Monday, September 16, 2013

YOM KIPPUR, WAR AND THE POWER OF DETERRENCE

Gilad Atzmon writes:
In the last week the Israeli papers have been saturated with articles and commentaries on Yom Kippur and the trauma that never fades away. Ynet and Haaretz both reflect on that event that shook Israel’s confidence and, for the first time, challenged its image of military omnipotence.
Two days ago I came across a very interesting story on Ynet (Hebrew edition). Apparently, just before hostilities began on October 6th 1973, Israel became aware of a vast Soviet delivery of long range Scud missiles to the Egyptian army.  Seemingly, this piece of intelligence deterred Israel from its intention to raid Egyptian governmental and civilian infrastructure in Egyptian cities.
“Three days later, on 9 October, the [Israeli] Air Force (IAF) launched a series of deep raids on Damascus military headquarters in an attempt to put pressure on the Syrian government and leadership. One would expect the IAF to launch similar air raids on Egypt’s capital. Yet despite the Egyptian initial assault, and despite the tremendous pressure exerted by Egyptian armies on the Israeli forces in the Suez Canal, Israel was careful. It was fearful. Policy makers in Israel, headed by Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, repeatedly rejected IDF’s suggestions to conduct deep raids against Egypt. It was the Soviet Scud missiles in Egypt that deterred Israel from conducting such aerial bombardments.”
I guess the meaning of this paragraph is simple yet crucial for the understanding of Israel and its politics. Israel restrained itself from pounding Egypt only because it was aware that the Egyptians had the means to retaliate
In other words, Israeli leaders knew all along that Egypt possessed the capacity to inflict pain to Israel’s cities. 
But it also means that Israel’s enemies: Arab countries, as well as Iran, must pursue every possible means to posses the kind of weaponry that deters Israel.
It seems this is the only way to bring Israeli aggression to an end.   

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