'Syria Owes Hezbollah One'

by-Sami Moubayed
(Syrian political analyst)
December 9, 2005

Damascus--The many people who predicted the demise of Hezbollah after the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon in April have been proved comprehensively wrong. The Shi'ite Resistance Group, far from being weakened, is as strong as ever, and even influencing events in Syria.

Hezbollah's Secretary General Hasan Nasrallah recently emphasized his party's friendship with both Syria and Iran (the patrons of Hezbollah), claiming that they had freed Lebanon from occupation, and calling on all lebanese to establish a similar friendship with Damascus and Tehran.

He said, "Hezbollah's orders do not come from Damascus. Since 1982 we have been friends of Syria and until today do not hide this friendship, nor are we embarrassed by it." He was referring to the many Syrian allies in Lebanon who turned against Damascus after Syria's power in Lebanon began to wane in early 2005.

And far from being embarrassed by the friendship with Syria, Nasrallah has risen to its defense, forcing the circling vultures to back off from the embattled nation.

Since April, Hezbollah had been relatively quiet. On the political front it has participated in the democratic process: it has 14 Deputies in Parliament and Ministers in the Cabinet of Prime Minister Fouad al-Siniora.

On the Resistance Front, the armed group-branded as a terrorist group in many countries-had kept a low profile.

All this changed on November 21 when Hezbollah carried out an operation in the occupied Shebaa farms in South Lebanon. This led to an Israeli reprisal, the injuring of 10 Israeli's and the killing of three members of Hezbollah--it was the most serious incident between Israel and Hezbollah since Israel withdrew its troops from South Lebanon in 2000.

Then, on November 25, Nasrallah delivered an inflammatory speech as his party welcomed to Lebanon the bodies of the three slain combatants. Undaunted by a UN Security Council statement condemning Hezbollah for the violence on the border, he defended the Resistance, saying: "It is not a shame, a crime or terrorist act. It is our right and our duty."

Without coincidence, later that evening a breakthrough was announced from Damascus over the UN Commission charged with investigating the murder of Lebanon's former Prime Minister, Rafik Hariri, in February.

Detlev Mehlis, head of the Commission, had previously met with Syrian officials in Damascus and issued a report in October claiming that Syria, in compliance with Lebanese officials, was involved in the assassination of Hariri, adding that Syrian authorities had not cooperated with the UN team. UN Resolution 1636 followed, calling on Syria to comply with Mehlis or face the consequences of its behavior.

Mehlis demanded that six Syrian officials, reportedly including President Bashar Assad's brother-in-law, General Assef Shawkat, be interrogated in Lebanon. Syria refused and requested that the meeting take place at the Arab League premesis in Cairo or at a UN office in the Syrian Golan Heights.

Mehlis refused to budge, insisting on Lebanon. Then, suddenly, Mehlis started to bend, and agreed that the interrogations could take place in Vienna. Then he bent some more, and Syrian authorities announced that five officials, rather than six, would be questioned by Mehlis. The names were not disclosed, but it is widely believed that the name to have been crossed off the list was that of Shawkat.

The game had dramatically changed. It was Syria that was supposed to cooperate with Mehlis, and not the other way around.

A part of the reason for this change of attitude was the direct intervention of Russian President Vladimir Putin, Saudi King Abdullah and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak.
Behind these highly visible faces, though, was Hezbollah. Nasrallah made it very clear in his speech on November 25, and in the days that preceded it, that Hezbollah was still around and still able to destabilize matters in Lebanon.

The threat of renewed unrest in Lebanon was enough to get the world to recalculate its stance with Hezbollah and ease pressure on the Syrian regime. Hezbollah, after all, has open access to money and logistics from Iran, and it is the only group in Lebanon still to carry weapons since the end of the civil war in 1992.

Politically, Hezbollah's Deputies can veto government decisions in the Cabinet, create trouble from within Parliament, and even walk out on Siniora. They have already threatened to bring the Cabinet down if Siniora insists on Internationalizing the Court that will investigate the suspects of Hariri's murder.

In his speech, Nasrallah was clearly saying that Hezbollah was angry, still allied to Syria, and upset at all the pressure being mounted on Damascus by the United States, Mehlis and the Lebanese government. He wanted to remind the world that it was unwise to pressure Syria too strongly because Hezbollah would not stand and watch in silence.

While many said that Syria's role after its exodus from Lebanon was to save Hezbollah and prevent its disarming, the truth is that Hezbollah does not need the help of Syria. It is Syria that needs the help of Hezbollah. And Syria got it with Nasrallah's "military diplomacy" over the past few weeks.

With the Mehlis report facing scrutiny after one of the witnesses, Hussam Taher Hussam, recanted on his statements which had incriminated the Syrian regime, and Mehlis himself saying that he will step down as head of the United Nations investigation team in January, Syria seems, for the meantime at least, spared from ongoing international pressure.

Apart from remaining strong domestically, Hezbollah has received a fillip with the rise to power of Tehran's allies in Iraq. Men like influential cleric Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq and Prime Minister Ibrahim Jaafari are all favorites of the Mullahs of Tehran.

Although Iran is the US's traditional foe in the Gulf, Iran's allies in Iraq happen to also be America's strongest allies in the country. Upsetting the Shi'ites of Lebanon would enrage the Shi'ites of Iran, and also the Shi'ites of Iraq.

Having the Shi'ites walk out on the post-Saddam Hussein order would destroy the already very shaky system created by the American's since 2003. The US cannot afford to lose a single ally in Iraq. And therefore cannot afford to pressure the Shi'ites of Lebanon, and Hezbollah, too strongly.

Another benefit for Hezbollah was Iran's election of hardline President Mahmud Ahmadinejad this year. He is devoted to the principles of the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and shares a common agenda with Hezbollah in his dislike for America and Israel.

For the time being, Damascus is safe.