Wednesday, July 30, 2008

A Case Of Double Standards

By Salma Shaheen
Wednesday, July 30, 2008
Courtesy Of
The International News Of Pakistan

India has made public a draft safeguards agreement submitted to the IAEA on July 08, 2008. In order for the Indo-US nuclear deal to be approved by Congress, this draft needs to be approved by the IAEA Board of Governors (BoG) and the 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

India has very astutely formulated this draft, first by making it an 'umbrella agreement' and second by incorporating several clauses in form of 'corrective measures' and conditions of termination of the agreement which serve to deter both the IAEA and NSG member states. However, a careful scrutiny of the draft reveals a classic case of contradiction whereby India will on one hand enjoy the fruits of nuclear commerce and, on the other, will continue to vertically proliferate where its nuclear weapons are concerned.

The violation of global non-proliferation norms with the introduction of such discriminatory 'country-specific' approaches should be obvious to even a layperson. While this deal will promote cooperation between India and NSG states, at the same time it also sends mixed signals to the rest of the world. Also, such a country-specific exemption also sends a signal to non-NPT states – specifically Pakistan and Israel – that nuclear commerce is possible even if you are outside the nuclear club.

It is important to analyze this India-specific draft agreement for the purpose of 'specifics' it offers to India. The preamble of the draft is of special importance. It provides India with the threshold that it needs to throw its weight around through clauses that effectively deter other states from proliferation. Secondly, India wants to put up a show that it has safeguarded its sovereignty to the extent that it can opt out of the agreement at any time.

This is essential to please its domestic audience much of which has expressed disapproval over the deal.

In this regard, India can take three possible measures. It can terminate the agreement (which is the draft under discussion), it can remove its facilities from the annex meaning that these will fall outside the purview of IAEA inspection, and it can divert nuclear material from military to civilian facilities (something it did in 1974 after sanctions were imposed). If any of these three possibilities actually happen, then will be severe consequences for regional stability.

Given that India has come a long way from non-alignment to striking strategic cooperation with major powers over the decades, agreements like this one and the subsequent process of being accepted by the IAEA and NSG as a power of some standing will certainly its negotiating position where nuclear commerce is concerned. The deal is also likely to provide India de facto recognition as a nuclear-weapon state but the best part will be that it will be a guilt-free status, where it will be free to participate in the nuclear trade. Surely, this makes a complete mockery of global efforts aimed at eliminating proliferation of nuclear weapons and materials.

The realization of the deal will also allow transfer of technological know-how (otherwise termed as intangible proliferation) this will boost scientific development in India and thus allow development of new and advanced technologies. Besides this, such nuclear cooperation will allow India to utilize he uranium reserves that are consequently freed up for building more nuclear weapons.

In essence, the draft is problematic n two accounts. Firstly, the security environment in the region is already fragile given the tri-nuclear relationships existing in the region between India China and Pakistan. Secondly, nuclear proliferation threats at the global level are multiplying and there are also increasing concerns – justified – about dual-use technologies and nuclear terrorism. In such a delicate environment both at the regional and international level, allowing one country to indulge in nuclear commerce can only complicate regional and international security.
The writer is an Islamabad-based analyst. Email: shaheensalma@gmail.com

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