What Have The Arabs Ever Done For Us?
Sunday, November 02, 2014
The Glorious History Of Sicily Under The Arabs
What Have The Arabs Ever Done For Us?
Tuesday, April 26, 2011
Arabs Give Neo-Cons A Reality Check
By James Zogby
(Tuesday, April 19, 2011)
Courtesy Of "Media Monitors Network"
Wednesday, September 29, 2010
The Arab People Look For Peace & New Leadership
By Mahboob A. Khawaja
(Thursday, September 16, 2010)
Courtesy Of "Media Monitors"
Tuesday, July 20, 2010
Water In The Arab World
Since around the 1960s the equilibrium between water resources and population distribution in the world fell out of kilter, giving rise to numerous conflicts over water, especially in Africa, Asia and Europe. To a considerable extent, the growing disequilibrium derives from various political, social and economic developments in the modern world, as well as from the effects of climate change. Modern political boundaries, which impede the free movement of populations, hamper migration due to draught and famine. The pressures on countries that are less fortunate in water resources within their national boundaries can be tremendous. Soaring population growth rates give rise to or exacerbate water shortage crises in many parts of the world and in developing nations in particular. The population of the world is expected to exceed 10 billion in 2050 bringing with it a corresponding decline in the per capita share of water. Supply, in turn, is integrally linked to the interplay between demographic and economic factors. The larger the population the greater is the need to develop water resources to meet the requirements of domestic consumption as well as for agricultural, industrial and energy needs to sustain the population and economic growth.
Because of all these accumulating pressures on and demands for water, water is no longer the free or even cheap resource it once was. It is a substance that increasingly needs to be used wisely and economically. In fact, water has become a commodity, one that is beginning to vie with oil in terms of its economic importance. Israel, for one, has begun to buy water from Turkey. Economic considerations will certainly become increasingly instrumental in the rise of water crises in the areas where this resource is at its most scarce.
In the 21st century, the political hotspots as far as water is concerned are situated in those areas where countries have used up or are already utilising all or most of their own available water resources and have begun to tap additional amounts from the international watercourses they share with other countries. In riparian regions with urgent economic development needs and where there are vying and mounting demands on an international watercourse, disputes over water quotas could escalate to war. In fact, political scientists and other scholars and politicians have predicted that the wars of the 21st century will be over water. Arab countries threatened with water shortages or that rely on water resources from outside their borders should devote much more attention to their water security.
GLOBAL WATER RESOURCES: Some 97 per cent of the world's water is sea and ocean. Paradoxically, saltwater is the primary source of fresh water. Fresh water is the product of the hydrologic cycle, which begins with the evaporation of water from the surface of the ocean. As the water vapour rises into the air it cools and condenses to form the rain and snow that ultimately replenishes part of the water consumed by man. Freshwater is vital to economic growth and will be at the centre of the conflicts of the 21st century, especially in the world's most fragile strategic regions where most countries also have ambitious development plans and aspirations.
Since the mid-1970s, international agencies and specialised institutes and strategic research centres started to plan for the eventualities of the 21st century, towards which end they began to collect and process vast amounts of data and to organise hundreds of seminars and conferences. In a report on available freshwater resources around the world, the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) Freshwater Unit observed that from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s the global per capita share of water plunged from 12,900 to 7,600 cubic metres, or by around 40 per cent in the space of a quarter of a century. In the Arab region, the annual per capita share fell from 2,400 to 1,200 cubic metres during the same period. In September 1995, the World Bank announced that more than 80 countries were threatened by water scarcity and that 40 per cent of the population of the world lived in harsh conditions in which the basic amenities of public health were not available. The Middle East and North Africa were cited as areas suffering from water scarcity.
WATER IN THE ARAB REGION: Water resource development is one of the most serious challenges the Arab nation will face in this century, especially in view of growing demand on declining freshwater resources. Freshwater makes up only three per cent of the water on our planet. Some 77.6 per cent of this is in the form of polar or mountain icecaps and 21.8 per cent is subterranean water. Only the remaining 0.6 per cent is what meets the daily consumption, agricultural and industrial needs of the world's current population of six billion.
The Arab region, of which around a tenth is desert, is ranked as one of the poorest regions in freshwater resources. It contains less than one per cent of the world's available surface water and receives only two per cent of global annual rainfall. This relative scarcity hampers the ability to meet the water needs of Arab populaces. According to international agencies, per capita share of water should be no less than 1,000 cubic metres per year, according to the global average. In most countries of the Arab world, the annual per capita share is significantly lower and is estimated to fall to 500 cubic metres by 2025. There are 19 Arab countries that fall below the water poverty line and 14 of these do not have quantities sufficient to meet the basic needs of their citizens. In addition, because much of the Arab region is arid or semi-arid, 30 per cent of its cultivatable land is vulnerable to desertification due to water insufficiency. At the same time, the Arab world utilises only around 50 per cent of its available 340 billion cubic metres of water, exposing the remainder to waste or loss.
However, the water problem in the Arab region extends beyond the question of scarcity to the question of quality. For various reasons, the quality of water is deteriorating and large quantities of it are becoming unusable. The problem, moreover, extends to all sources of water in the Arab world. Because the major Arab rivers, such as the Nile and Euphrates, originate in non-Arab countries, those countries have a major strategic advantage over downriver Arab countries. Although the disadvantage could be offset by better use of subterranean water and rainfall, this would require huge investment in necessary projects and equipment. The alternative, water desalinisation projects, is not only costly but requires sophisticated technology. Clearly, then, the water problem is complex and multifaceted. The challenge requires a rational and innovative response, which in turn requires dynamic institutional mechanisms that are not yet available.
AVAILABLE ARAB RESOURCES: The Arab world has three basic types of water resources: renewable surface waters, slightly renewable subterranean waters, and limited quantities of water from artificial processes such as desalinisation and purification.
Rainfall is the most important source of renewable surface water. The Arab region receives an average of 2.282 billion cubic metres of rainfall every year. But rainfall is erratic, both over the course of a year and from one year to the next, which can affect the productivity of irrigated agriculture. In addition, rainfall efficacy is poor, as up to 85 per cent of it is lost to evaporation in some parts of the region, which means that only about 15 per cent of the annual rainfall can be utilised. Naturally, this situation has a direct bearing on the utilisation of land, as well as of surface and subterranean waters. Rainfall levels range from an annual 1,500 millilitres in the heights of northern Yemen, Lebanon, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Sudan to only five millilitres per year in northern Sudan and Libya. In other words, there are huge departures, positively and negatively, from the regional average of around 300 millilitres a year.
Rivers constitute the other major source of renewable water, supplying the Arab world with some 350 billion cubic metres of water a year. Of this, 125 billion cubic metres -- or 35 per cent -- come from rivers originating outside the region, with 56 billion cubic metres supplied by the Nile, 28 billion cubic metres by the Euphrates and 38 billion by the Tigris and its tributaries. At 6,695 kilometres, the Nile is the longest river in the world. Emanating from Lake Victoria and the Ethiopian heights, the Nile River basin is home to 10 countries: Ethiopia, Congo (former Zaire), Kenya, Eritrea, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Sudan and Egypt. Whereas most of these countries are located along the sources and tributaries of the Nile, Sudan and Egypt host the main course of the river, which has its mouth at the Egyptian Delta. Of all these countries, Egypt is the most dependent on Nile waters in view of its predominantly desert geography and relatively scarce rainfall.
The Tigris and the Euphrates river system originates in the Anatolian plateau and passes through Turkey, Syria and Iraq. The confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates at Al-Qurnah, to the north of Basra, forms the Shatt Al-Arab. From its source in the Armenian mountains until its confluence with the Tigris, the Euphrates is 2,780 kilometres long, of which 761 kilometres are located in Turkey, 650 kilometres in Syria, and 1,200 kilometres in Iraq. Syria is dependent on the Euphrates for 90 per cent of its water needs. Iraq is almost entirely dependent on it. Numerous dams have been constructed along this river, some of the most notable being the Tabaqa Dam in Syria, and Al-Ramadi, Al-Habaniya and Al-Hindiya dams in Iraq. The Tigris is 1,950 kilometres long, of which 342 kilometres are in Turkey, 37 kilometres form part of the Turkish- Syrian border, another 13 kilometres form part of the Syrian-Iraqi border, and 1,408 kilometres pass through Iraq. This river originates in the Taurus Mountains in Turkey and has dams or barrages at Mosul, Samaraa (Tharthar), and Kut and Amara.
The relatively small Jordan River, which forms the borders between Palestine and Jordan, is 360 kilometres long. Formed from the tributaries Al-Hasbani in Lebanon and Al-Laddan and Banias in Syria, it passes through the Hula Valley after which it drops into the Sea of Tabariya (Sea of Galilee). From there, it continues southward through Al-Ghur after which it is joined by the Yarmuk, Zarqa and Jalloud tributaries and then flows into the Dead Sea. Jordan, Syria, Palestine, Lebanon and Israel are all dependent on water from the Jordan River.
In addition to these rivers, there is a vast network of seasonal wadis. Of diverse sizes and capacities, depending on topographical formations and annual rainfall level, they number in the hundreds of thousands. These wadis only fill during certain seasons of the year and sometimes only for a few days or even hours. Although there are no concrete studies on the volume of water that flows through these wadis during their flooding seasons, it is certain to be several dozen billion cubic metres, which could possibly be tapped.
In terms of subterranean water, the Arab region sits atop an estimated 7,734 billion cubic metres, of which 35 billion cubic metres are available. These resources renew themselves at the rate of only 42 billion cubic metres a year and large portions are non-renewable. Subterranean water resources are replenished primarily from rainfall that seeps down through the ground into subterranean aquifers. But they can also be created from the upward seepage of the steam or water given off from deep geothermal or sedentary processes, and which is then trapped in subterranean pores or rock strata. There are three major aquifers in the Arab world:
- The Nubian Sandstone Aquifer System (SNAS) that spans 1.8 square kilometres covering northwest Sudan, northeast Chad, southeast Libya and most of Egypt. About 150,000 square kilometres of this is in the form of artesian wells. This enormous reservoir contains nearly 20 times the amount of annually renewable water supplies in the Arab world. The SNAS water table rises to create the Dakhla, Kharga and Farafra oases in Egypt's Eastern Desert. Libya's Great Manmade River Project will be able to transport two million cubic metres a day from this aquifer to the Libyan coast where project planners envision that it will be able to irrigate 180,000 hectares of agricultural land.
- The Bas Saharan Basin is an aquifer system that covers 140,000 square kilometres from the Atlas Mountains to Tunisia, enclosing the Grand Erg Oriental. It is estimated to contain around four times the amount of renewable water supplies in the Arab region.
- The Disi Aquifer Basin, which stretches 106,000 kilometres through southern Jordan and northern Saudi Arabia, which is the primary beneficiary.
In terms of unconventional water resources, a process pursued primarily by Libya and the Gulf countries, desalinisation provides more than 75 per cent of the water consumed in the Arab Gulf countries. This area produces 1.85 billion cubic metres of desalinised water a year, or around 90 per cent of the total amount of desalinised water produced in the Arab region. According to some American sources, 35 per cent of the world's desalinisation plants and 65 per cent of the energy devoted to such plants in the world are located in the Arab world and in the Arabian Peninsula in particular. Meanwhile, the treatment of agricultural, industrial and domestic wastewater to permit for its reutilisation in agricultural and industrial projects saves between 6.5 and 7.6 billion cubic metres of water a year. Water consumption for domestic, agricultural and industrial use in the Arab world has increased fivefold over the past 50 years. The current annual level of consumption is estimate at around 230 billion cubic metres, of which 43 billion are for domestic and industrial purposes and 187 are for agriculture.
EMERGING WATER CONFLICTS: Water is of critical importance to the Middle East, with vast stretches of arid land, ambitious economic development projects and greater than average population growth rates. A report of the Washington-based Centre for International and Strategic Studies on a seminar it organised in 1987 on US policy towards Middle Eastern water issues stated that by the third millennium water would have supplanted oil as the region's prime concern. But this is not the only region where freshwater resources have been a source of international tension. The UN and its agencies were forced to step in between India and Pakistan in the 1950s after water disputes spiralled into a full-fledged war.
Of course, some international water disputes have been resolved peacefully and, occasionally, water resources have proved instrumental in avoiding conflict and bringing countries together. Treaties between countries that share a single river are an example. Nevertheless, of the 215 trans-boundary river systems, many remain unregulated by treaties covering the various aspects of their utilisation. Although there exists a range of international principles and judicial rulings aimed at protecting acquired rights to and the freedom of navigation in what are termed international rivers, they are not comprehensive enough to forestall conflict as the water crunch grows more and more serious.
In this region, water will become a chief if not the chief source of tension when the water deficit becomes severe under the impact of the pressures of demographic growth and economic development requirements. Political hotspots surrounding water will surface in those areas where Arab freshwater resources are plundered or used illegally and where there is constant abuse or attrition of Arab water rights. Hydraulic projects on the part of countries at the source or along the tributaries of major rivers that provide the Arab world with 85 per cent of its freshwater could constitute such a threat. The threat and the consequent spectre of war would be greater where there are no treaties regulating water rights to international rivers or where existing treaties have grown obsolete and need to be renewed, or where there are no international mechanisms to enforce accepted conventions or formal agreements on water use.
The Jordan River basin, the Tigris-Euphrates river system, and the Nile River basin are all potential water resource flashpoints. Perhaps the most serious threat comes from Israel's theft and depletion of Arab water resources in the West Bank and Gaza, Jordan, the Golan Heights and South Lebanon. Israel obtains 60 per cent of its water from the occupied Arab territories. Indeed, it has been conjectured that one of the reasons it occupied these territories in 1967 and attempted to occupy Lebanon up to the Litani River in the 1980s was to ensure its own water security. Meanwhile, major Turkish hydraulic projects such as the Ataturk Dam and the Southeast Anatolia Project have sparked sharp tensions with Syria and Iraq. And to the south of the Tigris-Euphrates basin, the Shatt Al-Arab has been an arena of tension and warfare between Iraq and Iran.
The Nile River basin is no less a sensitive region, given that the Nile is the life-giving artery for both Sudan and Egypt. Recently, the quota system became a source of tension between Egypt and Sudan on the one hand, as downstream countries, and the other eight upstream countries, especially in light of Israel's attempts to help Ethiopia build dams along the Blue Nile, which would reduce the amount of water flowing into Sudan and Egypt. The Israeli hand is revealing itself day by day in southern Sudan where its backing of the rebel movement obstructs the completion of the Gongoli Canal, a joint Egyptian-Sudanese project aimed at preventing the waste and loss of Nile waters.
CHALLENGES AHEAD: Arab countries need to coordinate with other riparian countries in order to prevent or offset the potentially detrimental impact of hydraulic projects upriver. Whether the impact derives from long-term direct effects or from immediate direct effects, it will have considerable social, economic, political and technical repercussions. Otherwise put, the question of water in the Middle East is no less than a question of Arab national security. Reduction in the amount of water available to Arab countries because of upriver hydraulic projects poses a threat to their water security. Water deficiency not only hampers the ability to meet the immediate water consumption needs of a people, it also obstructs agricultural production and development, thereby threatening food security. Without food security, Arab countries cannot achieve economic self-sufficiency and, hence, true autonomy.
Upriver hydraulic projects could also impair hydraulic projects downriver, especially hydroelectricity projects. Reduction in the efficacy of these would be detrimental to industrial development and economic development in general. Then, too, there is the spectre of pollution deriving from the misuse or abuse of water by upriver riparian nations. In other parts of the Arab world, the theft or abuse of subterranean resources by non-Arab parties threatens artesian wells with salinity, making these waters unfit for consumption and for agriculture.
The political repercussions of the water crisis are obvious. Countries that can control the source of water, as is the case of upriver riparian nations, can have a powerful influence on the political will of others. Ironically, just as Arab thought turned its attention to the importance of water resources, water crises began to emerge in the Middle East. Around this time, Turkey decided to complete its mega Southeast Anatolia Project, which entailed cutting off Euphrates water from Iraq and Syria for several weeks, nearly triggering a war between these two countries and Turkey. Also around this time, the Middle East peace conference opened in Madrid in 1991. One of its stated aims was to create a climate that would enable higher levels of development in the world.
Since the second half of the 20th century, the Arab region has had to maximise the use of its water and compete over and search for additional water sources in order to address three chief challenges: high and rapid population growth rate; agricultural expansion and development in order to feed the growing population; water management. These challenges have proved all the more demanding in view of the fact that a large percentage of the populace of the Arab world depends on river systems shared with non-Arab countries. The problems created by shared international rivers have, so far, compounded other problems that plague the international relations of the region. The strategic challenge, therefore, is how these countries can secure their water rights and maintain peaceful and cooperative relations. The task is not as easy as it may appear, given that water is not the only issue of contention between nations; relations are frequently complicated are other political, economic and social problems of a cumulative historic depth.
Consider, too, that the challenges are exponential in nature. Rising population rates mean that populations double within shorter and shorter timeframes, meaning that agricultural production needs to double accordingly and so too the amount of water currently used. It is little wonder, therefore, that in this region of limited water resources some countries with the power and wherewithal to dominate water resources grab the quantities they need for the present and for the future and then proceed to turn water into a weapon in order to bend other countries to their will. As water security is increasingly threatened by scarcity and surpasses oil in strategic importance, one can easily picture it becoming not just the key to agricultural and industrial development but also the decider between life and death itself.
* The writer is a researcher at Al-Ahram Centre for Strategic and Political Studies.
Saturday, July 17, 2010
Arab Autocracy: Thank You & Goodbye
Jul 15th 2010
Courtesy Of "The Economist"
THE fate of the Arab world’s two most important states lies in the hands of ageing autocrats. Hosni Mubarak, an 82-year-old air-force general who has ruled Egypt since 1981, is widely reported to be grievously ill. King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, who assumed the throne of the Arabs’ richest country five years ago but has run the show for longer, is reckoned to be 86. The grim reaper will bring change in both places soon.
Maybe the old men will manage to control their succession. President Mubarak has been preparing the ground for his son, Gamal, to take over (see special report). King Abdullah’s anointed successor, Crown Prince Sultan, one of his 18 surviving brothers, has long been poorly, but there are plenty more where he came from (see article). Decades of repression have ensured that the opposition is quiescent in Egypt and virtually inaudible in Saudi Arabia. But they have also made these countries vulnerable to violent disruption. Transition in autocracies often means instability.
The fate of these two countries matters to the West for two big reasons: energy and security. Egypt and Saudi Arabia have been reliable, if flawed, allies. Should they stumble, the West’s interests in the region will be imperilled. That is why those regimes need to be encouraged to liberalise their countries’ economic and political systems further and turn them into places where change brings hope not fear.
What’s Wrong With Them…
The problem of Arab governance is by no means confined to those big two. In the past few centuries the Arabs, once pre-eminent in a host of skills, from astronomy and algebra to architecture and engineering, have seen their societies stagnate and fester. Though blessed with natural resources, especially the oil that has enriched Arab dynasties and their subservient elites while often leaving the masses in penury, few Arab countries have seen their non-oil economies flourish or their people enjoy the public services or freedoms taken for granted elsewhere.
Of the Arab League’s 22 members, not a single one is a stable and fully fledged democracy. Fragile but sophisticated Lebanon may come nearest, despite its lethal rivalries between sect and clan and failure to get a single national army to control all its territory (see article). Post-Saddam Iraq has had genuine multiparty elections but is mired in corruption, violence and sectarian strife. The Palestinians had a fair election in 2006 but the winners, the Islamists of Hamas, were not allowed to govern. A handful of other countries, such as Morocco and Kuwait, have multiparty systems, but monarchs still rule the roost. And where they have given way to republicans, new dynasties, such as Syria’s today and Libya’s probably tomorrow, still hold sway. Even sub-Saharan Africa has a better record of electoral freedom.
The rulers of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, ancient as they are, have made improvements. Egypt’s economy has belatedly begun to grow quite fast. The Saudi king is educating his people, even women—though he still won’t let them drive a car. He has spent more than $12 billion creating just one new university near the Red Sea port of Jeddah, while pouring many more billions into ambitious projects, such as high-speed railways, that should benefit everyone. But the closed political systems of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, the uncertainties of dynastic power-mongering and the corruption inherent in patronage-ridden autocracies still often leads to plotting at the top and frustration that could spill over into anger at the bottom. That becomes more likely as the internet, mobile phones and easier travel make people far less easy to control.
It would be naive to urge or expect either country to become a full-blooded democracy in a trice. Each could descend into chaos, winding up with a fundamentalist version of Islamist rule that would make the present regimes look cuddly by comparison. Many Egyptians, including reform-minded professionals, fear that the Islamists of the Muslim Brotherhood, the unofficial opposition, would never relinquish power once they had won it at the ballot box. Sensible Saudis know that those who sympathise with their compatriot Osama bin Laden would impose an incomparably nastier regime than the present one, if given the freedom to do so.
All the same, the suppression of Egypt’s Muslim Brothers, who have a large following, has been unwise as well as unjust. Thousands of them are in jail; many have been tortured. Leading Brothers repeatedly disavow violence and jihad, insisting that they, like Turkey’s mild Islamists, would hold multiparty elections if they ever won power—and would graciously bow out if the voters told them to. Mr Mubarak must seek to draw the Brothers openly into the parliamentary and perhaps even ministerial fold, and test their sincerity, at first by giving them a chance to run local councils. And in the presidential election due next year, all the obstacles that make it nigh-impossible for a relative outsider, such as Mohamed ElBaradei, a former head of the UN’s nuclear watchdog, to compete, should be swept away. As for the Saudis, their king should at least encourage his Allegiance Commission, an inner family body of some 35 princes that is meant to oversee the succession, to skip a generation rather than plod down the geriatric line of the surviving sons of the founding king.
…And What’s To Be Done
Elections, though vital in the end, are not an early panacea. What the Arabs need most, in a hurry, is the rule of law, independent courts, freeish media, women’s and workers’ rights, a market that is not confined to the ruler’s friends, and a professional civil service and education system that are not in hock to the government, whether under a king or a republic. In other words, they need to nurture civil society and robust institutions. The first task of a new Saudi king should be to enact a proper criminal code.
In the Arab lexicon, the concept of justice means more than democracy. In the end, you cannot have the first without the second. But the systems that now prevail in the Arab world provide for neither.
Saturday, July 10, 2010
Arabs and The Holocaust
For the West, the Holocaust is an extremely sensitive issue. Denial of the Holocaust has been criminalised In 12 Western countries. For Israel, the Holocaust (Shoah in Hebrew) is an "industry." Back in 1965 Gamal Abdel Nasser noted: "Over the past ten years, Israel has received 3,700 million dollars from Germany; that is, more than a million a day." That is the potential of the "Holocaust industry." For the Arab world, the Holocaust has become, in the words of the late Edward Said, "an obfuscatory confection created by the Elders of Zion."
The Zionist propaganda machine happily advertises the outbursts of Holocaust deniers to paint Arabs and their supporters as barbarians lacking humanism. To further discredit Arabs, they swamp the West with literature on the Grand Mufti of Palestine, Hajj Amin, who was a supporter of Hitler.
The London-based Arab intellectual Gilbert Achcar has come out with a brilliant book on the subject. His book, The Arabs and the Holocaust, debunks all clichés about Arab attitude towards the Holocaust. Arab attitudes vary on the Holocaust. As they do on Zionism, which even had Arab allies like Jordan's King Abdullah, the great-grandfather of the present king, and the Maronites of Lebanon.
During the Nazi era, when the Holocaust was in progress in Germany and German-occupied Europe and Israel was in the making in Palestine, the Arab world was convulsed by groups following four competing currents: westernised liberals, Marxists, nationalists and Pan-Islamists. Inspired by Enlightenment, the liberals staunchly opposed Nazism. For instance, the weekly Al-Risala, with a circulation of 40,000 and with contributors like Taha Hussein and Muhammad Husayn Haykal, was running scathing condemnation of Nazism and its actions. But these liberals did not hold mass appeal, given the contradiction between western values and the western occupation of the Arab world. Similarly, Arab Marxists, with many Jews in their ranks, were fighting back Nazi ideas in the Arab world. During the Hitler-Stalin pact (1931-41), they briefly toned down their criticism of Germany.
Likewise, mainstream Arab nationalists refused to sympathise with Nazism. However, ultra-nationalists (including Young Egypt and the Lebanese SSNP) emulated Nazism but did not necessarily collaborate with Hitler's Germany. It was the Grand Mufti of Palestine who openly supported Hitler and Mussolini, following the dictum that "the enemy's enemy is your friend." The pan-Islamist Mufti ignored Italy's brutal treatment of Libya and overlooked Hitler's classification of Arabs as a race inferior even to Jews. It is this Hitler-Mufti relationship that often translates into titles of anti-Arab books adorned with picture of the Mufti shaking hands with Hitler. This is why Zionism has catapulted the Mufti to the status of sole leader of the Palestinians.
Without Zionist propaganda, the Mufti's memory would have disappeared from Palestinian consciousness. A Google search conducted in 2008 turned up ten times more results for the Mufti in the English pages of the search engine than on its Arabic pages. In the hullabaloo about the Mufti's collaboration, Zionism deliberately goes schizophrenic. It ignores that only 6,300 Arabs served in the German military while hundreds of thousands of them (including 9,000 Palestinians) fought in Allied ranks.
Of the 97,000 French causalities from the Tunisian campaign leading up to the German surrender, 52 percent were Muslims. Similarly, Muslim Albania was the only country in Europe to come out of the Second World War with a larger Jewish population than it had at the beginning of the war. (Albanians have been honoured even in Israel as "righteous Gentiles.") What the Zionists also ignore is that Zionism had dealings with Nazism in the 1930s, with its Maximalist faction having affiliations with Mussolini's Italy.
Denial of the Holocaust was not in fashion in the immediate post-Holocaust/post-Israel period, especially with the rise of Nasserism. Even the Mufti refrained from Holocaust denial. Yasser Arafat called for the restoration of "a progressive, democratic and non-sectarian Palestine in which Christians, Muslims and Jews will worship, work and live peacefully and enjoy equal rights."
Denial of the Holocaust gained currency only in the past three decades. This denial is caused by several factors. It is a way to vent anger against Israel's monopoly on victimhood, for which it unfailingly invokes the Shoah. Two cases of Holocaust denial in the last 15 years have attracted worldwide attention. In his 1995 book on Holocaust, French convert to Islam Roger Garaudy contested the validity of Holocaust accounts and had to face trial in France. In 2005, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran issued a statement in Mecca (also to embarrass his hosts) which denied the Holocaust. He thus handed the Zionists a new whip to lash the Arabs with. In 2001, a conference of Holocaust deniers was planned in Beirut. The event was cancelled because of opposition by intellectual like Edward Said, Mahmoud Darwaish and Elias Khouri. Such intellectual giants have always opposed Holocaust denials.
Regardless of the attitudes of varying ideological currents, Arabs of all political orientations opposed Jewish immigration to Palestine in the period leading up to Israel's creation. They talk about the Nakba (Catastrophe), as Arabs refer to the event of May 15, 1948, in relation to the Shoah. Gilbert says: "The Holocaust was incomparably crueler and bloodier than the Nakba. This consideration, however, in no way diminishes the tragedy of the Palestinians, particularly since they did not, as a people, bear any blame for the destruction of European Jewry." How true!
(All facts have been cited from Gilbert Achacar's book 'Arabs and the Holocaust').
The writer is a freelance contributor.
Email: mfsulehria@hotmail.com
Thursday, May 27, 2010
The West Cannot Afford Arab Democracy
By Khaled Hroub
Wednesday, May 19, 2010
Courtesy Of "The Daily Star"
world results from an unholy alliance between Western interests and local autocrats, justified by what both sides claim to be the region’s “cultural specificity.” In a nutshell, it has been much easier for the West to do business in the post-colonial Middle East with un-democratic regimes, which have found Western support and recognition useful in marginalizing local liberal and democratic forces, even as it paved the way for the rise of Islamist radicalization.
Sticks as well as carrots have been used – by both sides – to maintain this alliance. For example, the Western emphasis on reform and democracy in recent years has been used more often than not as a threat, a typical message being: “Help us in Iraq or we will press for democracy and human rights in your own country.” And the Arab reply is equally threatening: “Stop pressing us on the reform issue or we won’t cooperate in the ‘war on terror!’”
Two other major issues have sustained the trade-off: Israel and the rise of the Islamist movements. The Arab public overwhelmingly regards Israel as an alien and illegitimate entity imposed by force on Palestinian land with Western support. If this perception was channeled democratically and allowed to shape the policies of the Arab countries toward Israel, any peace negotiations would be even more complicated than they are now.
So it is far easier for authoritarian regimes like Egypt and Jordan (and in the future perhaps Syria), where there is no need for parliamentary agreement, to launch negotiations and sign peace agreements with Israel. Likewise, in Morocco, Tunisia, Mauritania, Qatar, Oman and Bahrain, where various low-level contacts and Israeli representations exist, undemocratic regimes can define whatever relationship with Israel they choose.
The rise of radical Islamism has been no less obstructive when it comes to Arab democracy. Decades of unholy alliance between Arab autocrats and the West have seen radical Islam emerge as a “salvation” force. If free and fair elections were to be held in any Arab country, Islamists would come to power. That was the case in Algeria in 1991-1992, in Iraq in 2005, and in the West Bank and Gaza in 2006. Other countries, such as Jordan, Morocco, Kuwait, Yemen, and Bahrain, have created more limited space for democracy. There, too, Islamists have immediately filled it.
The West has wasted decades, missing countless chances to establish regimes that could empower Arab liberal and democratic forces. The West’s blind support for autocratic Arab rulers has reduced all hope of peaceful change. The democratic process has lost its aura and its thrust, not least because democratization seems to lead to the rise of political movements that the West finds unacceptable. The whole notion of democracy has been eroded and discredited, with the radicalization that engulfs many Muslim societies now spilling over into their emigrant communities in the West.
When US President George W. Bush’s administration launched its Middle East Partnership Initiative for democratization in 2002, it turned out to be too little too late – and it died too soon. The allocated budget was just $29 million, but its rapid death can also be ascribed to its short-sighted design – and to Barack Obama, who has shown little interest in the issue. Obama’s praise of Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak as a man with whom one could do business demoralized Egyptian opposition groups, which have been struggling against the long-serving autocrat and his efforts to ensure that his son, Gamal Mubarak, succeeds him.
The United States is not the only guilty party. Europe has played a major role in retarding democratic reform in Libya and Saudi Arabia. Libya has become a Mecca for European leaders trying to win multi-billion dollar oil and investment deals. The rehabilitation of Colonel Moammar Gadhafi’s regime has never included any push to ease political repression in Libya.
An even more telling case is Saudi Arabia. No European leader risks antagonizing the Saudis by raising the issue of democracy and human rights. Saudi women remain prohibited from driving cars, traveling on their own, and working or studying without the permission of a male relative. Saudi society, like societies in some other Gulf States, lacks minimum levels of political freedom and participation. The status quo is excused by Arab regimes in the name of cultural specificity – the same pretext used by Western governments to justify their “value-free” policies toward these regimes.
Add together all the trade-offs between the West and the Arab regimes, along with the Israeli and Islamist factor, and the conclusion at which one arrives is as inescapable as it is alarming: the West cannot afford democracy in the region.
Khaled Hroub is the director of Cambridge University’s Arab Media Project and author of “Hamas: Political Thought and Practice”.THE DAILY STARpublishes this commentary in collaboration with Project Syndicate © (www.project-syndicate.org).
Friday, April 23, 2010
Time For US To Recognise Reality Of Iran’s Nuclear Plans
By Tony Karon
First Published 2010-04-04
Courtesy Of Middle-East-Online
Iran diplomacy in Washington these days consists principally of coaxing the likes of Russia and China to support new sanctions – and persuading gullible journalists that Moscow and Beijing are “on board”.
On Friday, the US president Barack Obama told CBS television that Iran is trying to get the “capacity to develop nuclear weapons”, and that he and his allies “are going to ratchet up the pressure ... with a unified international community”. Nobody sets much store by such talk, of course, because President George W Bush had been saying the same thing since 2006 with little effect.
Sure, Russia and China have agreed to finally discuss a Security Council resolution to increase sanctions first imposed three years ago over Iran’s failure to comply with all the transparency requirements of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). But Moscow and Beijing have also made clear that they don’t believe Iran is building nuclear weapons. Nor does the US, for that matter. The CIA’s assessment is that no such decision has yet been taken, and that Iran’s current nuclear efforts will simply give it the option to build nuclear weapons.
As a result, Russia and China have also made clear that they will block any new sanctions that inflict significant pain on the Islamic Republic, aware that the stand-off can only be resolved by dialogue, and that sanctions are unlikely to help.
The international community is certainly united in the belief that Iran should not be allowed to build nuclear weapons, but “the capacity to develop nuclear weapons” is a different matter. Any state with a full fuel-cycle civilian nuclear energy programme has the “capacity” to develop nuclear weapons, and such a programme is Iran’s right as a signatory to the NPT. Until now, the position of the US, France, Britain and Israel has been that Iran can’t be allowed to enrich uranium for energy purposes, because enrichment gives it the means to create weapons-grade materiel. But for the rest of the international community, the issue is simply ensuring that Iran’s enrichment programme complies with NPT safeguards against weaponisation.
Now the position of the US has proven to be untenable. “The Iranians are determined to have a nuclear programme,” the former US secretary of state Colin Powell said last week. “Notice I did not say a nuclear weapon. Notwithstanding the last six or seven years of efforts on our part to keep them from having that nuclear programme, they have it. I don’t yet see a set of sanctions coming along that would be so detrimental to the Iranians that they are going to stop that programme. So I think ultimately the solution has to be a negotiated one.”
Similarly, the chairman of the Senate foreign relations committee, John Kerry, warned last June that the US demand for Iran to forego enrichment altogether was “ridiculous”, noting that as a signatory to the NPT, “they have a right to peaceful nuclear power and to enrichment in that purpose”.
Mr Powell and Mr Kerry were advocating that the US boost its chances of diplomatic success by accepting Iran’s right to enrich uranium, while strengthening safeguards against weaponisation. But the Obama administration has not changed its stance. And after the failure of a deal to swap most of Iran’s current enriched uranium stockpile for reactor fuel, Washington has focused its efforts on grinding out agreements for incremental increases in sanctions – sanctions that everyone expects will fail, and for which there’s no Plan B. Mr Obama still talks gamely about “leaving all options on the table” (code for threatening military action), but the US strategic establishment is openly sceptical of a course of action that risks a disastrous region-wide war in exchange for very limited gains.
As the defence secretary Robert Gates put it late last year: “There is no military option that does anything more than buy time,” suggesting that bombing would set Iran back by just one to three years.
And despite the apocalyptic rhetoric in the Israeli mainstream, coolheaded analysts say Israel won’t be in a position to take military action against Iran without US approval and assistance – which is unlikely. That has left some resigned to a Cold War-type strategy of “containment” of a nuclear-armed Iran, which also presents considerable perils of a possible war. Indeed, it’s hard to avoid the impression that Mr Obama is locked into the same paralysis as his predecessor was on Iran.
US leaders often claim that they’re acting against Iran on behalf of the whole Middle East region, implying that their strategy has the backing of Arab governments. Washington hawks insist that the Arabs would applaud if the US bombed Iran, utilising the silence of the Arab regimes to speak as if on their behalf. That underscores the importance of the Arab voices that have begun challenging the idea that a confrontation with Iran could produce any positive outcome.
At last week’s Arab League summit, the secretary general Amr Moussa called for the stand-off to be tackled through Arab dialogue with Iran. “We need to see where we differ and where we disagree with Iran and how to deal with that,” Mr Moussa said. “Iran is not an enemy and dialogue will help bring about peace and stability in the region.”
The Arab League had best get on with it, because nothing coming out of Washington right now offers any hope of breaking a stalemate that could yet engulf the region in flames. Washington and Tehran both need help finding their way to a new modus vivendi. Some of that help will come from China, Turkey and even Japan, which has discreetly been trying to broker a nuclear deal. But it is the Arabs on whose behalf Washington hawks are urging that Iran be bombed, and it is the Arabs who would suffer many of the disastrous consequences of such an act of war. That should give them plenty of incentive to play a meaningful role in keeping the peace.
Tony Karon is an analyst based in New York who blogs atwww.tonykaron.com. This article appeared in The National of Abu Dhabi.