Armed Conflict Looming In East Asia

At the heart of the territorial dispute is a chain of islands under Japanese control that is also claimed by Taiwan.

The islands - known as Senkaku in Japan, Diaoyu in China and Diaoyutai on Taiwan - are close to strategic shipping lanes and are thought to have oil deposits.

Japan is also locked in another territorial dispute with its former colony South Korea. Both claim sovereignty over another island chain, known as Takeshima by the Japanese and Dokdo by the Koreans.

All these disagreements are linked to Japan's 20th century military expansion across Asia.

Also adding to the anger of Japan's neighbours was the way two Japanese cabinet ministers decided the mark the anniversary of the end of World War II in the Pacific.

They ignored the Japanese prime minister's call and visited the controversial Yasukuni shrine in Tokyo, a move that always anger China and South Korea.

To both Beijing and Seoul the gesture amounts to an official veneration of the 14 convicted war criminals laid to rest there, along with the two million war dead.

"A lot of this is due to the fact that Japan was made to look somewhat cowardly in 2010 when it had to hand over the Chinese ship captain who was in the boat collision in the dispute over the Senkaku islands… Japan wants to be strong and they need to protect themselves in the region."

Brett Bull, a freelance reporter

Legacy Of Dispute

Struggle Over The Nile

It Is A Source Of Sustenance But Also Of Tension and New Political Realities Are Now Increasing Uncertainty.

Last Modified: 07 Jun 2011 11:18
Courtesy Of "Al-Jazeera"

The world's longest river is a source of sustenance for almost 400 million people. But it is also a source of tension.

"When the British took control of Egypt in 1882 they very soon realised that they had become rulers of a society totally dependent upon the Nile. So they understood from the very beginning that the economic development and political stability of Egypt depended upon [control of] the Nile" Professor Terje Tvedt, geographer

These tensions have their roots in the 19th century. The colonial decisions of the past are a point of bitter dispute today.

"Most Sudanese believe that the Nile agreements were unjustly set and that distribution of the water should have been based on the size of the country. Sudan's share would have been much more than what was agreed upon because it is far larger" Sharaf-Eldin Banaga, Sudanese consultant engineer

And new political realities on the ground are increasing the sense of uncertainty over who owns the River Nile.

"All the time they walk out, but they still come back ... because there is no other source that they can be able to use ... and what we have been telling them, the only simple way is cooperation .... I think even in marriage if the husband and wife cannot talk, then there will be no cooperation in that house ... if one runs away, the night will come and [they] will still have to come back ... and they will have to sit at a table and negotiate and see what the problem is" John Nyaoro, Kenyan director of water resources

The second episode in the three-part Struggle Over the Nile series examines the historical fascination with the Nile and the forces that shaped the way it is used today.

Arab World Faces Worsening Water Crisis

Thu Nov 4, 2010 2:00pm GMT
Courtesy Of "Reuters Africa"

* Arab world to face severe water scarcity by 2015

* Population to hit 600 million by 2050 from 360 million

* Groundwater over-exploited, cheap pricing leads to waste

By Alistair Lyon, Special Correspondent

BEIRUT, Nov 4 (Reuters) - The Arab world, one of the driest regions on the planet, will tip into severe water scarcity as early as 2015, a report issued on Thursday predicts.

By then, Arabs will have to survive on less than 500 cubic metres of water a year each, or below a tenth of the world average of more than 6,000 cubic metres per capita, said the report by the Arab Forum for Environment and Development (AFED).

"The Arab world is already living a water crisis that will only get worse with inaction," the report says, adding per capita supply has plunged to only a quarter of its 1960 level.

Rapid population growth will further stress water resources. According to U.N. projections, the Arabs, who now number almost 360 million, will multiply to nearly 600 million by 2050.

Climate change will aggravate matters. By the end of this century, Arab countries may experience a 25 percent drop in precipitation and a 25 percent increase in evaporation rates, according to climate change models cited in the report.

"As a result, rain-fed agriculture will be threatened, with average yields estimated to decline by 20 percent," it says.

Thirteen Arab countries are among the world's 19 most water-scarce nations. People in eight Arab countries already have to make do with less than 200 cubic metres a year each.

"Without fundamental changes in policies and practices, the situation will get worse, with drastic social, political and economic ramifications," the AFED report says.

Conditions vary across the region, but within five years only Iraq and Sudan will pass the water scarcity test, defined as over 1,000 cubic metres a year per capita, assuming supplies from Turkey and Ethiopia still flow at current levels.

Agriculture consumes 85 percent of Arab water use, compared with a world average of 70 percent. Irrigation efficiency is only 30 percent, against a world average of 45 percent.

Groundwater is over-exploited, leading to significant declines in water tables, pollution of aquifers and seawater intrusion in coastal areas, AFED says. More than 43 percent of wastewater is discharged raw, while only 20 percent is reused.

The Arab world has 5 percent of the world's population but only 1 percent of its renewable fresh water, so several Gulf Arab countries rely heavily on desalinated sea water -- accounting for more than half the world's desalination capacity.

GOLF COURSES IN THE DESERT

Some of the expensive desalinated water is used to irrigate low-value crops or even golf courses, the AFED report says.

Discharge from the desalination plants, which use imported, polluting technologies, makes sea water warmer and more saline.

Despite its scarcity, water is often squandered in the Arab world thanks to low prices and subsidies that disguise its cost.

"Free water is wasted water," the report says, noting average prices charged in the region cover 35 percent of water production costs and only 10 percent for desalinated water.

Governments, which often focus on seeking new supplies of water, should instead concentrate on improving water management, rationalising consumption, encouraging reuse and protecting water supplies from overuse and pollution, AFED urges.

Better water management presents huge challenges in Arab countries where most public organisations serving irrigation and urban water needs "do not function properly".

Water pricing schemes are needed to attract new investment in the sector, but that will not be enough, the report says.

"No technological or engineering solutions will be effective without the necessary policy, institutional and legal reforms." (Editing by Janet Lawrence)

(For full report see www.afedonline.org/Report/2010/main.asp)

Taking The Troubled Waters In Egypt

By Abdel Monem Said Aly

Monday, July 19, 2010

Courtesy Of "The Daily Star"

It was one single paragraph in one article of a much larger agreement that triggered a semi-crisis situation among the Nile basin states. Paragraph B, article 14 turned a promise of regional cooperation into tension and a threat to the national security of some states. It called for the right of all Nile basin states to erect projects on the Nile. Those who are familiar with international relations know that crises and wars can emerge from much less than a single paragraph.

This story finds its origins in colonial times. It was in 1902 and 1929 when Britain, the custodian of Egypt and Sudan, negotiated and signed agreements with Ethiopia to give both Arab countries historic rights to the waters of the Nile. In 1959, Cairo signed an agreement with Khartoum that guarantees Egypt 55 billion cubic meters while giving Sudan 18 billion annually. In fact, Sudan has never used the amount assigned to it, while Egypt has “borrowed” what it needed or stored it behind its dams, particularly the Aswan Dam after 1970.

The other Nile basin states have questioned the legality of these three agreements, arguing that what was signed in colonial times was invalidated in the period of independence. The Egyptians and Sudanese have responded that Ethiopia was an independent country at the time of the 1929 agreement. They argue that one of the foundations of the Organization of African Unity (now the African Union) is that agreements signed during colonial times remain sacrosanct, and that international law acknowledges not only historic rights to river waters but also does not permit any country at a river’s source to affect the flow of waters to other riparian countries.

Legal debates aside, Cairo has taken a different approach. The starting point is to differentiate between the Nile basin and the Nile River. Regarding the former, rainfall is approximately 1,660 billion cubic meters annually, 85 percent of which is on the Ethiopian high plateau. The remaining rainfall is recorded in the African great lakes and Nile basin states, including Congo, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Central Africa, Kenya, Rwanda and Burundi. What reaches the Nile River is about 100 billion cubic meters, some of which flows into the Mediterranean.

What is needed, Cairo has argued, is the creation of projects that use the vast remaining quantity of water to support development in all the participating countries. The Nile Basin Initiative was born as a partnership among the Nile riparian states that “seeks to develop the river in a cooperative manner, share substantial socioeconomic benefits, and promote regional peace and security.” It was formally launched in February 1999 by the water ministers of 10 countries: Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo. (Eritrea is not a Nile basin state but is participating because of its past relations with Ethiopia).

For the next decade, the countries strove to establish a framework of cooperation involving a wide range of possibilities for projects that allow the generation of electricity and the collection of large quantities of water wasted in the Nile marshes. A regional commission was planned to lead the process of cooperation in a variety of fields. However, differences remained over recognition of past agreements and “historic rights.”

With negotiations on these issues still ongoing, on May 14, 2010 four countries, Uganda, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Tanzania, opened an Agreement on the Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework for signature for a period of one year until May 13, 2011. The event took place at Lake Victoria Hotel, Entebbe, under the auspices of the government of Uganda. The four founding countries signed immediately and were joined shortly thereafter by Kenya.

In a way, the initiation of this agreement was the flashpoint that announced the birth of a “crisis.” As the agreement recognized neither historic rights nor past agreements, and paragraph B, article 14 gives the Nile basin states unrestricted rights to erect projects on the Nile as they see fit, it was natural that Egypt and Sudan viewed the agreement as possibly affecting negatively the flow of waters to their respective countries, hence threatening their vital national interests. Accordingly, they called for recognition of historic rights and for unanimity over any new project on the Nile. The signing states saw this position as “unjust” in view of the difference in the degree of development of their countries as compared with Egypt. The media played its part in turning negotiating positions into national crises.

Cool heads, however, prevailed. The leaders of the signing states clarified that they had no intention of harming the vital interests of other countries, particularly Egypt and Sudan. This made it possible for the latter to present their case and declare their readiness to assist in the development of the other basin states. Both sides announced their intention to continue negotiations. The crisis went into abatement.

But resolution of contradictions remains a target. Luckily, there is no imminent project that might put the process to a test. For the present, there is plenty of water for all. For the future, in the Egyptian view, there is enough as well – provided that all the Nile basin countries choose the right kind of projects that help all sides to develop.


Abdel Monem Said Aly is director of the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo. This commentary first appeared at bitterlemons-international.org, an online newsletter.

All About Who Controls The Persian Gulf

By Linda S. Heard
Online Journal Contributing Writer
Mar 10, 2010, 00:18
Courtesy Of The Online Journal

Believe it or not, the US-Iran face-off has nothing to do with Iran’s nuclear programme. That’s just a red herring. Former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger revealed in a 2007Washington Post op-ed that it’s all about who controls the Persian Gulf.

While “Iran has legitimate aspirations that need to be respected, those legitimate ambitions do not include control over the oil that the United States and other countries need . . . ,” he wrote. “Industrial nations cannot accept radical forces dominating a region on which their economies depend . . .”

US President Barack Obama has obviously been schooled in that reality during the past year. Initially, he promised to reach out to Iran, but instead he has been goading it in the way children taunt a caged bear by deploying an interceptor missile system in the Gulf and threatening that America’s patience is limited.

Likewise, Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has abandoned any pretence at diplomatic nicety, preferring to shoot as many barbs as he can in Washington’s direction.

As the US and its Western allies draft a fourth round of anti-Iranian sanctions in the United Nations, Iran’s leader calls the September 11, 2001, attacks “a complicated intelligence scenario and act” that was used “as a pretext for the war on terror and a prelude to invading Afghanistan.”

In December, Ahmadinejad characterised the US presence in Afghanistan as being “caught like an animal in a quagmire.” Add that to his controversial views on the Holocaust and, together, they pretty much stymie any chance of the two leaders enjoying a cozy tete-a-tete any time soon, if ever.

Earlier, both sides made a half-hearted attempt at rapprochement. The Iranian leader sent a letter to Obama in November 2008, congratulating him on winning the election. Then in March 2009, Obama released a special Iranian New Year video message committing his administration to respectful and honest diplomacy. From then on, relations between the two countries went south.

With hopes for a diplomatic solution receding, the question is: What happens next? There are basically three scenarios on the table from the US perspective, but all have severe downsides.

Missing The Point

The first consists of punishing Iran with sanctions. However, as long as countries such as Russia, China, Brazil and Venezuela are opposed, they won’t work. In any event, stringent sanctions end up hurting ordinary people more than they do governments.

While it’s true that Russia may be prevaricating somewhat, China will never agree to UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions as long as it relies heavily on Iran for its oil and is invested to the tune of billions of dollars in the Iranian oil industry. This is the reason behind US attempts to persuade Saudi Arabia to offer China increased oil supplies.

China is in no mood to throw its current supplier over for one of America’s closest allies. In any case, no amount of sanctions or isolation will bring Iran to its knees.

The second option is a military strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. Again, this is one with little to no chance of success. Like the 2003 invasion of Iraq, any attack on Iran would not pass muster in the UNSC unless there is proof that Iran is physically aggressing another country.

The US could circumvent this obstacle by giving Israel the green light to initiate hostilities when in the event of Tehran’s retaliation, America could -- nay, would be obliged -- to militarily intervene. The military route is fraught with unknowns and no one can predict what repercussions would ensue.

Numerous negative consequences have been mooted. These include the inability of the US/Israel to destroy all of Iran’s nuclear plants, the disruption of oil supplies and the effects of conflict on fragile world economies and the destabilisation of the Middle East region. Moreover, Iran has warned that in case of attack, it would bomb US interests in the area, close the Straits of Hormuz to shipping, torch Gulf oilfields and incinerate Tel Aviv.

The third option is for the US and its Western allies to accept that Iran has the right to enrich uranium under the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to which it is a signatory. Washington considers this an anathema because it suspects Tehran of harbouring ambitions to build a bomb.

In reality, there is no evidence that Iran seeks nuclear weapons. But even if it possessed that capability, it would be used as a deterrent in the same way that the Soviet Union’s nuclear arsenal was used during the Cold War. Nothing points to the Iranian leadership as being suicidal. Any nuclear attack on the West or Israel would be met with instant devastation.

And that, my friends, is the bottom line. Iran and the US are engaging in a hegemonic power struggle. America wants to control the oil and Iran wants to rid the region of foreign influence so that it can exert its own. Caught in the middle are Gulf states which can only watch and wait to see what their future holds.

Linda S. Heard is a British specialist writer on Middle East affairs. She welcomes feedback and can be contacted by email atheardonthegrapevines@yahoo.co.uk.

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