorist tactics, testifies to the Ikhwan’s deep roots.

Following the Arab spring, some Western statesmen are keen to talk to the Brotherhood. Recent weeks have seen delegations rush to the gleaming new Cairo headquarters of the group’s General Guide, Muhammad Badeea. The former professor of veterinary science, whose position as head of the Egyptian mother organisation carries moral authority across the region, beamed for the cameras recently as he greeted Anne Patterson, the American ambassador to Egypt, with a hearty handshake. This was doubly significant. American officials had long shunned contact with the Ikhwan. Mr Badeea’s gesture also underlined the Brothers’ lack of puritanical priggishness regarding women.

Does this mean that the secretive society, founded in Egypt in 1928 and a wellspring of Sunni Islamist ideology ever since, is on the verge of fulfilling a long-thwarted dream? Back in 1938 the Brotherhood’s founder Hassan al-Banna, an Egyptian schoolteacher with a knack for organisation, took the podium at an Islamic gathering in Cairo and proposed stitching together the nascent states that Europe’s colonial powers had carved out of the Ottoman empire. “Islam does not recognise geographical boundaries, nor does it acknowledge racial and blood differences, considering all Muslims as one umma[community],” declared Mr Banna, who enlisted hundreds of thousands of followers in six countries by the time of his assassination in 1949. Congregants, he said, should nominate a global body to elect a new Caliph, replacing the Ottoman ruler whose downfall Europe had engineered.

Ideologues still hanker after the revival of a pan-Islamic empire. “We’ll have to get our respective houses in order first,” admits Jamal Hourani, a leading member of Jordan’s Islamic Action Front.

To judge from a recent scene in Cairo, that may take some time. The Ikhwan is far from smugly comfortable following their sweep of Egypt’s elections, even after decades of sporadic but often vicious persecution. During a huge demonstration in Tahrir Square commemorating the revolution’s first anniversary last month, hecklers continually surrounded a marquee featuring Brotherhood speakers. “Beea beea ya Badeea,” they chanted, taunting Mr Badeea to “sell, sell out,” the revolution.

Despite the legitimacy conferred by success at the ballot box, Egypt’s Brothers are on the defensive. Secular critics suspect them of cutting a deal with the army generals who emerged from the shadows following the fall of the old regime. In exchange for a free hand in the legislature, it is rumoured, the Brothers have quietly agreed to extend the long lease of Egypt’s military-backed “deep state”. Perhaps so, but the generals also seem to distrust the Ikhwan, and show it by trying to blunt their influence wherever possible. To date, the army has coldly ignored suggestions that, as the largest block in parliament, the Brotherhood should have the right to form a coalition government.

It’s Hard To Rule

Liberal Islamists in Egypt, meanwhile, decry the group’s ideological sterility, rigid command structure and penchant for back-room politicking. More puritanical Islamists, such as the Salafists whose Nour Party came a surprisingly close second to the Ikhwan in Egypt’s elections, accuse the Brothers of diluting the Islamist agenda so as to soothe Western fears. Salafists also complain of being shunned by their ostensible Islamist cousins in favour of secular potential coalition partners.

In other words, the Egyptian Brotherhood is finding that proximity to power carries a heavy tax. They are not alone. Nearly everywhere that Ikhwan-related parties have left opposition politics and entered government they have faced similar headwinds. Within a few years of Sudan’s 1989 coup, General Omar Bashir, the strongman who remains in power to this day, had shunted aside his Brotherhood partners and jailed their leader. Palestinian pundits sniff that just when the Brotherhood is gaining power elsewhere, Hamas’s exiled leader, Khaled Meshal, signed a deal replacing Gaza’s government with one led by Fatah’s leader, Mahmoud Abbas. In Kuwait and Bahrain, the sole Gulf monarchies with active, albeit highly circumscribed parliaments, the Brothers have failed to corral fellow Islamists into a united front, and have lost out to rivals with either tribal or more strongly religious appeal. For similar reasons Ikhwan-style parties have made few new converts and little electoral progress in the messy politics of Algeria, Iraq and Yemen.

Anxiety over a Brotherhood-run Arab empire should be tempered too by a better understanding of how the organisation works. The Ikhwan have a tanzim alami, or global organisation, comprised of at least two representatives from each of many Muslim communities across the world. Its nominal leader is Egypt’s Supreme Guide; by tradition lesser representatives kiss his right hand. Some wishfully liken the tanzim to America’s Congress, hoping that it could yet provide an institutional umbrella for a closer confederation of Arab states.

But the global Brotherhood wields little real authority. Far from applying a unified blueprint, executive offices in each country operate their own institutions with separate funding mechanisms. “The people of Mecca know their own people,” says Mahmoud Musleh, a Hamas parliamentarian in Ramallah. “Egypt cannot interfere in Palestinian affairs.” The head of Tunisia’s Brotherhood-linked Nahda Party, Rachid Ghannouchi, says he will tolerate both alcohol and bikinis in his country, and his government continues to license prostitution. The Libyan chapter next door vows to continue Colonel Muammar Qaddafi’s bans on all three.

Branches of the Brotherhood have clashed bitterly in the past. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 split the global franchise into feuding pro- and anti-Iraq factions for a decade. The Syrian Brotherhood, exiled since suffering gory massacres at the hands of the country’s Baathist rulers in the 1980s, long despised Hamas for maintaining its offshore headquarters in the Syrian capital, Damascus.

The Brotherhood’s preparation for power has only deepened geographical divides. To prod King Abdullah into inviting them to join his government, Jordan’s Brotherhood recently announced it was formally separating from its Palestinian counterpart, proof that it puts Jordan’s, not Palestine’s, interests first. The Hamas prime minister in Gaza, Ismail Haniyeh, has clawed control over finance away from Mr Meshal.

Lingering suspicion of the Ikhwan in Western chanceries, meanwhile, is shared by many of the Arab world’s remaining autocrats. Saudi Arabia’s powerful interior minister, who is next in line to the throne, castigates the Brothers for showing little gratitude for receiving refuge during past waves of persecution. He has been quoted as calling them “the source of all troubles in the Arab world”. The wealthy rulers of the United Arab Emirates maintain a quiet but effective ban on the Ikhwan.

Even now, when seeking to promote a moderate face, the Brothers look awkward or uncomfortable sharing power. Hamas’s leaders in Gaza, who forcefully overthrew a national-unity government in 2007 three months into its rule, might still balk at a reconciliation agreement which would reunite Palestine’s two splintered halves. Nahda, the Brotherhood chapter that won Tunisia’s election, supported the nomination of a non-Islamist president yet kept key ministerial portfolios. Egypt’s Ikhwan are proposing a similar arrangement.

The Vaunted Turkish Model

Still the Brotherhood stands out as a movement of institutions, not a figleaf for megalomaniacs. Its local chapters run internal elections and rotate their leaders. These men (and a few women) have generally proven pragmatic politicians, skilful at cutting deals when it helps them muster influence. They have sidled up to Egypt’s junta and offered to serve in King Abdullah of Jordan’s government, with or without elections. Across the Arab world they have professed a commitment to Turkish-style democracy, civic freedoms and free markets. To prove their belief in pluralism, Brotherhood leaders attended the most recent Christmas celebrations in Cairo’s Coptic cathedral. Leaders advertise their gender sensitivity by noting that nearly a quarter of Tunisia’s new parliamentarians are women, of whom 80% stood on Islamist lists. Mr Meshal recently promised a delegation of Palestinian liberals that he would add a woman for the first time to his nine-man politburo.

Besides, for all the Brotherhood’s shortcomings, the region could have many worse governments. In spite of Hamas’s record of terror tactics in Gaza, it has unquestionably managed the unruly Palestinian coastal strip far better than its secular predecessor Fatah. Its forces are more disciplined, the streets safer and the bureaucrats more efficient and less nepotistic. What corruption there is runs along institutional rather than blood lines. The Brotherhood’s members are largely lay professionals, not clergymen, and instinctively shrink from handing clerics too much power. As for imposing sharia law, it is telling that Yousef Qaradawi, the Al Jazeera channel pundit who is the Brotherhood’s preferred religious authority, recently opined that the application of God’s law in Egypt needed a five year reprieve. Alas five years after taking control of Gaza, Hamas has mostly preserved existing structures and laws, with minor tweaks. Now that Israel’s siege has relaxed and Hamas feels less threatened, its social controls have eased too. Though the interior minister has formally banned the mingling of genders and women smoking water-pipes in public, the new beach front resorts he has helped build sport both.

Across the region the Brotherhood has worked hard, through years of painstaking social work and uphill political battles, to enter the corridors of power. “It was like a stake tethering a water buffalo,” recounts one of the Ikhwan’s new parliamentarians in Egypt, who like many of his colleagues suffered jail and exile under the previous regime. “The government kept hammering it into the ground but we just kept on digging it out.” Such patient dedication bodes well for the new rulers’ ability to address the deep social and economic maladies afflicting most Arab countries. The Brotherhood’s rise through the ballot box and civil action marks a hope that Islamism’s reform-minded mainstream might yet prevail over the impetuous and increasingly abortive rush to arms that has characterised revolutionary Islamist groups, from the assassination of Egypt’s leader Anwar Sadat in 1981 to al-Qaeda today.

Those Who Support Democracy Must Welcome The Rise Of Political Islam

From Tunisia To Egypt, Islamists Are Gaining The Popular Vote. Far From Threatening Stability, This Makes It A Real Possibility 

By Wadah Khanfar 
Sunday 27 November 2011 14.30 EST 
Courtesy Of "The Guardian"

Ennahda, the Islamic party in Tunisia, won 41% of the seats of the Tunisian constitutional assembly last month, causing consternation in the west. But Ennahda will not be an exception on the Arab scene. Last Friday the Islamic Justice and Development Party took the biggest share of the vote in Morocco and will lead the new coalition government for the first time in history. And tomorrow Egypt's elections begin, with the Muslim Brotherhood predicted to become the largest party. There may be more to come. Should free and fair elections be held in Yemen, once the regime of Ali Abdullah Saleh falls, the Yemeni Congregation for Reform, also Islamic, will win by a significant majority. This pattern will repeat itself whenever the democratic process takes its course.

In the west, this phenomenon has led to a debate about the "problem" of the rise of political Islam. In the Arab world, too, there has been mounting tension between Islamists and secularists, who feel anxious about Islamic groups. Many voices warn that the Arab spring will lead to an Islamic winter, and that the Islamists, though claiming to support democracy, will soon turn against it. In the west, stereotypical images that took root in the aftermath of 9/11 have come to the fore again. In the Arab world, a secular anti-democracy camp has emerged in both Tunisia and Egypt whose pretext for opposing democratisation is that the Islamists are likely to be the victors.

But the uproar that has accompanied the Islamists' gains is unhelpful; a calm and well-informed debate about the rise of political Islam is long overdue.

First, we must define our terms. "Islamist" is used in the Muslim world to describe Muslims who participate in the public sphere, using Islam as a basis. It is understood that this participation is not at odds with democracy. In the west, however, the term routinely describes those who use violence as a means and an end – thus Jihadist Salafism, exemplified by al-Qaida, is called "Islamist" in the west, despite the fact that it rejects democratic political participation (Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of al-Qaida, criticised Hamas when it decided to take part in the elections for the Palestinian legislative council, and has repeatedly criticised the Muslim Brotherhood for opposing the use of violence).

This disconnect in the understanding of the term in the west and in the Muslim world was often exploited by despotic Arab regimes to suppress Islamic movements with democratic political programmes. It is time we were clear.

Reform-based Islamic movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, work within the political process. They learned a bitter lesson from their armed conflict in Syria against the regime of Hafez al-Assad in 1982, which cost the lives of more than 20,000 people and led to the incarceration or banishment of many thousands more. The Syrian experience convinced mainstream Islamic movements to avoid armed struggle and to observe "strategic patience" instead.

Second, we must understand the history of the region. In western discourse Islamists are seen as newcomers to politics, gullible zealots who are motivated by a radical ideology and lack experience. In fact, they have played a major role in the Arab political scene since the 1920s. Islamic movements have often been in opposition, but since the 1940s they have participated in parliamentary elections, entered alliances with secular, nationalist and socialist groups, and participated in several governments – in Sudan, Jordan, Yemen and Algeria. They have also forged alliances with non-Islamic regimes, like the Nimeiri regime in Sudan in 1977.

A number of other events have had an impact on the collective Muslim mind, and have led to the maturation of political Islam: the much-debatedIslamic Revolution in Iran in 1979; the military coup in Sudan in 1989; the success of the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front in the 1991 elections and the army's subsequent denial of its right to govern; the conquest of much of Afghan territory by the Taliban in 1996 leading to the establishment of its Islamic emirate; and the success in 2006 of Hamas in the Palestinian Legislative Council elections. The Hamas win was not recognised, nor was the national unity government formed. Instead, a siege was imposed on Gaza to suffocate the movement.

Perhaps one of the most influential experiences has been that of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey, which won the elections in 2002. It has been a source of inspiration for many Islamic movements. Although the AKP does not describe itself as Islamic, its 10 years of political experience have led to a model that many Islamists regard as successful. The model has three important characteristics: a general Islamic frame of reference; a multi-party democracy; and significant economic growth.

These varied political experiences have had a profound impact on political Islam's flexibility and capacity for political action, and on its philosophy, too.

However, political Islam has also faced enormous pressures from dictatorial Arab regimes, pressures that became more intense after 9/11. Islamic institutions were suppressed. Islamic activists were imprisoned, tortured and killed. Such experiences gave rise to a profound bitterness. Given the history, it is only natural that we should hear overzealous slogans or intolerant threats from some activists. Some of those now at the forefront of election campaigns were only recently released from prison. It would not be fair to expect them to use the voice of professional diplomats.

Despite this, the Islamic political discourse has generally been balanced. The Tunisian Islamic movement has set a good example. Although Ennahda suffered under Ben Ali's regime, its leaders developed a tolerant discourse and managed to open up to moderate secular and leftist political groups. The movement's leaders have reassured Tunisian citizens that it will not interfere in their personal lives and that it will respect their right to choose. The movement also presented a progressive model of women's participation, with 42 female Ennahda members in the constitutional assembly.

The Islamic movement's approach to the west has also been balanced, despite the fact that western countries supported despotic Arab regimes. Islamists know the importance of international communication in an economically and politically interconnected world.

Now there is a unique opportunity for the west: to demonstrate that it will no longer support despotic regimes by supporting instead the democratic process in the Arab world, by refusing to intervene in favour of one party against another and by accepting the results of the democratic process, even when it is not the result they would have chosen. Democracy is the only option for bringing stability, security and tolerance to the region, and it is the dearest thing to the hearts of Arabs, who will not forgive any attempts to derail it.

The region has suffered a lot as a result of attempts to exclude Islamists and deny them a role in the public sphere. Undoubtedly, Islamists' participation in governance will give rise to a number of challenges, both within the Islamic ranks and with regard to relations with other local and international forces. Islamists should be careful not to fall into the trap of feeling overconfident: they must accommodate other trends, even if it means making painful concessions. Our societies need political consensus, and the participation of all political groups, regardless of their electoral weight. It is this interplay between Islamists and others that will both guarantee the maturation of the Arab democratic transition and lead to an Arab political consensus and stability that has been missing for decades.

Democracy In The Muslim World

By Saad Hafiz 
Monday, October 31, 2011 
Courtesy Of "The Daily Times"

There seems little choice but to give leadership and political development in Muslim countries a chance to succeed, although many in the west may feel that Islam is incompatible with democracy

A familiar lament you hear from many Muslims is that our leaders are corrupt and inaccessible; that Muslims have borne the brunt of atrocities, particularly in the last hundred years from the forced unravelling of the Ottoman empire to Palestine, Kashmir, Iraq and Afghanistan in the present day; that Muslims are not in control of their destiny, which is effectively controlled by the ruling elite and more so by a perfidious west that is hell-bent on devouring the resources of Muslim nations. A major cause of the abysmal state of the Muslim world today can be attributed to capricious and corrupt leadership and a lack of democratic institutions.

History is replete with examples of absolutism and oppression in Muslim countries. We know that absolute monarchs, caudillos and clerical dictatorships thrive in Muslim societies. The Arab Spring notwithstanding, there traditionally has been little overt resistance to a military or civilian dictatorship. Muslim societies, particularly of late, have become fertile ground for authoritarian brands of Islam that promise certain austerities and peddle purist doctrines. In this environment, it is a tremendous challenge for representative democracy to become entrenched in the Muslim world. 

It is a fact that the overwhelming majority of Muslim rulers regard their countries as their personal possessions to be used as they see fit. This concept of power led in the past centuries to kings controlling their subjects’ lives from birth to death. The centuries-old culture of leadership that is ingrained in many Muslim societies has played a disastrous role in keeping most Muslim countries among the poorest in the world. Many Muslim countries also condone the awful treatment of women and minorities.

It is also true that nowadays most Muslim leaders squander their countries’ resources and revenues, leaving the majority of their populations mired in poverty, disease, hunger, war, and hopelessness. We know of the widespread misuse of oil wealth by rich Muslim nations, including those ruled by tribal dynasties or military, civilian and religious elites. National resources that should be used towards developing human potential are allocated to armament programmes and to the spread of a retrogressive Islamic ideology.

A very useful table in The Economist provides its readers with a damning indictment of the decades of dictatorial rule among the members of the Arab League. Countries have been compared on the basis of democracy, corruption and press freedom, and have fared embarrassingly badly on each count. For instance, Egypt ranks 138th for democracy, 98th for corruption, and 130th for press freedom. Libya, ruled until very recently by the late Muammar Gaddafi since 1969, ranks 158th, 146th, and 193rd. Yemen, where a revolt is in progress, has been governed by Ali Abdullah Saleh since 1978, and ranks 146th, 146th, and 173rd. Saudi Arabia, unsurprisingly, is placed at 160th for democracy and 178th for press freedom.

On the other hand, there are a few cautiously optimistic examples of successful Muslim leaders and secular democracies in Turkey, Indonesia and Malaysia. One such example, Turkey’s Prime Minister Erdogan, on his recent re-election proclaimed: “The people gave us a message to build the new constitution through consensus and negotiation. We will bring democracy to an advanced level, widening rights and freedoms.”

There seems little choice but to give leadership and political development in Muslim countries a chance to succeed, although many in the west may feel that Islam is incompatible with democracy. Muslim modernists would disagree, pointing to examples of leaders and countries where democracy based on consensus and negotiation is working. There is also evidence that political Islam, given the opportunity to find space through the ballot box, can work within a representative democracy.

The writer is a banker interested in history and international affairs

The Rise Of Political Islam

Why Have The Revolutions Of The Arab Spring Brought Political Islam To The Fore? One Reason Is That, Having Suffered Decades Of Persecution At The Hands Of Western-Backed Arab Autocrats, Islamists Now Benefit From A Mantle Of Martyrdom.

By Patrick Seale
First Published: 2011-10-25
Courtesy Of "Middle-East-Online"

Political Islam is making a dramatic comeback right across the greater Middle East. Some in the West will react with alarm at what they see as a dangerous geopolitical upset. Democrats, secularists, feminists, Christians and other religious minorities may fear that a rigid application of the shari‘a, the body of Islamic law, will threaten their freedoms and their way of life. But these fears are almost certainly exaggerated, if not wholly unfounded, at least in most Arab countries.

The triumph at last Sunday’s elections of Tunisia’s leading Islamic party Ennahda (Renaissance) is the latest example of the revival of political Islam in the Arab world. But it is also cause for reassurance. This moderate Islamic party should not be confused with hard-line Salafis, who demand a return to the uncompromising values of early Islam.

Without an absolute majority in the new Constituent assembly, Ennahda cannot rule alone, nor does it intend to do so. It will seek to form a coalition to carry forward its programme of social justice, economic development, and clean government. It has pledged not to erode or claw back the achievements of the past, notably democratic freedoms and women’s rights.

In Libya, however, the interim leader, Mustafa Abdel Jalil, has aroused fears by declaring that “any law violating the shari‘a will be legally null and void.” If this is implemented, it could have an impact on laws of personal status, for women in particular, in such matters as inheritance, divorce and polygamy. But what it will actually mean in practice has yet to be determined.

The rebel forces that stormed and captured Tripoli were led by an Islamist, Abdalhakim Belhadj, battled-hardened in the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Tracked by the CIA and Britain’s MI6, he was returned to Libya and tortured for seven years in Abu Salim prison. His attachment to Western interests should not be counted on.

Why have the revolutions of the Arab Spring brought political Islam to the fore? One reason is that, having suffered decades of persecution at the hands of Western-backed Arab autocrats, Islamists now benefit from a mantle of martyrdom. Hamid Jebali, Ennahda’s secretary-general, spent 16 years in prison, including ten in solitary confinement. Rashed Ghannouchi, the party’s spiritual leader, spent 22 years in exile.

In Egypt, Syria, Libya, Algeria and elsewhere, members of Islamic movements have been hounded, jailed, killed and tortured in great numbers, or have simply fled abroad. In Syria, the Muslim Brotherhood has been outlawed since the 1980s. Membership is a capital offense. If there is a change of regime in Damascus, the Islamists, by far the best organised of the opposition movements, are bound to figure prominently.

Another reason for the emergence of political Islam is the poverty and deprivation of a large part of the electorate in most Arab countries, especially those with little or no oil income. Free elections have at last given this under-class a voice. The Islamic parties have long distinguished themselves by their welfare activities in favour of the underprivileged. Of all the political parties, they can justly claim to be closest to the common people.

The Tunisian revolution was not a middle class achievement but was, on the contrary, driven forward by young men and women on the margin of society, bitter at their own unrelenting misery and at the gross corruption of the former ruling elite, especially the plutocrats close to former president Ben Ali and his wife.

There is a striking contrast in Tunisia between what the tourists see -- the coastal hotels, restaurants, comfortable villas, well-tarred roads, efficient services and so forth -- and the interior of the country, where jobs are scarce, running water a luxury denied to many, medical services virtually non-existent and government indifference a subject of angry complaint.

The same is true of Syria. The rural poor, which have suffered gravely from drought and government neglect, make up the massed ranks of the opposition, while the well-heeled merchant class of Damascus and Aleppo has so far remained loyal to the regime.

Egypt’s Muslim Brothers are expected to do well at next month’s elections. But, like Ennahda in Tunisia, they do not aspire to rule alone. The task of satisfying the economic demands of the great majority of the population is simply too daunting. The Islamists have no ambition to assume the burden alone. They fully realise that there can be no economic miracle which will, overnight, produce the hundreds of thousands of jobs, the affordable housing, student scholarships, low-cost medical services, and efficient public services which the population is clamouring for. Rebuilding the state institutions and the economy in all these countries will be a long and trying process, and many expectations are bound to be disappointed.

Another winning asset of the Islamic movements, however, is that they express, more clearly than their rivals, the frustrated but largely unvoiced ambition of the masses to affirm their Muslim-Arab identity. Most Arabs, with the exception of small Westernised elites, are God-fearing, socially conservative and attached to their traditional way of life. They are unhappy at attempts -- which they attribute to outside powers -- to impose on them a Western model of society. Islamic parties are the champions of this aspiration -- all the way from the Taliban in Afghanistan, to Hamas in Gaza and, in its own way, even to the moderate Ennahda in Tunisia.

The so-called ‘Arab Spring’, therefore, is far more than a revolt against long-entrenched, corrupt and brutal dictators. It is also a rebellion against foreign values -- and foreign military intervention. America’s destruction of Iraq and Israel’s oppression of the Palestinians arouse great anger. What the various Islamist movements have in common -- whether in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria and Yemen -- is an ambition to satisfy the thirst of the populations for an Islamic version of social justice freed from foreign tutelage.

It needs to be stressed that each country’s experience will be different. Tunisia, where women are among the most emancipated of the Arab world, is not like Libya or Yemen, nor will it be changed radically when Islamist parties come to power. In countries heavily dependent on tourism like Egypt and Tunisia, wide-ranging compromises with the shari‘a are bound to be made. Tourists will not be denied alcohol, belly-dancers or night-clubs.

In Turkey, Prime Minister Erdogan’s Islamic-coloured Justice and Development Party has had to compromise with the strong secular tradition of Ataturk, the Republic’s founder. The result is Turkey’s special brand of democracy. Likewise, Tunisia’s large and educated middle class will be a force with which Ennahda will have to accommodate. In most Arab countries, Islamists will be constrained by the counter-weight of long-established secularists and the need to satisfy foreign investors, donors, tourists and Western governments.

The West wants to see democracy flourish in the Arab world, no doubt to protect its interests. But the locals want jobs, a better future for themselves and their families, a fairer distribution of the country’s resources, an end to corruption and police brutality. They want good governance and a respect for their traditions rather than Western- style democracy or Western interference.

Patrick Seale is a leading British writer on the Middle East. His latest book is The Struggle for Arab Independence: Riad el-Solh and the Makers of the Modern Middle East (Cambridge University Press).

Copyright © 2011 Patrick Seale – distributed by Agence Global

Arab Democrats: Beware The US Model

In 1994 Newt Gingrich pushed for term limits for US congressmen, but was unable to bring them about [GALLO/GETTY]


Recent Events Have Underscored The Less Desirable Traits Of The US Political System: Gridlock and Self-Preservation.

By Robert Grenier
Last Modified: 16 Aug 2011 08:57
Courtesy Of "Al-Jazeera"

Americans like to think of themselves and their country as a model for the world. Indeed, this attitude of self-congratulation is one of the least attractive aspects of US culture when viewed from abroad, even if Americans themselves are barely aware of it. For most Americans, this common faith in the superiority of many aspects of their society - from popular entertainment, to higher education, to the judicial system, and so on - is part of the web of shared assumptions that underlie US culture. And among these, nothing is so firmly fixed in the American mind than the inherent superiority of their democratic political system.

Well. The world has been treated in recent weeks to the spectacle of the vaunted two-party American political system as it has driven the government heedlessly to the very brink of a disastrous default on its debt payments. This national financial near-miss, and the profound skepticism it has generated concerning the US' long-term ability to put its fiscal house in order, has roiled global stock markets, and threatens, if not soon addressed, to upend the dollar-based global financial system which has been in place since the end of World War II. Whether such a change in the global financial system is a good or bad thing over the long term I cannot say, but it would not happen without severe global economic dislocations, from which all would suffer.

On the surface, it would appear that the dysfunction at the heart of the US Congress is due to the ideological inflexibility of both Democrats and Republicans, who refuse to compromise in making self-interested appeals to their respective constituencies. The former refuse necessary cuts in social benefits, while the latter refuse to contemplate even sensible tax increases. Together, they reflect an apparent refusal on the part of Americans to live within their means. Indeed, that refusal, reflected in huge, endemic and unsustainable trade and budget deficits, and in the rapidly accelerating growth of the US national debt, is abetted by the dollar's status as a reserve currency, which has greatly moderated what for any other nation and any other currency would be enormous downward pressure on exchange rates. Thus, the world's faith in the US has served to reward American faithlessness.

Particularly as they have been shielded from some of the worst immediate effects of their profligacy, Americans' lack of fiscal discipline should come as no surprise. It would be hard, however, to make the case that their irresponsibility is owing to something unique in the US national character - particularly as we are currently confronted with the disastrous results of years of Italian self-indulgence, and with the political infantilism of the Greeks, as they riot in the streets against the inevitable results of their own mismanagement, to name but two recent and prominent examples.

No, to understand the core of the problem in the US system one must look deeper, at the nature of the system itself. Those in the Middle East who are currently struggling to democratise their systems of governance would do well to take a hard look to the US model: Not just to copy its positive aspects - and there are many - but to avoid its palpable weaknesses. As I used to note for younger cadres who suffered under my years of management in government, one should not doubt the value of a negative model. For students and proponents of democracy there is much to be learned from the US, even if the nature of those lessons is not always what most Americans would anticipate.

The current US legislative system did not spring forth from the minds of the US' Founding Fathers intact and immutable. Like any system, it evolved over time. Although the US model of governance is a federal one, nominally leaving much authority to the individual states, the story of the US has been one of steady, incremental centralisation of authority at the centre.

Concentrating Power In Washington

To track this, it is necessary to do what mafia prosecutors do: follow the money. Over time, a steadily increasing proportion of tax revenues has flowed to the federal government, at the expense of the states. With that money has come greater authority. Rather than the citizens of the states making spending decisions at the local and provincial level, where their input would be far more direct and the opportunities for abuse, mismanagement and duplication far less, key decisions are more and more frequently made in Washington.

Thus, the money which has flowed from the states is then bequeathed, magnanimously, back to the states. Only now, the uses to which that money is to be put are dictated by, and bureaucratically administered from, the centre. Moreover, free of the balanced-budget constraints which exist in most states, the federal government can dispense largesse, particularly for health, retirement and other large-scale "entitlement" programmes, using money it does not have, for the purpose of expanding and sustaining its own power.

This was not the intent of the framers of the US constitution. Their vision was one of citizen legislators, who would temporarily put aside their careers in business, the professions, or academia, to serve the public good for a time before returning to their communities. Those who originally conceived the US system did not foresee the rise of a permanent class of professional legislators, motivated to ignore the greater good in order to sustain themselves in office.

Polls show conclusively that Americans are greatly concerned with the national debt, even if they disagree strongly about how to cut it. The same polls, unsurprisingly, show popular disdain for a Congress whose political cowardice and fecklessness were so prominently on display during the recent crisis over the US debt ceiling.

Citizens' disdain, however, usually does not extend to their own congressmen. Why? Because in the desperate effort to win federal dollars, an individual congressman's worth is determined not by her ability to change a dysfunctional system, which she can hardly do alone, but by ensuring a fair share for her constituents. Remember, in Washington, congressmen are not citizen-legislators, but professionals. Their influence, measured by their ability to get money for their states and districts, is not determined by merit, but by seniority.

A voter who might otherwise be tempted to send a message to Washington, and to try to change the wasteful and self-serving culture of the Capitol knows that the result of voting his or her congressman out of office will most likely be to gratuitously disadvantage one's own locality in the zero-sum competition for federal money.

Term Limits Needed

An evil genius working alone could not have devised a better system for favouring incumbents, who indeed are consistently shown by election results to be greatly advantaged. The only way to address this systemic weakness and to bring public-spirited responsibility to US governance is to impose a systemic change: That is, to impose term limits on federal legislators.

In 1994, Newt Gingrich, the then newly-elected Republican Speaker of the US House of Representatives, announced a new conservative agenda, designed to bring an outsize federal government to heel. Whether one loved or loathed him and his policies, one would have to concede that he had a thorough understanding of the fundamental dynamics of the US governmental system in which he had grown up.

At the heart of his radical agenda was congressional term limits. Though his supposedly small-government Republican colleagues were forced to support him nominally lest they appear hypocritical, they proved to be every bit as attached to their political careers as were their Democratic colleagues. Gingrich failed to reform Congress; and the record since has demonstrated that fundamental reform of the US congressional system will not come from Congress itself.

The new democrats of the Arab Middle East doubtlessly feel that they have more fundamental concerns at present in trying to win and sustain their fundamental political rights. Painful history has certainly taught them the need for term limits for presidents and other executives. But if they are wise, they will heed the negative model of the US Congress, and ensure that those whom they elect to newly-empowered legislatures reside within a system which aligns the motives of the legislators with those of the people whom whey serve. If the newly-democratised wish to control their destinies over the long term, they need to ensure that their representatives are not only elected by them, but are truly of them.

In the meantime, to the extent that world prosperity is placed at risk by the irresponsibility of the US Congress, all should hope that Americans will be stirred by the current crisis to address one of the manifest shortcomings of their own political culture.

Robert Grenier is a retired, 27-year veteran of the CIA's Clandestine Service. He was Director of the CIA's Counter-Terrorism Center from 2004 to 2006.

Turkey and Egypt: Islam’s Future?

• RD associate editor Haroon Moghul is Executive Director ofThe Maydan Institute, fellow at the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding and teaches at Adelphi University. His work has appeared or he has been otherwise featured on CNN, BBC, History Channel, the New Yorker, and Tikkun.
• - HAROON MOGHUL

Post by HAROON MOGHUL
July 13, 2011 5:34pm
Courtesy Of "Religion Dispatches"

• Islam and Christianity are frequently described as “missionary religions.” Considering that well over half the planet’s population belongs in some way to either tradition, there’s no small truth in that. But Islam’s concern has often been preaching to the already converted; the tradition of tajdid, or renewal, goes hand in hand with islah, or reform.
  Muslims often focus more on making Muslims better Muslims than on making new Muslims. Take the largest Muslim movement in the world, the Tablighi Jama’at; it’s a non-hierarchical movement of Muslims leaving their homes to visit other Muslim communities, encouraging congregations to renew their focus on core Islamic practices. Muslim reformers of all stripes seek to take Islam back to the spirit of the Prophet Muhammad, the embodiment of moral truth and good character—however differently they interpret him. 
  This historical tendency is often picked up by Muslim-majority nations, who pursue similar ends through modern means. These nations try to take the lead in shaping the return of Muslims to more ‘authentic’ expressions of their faith. Often this meant Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan pushing their religious agendas alongside their foreign policy objectives. It made for messy, even ugly, politics, with ideological wars complementing actual wars—and Islamic thought another victim. 
  Saudi Arabia funded madrasas in Pakistan, leading to Iran and Iraq funding madrasas in Pakistan; in generally more benign instances, Egypt dispatched scholars to other Muslim countries, and issued scholarships to bring scholars to study in Egypt. But whatever the specifics, it was hard to see these countries, as they’ve existed over the past few decades, offering models. Who wants to practice Islam like Pakistan, considering where Pakistan as a nation is? Is Saudi Arabia’s vision of a Muslim society actually compelling? 
  But in the last few years, there’s been a new player that combines religious activism, global reach, historical authenticity, and a national model that is genuinely impressive. I’ve spent the last few days meeting folks from a number of civil society organizations in Turkey.
  They’re well-organized. They have fantastic facilities. And they have the desire to push their vision of Islam globally: Eastern Europe and Central Asia where Turks have historical and cultural links respectively, as well as West Africa and South Asia. These aren’t just ordinary organizations, either. There are TV stations, in several languages, private schools, journals and magazines, dialogue projects, and literary festivals.
  I met young Albanians and Macedonians studying Islamic sciences, between themselves fluent in Albanian, Turkish, Arabic, Bulgarian, Macedonian, and English; they’re in Istanbul for general studies and religious sciences, and they’ll complete their undergraduate educations in Turkey. Those who go back to Albania and Macedonia will be reacquainting their homelands with their faith tradition, from which Communism generally distanced them, filtered by a Turkish experience.
  And it’s far broader than just Albania. I came across West Africans studying Qur’an—and speaking Turkish. Tourists from Indonesia, India, Egypt, and other Muslim societies, finding in Istanbul a cultural touchstone, an inspiring mix of the modern and the pious, challenging the traditional players in the politics of Islamic practice. They all come here for a reason; the visibility of Islamic practice a far cry from where the country was even two decades ago.
  Turkey offers something fellow Muslim nations can’t: Access to the West, and the institutional sophistication to be attractive and engaging. But I think there’s another country, too, that will have a new part to play in the changing dynamics of Muslim reform movements. And that’s Egypt. This is something of a forecast, but I see promising conditions ahead.
  Turkey is farther along, in terms of the statistics one often throws out in such discussions, but Egypt has potential advantages, too. Unlike Turkey, Egypt has no imperial legacy to overcome—Arabs and Kurds will always eye Turkey a bit suspiciously. And Egypt, being Arab, has cultural and social authority magnified in other spheres. The most popular Qur’an reciters, for example, are dominantly Egyptian. 
  Let’s hope Egypt develops democratically; in that case, very quickly we’ll see Egypt’s religious culture birth new movements and tendencies which seek to marry their historical religious legitimacy and the energy of their recent revolution. Without a doubt, Egypt has played a key and perhaps unparalleled role in the last two centuries of Middle Eastern Islam, and could do so again, with the added advantage of size and reach.
  In that respect, Turkey and Egypt are less rivals than complements, with common strengths—but different regions of influence. Egypt looks across the band of the middle of the geographic Muslim world; Turkey has historically had a profound impact on Central Asia and the Balkans. They’re also more likely and able to challenge Iran and Saudi Arabia for the authority to speak to Muslims. 
  These are far better places to look to for future directions in Islamic thought and practice. Cairo and Istanbul, for example, will fairly or not overshadow Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta, if only because they’ve been central to the Muslim imagination for longer. And both Cairo and Istanbul are megacities, with robust tourist industries and diverse populations.
  They are, in other words, open to the world, yet old enough to have a confidence in their place in the world. They’re used to folks from all over passing through, and not only for Islamic instruction. They have a very different take on centers of Muslim reform movements in the recent past—places like Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Pakistan, and Iran.
  The democratic structure solidifying in Turkey right now, and just emerging in Egypt (hopefully successfully) will have a deep impact on Islamic reformism across the region; if Egyptian democracy takes hold, it will help elbow out the Islamist movements we’re used to hearing about—narrowly ideological, and often disturbingly politicized—far more quickly than we’re ready to imagine.