Bill Maher Shredded By Glenn Greenwald On US Intervention In Muslim Countries

Courtesy Of Real Time With Bill Maher and HBO,
Glenn Greenwald

Bill Maher is taken apart by Glenn Greenwald for trying to absolve the US from any responsibility for the mass slaughter and destruction in Muslim countries, blaming it on Islamic fundamentalism, as if the Afghanistan and Iraq wars never happened, as if the US wasn't pushing for more war in Iran, as if it isn't intervening in Somalia and Yemen.

“The Foundation Of A Very Oppressive State”

By Fred Kaplan

Jenkins thinks that the U.S. government’s counterterrorism policies—which he’s helped influence over the decades—have gone too far. “What we have put in place,” he said, “is the foundation of a very oppressive state.”

The oppressive state doesn’t yet exist, he said, but if a president wanted to move in that direction, “the tools are in place now.” The choice to do so “could be made under circumstances that appear perfectly reasonable,” he went on, noting, “Democracy does not preclude voluntary submission to despotism. Given a frightened population, Congress can legislate away liberties just as easily as tyrants can seize power. That seems to be what has started to happen.”

Jenkins was, of course, responding to the recent revelations that, for several years now, U.S. intelligence agencies have been mining data from the three major phone companies and nine Internet companies, gaining access to at least the patterns of all telephone calls and Internet traffic.

But Jenkins, who still has close contacts inside the intelligence community, has been concerned about these dangers for most of the past decade, beginning with the hasty passage of the Patriot Act and the subsequent news stories about NSA domestic surveillance outside the purview of Congress or the courts set up by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Congress forced the shutdown of that surveillance program, which was known as Total Information Awareness, and passed new laws, expanding the powers of the FISA courts, so that it could rule not just on individual search warrants but also on massive data-mining expeditions.

SWAT team members stand in front of a house while looking for 19-year-old bombing suspect Dzhokhar A. Tsarnaev, during a door-to-door search on April 19, 2013, in Watertown, Mass.

Photo by Mario Tama/Getty Images

In fact, though, these steps were illusory. “They put in place the principle of oversight,” he said, “but the practical impact—the actual oversight—is less than it was before.”

The problem is what happens incrementally. “What now seems extraordinary is soon accepted as normal, and becomes the baseline for the future,” Jenkins said. “Over a period of time, this baseline shifts, and these new intrusions accumulate and reinforce one another—and that fundamentally changes things.”

“But we’re in a situation now that doesn’t have a finite ending. If there isn’t an end, then these powers accumulate and accumulate and accumulate. This is a fundamental difference. What we put in place becomes a permanent part of the landscape.

“We are driven,” he continued, “ by fears of what might happen, not by things that have happened.” He noted that since Sept. 11, 2001, there have been 42 terrorist plots in the United States. All but four of them were halted. Three of those succeeded and killed a total of 17 people. “Not that this isn’t a tragedy,” he said, “but, really, in a society that has 15–16,000 homicides every year, it isn’t a lot.

“The point,” he said, “is that if we are fearful of what might be, and if there is no visible end to this—you can always fear what might be—then there will be no occasion for reconsidering the measures we’ve put in place.”

Jenkins thinks the occasions should be mandated. It appears that these programs are renewed periodically. After the Guardian reprinted a court document allowing the NSA to mine data from Verizon, Sen. Dianne Feinstein, chairwoman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, revealed that this was a routine renewal of a long-standing program. But Jenkins is bothered that the renewal is so routine. “I don’t know if it’s every year or five years or seven years,” he said, “but somebody should have to come back and say, ‘These are the measures in place, they were useful in the following circumstances.’ Then a choice should be made on whether to keep them in place. The government will always argue that they should be, but at least they should have to make the argument, again and again.”

This means Congress should take its oversight responsibilities more seriously—and the debate should be conducted more broadly, as much of it as possible in public.

What happens if—after a genuine public debate, true congressional oversight, and a FISA court with teeth—it is agreed that all these programs should continue? “Well, if that’s what we want, that’s democracy,” Jenkins said. “The problem now is there’s no structure in place to ensure that this is what we want.”

Back in 1974, in his first monograph on the subject, International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict, Jenkins wrote:

Owing to technological developments and changes in the political environment, power—defined crudely as the capacity to kill, destroy, disrupt, cause alarm, and compel society to divert vast resources to security—is coming into the hands of smaller and smaller groups whose grievances, real or imaginary, it would not always be possible to satisfy. How democracies deal with this, and remain democracies, is one of the major challenges we face in the late twentieth century.

Almost 40 years later, well into the 21st century, he now said, “That’s still the major challenge.”

More Strife In Store For Egypt

By Victor Kotsev
March 30, 2011
Courtesy Of "Asia Times Online"

TEL AVIV - "[There will be] no presidential candidate from the military establishment in upcoming presidential elections," a high-ranking Egyptian military officer assured Reuters two weeks ago. Yet the Egyptian army is gradually but firmly taking control of the country and asserting itself in issues ranging from domestic security to foreign policy.

Similarly, Muslim Brotherhood officials interviewed by CNN asserted that they "want to participate [in], not to dominate" the government, and have promised not to field a presidential candidate. With some reservations, the Brotherhood has backed the idea of a "secular government," and has elected to stay on the sidelines, even as many analysts doubt it will remain there long.

This is something rare and alarming. Neither of two main established forces in Egypt - the military and the Muslim Brotherhood, who have battled each other in different circumstances and ways ever since Gamal Abdel Nasser's 1952 military coup - wants to govern. It is unlikely that they have been infected with popular revolutionary fervor and have decided to throw out good old Machiavellian realpolitik for a utopian political model based on selflessness and broad social consensus. It is possible that one of them - specifically the military - is bluffing. Even more likely, however, is the possibility that they have both concluded that whoever assumes power is doomed.

This has a lot to do with economics. Even the International Monetary Fund, which otherwise painted a rosy picture of the protests and cautiously predicted long-term growth, acknowledged that the immediate future looked bleak. In his article Food and failed Arab states (Asia Times Online, February 1, 2011) David Goldman became one of the first to argue that a long-term upward trend in wheat prices is at the root of popular discontent in Egypt.

"It is unclear whether President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt will survive, or whether his nationalist regime will be replaced by an Islamist, democratic, or authoritarian state," Goldman writes, less than a week after the protests began. "What is certain is that it will be a failed state."

Politically, things don't look very good either. The popular enthusiasm is still strong: observers on the ground note an unprecedented level of social solidarity, a decline in sexual harassment of women, and a general atmosphere of hope and mutual support. However, at the current levels, change is not coming to Egypt nearly as quickly as the protesters may expect.

There are warning signs as well. Some reports indicate that there is also a lot of confusion, paranoia, and opportunism on the ground. According to others, despite the ouster of Mubarak, the old regime is very much alive and well.

Amira Hass, a prominent Israeli journalist with close ties to the Palestinians and the rest of the Arab world, reports from Cairo:

People are now talking about ‘the return of the bullies' - emissaries of the old order who are signaling that they don't intend to go quietly. A meeting between two friends is delayed: there are problems at the workplace of one of the women, which has to do with the opposition to Mubarak. Out of the blue, a swarm of thugs appears, bullying and threatening people. It's been going on for three days already. The phone call was light on details, but others too sense the presence of a real but hidden hand that is attempting to screw things up. There are undeciphered signals that evoke anxiety.

The military may want to divert the responsibility of governing, but it also appears set on holding on to "real" power. "What we see is that while Mubarak is gone, the military regime in which he served has dramatically increased its power," writes prestigious American think-tank Stratfor. 

The generals of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, now in charge of the country, all have ties to the old regime, and are unlikely to execute radical reform. They may be willing to reform the political system, to impose term limits on the presidency, and to relax the emergency laws that have been in place for the last 30 years, but they are unlikely to overturn their broad power base. 
The Egyptian military has integrated itself deeply into Egyptian political, economic, and social life. According to a report, former army officers have "penetrated the media, transportation, the education system, as well as social welfare organizations and humanitarian funds". They and the structures they govern were very much part of how Mubarak's regime functioned, and they are implicated in the creation of the "old order". It is hard to imagine them producing something radically different overnight. 

Moreover, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces shows power ambitions beyond the domestic front. According to a Stratfor report:

Coming out of its own political crisis, Egypt is experiencing a reawakening in the Arab world and appears eager to reassert its influence following years of insularity ... Cairo already has begun using its response to its domestic crisis to reclaim its influence in the Arab world amid regional unrest - the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces of Egypt has publicized the fact that Defense Minister Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi is actively advising high-risk regimes ... In the case of Libya, Egypt is trying to position itself as the regional power that the outside world must rely on to operate in the country.

Judging by all this, it is practically certain that the military will seek to control the next Egyptian government, and that it will be pulling the strings on a lot of, if not most, policies. However, it is also likely that it will choose to do so discreetly, from behind the scenes if possible, because of the danger of popular backlash. 

There are already periodic clashes between a core of committed protesters and soldiers - most recently last Saturday. So far the protests are not violent and not very widespread. But the situation is charged, and given the negative economic trends and the stagnant politics, a new explosion of popular anger is almost guaranteed. 

The Egyptian military is thus treading as carefully as possible. It is quite conceivable that it will try to reduce its public profile by propping up a civilian presidential candidate in hopes that the new government, rather than the military, will absorb the popular anger once disillusionment sets in. 

Incidentally, such a scenario could be acceptable to the Muslim Brotherhood as well, which does not deem itself ready to rule yet, is kept in check by the military, and is probably also worried about the popular discontent. Similarly to the military, the Brotherhood has deep roots inside Egyptian society. It has survived for a long time on the sidelines of politics, and can stay there for a while longer while waiting for the storm to pass. It likely calculates also that this time at least some of the anger will be directed at the army. 

Thus, it is increasingly possible that the third political force in the country, the secular democratic opposition, will get a chance to assume power after an initial transition. It is safe to both the military and the Muslim Brotherhood in that it is the most susceptible to popular mood swings. Its powerbase multiplied quickly, drawing on popular enthusiasm, but it can fade just as quickly, if its leaders fail popular expectations. Once that happens, the old power game between the Brotherhood and the military can resume. 

Notes 

1. An Interview with the Brotherhood, The Mantle, February 2.
2. IMF: Mideast protests could help foster long-term growth, Ha'aretz February 19. Egypt: Persecuting the stars! , Aharq Alawsat February 25. 

Victor Kotsev is a journalist and political analyst based in Tel Aviv. 

(Copyright 2011 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved.)

Egyptian Military Police Torturing Detainees With Tasers

The Islamic Awakening

Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, Jordan, Iraq, etc.

The Coming Clash Between Egypt's Protesters & The Military

The Egyptian Revolution's Coming Face-Off

Post-Mubarak, the country is experiencing a historic moment of unity, but it is entering an unstable period that could leave Egypt a stable democracy, like Turkey, or a chaotic nightmare, like Iraq. Stephen Kinzer on the looming clash between the protesters and the military.

By Stephen Kinzer
Courtesy Of "The Daily Beast"

A dictator's corrupt and repressive rule becomes unbearable as people see that his family intends to hold power forever. A popular movement arises, embracing every layer of society. Finally, unimaginably, the family that has tyrannized its nation for decades is gone. People feel an exhilarating sense of accomplishment and suddenly see limitless possibilities for themselves and their country. Everyone wants the same things: democracy, honest government, and a respectable place in the world. It is a moment of sublime unity rare in history.

That was Nicaragua in 1979. I covered that turbulent year, and saw how quickly the jubilation of victory can fade. In all probability, this month—February 2011—will prove to be the all-time high point for unity among Egyptians. The example of Nicaragua suggests they should enjoy it while they can, because it's likely to dissolve quickly.

The comparison between the two revolutions is not exact. Nicaragua's dynastic dictator, Anastasio Somoza Debayle, was deposed by a guerrilla-led movement, while Hosni Mubarak was toppled after an outburst of peaceful protest. And there is little similarity between a poor, remote country of 3 million and one that has centuries of rich culture, a tradition of regional power, and 85 million people including a substantial middle class. Yet rebellions in Nicaragua and Egypt sprang from the same frustrations and were infused by the same idealistic dreams. The one in Nicaragua has not worked out well; the country is at peace but is as poor and undemocratic as ever.

What happened? Conflicting ideologies fueled by the inexperience of new leaders led to quick polarization. Men in uniform proved unwilling to cede real power to civilians. Ultimately Nicaragua split violently apart. Warring factions sought military aid from outside patrons, and the country became a bloody theater for big-power rivalries. Four years after a revolution that at least 90 percent of Nicaraguans supported, the country was in civil war.

Equivalent dangers await Egypt. The dictator is gone, but the political and economic structures he built remain largely intact. How much power the army is willing to surrender to civilians is not at all clear. There will be intense debate over policy toward Israel and, by extension, the United States. Habits of democracy are unformed. Civil society is weak, and there are few organized groups other than the Muslim Brotherhood.

Egypt is free of Mubarak, but for now it is still just a poor Middle Eastern country ruled by a junta of geriatric soldiers. If there is to be a revolution, it has not yet happened.

Demonstrators celebrate in Tahrir Square in Cairo, Egypt, Friday Feb. 18, 2011. (Photo by Hussein Malla / AP Photo)

For best-case and worst-case scenarios of Egypt's future, it is only necessary to look around the neighborhood. If all goes swimmingly well, Egypt could become an Arab version of Turkey: an open democracy with a capitalist economy, fundamentally pro-West although strongly opposed to U.S. policies in the Middle East, and governed by observant Muslims who reserve a place for religion in public life. That's the best outcome for which outsiders can dare to hope.

The other extreme is Iraq. Sectarian divides are not as pronounced in Egypt as in Iraq, but in both countries, long stagnation has prevented the emergence of any shared vision of national goals or identity. Egyptians may soon become frustrated by perceived betrayals of this year's uprising. Some powerful forces might see benefits in promoting instability. If Egypt makes a peaceful transition to democracy, for example, the army's power will inevitably fade. Chaos, however, always gives armies a good excuse to stay in power.

A peaceful transition to democracy in Egypt would also lead people in other Arab countries to conclude that they face a choice between autocracy or freedom. Dictators, however, want them to conclude something different: that the choice is between autocracy and terror. Fomenting terror in Egypt would help them make their point—and stay in power.

All three of the Middle East's powerful religious regimes have an interest in seeing Egypt stumble. For Saudi Arabia and Israel, a peaceful, democratic Egypt would be a potent rival for Washington's affection. For Iran, it would threaten dreams of regional hegemony. All three will cheer quietly if Egypt drifts toward the abyss of instability. They may even nudge it along.

Domestic conflicts that escalate into proxy wars fueled by powerful outsiders: This spiral destroyed national unity in Nicaragua, and, more recently, in Iraq. It now threatens Egypt.

Debates over the role of the army will soon challenge the national unity that now holds Egyptians in its fickle embrace. People realize that the army is essential for a peaceful transition, but they also want to reduce its power. Already they are demanding that the Mubarak regime's corrupt business structures be dismantled, but this would strike directly at the army, which built a dense web of investments with Mubarak and his inner circle. In addition, Egyptian generals have warm relationships with their American and Israeli counterparts, and will resist demands for radical changes in Egypt's policy toward Israel.

History presents few examples of military overlords meekly retiring to their barracks in the face of growing civilian power. The encouraging counterexample is Turkey, where over the last decade voters have dramatically cut military power and the generals have grudgingly allowed themselves to be marginalized. Even that process, though, took a generation to develop.

At least Egyptian generals have experience in politics. The same cannot be said for many of the politicians, entrepreneurs, trade unionists, students, farmers, women, religious fundamentalists, and others who will emerge in the coming months to present their competing visions of a new Egypt. It is a volatile menagerie and will be cacophonous.

In Egypt, the army finally turned on Mubarak because it saw that sacrificing him was necessary to save the ruling system. The hundreds of thousands who filled Tahrir Square, however, want to wipe away that system. Or do they? People's shared goals in the wake of revolution are vague and diffuse. The astonishing unity that emerges at these rare moments is only a unanimous rejection of the old regime. It reflects no consensus about what comes next.

Two groups in Egypt believe they toppled Mubarak. Demonstrators think he fell before their numbers and moral power. Military commanders, however, believe the credit is theirs; they staged a coup to prevent a dynastic transition, using the protests as a convenient excuse. These groups have conflicting agendas and will soon face off.

Egypt is free of Mubarak, but for now it is still just a poor Middle Eastern country ruled by a junta of geriatric soldiers. If there is to be a revolution, it has not yet happened. Generals will try to make sure it doesn't. That may bring protesters back to Tahrir Square. Egypt is entering an unstable period. Turkey is its dream. Nicaragua and Iraq are its nightmares.

Stephen Kinzer is an award-winning foreign correspondent. His new book is Reset: Iran, Turkey and America's Future.

For The Love Of Liberty

Courtesy Of "Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr."

When the Egyptian protests first broke out, most Americans celebrated. Though Mubarak’s military must still be circumvented or overthrown, the revolt has spread, like a cleansing fire, to Bahrain, Libya, Iraq, Iran, Yemen, Jordan, and beyond.

What is all this all about? Thanks to Western rule since WWI, this is a region of dictators and domination. Regardless of the spark, that is the issue. This might just be an old story and exactly what it appears to be: a struggle between the liberty of the people and the criminal power of the State.

Somehow, however, this is not obvious to many conservatives. Never mind that the people are denouncing the dictators, the jails, the political persecutions, the torturing and brutality, the disappearances and murders, and demanding the freedom to speak, publish, and live. Surely there must be some nefarious plot behind it all.

The liberty theme was clear enough in Egypt. Here we had multitudes of educated, young, tech-savvy, pro-freedom activists taking a brave stand against a national socialist dictator of 30 years – and the bad guy lost, thereby giving hope to all peoples in the world who struggle against tyranny. The role of the military in the future of the country is still up in the air, and who doubts that another government will have to be overthrown again in the future? Still, victory is victory.

The parallels with 1989 and with 1776 were impossible to miss. Anyone who loves Jefferson, Bastiat, and Rothbard had to feel a mighty rush, a sense that the flame of freedom will never, ever be extinguished. If it can happen there, it can happen anywhere, including in Washington, DC.

A Pew Research study confirmed intense American public interest in this Egyptian story. It was the biggest foreign policy story in four years – bigger than any natural disaster or any US war. The story even overwhelmed domestic news. From an American popular perspective, there is nothing quite as thrilling as seeing a people stand up to a brutal dictator – and having it end—though there is much more to do – the right way.

This story is embedded deep within our own civic culture, with our own revolt against empire. The themes of the revolt – liberty, human rights, justice – are our themes, beautiful evidence of the way the American experience has been a light to the world, despite 20^th-century deviations. And if you were watching the live coverage, especially Al Jazeera, it was clear that freedom, in exactly the way we understand that term, was the theme. The Declaration of Independence was quoted in placards. Speakers mentioned Patrick Henry. This was the memory of the American revolution revived in the old world.

Just as commentators and intellectuals have trouble understanding liberty as a theme in domestic politics, some people just can’t get it in foreign policy. I noticed a strange lack of celebration on many conservative blogs and sites. There is far more hand-wringing about "instability" than cheers for the people.

If the Egyptian case is any indication, we can look forward to more fretting and puzzling and even opposition from the American right. The angst-filled view on Egypt began with Glenn Beck, the most influential voice on the tea-party right, a man who last year celebrated Hayek’s Road to Serfdom and put it on the bestseller list.

In a YouTube video, he warned that these revolts were not what they seemed. They are really the working out of a conspiracy of Muslim fanatics insufficiently appreciative of the US-installed and maintained dictator. It was shockingly clear: he supported the regime over the people, the US empire over self-determination. From his account, one would think that a protest for liberty was terrorism. Which may give us some indication of what terrorism means to him and others like him.

Following Beck, there was a rising ethos on the American right that looked down on the protests, regretting them and even hoping for a full-scale and murderous crackdown. At the CPAC convention on the very weekend that Mubarak fell, Ron Paul was the only major speaker to even address the subject, much less celebrate the freedom movement.

At the bottom of the heap was Ann Coulter at CPAC, who expressed no love for the Egyptian people. She was specifically asked about the reality that the Mubarak regime was jailing journalists. Her response: "I think there should be more jailed journalists." 

The audience cheered.

Michael Barone of National Review put it bluntly: "most of us would probably prefer to have seen a victory of people power in Tehran or Pyongyang than in Cairo. Mubarak’s Egypt was an ally of the United States."

In holding these opinions, the conservatives are echoing the same absence of joy found in the regimes of Algeria, Libya, and Morocco – other governments that are wholly owned by the CIA and worry about what a freedom uprising would mean for them.

For many people on the right, Islam is the new communism, the bugaboo that we must fear above all else. They see its wickedness everywhere. It’s gone so far that many people cannot recognize the just aspirations of an Islamic people to be free of dictatorship. The message of Beck, Coulter, and others, seems to be that the best thing for these people is US-imposed totalitarianism.

It is true that freedom is not certain to bloom in the post-protest world. Sometimes freedom comes in stages. Sometimes a worse regime can replace a bad one. But it is always an occasion to celebrate when the tyrant is overthrown. It is always a blow for liberty – no matter that the brutal State in question is officially supported by the US government.

For some sixty years, there has been a deep fissure in what is called the American right. There are those who believe in liberty. And there are those who believe in the American imperial State. They are not the same. Indeed, they are in opposition. These events underscore the serious difference, to the point that many spokesmen among the conservative movement can’t even recognize the legitimate aspirations of a people not to be ruled by a dictator in power for decades. The reality highlights the lie that these people believe in liberty as versus government power.

The same fissure on a more philosophical level is summed up as the debate between liberty and order. The right has gone back and forth on this subject for many decades. But the discussion becomes less abstract in a case where millions suffer under despotism. To favor order over liberty here meant to crack skulls and massacre people to keep an illegitimate regime in power for the Pentagon.

In a world in which the last superpower is losing control – and the sooner the better – American conservatives will have to make a choice. Do they favor freedom? Or do they favor the global military state? Fess up, fellows. You have to make the choice.

February 18, 2011

Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr. [send him mail], former editorial assistant to Ludwig von Mises and congressional chief of staff to Ron Paul, is founder and chairman of the Mises Institute, executor for the estate of Murray N. Rothbard, and editor of LewRockwell.com. See his books.

Copyright © 2011 by LewRockwell.com. Permission to reprint in whole or in part is gladly granted, provided full credit is given.

The Best of Lew Rockwell

THE REAL EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION IS YET TO COME

Mamdouh Habib


In his memoirs, Habib recounted one torture session of electric shocks, broken fingers and being hung from meat hooks that culminated in being slapped so hard that his blindfold flew off—-revealing Suleiman as the purveyor of the violence.

By George Katsiaficas
February 18, 2011
Courtesy Of "Intifada-Palestine"

Around the world, people are enthusiastically greeting the “Egyptian Revolution”—the astonishing victory won by the historic 18-day People Power Uprising. As events move more rapidly than anyone can anticipate, not only has Mubarak been deposed, his corrupt parliament has been dismissed and new elections promised within six months. People’s ecstasy in the aftermath of these great victories belies the fact that Mubarak’s authoritarian system remains intact—nay, strengthened—by the ascension of Suleiman and the military to supreme power in Cairo. While the world hails the Egyptian “revolution,” a more sober assessment of recent events would question the accuracy of that label, at least for now.

If we look at other countries for comparison (and there are many recent examples of People Power Uprisings suddenly ending the reign of longstanding authoritarian regimes), I am especially struck by parallels with Korea’s 1987 June Uprising, when for 19 consecutive days, hundreds of thousands of people illegally went into the streets and battled tens of thousands of riot police to a standstill. On June 29, the military dictatorship finally capitulated to the opposition’s demands to hold direct presidential elections, thereby ending 26 years of military rule.

As in Egypt on February 11, 2011, the man who made the announcement in Seoul on June 29, 1987 was none other than the dictatorship’s No. 2 leader. Roh Tae-woo went on to become the country’s new president after elections marked by both a bitter split between rival progressive candidates and widespread allegations of ballot tampering. People’s high expectations and optimism after the military was forced to grant elections turned into bitter disappointment. Throughout the country, new massive mobilizations were organized, during which more than a dozen young people committed suicide to spur forward the movement for change.

Like Suleiman, Roh was a long-time US asset with ties to a list of nefarious deeds. In 1996, Roh and his predecessor Chun Doo-hwan were convicted of high crimes, sent to prison, and ultimately ordered to return hundreds of millions of dollars they had illegally garnered. (Roh eventually returned around $300 million; Chun deceitfully pleaded poverty and, although thereby dishonored, he absconded with even more than that amount of Korea’s wealth.)

Omar Suleiman

Roh was never linked to any direct act of sadism, but Suleiman is known to have personally participated in the torture of CIA rendered terrorist suspects. As “the CIA’s Man in Cairo,” he helped design and implement the American rendition program through which dozens of suspected terrorists were kidnapped, imprisoned and tortured. Suleiman took a personal hand in the torture of Australian citizen Mamdouh Habib. In his memoirs, Habib recounted one torture session of electric shocks, broken fingers and being hung from meat hooks that culminated in being slapped so hard that his blindfold flew off—-revealing Suleiman as the purveyor of the violence.

While Habib was innocent, another rendered suspect, Ibn al-Sheikh al-Libi, confessed to participation in training anti-US fighters and famously asserted under torture that ties existed between al-Queda and Saddam’s government in Iraq. That lie became one of Colin Powell’s most significant assertions to the UN Security Council when the US convinced much of the world to attack Iraq. When al-Libi later recanted and threatened to expose his lie, he “committed suicide” in a Libyan prison—coincidentally at the same time as Suleiman made his first ever visit to Tripoli.

For his extraordinary efforts on behalf of the US, Suleiman found his fortunes rise. Thanks to WikiLeaks, we know today that almost three years ago, the US was prepared to elevate him to the top slot in Egypt. According to a US diplomatic cable of May 14, 2007, entitled “Presidential Succession in Egypt,” Suleiman was to be named vice-president (as occurred on January 29, 2011).

The chief of the Egyptian armed forces, Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, like Suleiman and Mubarak, is a regime insider with long ties to the Pentagon. One U.S. Embassy cable released by WikiLeaks noted that, “Tantawi has opposed both economic and political reforms that he perceives as eroding central government power.” While Suleiman and Tantawi are clearly cut from the same cloth as Mubarek, my objection is not simply to these men but to the system they embody. For a genuine revolution to take place, Suleiman and his kind must be driven from power—even punished for their crimes—not elevated to the highest levels of government.

What the masses of Egyptians want is freedom from dictatorship and foreign domination. They want the right to participate in their own government and to do so freely, with a free press, and in a society where civil liberties are guaranteed. They want an end to the country’s poverty and to take back the mountain of wealth stolen by the super-rich.

As it seems that Korea’s democratization might hold possible lessons for Egypt, so might the Philippines in 1986. Less than a year after the first “People Power Revolution” sent long-time dictator Ferdinand Marcos into exile, Corazon Aquino’s new government shot to death 21 landless farmers who marched in Manila to demand she keep her promises for land reform. The Philippines today is plagued by increasing hunger, and more than three million children are underweight and underheight. In 1973, students in Thailand overthrew a hated military dictatorship after 77 people were gunned down in the streets of Bangkok. After a two-year hiatus, one of the most free periods in the history of Thailand, the military bloodily reimposed dictatorship and killed dozens of students. In Nepal in 1990, fifty days of popular protests during which 62 citizens were killed won a constitutional monarchy, but within a few years, the royal family again seized absolute power. A 19-day People Power Uprising in 2006 ended the monarchy altogether, but only after 21 more unarmed civilians had been killed by the forces of order.

No one can anticipate the outcome of what has been set in motion in Egypt, but historical antecedents may provide insight into possible outcomes. Will the blood of the 300 murdered citizens in Egypt, like the hundreds of martyrs of the 1980 Gwangju Uprising, water the tree of liberty? Or will their sacrifice grease the wheels as US banks and global corporations rush to replace “crony capitalism” with ever more profitable arenas for wealthy investors?

Young activists in Cairo remain camped in Tahrir Square—for now at least—where they have already had to stand up to the army’s attempt to clear them out. Remaining steadfast, they are calling for substantive reforms—for a new system and democracy worthy of the name. Even with Mubarak gone, so long as his military commanders and chief of intelligence remain in power, nothing like a revolution can be said to have transpired in Egypt.

For that to be said, rather than celebrating their victory from high positions of power, Suleiman and his buddies should themselves be guests in the very prisons where they were previously hosts. The full turning of the wheel of justice—a revolution in the true sense of the word—demands nothing less. The sites where Suleiman tortured Habib and al-Lidi should become public museums open to ordinary Egyptians to sadly recount the country’s decades of suffering under the US-backed dictatorship of Mubarak. Instead, unless the movement continues to propel the country forward, Suleiman’s torture chambers may be destined to be used against young activists whose only crime is to insist upon making reality what is today claimed by nearly everyone—a revolution in Egypt.

George Katsiaficas, whose mother was born in Cairo, is a professor of humanities at Wentworth Institute of Technology in Boston. He is currently completing Asia’s Unknown Uprisings, a study of recent People Power uprisings.