Showing posts with label Enhanced Interrogation. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Enhanced Interrogation. Show all posts

Monday, March 24, 2014

Torturing Abu Zubaydah and The Art Of Deception

Observation room



A guard watches over detainees at the U.S. military prison in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in 2009.
J

As a guinea pig for ‘enhanced interrogation,’ Gitmo captive ™had a well-developed technique for misleading interrogators


By Jason Leopold


Zain Abidin Mohammed Husain Abu Zubaydah had endured days of beatings, humiliation and being tied up in a stress position. But his Pakistani-intelligence interrogators were not giving up as they grilled the self-styled jihadi on his role among the Arab volunteers who had gone to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets but were now often suspected of plotting attacks against the West.
Although the CIA had worked with Pakistani and Arab intelligence agencies to support these volunteer networks in the 1980s, the 1993 World Trade Center bombing was the first sign of a dramatic blowback, and Pakistan’s security services were now under pressure from their U.S. allies to crack down on an enterprise they had originally helped nurture.
One officer repeatedly struck Abu Zubaydah, according to the vivid account written in 1995 and 1996 in the fourth volume of his diaries — the U.S. government translation of which has been obtained exclusively by Al Jazeera.
“I want you to talk about your life for the last 10 years,” the officer told his captive. Today one of 14 high-value detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Abu Zubaydah back then was a leading figure in the Arab mujahedeen milieu from which Al-Qaeda emerged.



Handcuffs



Leg restraints in an interview room at Camp V, styled after state-of-the-art U.S. federal prisons, at Guantanamo Bay.
Paul J. Richards/AFP/Getty Images

Abu Zubaydah was not going to confess. When asked by his Pakistani tormentors for specific information — by his own account — he gave the impression of suffering greater physical pain than was the case and eventually offered false information in order to stop the abuse.
“Who is your trainer?” the officer asked, referring to the identity of the individual who trained him in weapons at Khaldan camp in Afghanistan.
“My teacher’s name is Mahmud,” Abu Zubaydah replied.
“Mahmud who?”
“Mahmud Al-Milaiji,” he answered, confident that his interrogator would not be aware that this was the name of an Egyptian film star. Abu Zubaydah would repeat the name of the Egyptian actor during a later CIA interrogation session, according to the book “The Black Banners,” written by Ali Soufan, an FBI special agent who was present at the CIA black site where Abu Zubaydah was rendered after his capture.
Abu Zubaydah was found along with his diaries in Pakistan on March 28, 2002, having fled the collapse of the Taliban regime. In the hands of the CIA, he became something of a guinea pig for the George W. Bush administration's interrogation procedures, which many groups, including top human-rights organizations, have labeled as torture. Although Al Jazeera has not seen the three subsequent diary volumes that Abu Zubaydah wrote while in CIA custody, according to his lawyers, they are a chronicle of his torture at the hands of U.S. captors.
On Aug. 1, 2002, five months after Abu Zubaydah’s capture, the U.S. Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel sent the White House a memo drafted by attorney John Yoo and signed by his boss, Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee. It authorized the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah using 10 techniques, including waterboarding, sleep deprivation, cramped confinement, stress positions, wall slamming and being placed in a confinement box with insects. This last technique was inspired by his diaries, where he had written of his fear of bugs.
Yoo’s memo asserted that Abu Zubaydah had been one of the planners of the 9/11 attacks, the 1998 East Africa embassy bombings and every other major assault carried out by Al-Qaeda — claims later significantly pulled back by U.S. authorities.
On April 27, 2002, Newsweek reported, under the headline “How Good Is Abu Zubaydah’s Information?” that he was the source of information leading to two U.S. domestic terrorism warningspertaining to possible attacks against banks, supermarkets and shopping malls.

'Your jihad is over'

The chronicle of his Pakistan torture experience in his diaries raises the question of whether Abu Zubaydah attempted to confound his American interrogators, too, by concealing information while appearing to be releasing gems of intelligence. Obviously, unlike his Pakistani interrogators in 1995, the CIA may have been using physical duress in conjunction with other more sophisticated methods. Still, the diaries  which could be painting a rosier picture than was the case of his performance under physical assault — suggest that Abu Zubaydah saw interrogation and torture as a contest from which he could emerge with his secrets intact, having fooled his questioners.
Abu Zubaydah had been captured at a Pakistani checkpoint as he drove with another man — a Yemeni from Saudi Arabia — on a journey in a mini-convoy of two vehicles delivering materials to comrades moved to a safe house, the House of Exile in Babi Jadeed, because of a crackdown by Pakistani police and intelligence services. 
They had been looking for Ramzi Yousef, mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Before he was caught, Yousef was one of the most notorious residents of the House of Martyrs, the guesthouse Abu Zubaydah ran and “the center of terrorism, as it’s called,” Abu Zubaydah wrote.
He recounted in his diary, “The police stopped us … I didn’t say a word. The police said to me, while pointing at me to come down, in a broken English, as if the Arabs are English speaking, he said, ‘Your Jihad is over.'”
Abu Zubaydah handed the border guard a United Nations refugee card he acquired earlier in the year, but the ploy did not work, and he and his passenger were taken to an office in the nearby Pakistani city of Peshawar. He recounted a frantic attempt to get rid of some seals that he had used to make fake Afghan passports for his comrades:
They decided to search us before being presented to the person in charge, and I was scared that they might discover the faked seals that I was carrying with me, so I said, I need to go to the bathroom (to urinate) but they didn’t allow me before doing a search. But I insisted that I can’t stand it any more, and that I will urinate in my pants. So they had to take me to the bathroom. After I closed the door, and get rid of the plastic seals, and left the wooden parts in the upper window … Then I pulled the flush and all the seals disappeared in the toilet. So I went out cheerfully because I don’t have a problem now.
However, he had forgotten one seal in a pocket, which was soon found. Abu Zubaydah wrote that he tried to portray himself as a “poor oppressed reporter who is calling for democracy and fighting dictatorship.” But the Pakistani officer didn’t believe him. “F--- you don’t try to bluff,” he reportedly said.
Soon the beatings began. Abu Zubaydah was taken downstairs to a prison and waited as a police car packed with Pakistani soldiers arrived. He sat in the backseat, handcuffed. The officer was in the front seat. “They took me around most of the places in the city (at night), and showed me to whomever they encountered, but no one could identify me … So they beat me up in the street and in front of the public while I was tied up. I could only push them back or scream in their faces.”
The Pakistanis were trying to force Abu Zubaydah to identify the location of the House of Martyrs. He was hit using shoes and facial slaps. Then he was taken to the upper floor of a house and thrown to the ground. Two of the men grabbed his feet “while the officer started flogging using a heavy stick.”
Abu Zubaydah wrote that he “turned to deceit” to get the Pakistanis to stop beating him.
“I played a theatrical role; I cried loudly while pointing to my head with my hand, then the beating stopped, and he wanted to check out what happened, so I held his hand and put it on the wound toward the opening.”
In Volume 2 of his diaries, Abu Zubaydah wrote that he suffered a shrapnel wound to his head, which left a small hole in his skull, while performing ablutions on a mountain in Gardez, Afghanistan. He temporarily lost his sight and hearing and the ability to move his body. He also lost part of his memory, the ability to speak and write for about seven months. He wrote in an entry that reading his “memoirs help(ed) me memory (sic) to recall everything.”
At the interrogation, Abu Zubaydah contorted his fingers to make it appear that the beating “will leave me in a state of nervous shock … I opened my right hand keeping two of my fingers twisted, and said, ‘I cannot control them.’” The officer “became more scared, left the room and lighted a cigarette hoping that the smoking will calm down his anger.”
But he returned about 15 minutes later and started beating Abu Zubaydah again.
“I am not going to let you go even if you die, where is the house?” he said.
“I only answered with a few words trying to show that my nervous (sic) had an impact on my tongue … But he started beating me again more forcefully while I was shouting at them in English, ‘you animals!” Abu Zubaydah wrote.
The officer left the room while a soldier continued to beat Abu Zubaydah. He was then taken to a prison at Qura Qabrastan. The officer, Abu Zubaydah wrote in his diary, “ordered that I should be tied up to the high bars so I can’t sit down or sleep during the night, and in fact that was what happened.”
“Hours passed by and I was feeling the pain in the bottom of my foot (The location of the beating). I also felt the pain in the calf, and the thigh, because of standing a long time … And I started to realize their intention, they must be trying to make me reach a nervous breakdown so I will confess with everything I know at the time of interrogation … I relied on my determination and rested against the bars and tried to sleep, and I really slept while standing, and when the pain increased in one foot, I woke up and leaned on the other foot so I could sleep.”
The technique the Pakistanis used on Abu Zubaydah was a stress position, one of 10 “enhanced interrogation methods” the CIA used on him. Almost immediately after his capture, according to declassified documents released several years ago, top Bush administration officials discussed using an “alternative” set of interrogation methods “because the CIA believed that Abu Zubaydah was withholding imminent-threat information during the initial interrogation sessions.”



Stress position



A Viet Cong prisoner is interrogated by U.S. forces in a stress position in Thuong Duc, Vietnam.
 National Archives

The CIA prepared a psychological assessment of Abu Zubaydah in July 2002, based heavily on his six volumes of diaries, that focused on how to break down a man the CIA then believed was the No. 3 person in Al-Qaeda’s hierarchy. 
His diaries provide clues to how he may have hoped to respond to physical pain inflicted by his CIA interrogators — although what actually transpired in the course of his “enhanced interrogation” by U.S. operatives remains unknown.
During his interrogation in Pakistan, after a night of half-sleeping in a stress position, Abu Zubaydah once again faced the interrogator with the “big mustache,” who questioned him about the fake passport seals. Abu Zubaydah was returned to the prison cell, where, he said, he spent more than two days “standing on my feet, almost torn down.” But “God gave me help because as long as I am thinking of (the brothers who are outside the prison, I don’t feel the pain, but when I stop thinking of them, then I think of pain).”

Prince at House of Martyrs?

Another day, Abu Zubaydah was taken by bus along with his Yemeni companion to an office he calls “The Special Branch.” There, he watched the interrogation of a young man he believed might have been a Pakistani who plotted a failed assassination attempt on Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. It’s unclear why Abu Zubaydah was present at the session. He wrote that he was forced to “sit in some place, and from the opening of the door we were revealed to — or we can see at the same time — a veiled person.”
He said after the man responded to the interrogator’s questions, he and his companion were quickly taken back to the bus and returned to the prison. Abu Zubaydah was then hooded, tied up and interrogated again by the “huge man with the big mustache.” The room, Abu Zubaydah wrote, was crowded and he could hear English words coming from near the vicinity of the “huge man.”
“The huge man started with a question which I was expecting … He said, ‘What do you know about the House of Martyrs?’ He spoke the words ‘House of Martyrs’ in Arabic, and the rest in English.”
Abu Zubaydah responded, he said, “In a very cool manner, ‘I heard about it.’”
The officer used his baton and smashed Abu Zubaydah “on the upper calf, just in the back of my left knee.”
“I said angrily, ‘What happened?’”
He was asked another question, “What do you know about the (prince of the House of Martyrs)?”
“I said angrily, ‘I don’t know him.’” The officer smashed Abu Zubaydah on the back of his calf again.
After repeated blows he said, “If the interrogation will continue in this manner, then go ahead and writing down all the answers that are appropriate for you, then I will sign, and everything will be over.” As the beating continued, Abu Zubaydah started giving false names to his questioners. He denied that he was the “prince” of the House of Martyrs. When asked about his affiliation, he denied that he was the emir of the Khaldan training camp.
“I am a sick man, and I am still taking medications … for my memory case, do you think that anyone is going to rely on me to run a camp,” he said.



Waterboarding



Waterboarding equipment used for torture.
 Waterboarding.org

After his capture by the United States, Abu Zubaydah’s interrogations became more intense. In “The Black Banners” Soufan, one of two agents who first interrogated Abu Zubaydah at that CIA black-site prison, suggested the “enhanced interrogation techniques” were an experiment. It’s a word that he uses more than a dozen times in his book to describe the techniques first used on Abu Zubaydah.
Soufan interrogated Abu Zubaydah using traditional rapport-building techniques that, Soufan said, resulted in cooperation. It was only after two psychologists under contract to the CIA took over the interrogation in the weeks after Abu Zubaydah’s capture and used abusive methods that he began to clam up. Soufan left the black site, according to an interview he gave “60 Minutes” after the publication of his book in 2011, when one of the psychologists introduced a box to be used during Abu Zubaydah’s interrogation session that resembled a coffin.
The effectiveness of the CIA’s interrogation of Abu Zubaydah is questioned in a 6,000-page report prepared by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, which spent four years investigating the CIA’s so-called rendition, detention and interrogation program. According to Sen. Dianne Feinstein, D-Calif., who chaired the panel, the report “uncovers startling details about the CIA detention and interrogation program and raises critical questions about intelligence operations and oversight.” Abu Zubaydah figures prominently in the report, the executive summary of which Al Jazeera is seeking from the Justice Department under a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit.
It is uncertain whether being held by the CIA was Abu Zubaydah’s first experience of American intelligence operatives during interrogations. He wrote that some questioning took place while he was hooded. He said at one point he heard “… some people leaving the room quietly, and I later learned that they were Americans who came to watch the interrogation with the one who is supposed to be the prince of the House of Martyrs.”
Former CIA operations officer Marc Sageman, who was based in Islamabad in the late 1980s, is now a forensic psychiatrist and reviewed Abu Zubaydah’s diaries for Al Jazeera. He believes the Americans Abu Zubaydah referred to were FBI agents who were in Pakistan hunting for Ramzi Yousef’s fellow conspirators. The FBI would not respond to questions about that possibility.
Abu Zubaydah wrote that he later learned that eight of his brothers, whom the police had arrested and whom he identifies by name, “were Mujahedeen and the others were employed by the relief agencies … They were arrested because one of them was accused of supporting Yusif Ramzi financially.” Abu Zubaydah wrote that they were eventually freed after paying the Pakistanis a bribe of more than half a million rupees.
After the “Americans” left the room, Abu Zubaydah’s hood was removed. He contorted his fingers again to make it appear as if he had a nervous breakdown. He refused to eat for three days after being returned to his prison cell. He was allowed to make a phone call, which he used to call his brothers at the House of Exile guesthouse and warned them that they should leave because they may be arrested.
The Pakistanis brought Abu Zubaydah before a judge, and he was charged with being “one of those Arab Mujahideen who has been left behind with no residency permit.” He waved his U.N. refugee card, but the judge ruled that he should be deported. He was taken to a central jail, where he was detained for three months.
But the U.N. came to his rescue. He wrote, “The United infidel nations started its job by contacting the ministry of the interior to establish my right for residency as it was stated before, so I was expecting to stay for two months in the prison …” Abu Zubaydah said an Italian and a Pakistani official from the U.N. visited him during that time and asked him about the other Arabs detained in the prison. He lied to them too, saying, “I am scared from them; they are fundamentalists.”
“Good! Be aware (sic) of them!” one of the U.N. officials said.
“I said, ‘I hate terrorism,’” Abu Zubaydah continued.
The U.N. official, “Mister Ferlando,” said after he left, “You look like a terrorist, but I know you well (apparently he meant my beard) … I said to myself, ‘Only if you knew!'”
Upon his release, Abu Zubaydah wrote that he and the brothers moved to a new guesthouse, away from the police, and he began “to steer the show one more time regarding … Khaldun affairs.”

Wednesday, August 29, 2012

Making Illegality The American Way Of Life

Alfred W. McCoy writes,


Perfecting a New Form of Torture
The modern American urge to use torture did not, of course, begin on September 12, 2001.  It has roots that reach back to the beginning of the Cold War and a human rights policy riven with contradictions. Publicly, Washington opposed torture and led the world in drafting the United Nation’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 and the Geneva Conventions in 1949. Simultaneously and secretly, however, the Central Intelligence Agency began developing ingenious new torture techniques in contravention of these same international conventions.
From 1950 to 1962, the CIA led a secret research effort to crack the code of human consciousness, a veritable Manhattan project of the mind with two findings foundational to a new form of psychological torture. In the early 1950s, while collaborating with the CIA, famed Canadian psychologist Dr. Donald Hebbdiscovered that, using goggles, gloves, and earmuffs, he could induce a state akin to psychosis among student volunteers by depriving them of sensory stimulation. Simultaneously, two eminent physicians at Cornell University Medical Center, also working with the Agency, found that the most devastating torture technique used by the KGB, the Soviet secret police, involved simply forcing victims to stand for days at a time, while legs swelled painfully and hallucinations began.
In 1963, after a decade of mind-control research, the CIA codified these findings in a succinct, secret instructional handbook, the KUBARK Counterintelligence Interrogation manual. It became the basis for a new method of psychological torture disseminated worldwide and within the U.S. intelligence community. Avoiding direct involvement in torture, the CIA instead trained allied agencies to do its dirty work in prisons throughout the Third World, like South Vietnam’s notorious “tiger cages.”
The Korean War added a defensive dimension to this mind-control research. After harsh North Korean psychological torture forced American POWs to accuse their own country of war crimes, President Dwight Eisenhower ordered that any serviceman subject to capture be given resistance training, which the Air Force soon dubbed with the acronym SERE (for survival, evasion, resistance, escape).
Once the Cold War ended in 1990, Washington resumed its advocacy of human rights, ratifying the U.N. Convention Against Torture in 1994, which banned the infliction of “severe” psychological and physical pain. The CIA ended its torture training in the Third World, and the Defense Department recalled Latin American counterinsurgency manuals that contained instructions for using harsh interrogation techniques. On the surface, then, Washington had resolved the tension between its anti-torture principles and its torture practices.
But when President Bill Clinton sent the U.N. Convention to Congress for ratification in 1994, he included language (drafted six years earlier by the Reagan administration) that contained diplomatic “reservations.”  In effect, these addenda accepted the banning of physical abuse, but exempted psychological torture.
A year later, when the Clinton administration launched its covert campaign against al-Qaeda, the CIA avoided direct involvement in human rights violations by sending 70 terror suspects to allied nations notorious for physical torture.  This practice, called “extraordinary rendition,” had supposedly been banned by the U.N. convention and so a new contradiction between Washington’s human rights principles and its practices was buried like a political land mine ready to detonate with phenomenal force, just 10 years later, in the Abu Ghraib scandal.
Normalizing Torture
Right after his first public address to a shaken nation on September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush gave his White House staff expansive secret orders for the use of harsh interrogation, adding, “I don’t care what the international lawyers say, we are going to kick some ass.”
Soon after, the CIA began opening “black sites” that would in the coming years stretch fromThailand to Poland.  It also leased a fleet of executive jets for the rendition of detained terrorist suspects to allied nations, and revived psychological tortures abandoned since the end of the Cold War. Indeed, the agency hired former Air Force psychologists to reverse engineer SERE training techniques, flipping them from defense to offense and thereby creating the psychological tortures that would henceforth travel far under the euphemistic label “enhanced interrogation techniques.”
In a parallel move in late 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld appointed General Geoffrey Miller to head the new prison at Guantanamo, Cuba, and gave him broad authority to develop a total three-phase attack on the sensory receptors, cultural identity, and individual psyches of his new prisoners. After General Miller visited Abu Ghraib prison in September 2003, the U.S. commander for Iraq issued orders for the use of psychological torture in U.S. prisons in that country, including sensory disorientation, self-inflicted pain, and a recent innovation, cultural humiliation through exposure to dogs (which American believed would be psychologically devastating for Arabs). It is no accident that Private Lynndie England, a military guard at Abu Ghraib prison, was famously photographed leading a naked Iraqi detainee leashed like a dog.
Just two months after CBS News broadcast those notorious photos from Abu Ghraib in April 2004, 35% of Americans polled still felt torture was acceptable. Why were so many tolerant of torture?
One partial explanation would be that, in the years after 9/11, the mass media filled screens large and small across America with enticing images of abuse. Amid this torrent of torture simulations, two media icons served to normalize abuse for many Americans -- the fantasy of the “ticking time bomb scenario” and the fictional hero of the Fox Television show “24,” counterterror agent Jack Bauer.
In the months after 9/11, Harvard professor Alan Dershowitz launched a multimedia campaign arguing that torture would be necessary in the event U.S. intelligence agents discovered that a terrorist had planted a ticking nuclear bomb in New York’s Times Square. Although this scenario was a fantasy whose sole foundation was an obscure academic philosophy article published back in 1973, such ticking bombs soon enough became a media trope and a persuasive reality for many Americans -- particularly thanks to “24,” every segment of which began with an oversized clock ticking menacingly.
In 67 torture scenes during its first five seasons, the show portrayed agent Jack Bauer’s recourse to abuse as timely, effective, and often seductive. By its last broadcast in May 2010, the simple invocation of agent Bauer’s name had become a persuasive argument for torture used by everyone from Supreme Court JusticeAntonin Scalia to ex-President Bill Clinton.
While campaigning for his wife Hillary in the 2008 Democratic presidential primary, Clinton typically cited “24” as a justification for allowing CIA agents, acting outside the law, to torture in extreme emergencies. “When Bauer goes out there on his own and is prepared to live with the consequences,” Clinton told Meet the Press, “it always seems to work better.”
Impunity in America
Such a normalization of “enhanced interrogation techniques” created public support for an impunity achieved by immunizing all those culpable of crimes of torture. During President Obama’s first two years in office, former Vice President Dick Cheney and his daughter Liz made dozens of television appearances accusing his administration of weakening America’s security by investigating CIA interrogators who had used such techniques under Bush.
Ironically, Obama’s assassination of Osama bin Laden in May 2011 provided an opening for neoconservatives to move the nation toward impunity. Forming an a cappella media chorus, former Bush administration officials appeared on television to claim, without any factual basis, that torture had somehow led the Navy SEALs to Bin Laden. Within weeks, Attorney General Eric Holder announced an end to any investigation of harsh CIA interrogations and to the possibility of bringing any of the CIA torturers to court.  (Consider it striking, then, that the only “torture” case brought to court by the administration involved a former CIA agent, John Kiriakou, who had leaked the names of some torturers.)
Starting on the 10th anniversary of 9/11, the country took the next step toward full impunity via a radical rewriting of the past. In a memoir published on August 30, 2011, Dick Cheney claimed the CIA’s use of “enhanced interrogation techniques” on an al-Qaeda leader named Abu Zubaydah had turned this hardened terrorist into a “fount of information” and saved “thousands of lives.”
Just two weeks later, on September 12, 2011, former FBI counterterror agent Ali Soufan released his own memoirs, stating that he was the one who started the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah back in 2002, using empathetic, non-torture techniques that quickly gained “important actionable intelligence” about "the role of KSM [Khalid Sheikh Mohammed] as the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks."
Angered by the FBI's success, CIA director George Tenet dispatched his own interrogators from Washington led by Dr. James Mitchell, the former SERE psychologist who had developed the agency’s harsh “enhanced techniques.” As the CIA team moved up the “force continuum” from “low-level sleep deprivation” to nudity, noise barrage, and the use of a claustrophobic confinement box, Dr. Mitchell’s harsh methods got "no information."
By contrast, at each step in this escalating abuse, Ali Soufan was brought back for more quiet questioning in Arabic that coaxed out all the valuable intelligence Zubaydah had to offer. The results of this ad hoc scientific test were blindingly clear: FBI empathy was consistently effective, while CIA coercion proved counterproductive.
But this fundamental yet fragile truth has been obscured by CIA censorship and neoconservative casuistry. Cheney’s secondhand account completely omitted the FBI presence. Moreover, the CIA demanded 181 pages of excisions from Ali Soufan’s memoirs that reduced his chapters about this interrogation experience to a maze of blackened lines no regular reader can understand.
The agency’s attempt to rewrite the past has continued into the present. Just last April, Jose Rodriguez, former chief of CIA Clandestine Services, published his uncensored memoirs under the provocative title Hard Measures: How Aggressive C.I.A. Actions after 9/11 Saved American Lives. In a promotional television interview, he called FBI claims of success with empathetic methods “bullshit.”
With the past largely rewritten to assure Americans that the CIA’s “enhanced interrogation” had worked, the perpetrators of torture were home free and the process of impunity and immunity established for future use.
Rendition Under Obama
Apart from these Republican pressures, President Obama’s own aggressive views on national security have contributed to an undeniable continuity with many of his predecessor’s most controversial policies. Not only has he preserved the controversial military commissions at Guantanamo and fought the courts to block civil suits against torture perpetrators, he has, above all, authorized continuing CIA rendition flights.
During the 2008 presidential campaign, Obama went beyond any other candidate in offering unqualified opposition to both direct and indirect U.S. involvement in torture. "We have to be clear and unequivocal. We do not torture, period," he said, adding, "That will be my position as president. That includes, by the way, renditions.”
Only days after his January 2009 inauguration, Obama issued a dramatic executive order ending the CIA’s coercive techniques, but it turned out to include a large loophole that preserved the agency’s role in extraordinary renditions. Amid his order’s ringing rhetoric about compliance with the Geneva conventions and assuring “humane treatment of individuals in United States custody,” the president issued a clear and unequivocal order that “the CIA shall close as expeditiously as possible any detention facilities that it currently operates and shall not operate any such detention facility in the future.” But when the CIA’s counsel objected that this blanket prohibition would also “take us out of the rendition business,” Obamaadded a footnote with a small but significant qualification: “The terms ‘detention facilities’ and ‘detention facility’ in... this order do not refer to facilities used only to hold people on a short-term, transitory basis.” Through the slippery legalese of this definition, Obama thus allowed the CIA continue its rendition flights of terror suspects to allied nations for possible torture.
Moreover, in February 2009, Obama’s incoming CIA director Leon Panettaannounced that the agency would indeed continue the practice “in renditions where we returned an individual to the jurisdiction of another country, and they exercised their rights… to prosecute him under their laws. I think,” he added, ignoring the U.N. anti-torture convention’s strict conditions for this practice, “that is an appropriate use of rendition.”
As the CIA expanded covert operations inside Somalia under Obama, its renditions of terror suspects from neighboring East African nations continued just as they had under Bush.  In July 2009, for example, Kenyan police snatched an al-Qaeda suspect, Ahmed Abdullahi Hassan, from a Nairobi slum and delivered him to that city’s airport for a CIA flight to Mogadishu. There he joined dozens of prisoners grabbed off the streets of Kenya inside “The Hole” -- a filthy underground prison buried in the windowless basement of Somalia’s National Security Agency. While Somali guards (paid for with U.S. funds) ran the prison, CIA operatives, reported the Nation’s Jeremy Scahill, have open access for extended interrogation.
Obama also allowed the continuation of a policy adopted after the Abu Ghraib scandal: outsourcing incarceration to local allies in Afghanistan and Iraq while ignoring human rights abuses there. Although the U.S. military received 1,365 reports about the torture of detainees by Iraqi forces between May 2004 and December 2009, a period that included Obama’s first full year in office, American officers refused to take action, even though the abuses reported were often extreme.
Simultaneously, Washington’s Afghan allies increasingly turned to torture after the Abu Ghraib scandal prompted U.S. officials to transfer most interrogation to local authorities. After interviewing 324 detainees held by Afghanistan’s National Directorate of Security (NDS) in 2011, the U.N. found that “torture is practiced systematically in a number of NDS detention facilities throughout Afghanistan.” At the Directorate’s prison in Kandahar one interrogator told a detainee before starting to torture him, “You should confess what you have done in the past as Taliban; even stones confess here.”
Although such reports prompted both British and Canadian forces to curtail prisoner transfers, the U.S. military continues to turn over detainees to Afghan authorities -- a policy that, commented the New York Times, “raises serious questions about potential complicity of American officials.”
How to Unclog the System of Justice One Drone at a Time
After a decade of intense public debate over torture, in the last two years the United States has arrived at a questionable default political compromise: impunity at home, rendition abroad.
This resolution does not bode well for future U.S. leadership of an international community determined to end the scourge of torture. Italy’s prosecution of two-dozen CIA agents for rendition in 2009, Poland’s recent indictment of its former security chief for facilitating a CIA black site, and Britain’s ongoing criminal investigation of intelligence officials who collaborated with alleged torture at Guantanamo are harbingers of continuing pressures on the U.S. to comply with international standards for human rights.
Meanwhile, unchecked by any domestic or international sanction, Washington has slid down torture’s slippery slope to find, just as the French did in Algeria during the 1950s, that at its bottom lies the moral abyss of extrajudicial execution. The systematic French torture of thousands during the Battle of Algiers in 1957 also generated over 3,000 “summary executions” to insure, as one French general put it, that “the machine of justice” not be “clogged with cases.”
In an eerie parallel, Washington has reacted to the torture scandals of the Bush era by generally forgoing arrests and opting for no-fuss aerial assassinations. From 2005 to 2012, U.S. drone killings inside Pakistan rose from zero to a total of 2,400 (and still going up) -- a figure disturbingly close to those 3,000 French assassinations in Algeria. In addition, it has now been revealed that the president himself regularly orders specific assassinations by drone in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia off a secret “kill list.”  Simultaneously, his administration has taken just one terror suspect into U.S. custody and has not added any new prisoners to Guantanamo, thereby avoiding any more clogging of the machinery of American justice.
Absent any searching inquiry or binding reforms, assassination is now the everyday American way of war while extraordinary renditions remain a tool of state.  Make no mistake: some future torture scandal is sure to arise from another iconic dungeon in the dismal, ever-lengthening historical procession leading from the "tiger cages" of South Vietnam to "the salt pit" in Afghanistan and "The Hole" in Somalia. Next time, the world might not be so forgiving. Next time, with those images from Abu Ghraib prison etched in human memory, the damage to America’s moral authority as world leader could prove even more deep and lasting.

Saturday, August 18, 2012

KUBARK's Very Long Shadow



A 2011 FBI "primer" on overseas interrogations, which became public on August 2, 2012, as a result of Freedom of Information Act action taken by the American Civil Liberties Union, repeatedly cites the Central Intelligence Agency's 1963 KUBARK Counterintelligence Interrogation. KUBARK was the code name the CIA used for itself.

The FBI briefing also cites the CIA's 1983 Human Resource Exploitation Manual (Honduras version) which was compiled by sections of KUBARK to train interrogators in the art of obtaining intelligence from "resistant sources". This was disseminated to the intelligence services of right-wing regimes in Latin America and south-east Asia in the context of the global "war on communism". In the mid-1980s, these manuals became the subject of Congressional investigations into US-supported atrocities in Central America. Both became public in 1997 as a result of FOIA action by the Baltimore Sun.

The FBI primer favourably invokes the KUBARK manual as a resource to illustrate the value of isolation "for several days before you begin interrogation" as well as during the "multi-session, multi-day process" as a means of prolonging a prisoner's fear prior to interrogation. The encouragement of fear-production through isolation is disturbing for (at least) two reasons. First, it indicates that some elements of the CIA's psychological torture model continue to have currency, despite the scandalous record of US prisoner abuse in the "war on terror" and the Obama administration's pledge to end torture.

 
 Frost Over the World:
The 'war on terror' ten years on
One of the many victims of the US extraordinary rendition programme, Maher Arar, a Canadian citizen who was shipped from New York to Syria in 2002, responded to the FBI primer's advocacy of isolation with the following tweets: "That's called torture. I say this from experience. Isolation 4 long time becomes worse than physical beating." "1 thing isolation inflicted on me is that my cognitive skills have been greatly & permanently diminished." And "If u want 2 know what solitary confinement does 2 humans try locking urself in the bathroom 4 only 24hrs. Please tweet about ur findings." 

The second disturbing element is the primer author's apparent unawareness - or disregard - for the ignominious history of KUBARK, and the CIA record more generally. Did he or she never read Darius Rejali's Torture and Democracy, or Alfred McCoy's A Question of Torture, or Naomi Klein's The Shock Doctrine to name but a few of the many studies that detail and critique that history? Since KUBARK continues to be an operable model, it is worth recalling some highlights (or lowlights) of that history in order to put the 2011 primer into context.

KUBARK was the product of the CIA's "mind control" research programme, which was prompted by the terrible mistreatment of US prisoners of war during the Korean War. Many soldiers who were captured by the North Koreans were beaten, starved, put into forced labour, marched to death, or summarily executed. China, which fought alongside North Korea, also committed war crimes against POWs, but added a new tactic to their repertoire of mistreatment: after starving prisoners into a weakened state, they subjected them to communist indoctrination. That history was immortalised in John Frankenheimer's (1962) political thriller, The Manchurian Candidate, which features a character who was "brainwashed" to become an assassin for an international communist conspiracy.

The CIA took a lesson from the Korean War. Fearful that a communist regime might achieve a breakthrough in the art of brainwashing, in 1953 the agency established the MK-ULTRA programme and invested in mind-control research. This began with experiments in hypnosis, electroshock, and hallucinogenic drugs - including LSD. The CIA programme evolved into psychological torture, which fuses tactics of sensory deprivation and self-inflicted pain (ie: stress position abuse). Unlike beatings and other tactics that violently attack the body, this combination, as McCoy explains, targets the mind and "causes victims to feel responsible for their suffering and thus capitulate more readily to their torturers". The 1963 KUBARK manual explains the purposes and uses of various combinations of tactics - including isolation - that systematically attack all of the human senses to produce effects of "debility, disorientation and dread".

By the late 1950s, the US viewed the conflict in Vietnam as critical to the Cold War goal of containment and rollback of communism. The US started sending forces to South Vietnam in the early 1960s. To root out Southern guerillas (Viet Cong) who were allied with the North, the CIA trained more than 85,000 South Vietnamese police, who operated a network of interrogational torture sites across the country. The CIA developed the Phoenix programme, which typified terroristic torture in its combination of brutal interrogations and extrajudicial executions. Although the Phoenix programme was an intelligence-gathering failure (and more than 26,000 prisoners were either tortured to death or summarily executed), the model lived on.

In the Western Hemisphere, US anxieties about the spread of communism spiked following Fidel Castro's 1959 victory in the Cuban revolutionary war and the installation of a communist government allied to the Soviet Union. The counter-insurgency warfare models honed in Vietnam were transported to Latin America in the 1960s through Project X, a secret training programme of Army Intelligence for militaries and police. The Phoenix programme model was incorporated into the curriculum of the School of the Americas.

Starting with Brazil in 1963, right-wing military leaders across Latin America seized power from democratically elected governments, with US encouragement and assistance. Through the School of the Americas and other US institutions (including the philanthropic Ford Foundation), regional military and political leaders were educated about the free market theories of Milton Friedman, an economics professor at the University of Chicago. Friedman and his acolytes, nicknamed the Chicago Boys, were opposed to any state involvement in the economy. They believed that for the market to be truly "free", government regulation of industry, subsidies, and social welfare programmes should end.
 
 Frost Over the World:
Chile: The nemesis of a dictator

In The Shock Doctrine, Klein explains how Friedman's fascination with the 1950s CIA-funded research into electric shock therapy to turn individuals' minds into empty slates that could be inscribed with new information (brainwashing) inspired his theories about how whole societies could be shocked to accept (unpopular) free market policies of privatisation, deregulation, and the termination of social programmes. In 1973, Friedman advised Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet, who had just seized power (with US assistance) from the democratically elected president, Salvador Allende, to impose economic shock therapy while Chilean society was in shock from the coup. Thus, Chile became the first place where the Chicago Boys' theories could be applied in the real world.

Those economic shock policies instituted by the Pinochet regime and emulated by other Latin American military dictatorships were a disaster. In the short term, the gutting of public services and popular social welfare programmes sparked unrest as people protested the declining standards of living. Over the longer term, national revenues diminished as multinational corporations bought up de-nationalised industries and transported profits to shareholders abroad. To defend their policies and subdue unrest, these military regimes embarked on national wars against domestic subversives and enemies, which they regarded as part of the West's war against international communism.

In these "dirty wars", the people targeted by the region's military regimes were depicted as traitors and communists, or guilty by association with leftist political movements. As Lawrence Weschler explains in A Miracle, A Universe: Settling Accounts with Torturers, the doctrine of national security guiding these military regimes was "a fearsome piece of work... The enemy - the International Communist Movement - is perceived as covertly operating everywhere, all the time, in all fields of human endeavour".

Although it is impossible to know exactly how many people were tortured by these military regimes from the 1960s through the 1980s, experts estimate the number between 100,000 and 150,000, tens of thousands of whom were killed. In some countries, following the collapse of these regimes, their records became the subject of investigations and published reports that took as their titles "never again". Since 1990, a number of leaders of the former military regimes have faced prosecution for torture and other crimes committed while they were in power.

The US has not had its "never again" reckoning, neither for the historic role of aiding other countries in their torture nor for our own history of torture. The FBI, which distinguished itself during the Bush years for refusing to cooperate with the CIA when illegal (and ineffective) tactics were used in the interrogation of prisoners, has now, apparently, decided to embrace some of the measures it had repudiated not long ago.

Via: "Al-Jazeera"

Friday, January 21, 2011

UK Linked To Notorious Bangladesh Torture Centre

Exclusive British authorities pressed for information while men were held at secret interrogation centre where inmates are known to have died under torture, Guardian investigation reveals

By Ian Cobain, and Fariha Karim in Dhaka
Monday 17 January 2011 21.47 GMT
Courtesy Of "The Guardian"


The headquarters of the Rapid Action Battalion
The headquarters of the Rapid Action Battalion in Uttara. Photograph: Shahidul Alam for the Guardian
UK authorities passed information about British nationals to notorious Bangladeshi intelligence agencies and police units, then pressed for information while the men were being held at a secret interrogation centre where inmates are known to have died under torture.
A Guardian investigation into counter-terrorism co-operation between the UK and Bangladesh has revealed a detailed picture of the last Labour government's reliance on overseas intelligence agencies that were known to use torture.
Meetings and exchanges of information took place between British and Bangladeshi officials in an effort to protect the UK from attacks that might be fomented in Bangladesh, according to sources in both countries.
The likelihood that a number of suspects would be tortured as a result of the meetings went unmentioned, according to the sources. Subsequently, more than a dozen men of dual British-Bangladeshi nationality were placed under investigation, and at least some suffered horrific abuse from the Bangladeshi authorities.
At one point Jacqui Smith, then home secretary, flew to Dhaka for face-to-face meetings with senior officials from one agency, the Directorate-General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI), whose use of torture had been the subject of a detailed report by Human Rights Watch, the New York-based NGO, less than eight weeks earlier. Seven months before the visit, a report prepared by Smith's own department had documented the widespread concern about the routine use of torture in Bangladesh. Smith spoke publicly during the visit about the dangers that could be posed by dual nationals; privately, according to a senior DGFI counter-terrorism officer, she urged that the agency investigate a number of individuals about whom the British were suspicious.
In September it emerged that in recent years MI5 and MI6 have always asked the home secretary or foreign secretary for permission before conducting any information exchange where there was a risk of an individual being tortured. Smith, her successor Alan Johnson and David Miliband, the foreign secretary during the period of the joint UK-Bangladeshi counter-terrorism campaign, have declined to answer questions about the matter.
A number of the British suspects were taken to the secret interrogation centre, known as the Task Force for Interrogation cell (TFI). The location of the TFI and the methods employed by those who work there became clear during the Guardian investigation, with both former inmates and intelligence officials speaking out about its operations.
Faisal Mostafa, from Manchester, was taken to the TFI after Smith's visit to Dhaka and is alleged to have been forced to stand upright for the first six days of his incarceration, with his wrists shackled to bars above his head. He is then alleged to have then been beaten and subjected to electric shocks while being questioned about Bangladeshi associates. At the point at which he was to be questioned about his associates and activities in the UK, he is said to have been blindfolded and strapped to a chair while a drill was slowly driven into his right shoulder and hip.
This abuse during questioning about the UK is said to have been repeated on a number of occasions. The Guardian has seen evidence that supports the allegation that he was tortured in this manner. The report prepared by Smith's own department povides warning that the paramilitary police unit that seized this man used precisely this method of torture.
Matiur Rahman, deputy chief of operations at the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), the police unit that detained the man, said: "The British were interested in him for some time. There was an assumption he was part of an international network. They gave information to us, and we gave information to them."
After being tortured for several weeks the man spent almost a year in jail before being freed on bail and allowed to return to the UK.
A second man, Gulam Mustafa, from Birmingham, was being held in Bangladesh during Smith's visit, and was released before being held a second time last April. He says he was tortured on both occasions while being questioned about associates in the UK, with his interrogators beating him, subjecting him to electric shocks and crushing his knees. He was eventually transferred to a prison hospital, where he was treated for injuries suffered he suffered during interrogation.Bangladeshi police officers who arrested him the second time say his first arrest had been at the request of MI6. "When we received the file from his first arrest from RAB, it was marked 'MI6 File'," said one senior detective. He added that when this man was arrested for the second time, officials from the British high commission in Dhaka contacted police and asked to be debriefed on the results of his interrogation. "They wanted maximum information." he said.
A third man, Jamil Rahman, from Swansea, is suing the Home Office, alleging that MI5 was complicit in his torture after he was arrested in 2005 and allegedly tortured in between interrogation by two British intelligence officers.
Smith said she would not answer questions "about the timings of any specific authorisations she may or may not have given the security service". She declined to say whether she accepted that individuals would be at risk of torture when she asked the Bangladeshi authorities to investigate them. Johnson refused to answer any questions about the matter.
Miliband failed to answer a series of questions about dual nationals investigated in Bangladesh, and about any role he played in granting permission for MI6 to be involved in their cases. A spokeswoman issued a statement on his behalf which said that there were no Foreign Office papers showing that ministers were asked to sanction the arrest of Faisal Mostafa or Gulam Mustafa. She added: "David would never ever sanction torture and it is completely wrong to suggest, imply, or leave a shadow of a doubt otherwise. The UK has detailed procedures that uphold the moral and legal conduct of the intelligence agencies and those responsible for them. When David was Foreign Secretary he followed them scrupulously."
The Foreign Office said both Mostafa and Mustafa had been offered consular assistance, and reiterated the government's position on torture. "The government have made absolutely clear in the Coalition's Programme for Government that we will never condone the use of torture," a spokesman said. "We take all allegations of torture and mistreatment very seriously, and - where we have permission to do so from the individual concerned - raise them with the relevant authorities. Our security cooperation with other countries is consistent with our laws and values."