Israel's Secret Uranium Buy

How Argentina Fueled Ben-Gurion's Nuclear Program.

BY WILLIAM BURR and AVNER COHEN

In mid-July 1964, the State Department and the CIA sent a joint message asking the U.S. embassies in Argentina and Israel to check out an unverified intelligence report. They wanted to know whether the Argentines had agreed to sell Israel some 80-100 tons of uranium oxide, or "yellowcake," an essential product for fueling a nuclear reactor and thereby producing plutonium that can be used in weapons.

As it turned out, Washington had gotten information about the sale from the British government, which in turn had found out about it from the Canadians. All three governments were concerned about Israel's nuclear weapons ambitions, and the yellowcake transaction was strong evidence that something was amiss. American diplomats in Argentina confirmed the sale, which soon put the State Department in an awkward position: It would have to ask the Israelis about a transaction that flew in the face of their assurances that the country's nuclear program was for peaceful purposes only.

Israel's nuclear program presents a sort of paradox to historians. While it may be the world's worst-kept secret, it is also the world's most opaque nuclear program. One aspect of the Israeli nuclear program that has been especially mysterious is how and where Israel was able to obtain the raw material required to sustain a serious weapons effort. In the 1960s, this was a real challenge for U.S. intelligence, which was not entirely clear about the purposes of the Israeli program or whether Israel would comply with its "peaceful use only" pledge. It remains a challenge for historians today because Israel still does not acknowledge that it has nuclear weapons.

Previously obscure declassified archival documents on the yellowcake sale shed light on the global context of the Israeli nuclear program's early history. Edited and annotated by the two of us, 42 documents are being published today for the first time by the National Security Archive and the Nuclear Proliferation International History Project (in conjunction with the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies). They demonstrate how vigorously Israel sought raw materials for its nuclear program and how persistently it tried to cultivate relations with nuclear suppliers. They also tell us how other players -- in particular the United States, Britain, and Canada -- viewed the program.

The story of the Argentine yellowcake sale to Israel has remained largely untold because Israel has gone to great lengths to keep it secret and because the U.S. government and its close allies have kept quiet about what they knew at the time. The United States has always been ambivalent about Israel's nuclear program, and exposing what it knew or suspected about the Israeli nuclear program could have caused the United States serious diplomatic problems with Israel's Arab neighbors and possibly the Soviet Union. This limited what Washington could do to circumscribe Israel's nuclear ambitions. Any kind of serious economic or political pressures, even if only contemplated by some, would have become public. And that could have been explosive domestically and internationally.

The U.S. government had been worried about an Israeli nuclear weapons program since late-1960, when the CIA learned and confirmed that, for nearly two years, Israel had been constructing a major nuclear facility (a reactor plus related infrastructure), with French assistance, near the town of Dimona in the Negev Desert. Initially, in support of Israel's desire to establish a nuclear program with military potential, the French apparently agreed to provide Israel with reactor fuel under loose safeguards. Under Charles De Gaulle, however, French policy changed, and it appears that by 1963, when the reactor was near completion, France imposed major constraints on supplying uranium to Dimona.

The Israelis had been trying to extract uranium from phosphate but that proved too costly; they needed a source that they could use freely, without external safeguards. South Africa was a prospective source. The French themselves recognized that Israel could try to acquire uranium from other countries, such as Argentina or Belgium, and in early 1964 they asked Washington whether the Israelis had "tapped" any such sources.

The Canadian government was interested in the Israeli nuclear program from its very inception. When Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion met Prime Minister John Diefenbaker on May 25, 1961, Dimona was at the center of the discussion. As he did with President John Kennedy a few days later, Ben-Gurion pledged that the Dimona project was peaceful. In March 1964, Canadian intelligence analyst Jacob Koop prepared a long secret report on Israel's nuclear program, asserting that Israel had all of the "prerequisites for commencing a modest nuclear weapons development project."

Not long after this report was prepared, Canadian intelligence learned (from a still-unknown source) that the Argentine government had made arrangements to supply 80-100 tons of yellowcake to Israel. By the end of April 1964, the British had seen the Canadian report. According to a British diplomat, "This means that Israel now has virtually unlimited supplies of uranium free of safeguards." Moreover, if the Israelis had reprocessing facilities, they could produce enough plutonium to "fuel a nuclear bomb" 18-20 months from the beginning of 1964.

The British soon shared the Canadian report with U.S. intelligence, overcoming Canadian reluctance to share it with its neighbors to the south (apparently the Canadians were irritated that the United States would not share the results of a recent American visit to Dimona). The CIA was initially skeptical, but in June 1964, the State Department and the CIA decided that the story should be checked out and sent the query -- reproduced below -- to its embassies in both Argentina and Israel. In September, the U.S. embassy in Buenos Aires confirmed from local sources that during 1963 Israel had arranged to purchase 80 tons of yellowcake from Argentina.

Evidently, the United States took seriously the information it obtained about the Argentine yellowcake sale. Like its British and Canadian allies, Washington was concerned that an Israeli bomb would threaten stability in the Middle East and complicate American efforts to curb nuclear proliferation worldwide. Moreover, to ensure that the Israelis were abiding by their public pledge that the Dimona facility was for "peaceful" use only, Kennedy and Prime Minister Levi Eshkol had secretly agreed in the summer of 1963 to allow American scientists to visit the reactor. The first U.S. team arrived in Dimona in early January 1964, but it is now known that the Israelis made "special arrangements" to prevent the visitors from seeing anything that revealed the true nature of the project.

William Burr is a senior analyst at the National Security Archive, and Avner Cohen is professor of nonproliferation studies at the Monterey Institute for International Studies and a senior fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. The authors would like to thank Ronen Bergman, Matthew Bunn, Marvin Miller, Olli Heinonen, and Sandy Spector for their helpful suggestions.

Israel Has Chemical Weapons, Too!

By Matthew M. Aid

It is almost universally believed in intelligence circles here in Washington that Israel possesses a stockpile of several hundred fission nuclear weapons, and perhaps even some high-yield thermonuclear weapons. Analysts believe the Israeli government built the nuclear stockpile in the 1960s and 1970s as a hedge against the remote possibility that the armies of its Arab neighbors could someday overwhelm the Israeli military. But nuclear weapons are not the only weapon of mass destruction that Israel has constructed.

Reports have circulated in arms control circles for almost 20 years that Israel secretly manufactured a stockpile of chemical and biological weapons to complement its nuclear arsenal. Much of the attention has been focused on the research and development work being conducted at the Israeli government's secretive Israel Institute for Biological Research at Ness Ziona, located 20 kilometers south of Tel Aviv.

According to the document, American spy satellites uncovered in 1982 "a probable CW [chemical weapon] nerve agent production facility and a storage facility... at the Dimona Sensitive Storage Area in the Negev Desert. Other CW production is believed to exist within a well-developed Israeli chemical industry."

"While we cannot confirm whether the Israelis possess lethal chemical agents," the document adds, "several indicators lead us to believe that they have available to them at least persistent and nonpersistent nerve agents, a mustard agent, and several riot-control agents, marched with suitable delivery systems."

Whether Israel still maintains this alleged stockpile is unknown. In 1992, the Israeli government signed but never ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention, which bans such arms. (The Israeli embassy in Washington did not respond to requests to comment on this article.) The CIA estimate, a copy of which was sent to the White House, also shows that the U.S. intelligence community had suspicions about this stockpile for decades, and that the U.S. government kept mum about Israel's suspected possession of chemical weapons just as long.

These facts were recently discovered by a researcher -- a friend of mine who wishes to remain anonymous -- at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library in California. He had found, stapled to an innocuous unclassified report, a single page that someone in the White House had apparently removed from his or her copy of a secret September 15, 1983 CIA Special National Intelligence Estimate entitled Implications of Soviet Use of Chemical and Toxin Weapons for US Security Interests.

Ordinarily this 30-year-old intelligence estimate would have attracted only passing interest from researchers because much of the report, which dealt primarily with unproven allegations of Soviet use of chemical and biological weapons in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia, had been largely declassified in 2009 and can now be found in the CREST database of declassified CIA documents at the College Park, Maryland research facility of the National Archives. But while the CIA was willing to declassify those portions of the report that deal with the U.S.S.R. and some of its client states -- including Syria -- it was far less willing to release any information about the chemical weapons activities of countries outside the Soviet Bloc. The censors at the CIA deleted from the version of the document that was released to the National Archives almost all information related to the Middle East, including long-declassified material about Saddam Hussein's chemical weapons program in Iraq.

But what makes the single page found at the Reagan Library so explosive is that it contains the complete and unredacted portion of the intelligence estimate that details what the CIA thought it knew back in 1983 about Israel's work on chemical weapons, which the CIA's censors had carefully excised from the version released to the National Archives in 2009.

The estimate shows that in 1983 the CIA had hard evidence that Israel possessed a chemical weapons stockpile of indeterminate size, including, according to the report, "persistent and non-persistent nerve agents." The persistent nerve agent referred to in the document is not known, but the non-persistent nerve agent in question was almost certainly sarin. That is believed to be the Assad regime's chemical weapon of choice -- and the agent used on the morning of August 21, 2013 to strike rebel-controlled or contested neighborhoods in the eastern suburbs of Damascus. The Obama administration says that attack killed over 1,400 innocent civilians, mostly women and children. On Sunday, the Israeli defense minister, Moshe Ya'alon, blasted Assad for "crudely us[ing] chemical weapons against his own citizens."

The CIA report is vague as to why Israel decided to secretly build its own stockpile of chemical weapons given that Israel was widely suspected at the time of having a small but potentially lethal stockpile of nuclear weapons. Israeli historian Avner Cohen, in his 1988 book Israel and the Bomb, wrote that Israeli Prime Minister David Ben Gurion secretly ordered that a stockpile of chemical weapons be built at about the time of the 1956 war between Israel and Egypt. The CIA, on the other hand, believed that Israel did not begin work on chemical weapons until either the late 1960s or the early 1970s.

According to the 1983 intelligence estimate, "Israel, finding itself surrounded by frontline Arab states with budding CW [chemical weapons] capabilities, became increasingly conscious of its vulnerability to chemical attack. Its sensitivities were galvanized by the capture of large quantities of Soviet CW-related equipment during both the 1967 Arab-Israeli and the 1973 Yom Kippur wars. As a result, Israel undertook a program of chemical warfare preparations in both offensive and protective areas."

Israeli concerns about Egypt and other Arab states possessing chemical weapons were legitimate. Documents discovered at the National Archives confirm that the Egyptian military had possessed a large stockpile of mustard gas since the early 1960s and had demonstrated that it was not afraid to use these weapons. A declassified May 23, 1967 intelligence assessment found at the National Archives reveals that Egyptian forces first began using mustard gas bombs against Saudi-backed royalist rebel forces in what was then known as North Yemen as early as 1963. According to a January 15, 1968 CIA report, U.S. intelligence learned in early 1967 that Egyptian Soviet-made Tu-16 bombers had dropped bombs filled with nerve agents on rebel positions in Yemen, marking the first time that nerve agents had ever been used in combat. And according to a May 20, 1967 top secret White House memorandum found at the National Archives, the Israelis sent Washington an intelligence report stating that Israeli intelligence had observed "canisters of [poison] gas" with Egyptian troops stationed along the Israeli border in the Sinai Peninsula.

The 1983 CIA estimate reveals that U.S. intelligence first became aware of Israeli chemical weapons-testing activities in the early 1970s, when intelligence sources reported the existence of chemical weapons test grids, which are specially instrumented testing grounds used to measure the range and effectiveness of different chemical agents, particularly nerve agents, in simulated situations and in varying climatic conditions. It is almost certain that these testing grids were located in the arid and sparsely populated Negev Desert, in southern Israel.

But the CIA assessment suggests that the Israelis accelerated their research and development work on chemical weapons following the end of the 1973 Yom Kippur War. According to the report, U.S. intelligence detected "possible tests" of Israeli chemical weapons in January 1976, which, again, almost certainly took place somewhere in the Negev Desert. A former U.S. Air Force intelligence officer whom I interviewed recalled that at about this time, the National Security Agency captured communications showing that Israeli air force fighter-bombers operating from Hatzerim Air Base outside the city of Beersheba in southern Israel had been detected conducting simulated low-level chemical weapons delivery missions at a bombing range in the Negev Desert.

The U.S. intelligence community was paying an extraordinary amount of attention to Israel in the 1970s, according to a retired CIA analyst I spoke with who studied the region at the time. The possible January 1976 Israeli chemical weapons test occurred a little more than two years after the end of the 1973 war, an event that had shocked the Israeli political and military establishment because it demonstrated for the first time that the Arab armies were now capable of going toe-to-toe on the battlefield with the Israeli military.

To complicate things further, in January 1976 the long-simmering civil war in Lebanon was beginning to heat up. And the CIA was increasingly concerned about the growing volume of evidence, much of it coming from human intelligence sources inside Israel, indicating that the Israeli nuclear weapons stockpile was growing both in size and raw megatonnage. At the same time that all this was happening, the Israeli "chemical weapons" test mentioned in CIA document occurred. It increased the already-heightened level of concern within the U.S. intelligence community about what the Israelis were up to.

In March 1976, two months after the Israeli test in question, a number of newspapers in the U.S. published stories which quoted CIA officials to the effect that Israel possessed a number of nuclear weapons. The leak was based on an authorized off-the-record briefing of newspaper reporters by a senior CIA official in Washington, who intimated to the reporters that Israel was also involved in other activities involving weapons of mass destruction, but refused to say anything further on the subject. The CIA official was likely referring to the agency's belief that the Israelis may have conducted a chemical weapons test in January 1976. According to a declassified State Department cable, Israeli foreign minister Yigal Allon called in the U.S. ambassador to Israel and registered a strong protest about the story, reiterating the official Israeli government position that Israel did not possess nuclear weapons. After the protest, all further public mention of Israeli WMD activities ceased and the whole subject was quickly and quietly forgotten. 

But in the years that followed the CIA and the rest of the U.S. intelligence community kept their eyes and ears focused on what the Israelis were secretly up to in the Negev Desert.

It was not until 1982, according to the CIA estimate, that U.S. intelligence got its first big break. On June 6, 1982, 20,000 Israeli troops invaded Lebanon in an effort to destroy the guerrilla forces loyal to Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leader Yasser Arafat. The Israeli troops swept northwards against weak resistance from PLO and Syrian forces, capturing a large portion of the Lebanese capital of Beirut and cutting off what was left of Arafat's forces inside the besieged city by mid-June. As of the end of the year, there were still an estimated 15,000 Israeli troops occupying all of southern Lebanon.

At some point in late 1982, as the Reagan administration strove with minimal success to get the Israeli government to withdraw its forces from Lebanon, American spy satellites discovered what the 1983 CIA intelligence described as "a probable CW nerve agent production facility and a storage facility ... at the Dimona Sensitive Storage Area in the Negev Desert."

The CIA report, however, provides no further elucidation about the size or production capacity of the newly discovered Israeli nerve agent production facility near Dimona, or even where the so-called "Dimona Sensitive Storage Area" was located.

At my request, a friend of mine who retired years ago from the U.S. intelligence community began systematically scanning the available cache of commercial satellite imagery found on the Google Maps website, looking for the mysterious and elusive Israeli nerve agent production facility and weapons storage bunker complex near the city of Dimona where Israel stores its stockpile of chemical weapons.

It took a little while, but the imagery search found what I believe is the location of the Israeli nerve agent production facility and its associated chemical weapons storage area in a desolate and virtually uninhabited area of the Negev Desert just east of the village of al-Kilab, which is only 10 miles west of the outskirts of the city of Dimona. The satellite imagery shows that the heavily protected weapons storage area at al-Kilab currently consists of almost 50 buried bunkers surrounded by a double barbed-wire-topped fence and facilities for a large permanent security force. I believe this extensive bunker complex is the location of what the 1983 CIA intelligence estimate referred to as the Dimona Sensitive Storage Area.

If you drive two miles to the northeast past the weapons storage area, the satellite imagery shows that you run into another heavily guarded complex of about 40 or 50 acres. Surrounded again by a double chain-link fence topped with barbed wire, the complex appears to consist of an administrative and support area on the western side of facility. The eastern side of the base, which is surrounded by its own security fence, appears to consist of three large storage bunkers and a buried production and/or maintenance facility. Although not confirmed, the author believes that this may, in fact, be the location of the Israeli nerve agent production facility mentioned in the 1983 CIA report.

This all may be a tempest in a teacup. It is possible that at some point over the past 30 years the Israelis may have disposed of their stockpile of mustard gas and nerve agents. These weapons need constant maintenance, they require massive amounts of security, and the cost for the upkeep of this stockpile must be extraordinarily high. Still, the Israeli government has a well-known penchant for preserving any asset thought to be needed for the defense of the state of Israel, regardless of the cost or possible diplomatic ramifications.

1NIE on Israeli Chemical Weapons by JDStuster

2Sanitized NIE by JDStuster

3Warning on Egypt by JDStuster

4Report on Egypt Using Chemical Weapons by JDStuster

5CIA Assessment of Israeli and Egyptian Capabilities by JDStuster

6CIA Report That Israel is Known to Produce Chemical Weapons by JDStuster

Matthew M. Aid is the author of Intel Wars: The Secret History of the Fight Against Terror and The Secret Sentry: The Untold History of the National Security Agency.

Prepare The Nukes For Action

Golda Meir and Moshe Dayan in the Knesset. 

This week, Dr. Avner Cohen, a researcher specializing in the history of Israel’s nuclear program, made public a video of an interview he conducted last decade with Arnon (“Sini”) Azaryahu, confidant and aide to Yisrael Galili, a man of many secrets, minister in several governments and one of Golda Meir’s closest advisers; the video will appear on the Wilson Center’s website from Saturday.

In the interview, held at Azaryahu’s home on Kibbutz Yiron, he recalled the lunch he was supposed to have with Galili on October 7, the second day of the war, the day Defense Minister Moshe Dayan coined the phrase “the destruction of the Third Temple” and uttered other despairing statements. Lunch was delayed; the nuclear question was on the menu. The cabinet discussion of the war, with the participation of Meir, Dayan, Galili, Yigal Alon and Chief of Staff David (“Dado”) Elazar, was running over time. Azaryahu waited for Galili in the hallway and was surprised to see his friend, Shalhevet Freier, then director general of the Israel Atomic Energy Commission. This time, Freier pretended not to see his old buddy.

“We were great friends. He was approaching and then I saw him turn suddenly. Instead of coming up to me and asking me how I was doing, he sat down on a bench down the hall. Now this was odd. Shalhevet and I were buddies, we would always talk when we bumped into each other, and here I’m watching him stop short when he sees me. Really strange, but I didn’t say anything. So he’s sitting there, maybe four benches down from me, and I’m sitting there, and we’re both obviously waiting. I think we must have sat there for about 45 minutes.

“Finally the door opens and Yisrael [Galili] comes out. He crosses the corridor as if coming toward me but then catches sight of Shalhevet and says to me, ‘Sini, wait a second, I forgot something I have to take care of.’ He turns on his heels, goes back into the room and stays there for about two minutes. We’re standing there in the hallway when the door opens again and Israel Lior, Golda’s military secretary, comes out and asks Shalhevet to come in. Then [Galili] says to me, ‘OK, Sini, we can go now.’”

Curiosity was killing Azaryahu, but Galili refused to spill his guts on an empty stomach. “He said, ‘I’m dying of hunger, don’t talk to me now. First let’s eat.’ We sat there silently till we finished our steaks and then he said to me, ‘You know, nothing like this has ever happened before.’ And then he told me why the cabinet discussion ran late: The news from the Golan was bad. The Syrians were advancing and we were unable to repulse them, and so on. Toward the end [of the cabinet meeting] Dado got a phone call from the ‘pit’ [the IDF’s underground command center]. They wanted him to get down there, there’s news from the Golan, not good news. So he goes down, and the rest are left sitting there. So they’re saying, ‘OK, that’s it, we’re done’ and they’re getting ready to leave, but then Moshe Dayan reaches the door, his hand is already on the handle and he’s getting ready to turn it, and he says, ‘Oh, I forgot the most important part.’ I thought it was because of the situation. I figured, well, we’ve been listening to Dado for half an hour, the situation is really bad, he’s got a lot on his mind. But then Dayan says, ‘Because we don’t have a lot of time or many options, I thought we should be prepared to show the nuclear option too.’”

According to Azaryahu, who was quoting Galili, Dayan added, “And therefore, so as not to waste any time, I decided before coming here to call Shalhevet Freier. He’s waiting outside.”

Turning to Golda, he is said to have added: “If you authorize it he’ll make all the necessary preparations so that if we decide to deploy it can be done within minutes rather than us spending half a day trying to do all the necessary prep work.”

In the interview, Azaryahu goes on to say: “So Moshe Dayan is suggesting saving a few hours of preparation, in other words, that the time factor could be really critical. He was waiting for Dado to leave. He waited until the end, Dado leaves. He wanted to give the impression that this was no big deal. It’s the end of the meeting, he’s halfway out the door and all we’re talking about is some preparations. He probably thought Dado would oppose him. Best to present the matter as something minor, to downplay the drama.”

The defense minister, says Azaryahu, “understood that the instructions [to Freier] must be given by both of them [he and the prime minister]. But Yigal [Alon] and Galili were startled. They started to yell, they were vehemently opposed to the notion. They said we’d we able to stop the enemy and hold the line, that our reservists were still en route to the Golan and that the ratio of troops would change very quickly, that there was no need to panic or generate panic, because were we to go that route that would be the end of the matter. And Golda, after hearing them out, sided with them and told Moshe to forget it. And Galili also told him to drop it. We’d fight conventionally, without the involvement of any other parties, directly or indirectly. Galili says to me, ‘The whole time, I noticed that Dayan was still holding onto the doorknob, as if we’re just standing around, just shooting the breeze.’”

According to Azaryahu, as evident in the Wilson Center’s publication, Dayan accepted the verdict. 

“He said, ‘Fine, if that’s your decision, I accept it. I’m going.’ But it’s not that he was convinced. He explicitly stated he was not persuaded, but if Golda was accepting responsibility that under no circumstances [was the bomb to be deployed], then he wouldn’t [give Freier conflicting instructions]. So that’s how it ended. He left by a different door; there were many doors going in different directions in that corridor.”

Azaryahu continues: 

“So then Galili comes out and sees Shalhevet sitting there. Later he told me, ‘I was afraid [Dayan] wouldn’t tell him [not to make the preparations]. That’s why I went back inside and said to Lior, “Listen, Moshe Dayan could forget to tell him not to start preparing. Call him in so that Golda can tell him in clear, simple words to forget about it.’ He wasn’t going to go to lunch before Lior called him in. Once he knew Golda would be talking to him his mind was at peace, because Moshe Dayan was liable to forget to tell him that we didn’t want this for the time being.”

U.S. Military Killed 130,000 People In Nuclear Tests During A 12-Year Span

Words Can’t Describe The Pain and Suffering Endured By Survivors Of The Tragic 12-Year Wave Of Terror Unleashed By The U.S. Government.

By Shepard Ambellas

MICRONESIA, THE REPUBLIC OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS  (INTELLIHUB) – 67 nuclear tests took place starting in 1946 and many living things, including humans, have been affected by the aftermath of radiation plumes released both undersea and in the earth’s atmosphere by the U.S. Government. In fact at the time it was unknown if any of the test explosions would actually fully ignite the oxygen in the earth’s atmosphere, possibly even decimating the entire surface of the planet.

“The Marshall Islands, officially the Republic of the Marshall Islands (Marshallese: Aolepān Aorōkin M̧ajeļ),is an island country located in the northern Pacific Ocean. Geographically, the country is part of the larger island group of Micronesia, with the population of 68,480 people spread out over 24 low-lying coral atolls, comprising 1,156 individual islands and islets. The islands share maritime boundaries with the Federated States of Micronesia to the west, Wake Island to the north, Kiribati to the south-east, and Nauru to the south. The most populous atoll is Majuro, which also acts as the capital.”, reads Wikipedia.org’s opening paragraph on the region._[1] Nonetheless, testing ensued.

Later on after the U.S. military used up and experimented with some 11,000 personnel throughout the 12-year testing process, the side-effects of the surrounding areas and areas downwind became evident. There was major collateral damage, damage that affected many living things in and around the region and damage that’s still is affecting living things to this day. An excerpt from a case study entitled U.S. Nuclear Testing on the Marshall Islands: 1946 – 1958_[2] reads:

I myself have met a survivor of the blast who was born with defects from the radiation and have seen first hand how sinister the U.S. Government is as they have actually offered the individual and others no financial assistance. Survivors and victims of the nuclear testing are currently planning to ban together in the near future to file a class-action lawsuit against the U.S. military for the experimental testing on human beings. Some lawsuits have already been filed.

Updated 2:57pm EST

I also wanted to add that my source for this information whom was indeed affected by the nuclear tests pointed out that still to this day, the entire area is highly contaminated with nuclear fallout. In fact my source stated that “flies will not even land on the fish” that you catch and told me how the fish actually “change color” when you pull them out of the water. My source also said that even coconut water in the area is contaminated and highly poisonous.

Nuclear Testing Review - Nuclear Test Film

Sources:

[1] Marshall Islands – Wikipedia.org

[2] U.S. Nuclear Testing on the Marshall Islands - http://www.uvu.edu/

Israel Mulls Building Nuclear Plant

Israel's Ministry of National Infrastructure has commissioned an external body to conduct a feasibility study for the building of a nuclear power plant.

The study will examine plans for Israel's Electric Corporation to construct a nuclear power plant in southern Israel, that will provide 1,200 megawatts constituting 10 percent of the corporation's mass production.

It will also focus on declaring the area where the plant will be constructed ex-territorial, an area over which Israel hold no sovereignty.


This would allow Israel to sidestep issues concerning its refusal to sign international nuclear treaties subject to the scrutiny of international observers.

Last March Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu told the American network CNN he favored building a nuclear reactor in Israel.