Egypt Not Afraid Of Muslim Brotherhood, But Of The Old egime

Kahled Fahmy: We're Not Afraid Of The Muslim Brotherhood, We Are Afraid Of The Resurrection Of The Old Regime.

Democracy Is No Panacea

Democracy does not necessarily resolve problems related to poverty and economic inequality [GALLO/GETTY]

It Will Be Harder For The People Of The Arab World To Uproot A Corrupt Economic Regime Than To Topple A Dictator.

By Lev Grinberg
Last Modified: 28 Feb 2011 14:25 GMT
Courtesy Of "Al-Jazera"

The Egyptian people have every reason to be proud. They have provided the world with a shining example of how to overthrow a dictator within three weeks with hardly any violence - their message of freedom, unity and solidarity will remain for years in the collective memory of the Middle East and the entire world.

The road to democracy is still long, of course, but given the political wisdom shown hitherto by the Egyptian demonstrators, there is good reason to believe that they will overcome the difficult obstacles expected for their country in the near future.

However, I would like to warn the democratic activists in Egypt and even more so their would-be followers in the Middle East that democracy is not the solution to all problems. Democracy does not necessarily solve problems related to poverty and economic inequality, nor does it resolve cultural conflicts related to the common identity of the nation's citizens.

A Western Formula

The basic reason for democracy's lack of solutions to such problems is that its principles have been formulated in industrialised capitalist societies characterised by considerable cultural homogeneity and relatively small economic gaps.

Democracy is a set of formal principles developed in Western Europe with the aim of facilitating the representation and articulation of the middle and working classes and designed to contain peacefully the conflicts between them and the upper class.

In the absence of a balance of power between classes, and a consensual unifying national identity, the automatic installation of formal democratic principles might only make matters worse.

In order to prevent such developments, it is necessary to comprehend the peculiar social and economic conditions of each country and install not only formal democratic principles, but also additional constitutional, institutional and policy elements.

The Dangers Of Democratisation

I will briefly suggest here the dangers of democratisation that must be faced in advance.

When there is a systematic link between cultural identity and economic status, democracy becomes a problem, rather than a solution. It exacerbates cultural conflicts to the point of violence, because it provides a formal opportunity for the majority to force their will on the minority.

Political sociologist Michael Mann has shown that in these cases democracy only serves to intensify conflicts among racial and ethnic groups, to which I would add, in the Middle Eastern context, the conflict between confessional groups and between the religious and the secular.

The most recent example of this has been the democratisation of Yugoslavia, which led to 10 years of war and the division of the country into seven states, accompanied by genocide and ethnic cleansing.

The oldest case, mind you, is the US - the cradle of the democratic constitution which announced a "government of the people" and began the massacre of the American indigenous people because they were not considered part of "we, the people" of America.

This warning is probably irrelevant to Egypt, with its exceptional national heritage, cultural homogeneity and tradition of tolerance towards religious minorities such as the Christian Copts and Jews, as well as mutual tolerance between the devout and the non-devout.

However, the adoption of the Egyptian model in other Middle Eastern countries such as Iran, Bahrain and Libya already suggests other possibilities, and this is what we can also expect should a similar process begin in Jordan - with conflicts between its Bedouin and Palestinian populations - as well as in Syria - between the Sunni and Alawi - and this is also the background for ongoing social tensions in the formally democratic Iraq and Lebanon.

In Israel, the violent repression of the Al-Aqsa Intifada proves that the ruling ethnic group will not give up its political control or its material assets, neither by democratisation nor by granting independence, unless the powers of both sides are more evenly balanced, as in the Sudanese case.

In search of political consensus

Whoever wants democracy under these conditions must first come up with a creative and consensual formula, according to which each cultural group would be free to live its unique cultural life without attempting to force its identity and customs on the entire citizen body.

In other words, demonstrating for democracy is not enough. What the countries of the Middle East require is political consensus on mutual recognition of rights and coexistence, guaranteed by a constitution and institutionalised by electoral procedures and representative institutions.

Egypt does have to worry, however, about economic inequality and the severe daily hardships suffered by most of its population. Without providing solutions to these problems, even the most democratic regime can be toppled by massive protests, possibly leading to new forms of dictatorship. A good example of such a failure of democracy was December 2001 in Argentina, when the masses flooded the streets calling for "all politicians to go home" and toppling five presidents in a row.

This happened only two years after democratic elections swept a broad leftwing front to power, which had promised to bring the country out of its deep economic crisis, but failed. The elected government pursued the policy dictated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which protected the interests of foreign investors against those of the local middle and salaried class. The crisis caused all holders of local bank deposits to lose 70 per cent of their money, with the blessing of the IMF.

Therefore, Egypt must realise that although democracy is essential, any formal constitution or system of government will not solve its economic problems. Immediately after the elections, Egypt's new policymakers will have to switch from the formal liberal discourse of democracy to face and discuss the fundamental questions of Egypt's economic structure. In the process, they are liable to discover that it is far more difficult to uproot a corrupt economic regime than to topple a single dictator.

Lev Grinberg is a professor of Political Economy and Sociology at the Ben-Gurion University of the Negev and author of Politics and Violence in Israel/Palestine: Democracy vs. Military Rule (Routledge, 2010).

The Egypt Effect

Thousands Of People Are Taking To Streets Across The Region Demanding Political and Social Reform.

By Riz Khan
Last Modified: 15 Feb 2011 11:07 GMT
Courtesy Of "Al Jazeera"

ens of thousands of people in countries such as Algeria, Jordan and Yemen are taking to the streets, demanding complete political and social overhaul. Their leaders have promised changes but protesters say that is not enough.

The latest demonstrations in Arab nations are inspired by the popular uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt that forced their leaders from power.

What lies in store for Egypt and Tunisia after their leaders were forced from power and how are those developments playing out in the rest of the Arab world?

On Tuesday, we will be discussing these issues with Sami Ben Gharbia, the co-founder of the Tunisian website Nawaat.org; Wael Abbas, an Egyptian activist whose regular tweets from Tahrir Square were followed avidly during the uprising; Mauritanian-American Nasser Weddady from the American Islamic Congress, which promotes social media activism in the Arab world; and Naseem Tarawnah, a Jordanian blogger.

Reflections: Egypt Revolution

A young protester wakes up as Egyptian military police finish closing demonstrators' encampments in Tahrir Square on February 14, 2011 in Cairo [Gallo/Getty]


Egypt's Uprising Is Only The First In Many Steps,The Challenge Ahead Is To Build A Society On Fair Principles.

By Richard N. Haass
Last Modified: 16 Feb 2011 10:14 GMT
Courtesy Of "Al Jazeera"

Revolutions happen for a reason. In the case of Egypt, there are several reasons: more than 30 years of one-man rule; Hosni Mubarak’s plans to pass the presidency on to his son; widespread corruption, patronage, and nepotism; and economic reform that did not benefit most Egyptians, but that nonetheless contrasted sharply with the almost complete absence of political change.

The net result was that many Egyptians felt not just alienated, but also humiliated. Humiliation is a powerful motivator. Egypt was ripe for revolution; dramatic change would have come at some point in the next few years, even absent the spark of Tunisia or the existence of social media.

Indeed, social media are a significant factor, but their role has been exaggerated. It is hardly the first disruptive technology to come along: the printing press, telegraph, telephone, radio, television, and cassettes all posed challenges to the existing order of their day. And like these earlier technologies, social media are not decisive: they can be repressed by governments as well as employed by governments to motivate their supporters.

Timing counts for a lot in politics. Mubarak’s announcement that he would not seek re-election would likely have averted a crisis had he issued it in December. But, by the time he did say it, the mood of the street had evolved to the point that he could no longer placate it.

The initial success of revolutions is determined less by the strength of the protesters than by the will and cohesion of the regime. Tunisia’s collapse came quickly, because its president lost his nerve and the army was weak and unwilling to stand by him. Egypt’s establishment and its military are demonstrating far greater resolve.

Mubarak’s departure is a significant but not decisive development. To be sure, it closes a prolonged era of Egyptian politics. It also marks the end of the first phase of Egypt’s revolution. But it is only the end of the beginning. What begins now is the struggle for Egypt’s future.

The objective must be to slow the political clock. Egyptians need time to build a civil society and open a political spectrum that has been mostly closed for decades. A hybrid, caretaker government, including military and civilian elements, may be the best way forward. To slow the clock is not to stop it, however. A genuine political transition needs to move ahead, albeit at a measured pace.

Early elections should be avoided, lest those (such as the Muslim Brotherhood) who have been able to organise over the years enjoy an unfair advantage. The Muslim Brotherhood should be allowed to participate in the political process so long as it accepts the legitimacy of that process, the rule of law, and the constitution. The history and political culture of Egypt suggest a natural limit to the Brotherhood’s appeal if Egyptians can bridge their most important differences, maintain order, and restore economic growth.

Constitutional reform is critical. Egypt needs a constitution that enjoys broad support – and that includes checks and balances that make it difficult for minorities (even those who command the support of a plurality of voters) to rule majorities.

Revolutionary movements invariably split into factions. Their sole common objective is the ouster of the existing regime. As soon as this goal comes close to being achieved, elements of the opposition begin to position themselves for the second phase of the struggle and the coming competition for power. We are already beginning to see signs of this in Egypt and will see more in the days and weeks to come.

Some in Egypt will be satisfied only with full democracy; others (probably a majority) will care most about public order, greater official accountability, a degree of political participation, and economic improvement. It is never possible to satisfy the demands of all protesters, and regimes should not try.

Egypt will face enormous economic difficulties, exacerbated by recent events, which have frightened off tourists, deterred investment, and kept many from working. The challenges of a fast-growing population, inadequate education, insufficient jobs, corruption, bureaucracy, and rising global competition constitute the greatest threat to the country’s future.

Outsiders have had and will have only limited influence over the course of events. Over the past 30 years, intermittent calls by the United States for limited political reform were largely rebuffed. Once the crisis began, the people in the streets, Mubarak himself, and above all the army have been the principal protagonists. Moving forward, it will again be Egyptians who will largely determine their own path.

In this vein, outsiders should be careful of intervening too much, especially in public. It is up to Egyptians to define for themselves how much and what kind of democracy is established. Outsiders can assist – for example, with ideas for constitutional reform or voting procedures – but this should be done privately and as suggestions, not demands.

Developments in Egypt will have uneven consequences in the region. Not every country will be affected equally. True monarchies, like Jordan, have a legitimacy and stability that the leaders of faux monarchies (Syria, Libya, and Yemen), as well as the Iranian regime, do not. Much will depend on what transpires and how.

Change in Iraq was imposed from the outside by force, whereas change in Egypt has come from within and has largely been accomplished by consent rather than coercion. But it is too soon to know whether change in Egypt will be far-reaching and lasting, much less positive, and thus too soon to assess its historic impact.

Richard N. Haass, formerly Director of Policy Planning in the US State Department, is President of The Council on Foreign Relations.

This article was first published by Project Syndicate.