India Fortifies Its Island Defenses

By Sudha Ramachandran
May 8, 2012
Courtesy Of "Asia Times Online"

BANGALORE - The Indian Navy has commissioned a new base, Indian Naval Ship (INS) Dweeprakshak, in the Lakshadweep Islands. Located at Kavaratti, the island chain's capital, Dweeprakshak will provide the navy with a permanent and more robust presence in waters that are threatened by pirates. 

The Lakshadweep archipelago (Lakshadweep means a hundred thousand islands in Sanskrit) consists of 36 islands, 12 atolls, three reefs and five submerged banks that are scattered in the southern Arabian Sea, 200-400 kilometers off the southern Indian coastal state of Kerala. 

Since 1980, the Indian Navy has operated a detachment in the Lakshadweep Islands. However, in December 2010 a Coast Guard district headquarters was commissioned at Kavaratti and a Coast Guard station was set up at Minicoy. A second Coast Guard station was set up at Androth Island in April this year. 

The facilities at Lakshadweep have been scaled up now to a full-fledged naval base. 

INS Dweeprakshak is India's sixth naval base and the fourth protecting the country's western flank. It is India's second base in island territories, the other being the base at the Andaman and Nicobar Islands in the Bay of Bengal. Dweeprakshak will come under the Southern Naval Command. 

The decision to beef up India's naval muscle at Lakshadweep has its roots in security concerns in the wake of the terrorist attacks in Mumbai in 2008 and the rising threat of pirate attacks in the Arabian Sea in recent years. Lakshadweep's strategic significance stems not only from its proximity to the Indian mainland but also, Nine Degree Channel - a 200-kilometer wide stretch of water through which much of the shipping between West Asia and South East Asia transits runs to the north of Minicoy, the southern-most of the islands. 

The magnitude of India's concern over the safety of sea lanes can be gauged from the fact that over 97% percent of India's trade by volume and 75% by value is sea borne. The key role that the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean play in meeting its India's energy requirements is evident from the fact that 67% of this comes from the Persian Gulf and 17% from Africa. 

Although the vulnerability of India's coast to terrorist infiltration and attacks became apparent in the early 1990s - the huge quantity of explosives used in the serial blasts in Mumbai in March 1993 was transported through the sea route - it was only after the terror attacks there in November 2008 that the India establishment began acting to secure the coasts - investigations revealed that Lashkar-e-Toiba operatives from Pakistan entered Mumbai undetected via the Arabian Sea. India has now put in place a maritime defense plan to secure its 7,516-km long coast line, including the island territories of Laskhadweep. 

The infrastructure set up in Lakshadweep is essential not only to safeguard the Indian mainland from terrorist attacks but also to prevent terrorists from taking sanctuary on the islands. Of Lakshadweep's 36 islands, 26 are uninhabited. That makes them vulnerable to misuse by terrorists for sanctuary or as training bases. Such anxieties have grown in the wake of the growing religious extremism, reported jihadi activity and political instability in the Maldives, which lie to the south of Lakshadweep. 

Besides, there is the threat of piracy to Indian and other shipping near India's waters. Anti-piracy operations by the multi-national task force in the Gulf of Aden created a "balloon effect", which resulted in pirate attacks shifting further afield into the middle of the Indian Ocean, even the seas near the Indian coastline. There have been a series of incidents in recent years involving piracy and trespassing in the vicinity of the Lakshadweep Islands. 

In March 2010, for instance, pirates sought to hijack a Maltese ship 200 nautical miles off Lakshadweep Islands in India's exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The attempt was foiled by the Indian Navy. 

Then in May, eight Somali pirates were apprehended by the Indian navy off the Lakshadweep Islands. In November, two piracy attempts on container ships were successfully thwarted; one of the incidents happened just 150 nautical miles off Minicoy. 

In December, a Bangladesh merchant ship was hijacked by Somalian pirates some 70 nautical miles from the Lakshadweep Islands. The same month an Indian warship on patrol apprehended an Iranian dhow with four Iranians and 15 Pakistanis on board some 300 nautical miles west of Lakshadweep's Bitra Island in India's EEZ. In November last year, a "mysterious" Iranian shipMV Assa that was reportedly armed was docked in the EEZ near Lakshadweep for around 40 days. 

Surveillance and patrolling of the seas off the Lakshadweep Islands by the Indian Navy and Coast Guard have resulted in hundreds of pirates being apprehended over the past year. The setting up of a full-fledged naval base at Lakshadweep will substantially enhance India's capacity to ward off threats from pirates and terrorists. 

India has deployed a warship in the Gulf of Aden as part of the multi-national anti-piracy force. It has stationed two warships in the central and eastern Arabian Sea "but in a flexible formation for redeployment on an as required basis", India Abroad News Service reported. Such efforts will be further strengthened by the base at Lakshadweep, which will have warships, aircraft and helicopters. 

While the naval base will enhance the infrastructure and capacity of the coastal security network, the problems of India's coastal security seem rather basic and cannot be addressed by deploying more warships. 

The flaws in the coastal security network were made visible rather dramatically during the turbulent monsoon months last year when unmanned ships slipped past radars and other high-tech "eyes" to drift undetected in Indian waters and ran aground at Mumbai's Juhu beach. 

The first incident occurred on 12 June 2011, when a 9,000-ton cargo ship MV Wisdom that was headed to the Alang shipbreaking yard in Gujarat broke tow, and then drifted on to Juhu beach. Then on July 31, the 1,000-ton MV Pavit, which had been abandoned by its crew a month earlier near Oman, ran aground at Juhu beach. The 1,000-ton ship had drifted for over a hundred hours in India's territorial waters and slipped past a three-level coastal security network involving the navy, the coast guard and the coastal police before it crept up on to the beach. 

These were not small fishing boats but massive vessels and that they could enter not just Indian waters but also ride right onto the coast undetected is a damning indictment of the coastal security network. 

While analysts have focussed on the poor infrastructure in detailing the leaks in the coastal security network, it is the lack of communication and co-ordination between the navy, the coast guard and the coastal police that lies at the heart of its failures. 

Consider the response to MV Pavit's advance onto the Indian coast. It appears that the ship was first sighted the previous night by a hotel manager looking at the sea through his binoculars. He alerted a police station at Juhu. A cop went to the beach but couldn't see the vessel. He did not pass on the information anyway to the Coast Guard. 

The following morning, fishermen saw the vessel lurching towards the coast. The informed the police station, who again failed to alert the coast guard. When the cops finally informed the coast guard at around 8.30 am, the latter asked for the information to be faxed but the police station was not equipped with a fax machine. By then, MV Pavit had run aground at Juhu beach taking early morning joggers by surprise. 

Very basic problems are causing the coastal security network to leak. These are problems that warships cannot fix. 

According to Pushpita Das of the Delhi-based Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, the "problem lies not in the measures adopted but in the inadequate attention paid to the functioning of the system at the ground level where the actual action takes place". 

The little "coordination or information sharing" taking place at present between the navy, the coast guard and the coastal police "is largely based on personal rapport between the concerned officers", she observes, calling for the institutionalization of this "rapport". 

A new naval base with warships and aircraft is a fine idea for enhancing security in the seas. But there is only so much it can do to secure the coast. 

Sudha Ramachandran is an independent journalist/researcher based in Bangalore. She can be reached atsudha98@hotmail.com 

(Copyright 2012 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved.)

The Battle For The South China Sea

Who Owns The World's Busiest Shipping Lane and What Lies Below The Surface That Is Causing Growing Tensions?

Counting The Cost
Last Modified: 03 Jun 2011 09:25
Courtesy Of "Al-Jazeera"

Six countries are all scrambling for the South China Sea. China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, Taiwan and Malaysia are all making claims to it.

But why now? China estimates there could be up to 213 billion barrels of oil beneath the sea. This would mean China would have the world's second-largest proven oil reserves, just falling behind Saudi Arabia, which has 264 billion barrels.

There are also estimates of up to two quadrillion cubic feet of hydrocarbon natural gas.

Also corruption and bribery in the beautiful game. We look at the crisis at the heart of FIFA and how it can fix its reputation after facing allegations of bribery and corruption. Counting the Cost scrutinises FIFA's 2010 financial report.

And protecting the rain forests. The clash between business and environment in Indonesia where a two-year government ban on rainforest logging is facing challenges.

Vague Sea Borders Let Hawks Pick Their Fight

By Francesco Sisci
September 23, 2010
Courtesy Of "Asia Times Online"

BEIJING - The question of who ultimately owns the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands scattered in the middle of the ocean between China and Japan has lingered for decades over the political and economic regional balance of power and could well take a few more decades to settle.

While Tokyo is officially investigating the incident in early September when a Chinese fishing boat, the Minjinyu 5179, was chased by the Japanese coast guard, and Beijing is seething with rage because of the investigation, a crowd of questions surrounds the incident. Very little is clear, and so it is uncertain who picked the fight.

At the time of the incident, some 160 Chinese fishing vessels were working in the shallow waters near the islands. Was the Minjinyu 5179 doing anything special? Was it the first time that a Chinese boat was hemmed in by Japanese patrols? If it was not the first time, at other times, did Chinese sailors obey Japanese orders once spotted? Why did the Minjinyu 5179 not obey this time? Was it only the Japanese who picked the fight?

Was the Chinese vessel simply a fishing boat, or did it have other purposes? Was it spying on submarine routes or other things?

Were the Japanese enforcing the limits around the islands for the first time? If not - and it is most likely it wasn't the first time - why did Tokyo decide to blow it up this time, during a delicate political power struggle for the leadership of the ruling Democratic Party of Japan(DPJ)? At the same time as the incident, Ichiro Ozawa was challenging Prime Minister Naoto Kan for the DPJ presidency. Did the Japanese navy take the lead over the politicians? Or were the politicians in Tokyo cueing the navy?

Or was Beijing trying to prod Tokyo at a sensitive time, shortly after China overtook Japan's gross domestic product to become the world's second-largest economy after the United States? Again, was it the Chinese military or the government? Or was the incident simply something that got out of hand as the vessel rammed the Japanese boat? Or did they just crash against each other because of the waves or a captain's mistake?

Additionally, why did Japan decide to make a case out of it by reporting it? Many such incidents took place during the Cold War, but they almost all went ignored. Was the Minjinyu 5179 one of many unaccounted incidents? In this case, why inform about this one and ignore the others?

The Japanese reported the story first, but perhaps they had to because they arrested the crew. Anyway, could the arrest go unaccounted for, and why did they have to arrest the crew? Couldn't they simply stop, reprimand the crew, and return them to China?

None of these questions has a clear answer, and possibly there will never be answers, since both sides, with the facts in their hands, have an interest in presenting their own versions of the story.

Is it just a coincidence that the incident occurred just weeks after US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced that the South China Sea, claimed by China and six other neighboring countries and territories, was of strategic importance for America, something that ruffled many feathers in Beijing? Is it another coincidence that it came after Beijing voiced its displeasure over the joint US-South Korean naval exercises just off the North Korean waters? Is there a broader plot by the US to hem in China, or by China trying to push its borders out?

Here is the crux: all around China there are vague sea boundaries, with even vaguer claims, and any side can push the envelope, or take actions that may be perceived as pushing the envelope. At any given moment an aircraft, a submarine or a fishing boat could cause an incident. Somebody can then leak it to the press and have it become a big international issue, stirring public emotions that kindle other incidents. In a matter of days, it could become a wildfire in which other countries demonize China or China demonizes other countries.

In other words, China can pick a fight with the rest of the world just by pushing the envelope on its vague ocean borders. Similarly, any country in the world can push China into a fight by stirring trouble with one of its neighbors.

During the Cold War, it was clear that incidents could fan the flames of public opinion and things could easily get out of control. Therefore, they were kept out of the public eye, and if they were leaked, it was clear that the tension was rising. At the time, besides the rules of conduct on the field, the sides believed it was necessary to muffle incidents - or reveal them according to political opportunities.

One way to handle them with China in the future could be to agree to a mutual ''non-disclosure agreement''. Therefore, it would be clear that the one breaking the agreement was the one wanting to pick a fight. As nobody wishes to be seen as the cause of a clash, there could be some incentive to restrain people on the field.

Moreover, the Minjinyu 5179 incident underscores once again a deep weakness in China. The government is dogged by hawks who want to start a fight with America. There are also doves, wishing to come to terms or even to "surrender" to America. Nobody knows for sure how strong either camp is, but certainly the hawks are pretty vocal.

If the system were to become democratic and the issue went to a vote, it is most likely that the hawks, appealing to the basest Chinese instincts and the half-hidden xenophobia dating back to colonial times, could perform well by fanning the flames of any "foreign provocation". In fact, opposition to alien prevarication or invasion brought down the empire, which was deemed too weak to deal with foreigners. And it was what made Mao Zedong's fortunes, as he managed to portray himself as a true patriot against Chiang Kai-shek (the nationalist leader), who was perceived as too weak with the invading Japanese.

The Chinese government has an interest in trying to come to terms with foreigners, who also provided the atmosphere and conditions for the extraordinary growth of the past 30 years, and has little interest in riding the tiger of nationalism. The apparent target of nationalists is foreign governments, but the real target is their own government that could easily be accused of being too weak with foreigners. Therefore, this government, if it wants to carry on with opening up and trading with the world, and being without the mandate of a popular vote, has an interest in squashing and forgetting about these incidents, which put it on the spot.

But a democratically elected government could be in no position to ignore those incidents, especially if the nationalists were openly prodding its flanks and threatening to undermine a parliamentary majority by shouting xenophobic slogans in their own free press. In other words, an undemocratic China, fully integrated into the world market, although weak because of a government without a popular mandate, can be in a position to cave in to foreign requests. A democratic China could react very differently.

We tend to forget that early 20th century Germany, which gingerly started World War I, the mother of all wars in Europe and the beginning of the end of the European domination of the world, was fully democratic. War was also voted for by the Social Democrats who, according to the then popular belief, were supposed to be pacifists, as proletarians' rights were thought to be without frontiers. In a similar fashion, a future democratic China could well be more war-mongering than present authoritarian China.

Here, there could be a paradox for America: if it wants to avoid a confrontation with China, it might have to cooperate more closely with authoritarian Chinese Communist Party (CCP); if the US wants war, it could conversely try to push for a democratic China.

In a similar way, egged on by foreigners prickling over disputed areas, a nationalist group within the CCP could stage a coup in China and embark the country on a defense of its borders, as Chinese extra-nationalists claim that the People's Republic lost territories to all of its neighbors.

This forecast may be wrong, and surely nobody can be certain about future developments. Yet there are many reasons to tread carefully on territorial disputes, both for China and for its neighbors - unless either party wishes for an open conflict.

Francesco Sisci is the Asia Editor of La Stampa. His e-mail is fsisci@gmail.com

(Copyright 2010 Francesco Sisci.)