Showing posts with label Nuclear Proliferator. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Nuclear Proliferator. Show all posts

Wednesday, January 07, 2015

DOD Stymies Access To Report On Israel's Nukes



The U.S. Defense Department is so far refusing to produce a report that discusses nuclear technology issues in Israel, in response to a researcher's request for information.

     The report at issue is called "Critical Technology Issues in Israel and NATO Countries," written nearly three decades ago. It is not classified.


     Grant Smith, founder of the Washington-based Institute for Research: Middle Eastern Policy, Inc., filed a request for the report under the Freedom of Information Act three years ago. When the government failed to produce the document, he followed up with a pro se complaint in September.


      In a November answer, government lawyers argued simply that Smith had "failed to state a claim."


     U.S. District Judge Tanya Chutkan is presiding over the matter and has expressed concern about the pace at which this case is proceeding.


     "I'd like to know what is taking so long for a 386-page document," she said at a Nov. 

21st hearing in federal court in Washington. "The document was located some time ago."


     "It certainly wasn't our intention to circumvent the procedures in this case," said Special Asst. U.S. Attorney Laura Jennings. "Our thought was that it would, in fact, expedite the process."



     The report "Critical Technology Issues in Israel and NATO Countries" appears to involve super computers and nuclear capability. It was cited but not identified by title in The Jerusalem Post in a 1990 article, "Supercomputers Slow in Coming."

     Similarly, it was referred to in general terms in a 1995 issue of a publication called The Risk Report that discussed a dispute among U.S. federal agencies over whether to sell a powerful computer from Cray Research to a group of Israeli universities.


     "The United States approved the sale of powerful computers that could boost Israel's well-known but officially secret A-bomb and missile programs," said the Risk Report article. 
"A 1987 Pentagon-sponsored study found that Technion University, one of the schools in the network, was helping design Israel's nuclear re-entry vehicle. U.S. officials say Technion's physicists also worked in Israel's secret weapon complex at Dimona."
     The article also said Hebrew University and the Weizmann Institute, two other Israeli institutions which, as members of the Inter-University Computation Center, would have access to the Cray supercomputer, had been cited in the same Pentagon study.

     The push to get hold of the Pentagon report is set against the backdrop of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.


     Israel has not signed the treaty.
     Iran, on the other hand, has signed the treaty.

     In his complaint, Smith noted that the Weizmann Institute, Technion, and Hebrew University raise large sums of tax-exempt donations through affiliates in the United States. 

The American Society for Technion-Israel Institute for Technology Inc., for example, reported raising more than $65 million in tax-exempt contributions in 2011.


     According to publicly available tax filings by non-profits, the American Committee for the Weizmann Institute of Science reported $59 million in tax-exempt contributions in 2012, and American Friends of Hebrew University raised nearly $48 million in that same year.


     Smith's complaint noted that those substantial sums are sent to Israel in addition to the $86 billion in direct foreign aid Israel has received from U.S. taxpayers since 1987 when the Pentagon report was written.



     "The Symington Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 prohibits most U.S. foreign aid to any country found trafficking in nuclear enrichment equipment or technology outside international safeguards," said Smith's complaint. "The Glenn Amendment of 1977 to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 calls for an end to U.S. foreign aid to countries that import nuclear reprocessing technology."

     On the same day as the Nov. 21st court hearing over the government's delay in producing the report, government lawyer Jennings filed a motion saying that "non-disclosure" agreements applied to the report. "We've become aware of these non-disclosure agreements that apply," she said at the hearing. "We'll now need to do a line by line review."


     Smith, representing himself, said: 


"So what we've seen most recently is that the government is now coming up with novel ways to try and delay this by talking about mandatory disclosure reviews. We don't think it's meaningful that their captive think tank may have signed NDAs. Perhaps they even have a sock puppet in the Pentagon that signs NDAs on their behalf. It would be the same from our perspective."

     Judge Chutkan answered, "I'm not willing to characterize the government responses as necessarily trying to be evasive or deceptive."


     During the Nov. 21st hearing, Judge Chutkan asked DOD counsel Mark Herrington how long ago the document had been located.


     "Quite a while ago," he answered.


     "But Mr. Herrington, this case was filed on September 23," the judge continued. "We are talking about one document that's 386 pages long. I've reviewed my share of documents in my career. It should not take that long to review that document and decide what needs to be redacted."


     Describing the Defense Department as "a gigantic bureaucratic machine," Herrington reiterated the government position that it was in fact trying to eliminate delays in producing the report. He said he thought the government could meet a deadline imposed by the judge for responding to Smith's complaint.


     "We were hoping to have had a decision two days ago," he explained. "Came close, didn't quite get there."


     "Didn't quite get where?" asked Chutkan.


     "Making a determination to release the document," replied Herrington, who proceeded to cite Thanksgiving week as an additional complication.


     "What we'd like the Court to do," Smith answered, "is to realize that the Department of Defense has failed to respond. If it's necessary that we file an additional motion requesting your personal in-camera review of the document in question, that's what we'd like to do."


     Chutkan concluded the hearing by granting a short extension of time to the government. "And I want to caution the government that I'm going to be looking with disfavor on further motions for extensions of time," she warned.


     In a late December filing, the government against asked for more time, calling their motion a request for a schedule "modification." 



     The motion also changed the government's explanation for the ongoing delay, saying the government was checking with Israel to see if its government had any objections to the report's release. There was no further mention of any non-disclosure agreement.

     In his response, Smith said: "Given the Defendant's overall bad faith approach to the Plaintiff's public interest FOIA, in camera review by this Court would now be the most efficient and fair way to determine their release status."


     A ruling on Smith's request for release of the report "Critical Technology Issues in Israel and NATO Countries" could come as soon as Friday.

By JANET MCMAHON

Sunday, April 20, 2014

Israeli Theft Of U.S. Weapons-Grade Nuclear Material Declassified

On March 18, 2014 ISCAP, the highest declassification authority in the U.S., released 84 pages (PDF) of formerly secret information about investigations into the illegal diversion of weapons-grade nuclear material from a Pennsylvania plant into the clandestine Israeli nuclear weapons program.  Files now available to the public from IRmep’s ISCAP process include:
4/2/1968 Letter from the Director of the CIA alerting the Attorney General (PDF) about a huge loss of material fromPennsylvania’s Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corporation (NUMEC). “It is critical for us to establish whether or not the Israelis now have the capability for fabricating nuclear weapons which might be employed in the Near East.”
03/09/1972 FBI memorandum (PDF) “On the basis of the foregoing it must be assumed for the purpose of U.S. national security that diversion of special nuclear materials to Israel by Dr. [Zalman] Shapiro and his [NUMEC] associates is a distinct possibility.”
07/28/1977 Notes of a briefing from CIA’s Associate Deputy Director for Operations Theodore Shackley to the Carter administration National Security Council  (PDF) “I also asked Shackley to get us a rundown on the political aspects—e.g. when were the President and Congressional officials briefed on the Israeli weapons program, on the NUMEC connection, and what were their reactions.  In December, Carter was briefed on the NUMEC problem as President-elect by Bush in Georgia…I do not think the President has plausible deniability.  The CIA case is persuasive…”
08/02/1977 Memo to Carter from Zbigniew Brzezinski ”So far as we know however, (and we have made serious effort to discover it) there is nothing to indicate active CIA participation in the alleged theft…There is a tremendous amount of interest in this issue in Congress…We face tough sledding in the next few weeks in trying to keep attention focused on ERDA’s technical [overall U.S. nuclear material loss] arguments..on the FBI investigations, and away from the CIA’s information.”
All released CIA evidence and former Tel Aviv Station Chief John Hadden suggest the severely undercapitalized NUMEC was “an Israeli [smuggling] operation from the beginning.” Multiple health-related lawsuits have been filed targeting companies that later assumed NUMEC ownership. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers currently estimates its toxic cleanup of NUMEC will cost$500 million.  No damage claims have yet been filed against the Israeli government.
IRmep is a Washington-DC based nonprofit researching U.S. Middle East policy formulation.

Saturday, April 19, 2014

US "Lousy" At Keeping Nuke Material From Israel



Courtesy Of  C-SPAN

American taxpayers have to pay $500 million to clean up an Israeli nuclear smuggling front.

Sunday, January 19, 2014

Delegitimating Israel

Now that American and European saber rattling has quieted down, Iran’s (aspirational) nuclear weapon no longer seems quite the “existential threat” it used to be.  For this, we have Russian and Iranian diplomacy to thank.
Of course, Israeli saber rattling continues unabated.  Existential threats keep Israel’s Jewish citizens more or less united and its international supporters on board.  The Iranian bomb is especially useful because, being spectral, it is safe as well as effective.
Existential threats to Israel work magic on public opinion throughout the global West.    This makes it easier for Western governments, the American government especially, to provide Israel with diplomatic, military and economic support.
They are inclined to do this anyway of course, for both domestic political and geostrategic reasons.  But the aid is indispensible, and the Israelis take no chances.
Existential threats also keep “charitable” donations flowing in from private Jewish and evangelical Christian sources.
Indeed, the great fear in Zionist quarters is that without the specter of an Iranian bomb or its functional equivalent, “diaspora” Jews will drift away and dispensationalist Protestants will be less eager than they now are to squander their time and money hastening the end days – when Jews who do not accept Christ will be cast into Hell for all eternity.
The diminution of the Iranian threat is not the only matter of concern to Israel’s leaders.  There is also the no longer deniable fact that the Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) movement is gaining strength in the United States.  It still has a long way to go, but it has already gone far enough to cause concern.
All is not lost, however.  Congress is still in Israel’s pocket and the President is still spineless.  The tail still wags the dog.
Moreover, Iran’s nuclear program was frozen, not stopped.  It could always bounce back and be of service again.  Many of Israel’s most servile Congressional pawns are working diligently to make this happens.
But the prospect is chancy, and Tel Aviv is disinclined just to wait and hope.  Without letting up on Iran, they have therefore deployed Plan B.  Predictably, it has been taken up with gusto by all who follow Israel’s lead.
Plan B is a hybrid strategy; it joins existential threat fabrication with an even hoarier and more familiar ruse — vilifying Israel’s critics.
Calling them anti-Semites, when they plainly are not, has been effective in the past, and no doubt still is.  But the ploy suffers from overuse.
In his suburban Philadelphia high school, Binyamin Netanyahu must have heard from his history teacher that America’s greatest President thought that you can indeed fool some of the people all of the time.  But Honest Abe forgot to point out that if you keep going about it the same way over and over again, the supply of susceptible people eventually declines.
Netanyahu and his co-thinkers are now discovering that on their own.
It is the same with their blather about “self-hating Jews.”  What could be more tired than that; or, in nearly all cases, more obviously false?
This is especially relevant now that the BDS movement is gathering steam.   In the United States and elsewhere, progressive, self-loving Jews are leading the way.
And so the word has gone out that vilification is not enough; Israel’s critics must be made out to be existential threats too, functional equivalents of the imaginary Iranian bomb.
To drive the point home, it is important to say it effectively – in other words, to get the language right.
This is why the party line now has it that some of Israel’s critics, the ones in the BDS movement for example, are out to “delegitimate” Israel.
They may not realize it — some of them may even think of themselves as Israel’s friends – but “objectively,” as Stalinists used to say, they are mortal enemies of the Jewish state.
This is not an impossible sell – notwithstanding the fact that, taken at its word, the claim is conceptually confused and highly misleading.  That, indeed, is its point.
* * *
Zionists do have reason to fear an Iranian bomb, but not the reason they claim.  Were it real, what it would put in jeopardy is not the survival of the Israeli population, but the ability of the Israeli state to bully and oppress as it pleases.
Their reasons to fear BDS and other solidarity movements are more complex.
Before the November 24 interim agreement that brought Iran’s nuclear program to a temporary – or possibly permanent – standstill, Iran probably could have developed a nuclear weapons capability over the next several years.  Then, if the Iranian government chose, Iran really would be able to concoct a nuclear weapon.
Nuclear proliferation is always a worrisome development, but this case is less scary than most — except to hardcore Zionists.  For the rest of us, an Iranian bomb might not be such a bad thing.
If nothing else, it would deter Israel from having its way with its neighbors and with the Palestinians.  It would function in much the way that Soviet nuclear power helped restrain the United States from trying too overtly to take over Eastern Europe.
Since a nuclear war between Israel and Iran would result in the annihilation of both, an Iranian bomb would serve no other, more worrisome or nefarious, purpose.
It would certainly not threaten the physical existence of people now living in Israel.  Iran may be ruled by theocrats, but they are not suicidal; neither are the Iranian people.
In that regard, there is more reason to worry about Israel exercising its so-called Samson option – where it rains down death and destruction on both itself and its enemies if it finds itself, like the Biblical Samson, with no alternative other than surrender.
BDS, on the other hand, actually could lead to changes that threaten the Israeli state – not by delegitimating it, but by changing its nature profoundly.
However, at this point, it would be premature to claim that anything like this is in the offing.  BDS proponents, like Israel’s critics generally, are a mixed bunch.  Their goals are far from settled.
Some only want Israel’s decades long occupation of the tiny portion of Mandate Palestine that is still officially Palestinian to end.  Others want Israel to be a state of its people, not a confessional or ethnic state.  Some support a two state solution; others favor a bi- or multi-national unitary state.
The common denominator is moral: everyone involved is moved by the realization that Palestinians suffer a grave injustice.  BDS is a solidarity movement, aligned with the Palestinian cause.
Does this – indeed, can this — imply “delegitimating” Israel?  The short answer is: No.  Delegitimation is not what solidarity movements are about.
What solidarity movements do is boost morale and influence world opinion; anything more falls beyond their ken.  BDS is no different.
Solidarity movements in themselves are not all that threatening anyway.  Even when their objectives are clear and their extent rivals or surpasses anything the world has yet to see, their efficacy is limited.
This is why in Palestine, if a new deal comes about, it will be mainly through the efforts of the Palestinians themselves.  It was this way for blacks and coloreds in South Africa; it is always this way.  Solidarity movements can help — but, in the end, what they offer is moral support.
To be sure, the U.S. role in maintaining Israeli dominance, and therefore Palestinian subordination, is historically unprecedented.  Moving American public opinion in a less one-sided direction can therefore be more than usually helpful.
But the fact remains: BDS and movements like it can only do so much.  Only Palestinians can make the situation for Palestinians more just.
Should they succeed, their efforts may indeed lead to regime change in Israel.  But nothing that they or anyone else will or can do will delegitimate the Israeli state.
This may seem like a distinction without a difference, but it is not.
Neoconservatives and liberal interventionists have made “regime change” a euphemism for imperialist maneuvering.  They, and the political leaders who follow their lead, have besmirched the concept.
But when justice requires that basic institutional arrangements be replaced, there is no better way to describe what must be done.  The time is past due to take “regime change” back.
Is regime change required for justice to prevail throughout what was formerly Mandate Palestine?  There is no consensus on this as yet — not even in solidarity movements like BDS.
But the possibility cannot be excluded  – the status quo is too awful for radical solutions to be proscribed out of hand.
Yet obfuscating that prospect, the better to derail it, is the point of talking about “delegitimation.”
That the idea does not strictly apply hardly matters.  Obfuscation can be as effective a way to stifle serious debate as outright suppression.
In this case, the sensitivities of the principals make frank and honest discussion of the moral and political issues involved especially difficult.  It hardly matters that these sensitivities are sometimes overwrought.
Indeed, obfuscation can be more than usually disabling in such circumstances.  As movements in solidarity with the Palestinian cause like BDS take shape in the United States and other Western countries, it is therefore urgent that the obfuscation be dispelled.
* * *
Political legitimacy used to be a philosophical matter only.   The issue is still a basic problem of philosophy.
Most of the others have been discussed from time immemorial– because they are inherently puzzling and because they elude solutions that everyone can accept.  They therefore seem to have a timeless aspect.  Free will is an example, or the existence of God or the nature of the good.
Authority relations too have existed in human societies since pre-historic times.  But their forms and limits have varied significantly and changed radically over time.
When authority relations are in transition or are otherwise in flux, there is considerable interest in justifying how some people can rightfully command others.  In less turbulent times, interest generally subsides.
However, fundamental institutional forms seldom change radically, even over long periods of time.  The puzzlements authority relations raise today are therefore much the same as those philosophers addressed at the dawn of the modern era.
They emerged in consequence of two epochal historical transformations underway in western Europe at that time: the dissolution of feudal societies based on relations of fealty and social solidarity, and the rise of the state form of political organization.
Thanks to the former, individuals and their interests, not God and His, became points of departure for thinking about how to justify basic institutional arrangements.  Thanks to the latter, the diffuse authority relations characteristic of traditional societies gave way to political forms that concentrate authority into a single institutional nexus, the state.
Nearly a century ago, Max Weber defined the state as an institutional form that holds and exercises a monopoly of the means of “legitimate” violence.
How can states, so conceived, be justified?   This is what the philosophical problem of political legitimacy is about.
The usual way to address it has been to argue for or assume some standard that, when satisfied, justifies the lawful exercise of coercive force by agents of the state and by no one else.
The standard can be demanding.  For example, Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s (1712-1778) account of political legitimacy held that states compel compliance rightfully only if individuals, when commanded, somehow still obey only themselves.
Or it can be easily satisfied.  Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) thought it was enough just to be able to assure civil order.
On the former view, no actually existing state satisfies the ideal; on the latter, all existing states do.
Liberal political philosophers, from John Locke (1632-1704) through John Rawls (1921-2002), defended less extreme positions.  On the whole, though, they tended to agree more with Hobbes than Rousseau.  By their lights, existing states fall short in many respects, but their fundamental legitimacy is never seriously in doubt.
The arguments of these and other philosophers concerning political legitimacy are complex, subtle, and, on many dimensions, incompatible.  But, from the purview of them all, it is plain that the claim that Israel’s critics seek to delegitimate the Israeli state cannot be sustained – not if political legitimacy is understood in the way it traditionally has been.
However it has been a while since philosophers monopolized discussions of political legitimacy.  For the past century or so, philosophical approaches have coexisted with understandings that focus on causes, not reasons, and that draw on social science and psychology, not moral philosophy.
The existence of God is another venerable philosophical problem that can also be approached this other way: one can ask whether there are rationally compelling reasons to believe in God, or one can investigate why (some) people actually do (or do not) believe.
Of course, reasons can also be causes; someone who thinks there are reasons to believe in God might believe for those reasons.  However this is seldom, if ever, the case, and not just because rationally compelling reasons are, to put it kindly, unavailable.
Non- or extra-rational causes for believing in the legitimacy of authority relations are evidently harder to overcome than causes that dispose persons to believe in God.
Regardless of what, if anything, people think about philosophical accounts of political legitimacy, some people all of the time, and probably all people some of the time, believe – or act as if they believe — that existing authority relations are justified.
True anarchists (if any) apart, we are all more likely to obey orders issued by police than by civilians, and not just because we fear the repressive power of the state.
Accounting for such phenomena  — and, more generally, for real world political behavior – is the business of social scientists, not philosophers.
Those today who speak of the legitimacy of nations in ways that bear on international or world politics straddle this divide.  However, their approach accords more with the spirit of social science than philosophy.
It could be otherwise.  When state institutions first came into being, politics was mainly about coordinating individuals’ behaviors within geographically defined territories.  This was what generated the puzzlements to which philosophical theories of political legitimacy responded.
Even with those puzzlements unresolved, the state form of political organization was effectively assumed by the time state formation got underway in the more developed regions of Europe, the Americas, Australia and New Zealand.
It was even more plainly taken for granted in the twentieth century: with new states being born out of the old land-based empires of Eurasia after World War I, and then carved out of the overseas colonial empires of imperial Europe after World War II.
The old questions continue to be philosophically fruitful but their bearing on real world politics today is minimal at best.
Meanwhile, new rounds of state formation have raised new problems and new puzzlements that more directly touch on matters of current political concern.
These puzzlements seem vexing enough to motivate philosophical reflections as original and far-reaching as those that accompanied the rise of the nation state centuries ago.  But either they are not as susceptible to philosophical treatment or else thinkers up to the task never quite materialized.
Whatever the reason, philosophical investigations of political legitimacy remain focused on the problems that engaged philosophers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, while problems pertaining to new states and to the inter-state issues they raise fall mainly under the remit of political scientists and international lawyers.
The consensus view, therefore, has it that states are legitimate, when the international community, or some significant portion of it, says they are.
This is like saying that God exists if people believe in God.  This is hardly satisfactory from a philosophical point of view, but it is how matters stand.
Israel therefore became as legitimate as any state can be when other countries, the United States and the Soviet Union first off, accorded it diplomatic recognition.  Other states followed suit in short order, and Israel was welcomed into the United Nations.
There are still states, mainly in the Muslim world, that, to this day, refuse to recognize Israel.  Diplomatically, though in no other way, they are in denial — much as the United States was when it refused to recognize the People’s Republic of China until almost three decades after the Chinese Revolution.
Because Britain ruled Palestine under a Mandate inherited from the League of Nations, the U.N. General Assembly had to agree to its partition.  The actual agreement was soon superseded by events as Israel and the surrounding Arab states went to war, but U.N. approval, and the U.N.’s subsequent acceptance of the borders formed when hostilities ended, accord Israel as much international legitimacy as any state in the world.
To be sure, Israel’s four and a half decades long occupation of the portion of Mandate Palestine that it did not control after 1948 raises serious legal and political problems.  Its settlements and annexations in the Palestinian territories are especially problematic.
But while there is worldwide opposition to the continuing Occupation, no one proposes revoking Israel’s legitimacy on its account.  It is not even clear how, as a matter of law or practical politics, this could be done.
Of course, were Israel literally “wiped off the map” – by a nuclear weapon or in a war fought by conventional means – it would thereafter cease to exist.  Then it would not, indeed could not, exist legitimately because it would not exist at all.  But it would still not have been “delegitimated” — except indirectly or in a manner of speaking.
Such things never happen in the real world however, and it is inconceivable that Israel, a nuclear state armed to the teeth, will be the exception to the rule.
Legitimation happens; delegitimation does not.
Thus new states are typically created by secession from already existing states.  South Sudan is a recent example; it had been a part of Sudan.
When it broke away, the Sudanese state was not delegitimated according to any of the accepted meanings of the term.  Rather, it was made smaller because part of it had seceded, and because the breakaway part was accorded international recognition.
Something similar happened with the states that had been Soviet republics before the Soviet Union expired.  When it splintered into its component parts, the Soviet Union ceased to exist.   But it was not delegitimated – except again as a trivial consequence of ceasing to exist at all.  It met its end by dissolving itself.
There are worse ways for states to perish.  In theory at least, they can degenerate internally to such an extent that they are no longer able to establish order in the territories they nominally superintend.  Then they become failed states.
Genuinely failed states do not meet even Hobbes’s criterion for political legitimacy.  They are states that have, so to speak, delegitimated themselves.  This is the only way that is even remotely imaginable that anything that could count as delegitimation could cause an existing state to cease to exist.
But in the real world this has never happened completely or irremediably – not in Somalia, not in the so-called tribal areas of Afghanistan, not anywhere.  The chance that Israel, a well-functioningHerrenvolk democracy, will become the first example is nil.
The usual, and perhaps the only, way for states truly to disappear “off the map” is for their component parts to declare independence and reconstitute themselves as legitimate, independent states in their own right.  This, again, is what happened to the Soviet Union and to Yugoslavia.
The legitimacy of these expired states was never revoked.  What happened instead is just that new states won the international recognition that legitimacy implies.
Similarly, the American Revolution led to the legitimation of the United States of America, but not to the delegitimation of the colonial regimes that preceded it.  They underwent a profound transformation, a structural reorganization; but at no point was anything like delegitimation, in any plausible sense of the term, involved.
Likewise, the French Revolution and the revolutions that followed it did not delegitimate the nations in which they occurred; they replaced old regimes with new ones, which is something else altogether.
Denying or overlooking this distinction only serves to obscure the difference between changing things fundamentally for the better, and spiteful, irrational nihilism.
That is what Israel wants the world to think Iran is up with its non-existent bomb and what solidarity campaigns like BDS are about.
Solidarity movements often do side with forces promoting regime change.  This was certainly the case with the movements that lent support to anti-colonial struggles after World War II and to popular efforts to overthrow fascist or authoritarian (quasi-fascist) dictatorships in Spain, Greece, Chile, Portugal, Argentina and elsewhere.
In a different register, this was also the goal of émigré groups in Western countries that sided with ethnic or nationalist independence movements in Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Union.
The South African anti-Apartheid struggle was about regime change too.
Because the forces fighting Apartheid had clearly defined objectives, the solidarity movements that supported it followed suit.
As remarked, this is not presently the case within the broad BDS movement.  Many of its supporters are more interested in changing policies than changing regimes.
There are some, however, who do envision a future state within Israel’s present borders or throughout all of Mandate Palestine that is very different from the Israel we know.
It might still be Hebrew-speaking and it would surely continue the distinctive cultural traditions that have become established under the present political arrangements.  But it would be a state of its citizens, not a confessional or ethnic state.
This would indeed amount to a change of regime; a Herrenvolkdemocracy would be transformed into a democracy tout court.
The change would be less far-reaching than the change in South Africa.  For Israeli Jews, very little need change at all.
But their state would then no longer be a Jewish state
Does this amount to an existential threat?  If so, the threat is benign.
What regime change threatens existentially is the Zionist idea or rather the predominant understanding of it – not the positive cultural achievements that have grown up under its aegis, and certainly not the physical existence of the peoples living in Israel today.
ANDREW LEVINE is a Senior Scholar at the Institute for Policy Studies, the author most recently of THE AMERICAN IDEOLOGY (Routledge) and POLITICAL KEY WORDS (Blackwell) as well as of many other books and articles in political philosophy. His most recent book is In Bad Faith: What’s Wrong With the Opium of the People. He was a Professor (philosophy) at the University of Wisconsin-Madison and a Research Professor (philosophy) at the University of Maryland-College Park.  He is a contributor to Hopeless: Barack Obama and the Politics of Illusion (AK Press).

Friday, December 20, 2013

Israel's Secret Uranium Buy



How Argentina Fueled Ben-Gurion's Nuclear Program.

BY WILLIAM BURR and AVNER COHEN

In mid-July 1964, the State Department and the CIA sent a joint message asking the U.S. embassies in Argentina and Israel to check out an unverified intelligence report. They wanted to know whether the Argentines had agreed to sell Israel some 80-100 tons of uranium oxide, or "yellowcake," an essential product for fueling a nuclear reactor and thereby producing plutonium that can be used in weapons.


As it turned out, Washington had gotten information about the sale from the British government, which in turn had found out about it from the Canadians. All three governments were concerned about Israel's nuclear weapons ambitions, and the yellowcake transaction was strong evidence that something was amiss. American diplomats in Argentina confirmed the sale, which soon put the State Department in an awkward position: It would have to ask the Israelis about a transaction that flew in the face of their assurances that the country's nuclear program was for peaceful purposes only.
Israel's nuclear program presents a sort of paradox to historians. While it may be the world's worst-kept secret, it is also the world's most opaque nuclear program. One aspect of the Israeli nuclear program that has been especially mysterious is how and where Israel was able to obtain the raw material required to sustain a serious weapons effort. In the 1960s, this was a real challenge for U.S. intelligence, which was not entirely clear about the purposes of the Israeli program or whether Israel would comply with its "peaceful use only" pledge. It remains a challenge for historians today because Israel still does not acknowledge that it has nuclear weapons.
Previously obscure declassified archival documents on the yellowcake sale shed light on the global context of the Israeli nuclear program's early history. Edited and annotated by the two of us, 42 documents are being published today for the first time by the National Security Archive and the Nuclear Proliferation International History Project (in conjunction with the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies). They demonstrate how vigorously Israel sought raw materials for its nuclear program and how persistently it tried to cultivate relations with nuclear suppliers. They also tell us how other players -- in particular the United States, Britain, and Canada -- viewed the program.
The story of the Argentine yellowcake sale to Israel has remained largely untold because Israel has gone to great lengths to keep it secret and because the U.S. government and its close allies have kept quiet about what they knew at the time. The United States has always been ambivalent about Israel's nuclear program, and exposing what it knew or suspected about the Israeli nuclear program could have caused the United States serious diplomatic problems with Israel's Arab neighbors and possibly the Soviet Union. This limited what Washington could do to circumscribe Israel's nuclear ambitions. Any kind of serious economic or political pressures, even if only contemplated by some, would have become public. And that could have been explosive domestically and internationally.
The U.S. government had been worried about an Israeli nuclear weapons program since late-1960, when the CIA learned and confirmed that, for nearly two years, Israel had been constructing a major nuclear facility (a reactor plus related infrastructure), with French assistance, near the town of Dimona in the Negev Desert. Initially, in support of Israel's desire to establish a nuclear program with military potential, the French apparently agreed to provide Israel with reactor fuel under loose safeguards. Under Charles De Gaulle, however, French policy changed, and it appears that by 1963, when the reactor was near completion, France imposed major constraints on supplying uranium to Dimona.
The Israelis had been trying to extract uranium from phosphate but that proved too costly; they needed a source that they could use freely, without external safeguards. South Africa was a prospective source. The French themselves recognized that Israel could try to acquire uranium from other countries, such as Argentina or Belgium, and in early 1964 they asked Washington whether the Israelis had "tapped" any such sources.
The Canadian government was interested in the Israeli nuclear program from its very inception. When Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion met Prime Minister John Diefenbaker on May 25, 1961, Dimona was at the center of the discussion. As he did with President John Kennedy a few days later, Ben-Gurion pledged that the Dimona project was peaceful. In March 1964, Canadian intelligence analyst Jacob Koop prepared a long secret report on Israel's nuclear program, asserting that Israel had all of the "prerequisites for commencing a modest nuclear weapons development project."
Not long after this report was prepared, Canadian intelligence learned (from a still-unknown source) that the Argentine government had made arrangements to supply 80-100 tons of yellowcake to Israel. By the end of April 1964, the British had seen the Canadian report. According to a British diplomat, "This means that Israel now has virtually unlimited supplies of uranium free of safeguards." Moreover, if the Israelis had reprocessing facilities, they could produce enough plutonium to "fuel a nuclear bomb" 18-20 months from the beginning of 1964.
The British soon shared the Canadian report with U.S. intelligence, overcoming Canadian reluctance to share it with its neighbors to the south (apparently the Canadians were irritated that the United States would not share the results of a recent American visit to Dimona). The CIA was initially skeptical, but in June 1964, the State Department and the CIA decided that the story should be checked out and sent the query -- reproduced below -- to its embassies in both Argentina and Israel. In September, the U.S. embassy in Buenos Aires confirmed from local sources that during 1963 Israel had arranged to purchase 80 tons of yellowcake from Argentina.
Evidently, the United States took seriously the information it obtained about the Argentine yellowcake sale. Like its British and Canadian allies, Washington was concerned that an Israeli bomb would threaten stability in the Middle East and complicate American efforts to curb nuclear proliferation worldwide. Moreover, to ensure that the Israelis were abiding by their public pledge that the Dimona facility was for "peaceful" use only, Kennedy and Prime Minister Levi Eshkol had secretly agreed in the summer of 1963 to allow American scientists to visit the reactor. The first U.S. team arrived in Dimona in early January 1964, but it is now known that the Israelis made "special arrangements" to prevent the visitors from seeing anything that revealed the true nature of the project.


William Burr is a senior analyst at the National Security Archive, and Avner Cohen is professor of nonproliferation studies at the Monterey Institute for International Studies and a senior fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. The authors would like to thank Ronen Bergman, Matthew Bunn, Marvin Miller, Olli Heinonen, and Sandy Spector for their helpful suggestions.

Saturday, December 14, 2013

Nuclear Weapons Are Israel's 'Worst-Kept Secret,'

Israel

By Tom Kutsch

Israel has long hewed to a policy of nuclear opacity — known as amimut in Hebrew — neither confirming nor denying the existence of a substantial nuclear arsenal. While the U.S. and its allies largely refrain from talking publicly about Israel’s program, Iran often cites it as an instance of what it decries as a Western double standard.
Israeli-American scholar Avner Cohen, currently at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, is one of the world’s leading experts on this secretive program and has done more than most to shed light on what may be — following the title of his most recent book — the "The Worst-Kept Secret."
He spoke with Al Jazeera earlier this week.

Q&A

What was the motivation behind Israel’s strategic doctrine to develop nuclear weapons in the first place?
Honestly, I do not think there was any well-defined strategic doctrine at that point at all. I think the initial interest in the nuclear option in the 1950s was out of anxiety and fear. David Ben-Gurion (Israel’s first prime minister) thought that Israel should have other, nonconventional options to compensate (for) its lacking in manpower, geography and all those things, and he wanted to have some sort of existential deterrent in the form of either a high nuclear option or actual nuclear weapons. I don’t think he knew himself exactly how far he would be allowed to push the nuclear program. The deed preceded the thinking.
The project was launched with a great deal of uncertainty about many things in the future, including whether and how far Israel actually could do it (i.e., develop a nuclear weapons program), whether Israel could get the outside help to do it, how far Israel would like to go, what would be the opposition in the world and, of course, what would be the American response. So it was a tentative project that had a great deal of ambition, but a lot of uncertainty.
And I think that’s the way that the project should be portrayed, rather than that those people knew what they wanted, had well-defined final objectives and (knew) how to achieve them. All those things, at that time, were far from being clear, and on all sorts of levels.
Why has Israel adopted a policy of opacity, or amimut, on the question of its nuclear capability?
That too is a matter of improvisation and evolution. The initial idea was simple: to prepare a last-resort option. Some hoped to develop a system of open deterrence, others opposed, and the compromise that Prime Minister Ben-Gurion adopted led eventually to the policy of opacity. Opacity, and its domestic origins, is a compromise between two different strategic camps. The idea is essentially to create some sort of national insurance policy.
You’ve talked about the beginning of Israel’s nuclear program as not being guided by any kind of strategic plan. Many decades later, with successive Israeli leaders having continued the policy of nuclear opacity, Israel remains part of a small minority of nations not party to theNuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and it is reluctant to discuss proliferation efforts or nuclear weapons — except largely with regard to Iran’s nuclear program. What is the thinking behind the nuclear doctrine in Israel's security establishment today?
This is my own interpretation of them, of course, as there is no real open discussion on this issue. But what I think is that there’s no true official nuclear use doctrine. I think the word "doctrine" may be too big, too formalistic.
There is infrastructure, there are facilities, there are assets, there are procedures, there is some sort of command-and-control system, there are some strategic principles. All these are elements of a broad national insurance policy, which ultimately is being left in the hands of the prime minister and executed by the nuclear agency under him. I think there is an inherent attitude of caution in all that, at least at the professional level — indeed, a great deal of caution: the notion that under virtually no conceivable circumstance can it ever be used. It’s primarily a certain taboo. It’s not something that the military, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), thinks much about. I don’t believe the IDF is even allowed to think about nuclear weapons. There are a few very specific military units, presumably in the navy and the air force, and their job includes elements of that reality, and they have the practical knowledge how to activate, etc. I believe that they have some procedures, but to call it a doctrine would be giving it too much credit.
Only in the case of the most unlikely situation that Israel itself would be attacked by somebody with nuclear weapons could one see Israel respond in kind. Other than that, I think nuclear weapons are for a kind of existential deterrence, national insurance policy, and not any concrete weapon.
I think that sometimes, some Israelis enjoy the opacity or the ambiguity around the nuclear program, because they would like others to think all sorts of things. They’re not going to say it, but they wouldn’t mind if others would speculate all sorts of ideas, including that nuclear weapons are usable. In my opinion I cannot see virtually any possibility that it could be used, including with regard to Iran.
Do you foresee any situation where Israeli policy could eventually embrace some kind of international nonproliferation agreement or regional nuclear-free option?
To be blunt, there is little true interest in Israel’s strategic community either in the NPT — and the NPT is not an option for Israel — or even in the idea of a nuclear-weapons-free Middle East. Also, no one in a position of power in Israel is seriously interested in removing or even modifying the policy of opacity. Opacity is a good excuse not to go into any kind of serious nuclear discussion. Israelis would like to keep that excuse.
So, to be frank and to be open, I don’t think there is among Israeli policymakers, among the security establishment in Israel — whether they know much about the nuclear issue or not — anyone who is really interested in change. And, by the way, most members of the Israeli security establishment know very little about this subject. But it’s a general attitude not to change anything; there’s no interest to give up anything, and there’s no faith in the desirability or in the feasibility of a nuclear-weapons-free zone. Of course, that can be put in nicer diplomatic language (by Israeli diplomatic officials). But in the frank language, forget about it. That’s the attitude.
There seems to be little or no transparency within Israel on the question of nuclear weapons. What kind of censorship or gag rule exists toward reporting about the existence of the program? Is there any kind of access or otherwise public discussion nowadays about nuclear weapons?
This issue is the creme de la creme of national security, and one cannot expect whatsoever to get any data. At the same time, the discourse in Israel in the last few years has somewhat changed, in the sense that people say somewhat more openly that Israel has nuclear weapons as a factual, nonproblematic statement. There is no more any effort to stop that kind of conversation, because it’s kind of anachronistic. Any effort to stop that would be totally ridiculous.
The point is that in terms of substance, the old policy remains unchanged. It is fair, though, to say that the general taboo and discourse has slightly become more amenable, more flexible, because otherwise it would look so idiotic.
Yes, slightly. But, for example, there was still a big fight over my Sini interview, that testimony that I just released. Had it not been released first by the Woodrow Wilson Center and then jointly with theThe New York Times, it could never have been published in Israel in any way — only when it was released outside.
To the question of "has something changed": Well, in some technical sense almost nothing has changed; in some broad, loose sense the discussion, the general societal discussion, the unspecific discussion (within official circles or the journalistic community) is much more open.
You’ve talked about Israel’s decision to bomb Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981, arguing that contrary to the common narrative, rather than preventing or demolishing Iraq’s nuclear weapons program, it actually accelerated it.
Yes, that’s my view. And I am not alone on this. In retrospect, I think in some respects that Israel’s decision to bomb the Osirak reactor accelerated and solidified Saddam Hussein in the '80s in his desire and determination to reach toward a military capability of nuclear weapons. 
Is there a parallel between how you see the Osirak episode and the policy that Israel, and to a lesser extent the U.S., pursues on Iran today with regard to its nuclear program?
It’s both more complex and more subtle than you seem to suggest. With Iraq —the world essentially did not know what Iraq was doing during much of the '80s. With Iran it’s a very different story. I think that in some respects, when Israel takes certain kinds of covert actions it only gives the Iranians motivations to protect the program and solidify their determination, not to stop but to be more determined.
For example, I don’t believe that killing Iranian scientists — while it may create an initial scare — ultimately gives the Iranians much besides strength and determination, rather than creating fear and defection. It’s not clear to me that it’s a helpful tactic to stop or even postpone the program. In the case of Iran, I think that Iran is playing a very sophisticated game.
My own view is that I don’t think that Iran today is after actual nuclear weapons. I think they would like to be considered a strong threshold state. I think that Iran realized some time ago that for them to be a full nuclear weapons state does not really serve their purpose.
And whether you believe their fatwa (the religious edict delivered against nuclear weapons by Iran’s Supreme Leader in the past on several occasions, and recently reiterated by its president) or don't, that’s not the issue. But I think, politically, they realized that it doesn’t serve their purpose to be a nuclear weapons state. They are not ready to pay the price for that. But they are determined, as a matter of prestige, as a matter of all sorts of national images and symbolisms, to be very close, to be known as being very, very close to the bomb.
I think they would like to let the world guess how close they are to having a nuclear weapon. I think they want to exploit the central weakness of the NPT, which is its unwillingness to define how far a country can go in pursuing a so-called peaceful interest in nuclear energy.
And Iran has been playing on this inherent ambiguity all along, and I think they would like to be more or less like Japan, which has a very sophisticated nuclear program, and everybody will know that they are relatively close to the bomb and to be treated in that way.
I think that the Israeli paranoia does not help them, because in some respects it’s giving more prominence and significance to what the Iranians do. In my view, the Israeli obsession with Iran and the very public way that it has manifested itself is not a smart and a wise way to respond. It is a way to deflect from Israel's real problems, i.e., the need to reach a working compromise with the Palestinians. I think it reflects poorly on the Israeli government; it reflects the fear of losing its nuclear monopoly in the region at some point in the future. And also it reflects a great deal of mirror imaging — that is to say that the Israelis look at the Iranians as if the Iranians were the Israelis themselves, who are determined to have the bomb.

Tuesday, December 10, 2013

Israel Helped Start The Shah Of Iran's Nuclear Program

Israelis dancing at a Purim party in the Israeli Embassy in Tehran in the late 1970s. (photo credit: screenshot from 'Before the Revolution,' courtesy Journeyman Pictures)
Israelis dancing at a Purim party in the Israeli Embassy in Tehran in the late 1970s. (photo credit: screenshot from 'Before the Revolution,' courtesy Journeyman Pictures)

A new documentary recalls the ‘paradise in a bubble’ of Israelis in Iran before 1979. It also suggests they played an initial role in setting Iran on the nuclear path

By Raphael Ahren

Sometime in the late 1970s, Yaakov Nimrodi, who served as military attaché in Israel’s unofficial embassy in Iran, hosted a number of high-ranking army officers at his Tehran home. Trying to impress his esteemed guests, Nimrodi asked his son Ofer to show them his skills on the piano. At first the child hesitated, but his father insisted, so he played a little bit. The Iranian generals loved the performance, and applauded heartily. Then Iran’s chief of staff, Gen. Fereydoun Djam, speaking in Persian, called little Ofer over to him.

“He took off his gold watch and gave it to me as a present,” Ofer Nimrodi, now 56, remembered. “I’m an 8-year-old boy, I have no idea what’s happening. But [Djam] said, ‘You played really nicely, you deserve it.’ I looked at my dad and he said, ‘No, General Djam, this is inappropriate, please.’ But the Iranian general insisted, and more than 30 years later Nimrodi, a prominent businessman and former publisher of the Maariv daily, still possesses the watch.


There are countless such anecdotes that illustrate the close ties between the State of Israel and the Iranian regime of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi before he was deposed in 1979 — a relationship utterly unthinkable in the current political climate.
Before the Islamic Revolution, thousands of Israelis, mostly diplomats and businessmen, sought and found their fortunes in Iran. A gripping documentary, by Dan Shadur and Barak Heyman, tells this “untold story of the Israeli paradise in Iran.”
Before the Revolution” reminds viewers that there used to be daily El Al flights connecting Tehran with Tel Aviv; that there was an Israeli school in the Iranian capital — one of only two outside Israel; and that some Israelis made so much money in Iran in a few years that upon their return they could afford to buy large houses in fancy Tel Aviv suburbs without mortgages. Over 8mm video footage from the 1970s, the 54-minute film quotes Israelis saying their years in Iran were “the happiest times in our lives.” They recall Purim parties in Tehran that “felt like Tel Aviv.” Former kibbutzniks talk of suddenly having maids to cook and clean for them.
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the late shah of Iran photo credit: Ghazarians/Wikipedia Commons)
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the late shah of Iran (photo credit: Wikimedia Commons/Ghazarians)
“Before the Revolution” — which is now being screened at film festivals, was shown on Israel’s YES satellite TV, and will hit international television screens later this year — does not ignore the more dubious aspects of Israel’s close ties with the dictatorial regime.The film contains some chilling quotes of Israelis who say they were aware of the regime’s human rights abuses (including torture of dissidents) but couldn’t be bothered with that, as they were busy making money and partying in the shah’s splendid palaces. It details the massive arms deals (Yaacov Nimrodi sold the Iranians advanced missile systems and 50,000 Uzi submachine guns). And it depicts a controversial framework of military and intelligence cooperation that likely included helping set up what became Tehran’s rogue nuclear program.
In one of the film’s many intriguing moments, Nachik Navot, who headed the Mossad’s branch in Tehran from 1969 to 1972, explains that the shah started Iran’s nuclear program as a means of deterrence against Iraq. Asked by filmmaker Shadur — an Israeli who grew up in Iran — who helped the Iranians develop their nuclear program, Navot quickly replies, “The heavens,” and then awkwardly averts his look away from the camera, clearly uncomfortable with the question.
Asked by The Times of Israel this week to expand on that topic, and whether he could state which countries or individuals assisted Iran with what became the rogue nuclear program, believed by Israel and others to be aimed at attaining nuclear weapons, Navot replied warily that he could comment “only on issues I am familiar with or was involved in.”
(Iran had formally launched a peaceful nuclear program in 1957, with the announcement of plans for cooperation with the US “in research in the peaceful uses of atomic energy.” Iran opened a nuclear research center in Tehran a decade later, with a US-supplied research reactor. It signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968 and ratified it in 1970. All formal US and European cooperation in this area ended with the 1979 Islamic Revolution. )

‘Relations Of Love, Without A Marriage Contract’




The Israeli-Iranian friendship was mutually beneficial. In Iran, a non-Arab country that in the 1970s underwent a tremendous economic boom, Israel had an important ally in a hostile region. Jerusalem imported Iranian oil. Tehran profited from Israel’s know-how in agriculture, business and, especially, the military.
“The Arab countries continue to be concerned with the close relations prevailing between Iran and Israel. A special grievance was the reported export of oil from Iran to Israel,” read a report in the 1961 issue of the Middle East Record, a journal published annually by Tel Aviv University. The Arab League’s secretary-general at the time worried that “Zionist penetration and influence in Iran were increasing daily,” the journal reported, adding that the group recommended that “all Arab nations break off diplomatic relations with Iran, whose activity defeated the aim of economic boycott of Israel.”
The shah admired Israel mainly because of its military success. “The cooperation with Israel was tremendous. Every Iranian general visited Israel and we visited them,” Gen. Yitzhak Segev, Israel’s military attaché from 1977 to 1979, says in “Before the Revolution.”

Top Iranian military officials Hasan Toofanian and Bahram Ariana meet with Israeli officers in the headquarters of the Israel Defense Forces, 1975 ((Photo credit: public domain, Wikimedia commons)
Top Iranian military officials Hasan Toofanian and Bahram Ariana (left), meet with Israeli officers in the headquarters of the Israel Defense Forces, 1975. (photo credit: public domain, Wikimedia Commons)
Since the Islamists came to power, of course, the Iranian regime has relentlessly denounced Israel and repeatedly expressed a yearning for, and a confidence in, the Jewish state’s rapid disappearance. Israel, for its part, has been tirelessly calling on the international community to force the regime to abandon its rogue nuclear program,threatening a military strike if all else fails to prevent Iran from reaching nuclear weapons capacity. But Benjamin Netanyahu, who has made thwarting a nuclear Iran the defining mission of his prime ministerial life, also well remembers the two nations’ past friendly relations.
“Today, our hope for the future is challenged by a nuclear-armed Iran that seeks our destruction. But I want you to know: that wasn’t always the case,” Netanyahu said during his October 1 address at the United Nations General Assembly. He went so far back as to mention that Persian King Cyrus ended the Babylonian exile of the Jewish people 2,500 years ago. “He issued a famous edict in which he proclaimed the right of the Jews to return to the Land of Israel and rebuild the Jewish Temple in Jerusalem. That’s a Persian decree, and thus began an historic friendship between the Jews and the Persians that lasted until modern times.”
Back in 1942, before the State of Israel was founded, the Jewish Agency opened a “Palestine Office” in Tehran. In an ironic twist of history, that very same office, which served as Israel’s diplomatic mission until 1979, was handed to Yasser Arafat’s Palestine Liberation Organization that year, after the Israelis were chased out of the country by the Islamic Revolution.

Yasser Arafat at the building that used to house the Israeli embassy (photo credit: screen shot 'Before the Revolution,' courtesy Journeyman Pictures)
PLO leader Yasser Arafat at the building that used to house the Israel Embassy. (photo credit: screenshot ‘Before the Revolution,’ courtesy Journeyman Pictures)
(photo credit: screenshot from ‘Before the Revolution,’ courtesy Journeyman Pictures)
The Imperial State of Iran officially extended de facto recognition to Israel in March 1950, being the second Middle Eastern country to do so (after Turkey). Three months later, Iranian minister plenipotentiary Reza Safinia, who represented Tehran in Israel, hosted an official reception in Jerusalem, which marked “the first such function to be held by a foreign diplomat in Jerusalem since it was proclaimed Israel’s capital,” according to a JTA report at the time. The event was attended by prime minister David Ben-Gurion, several ministers and both chief rabbis.
“After the Suez campaign, from 1956 onward, we began working in Iran, attempting, eventually succeeding, to purchase oil, which was denied to us by the Arabs and the West,” Aryeh Levin, the No. 2 official in Israel’s diplomatic mission in Tehran from 1973 to 1977, told The Times of Israel.

Iranian Minister Plenipotentiary Reza Safinia, center, who represented Tehran in Israel, chats with then-prime minister David Ben-Gurion at a party in Jerusalem, June 1, 1950 (photo credit: Teddy Brauner/GPO)
Iranian Minister Plenipotentiary Reza Safinia, center, who represented Tehran in Israel, chats with then-prime minister David Ben-Gurion at a party in Jerusalem, June 1, 1950. (photo credit: Teddy Brauner/GPO)
Israel contributed greatly to Iran’s agriculture, town planning, and other fields, he added. “Israelis were considered devoted, hard-working and supportive — especially, for instance, after the tragic 1962 earthquake in the Qazvin area, where we eventually planned and remade their agriculture, village construction and communal organization,” noted Levin, whose official title was minister plenipotentiary. “In agriculture, we had a number of talented and experienced experts who helped and guided the Iranians, excellent agriculturists themselves, toward modern methods of production and husbandry.”
Besides flourishing trade relations, the Israeli officialdom was also very close to the Iranian government and the shah himself.
In “Before the Revolution,” Israeli businessman Yehuda Artziele reminisces about a lavish dinner he attended at the royal palace. As classical music played in the background, he recalls, the shah told him that, in the ballroom, the rules of Islam do not exist. “Drink as much as you want. Feel free, do whatever you wish,” he was urged by the Iranian ruler. “I hadn’t seen such wealth even in Europe, where people know how to be wealthy without showing off.”
‘It’s better to have love relations without a contract, then having a contract that doesn’t mean much’
Yet even then, Iran’s relationship with Israel was not entirely uncomplicated. No flag fluttered outside the Israeli diplomatic mission in Tehran, which was never officially recognized as embassy.
David Menshari, who spent two years conducting a field study in Iran on the eve of the Islamic Revolution, once asked an Iranian Foreign Ministry official why Tehran could not formally recognize Israel, given that bilateral relations were so cordial. “He told me: ‘This is like relations of love without a marriage contract.’ He said it’s better to have love relations without a contract, than having a contract that doesn’t mean much.”
Today a Tel Aviv University professor focusing on the history of modern Iran, Menashri said that even El Al’s daily flights in and out of Tehran were not officially listed. Arab League Secretary-General Mahmoud Riad once arrived in Iran and was surprised to see an Israeli plane at the airport, according to Menashri. Riad asked the Iranian foreign minister how such a thing was possible. “The minister said: ‘As far as I know there are no flights from Tel Aviv to Iran, but I will check with his majesty the shah.’ Before he left Iran, Riad asked the foreign minister if he had checked. ‘Yes, I checked, and we don’t have El Al planes landing in Iran,’ the foreign minister said. ‘But I saw it with my own eyes,’ Riad insisted. The foreign minister replied: ‘Do you want me to believe your eyes or the word of the shah?’”

El Al's office in Tehran, after it was ransacked by anti-shah protestors in 1979 (photo credit: screen shot 'Before the Revolution,' courtesy Journeyman Pictures)
El Al’s office in Tehran, after it was ransacked by anti-shah protestors in 1979. (photo credit: screenshot from ‘Before the Revolution,’ courtesy Journeyman Pictures
But who needs official recognition when life is good? In upscale northern Tehran, Israelis lived in a bubble of comfort and wealth that apparently prevented them from noticing both the misery all around them and, later on, the dangers of the looming Islamic Revolution — which was initially motivated less by religious zeal than social injustice.
“I didn’t really understand that there was a terrible injustice, of so few rich and so many poor that were really suffering,” admits Rebecca Meromi, a dance teacher who gushes in the film that their in-house maid washed their dirty laundry by hand. “We weren’t aware of it,” adds her husband Eylon Meromi, an architect, in the movie. “We thought we were helping them. We really thought to ourselves that we’re helping the Persian people — building them apartments, strengthening their army and protecting their country. It was clear that there was a huge social gap, but that was out of our hands.”
Nili Yanir says in the documentary: “We lived on a different planet, we really didn’t know. We weren’t really involved in their domestic policies. I also don’t think that really interested us. We were young.”
‘Of course the Iranians suffered. But if you ask me if it bothered us, the answer is no’
Perhaps more problematic than merely living the high life while being oblivious to the local population’s suffering, the Israelis in Iran also were fully aware of the repression by Savak, the autocratic regime’s notorious secret police. Critics of the shah often mysteriously disappeared. There were no Xerox machines on university campuses because the Savak feared the dissemination of anti-regime propaganda. But the Mossad maintained excellent relations with the Savak, and everyone knew it. It was even rumored among Israelis that the Mossad helped set up the Savak, teaching it how to torture people, the film reports — an allegation other experts reject.
“Of course the Iranians suffered, I won’t say they didn’t. But if you ask me if it bothered us, if it was subject for day-to-day conversation, the answer is no,” says Nathan Frenkiel, who directed a construction group in Tehran, in “Before the Revolution.” “They didn’t complain and we didn’t intervene. We’re not blind; we knew what kind of reality we were living in — but it’s not our bloody business.”
Menashri is forgiving: “As much as they [Israelis] benefited from Iran, Iran benefited from them coming to Iran. Iran needed expertise,” he said. Israel was ready to extend even altruistic help, for instance when it sent aid to Iran after the devastating 1962 earthquake. “Iranians have the tendency to blame everything on the foreigners. But the Iranians invited them.”
Before the Revolution
‘Before the Revolution’
Meir Javedanfar, an Iranian-born Israeli Middle East analyst, says Israelis in Iran should not be accused of abetting the regime’s brutal repression of dissent. The Savak did not need Israeli training to know how to beat people up, he said. “Probably they [the Mossad] helped the Savak in other areas,” he said, “but it wasn’t in torturing people.”
All kinds of people live in undemocratic countries and don’t intervene lest they be accused of interfering in the state’s internal affairs, continued Javedanfar, who left Iran in 1987 and now teaches contemporary Iranian politics at the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya. Either way, he argued, they wouldn’t have been able to do much about the ordinary Iranian’s plight. “The shah certainly wasn’t going to take lessons from Israelis. [Then-US President Jimmy] Carter was having enough trouble convincing the shah to respect human rights. I don’t think Israel would have had any chance whatsoever.”
According to Levin, Israel’s No. 2 at the embassy in Tehran, Israel’s close ties to the Savak did contribute to the fact that many ordinary Iranians weren’t too fond of Israelis. “Identifying Israel’s activities with the Savak was not totally justified, however, since we did not help the intelligence agencies in tracking the opposition, but rather worked hand in hand with them on intelligence-related matters that dealt with the Arab world,” he said.

‘We Didn’t Want To Leave; We Had A Lot To Lose’




“Before the Revolution” documents how oblivious many Israelis were to the beginning of the Islamic takeover in 1979. After the first anti-shah demonstrations turned violent, there were tanks in the streets and a nightly curfew was imposed. Yet most Israelis, while worried, stayed put, expecting the uprising would soon be crushed and life would continue as usual. As the protests grew more intense, some of the Israeli security staff started to think about evacuation, but the powers-that-be hesitated.
“We had an emergency plan which said that we would not leave too soon, because we had a lot to lose, strategically and economically, in Iran,” recalls Eliezer “Geizi” Tzafrir, who headed the Mossad station in Tehran at the time, in the film. “If we left too soon and order was restored, we would never be able to get back to Tehran.”
But as the weeks passed by and the revolt turned into a full-blown revolution, the Israelis finally realized it was time to send the embassy staff home. “I didn’t leave thinking we’d never come back. I thought we were leaving for a little bit, until they get things into order, and that we’d return,” a former employee remembers.
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini returned from exile to Iran on February 1, 1979; the Islamic Revolution was now in full swing and the remaining Israeli diplomats and security officials feared for their lives. They changed locations several times in order not to be detected by the Revolutionary Guards, who happened to be headquartered right next to the Israeli embassy.
“Outside, people were shooting like mad in every direction,” recounts David Nachshol, a security guard at the embassy, in the film. “On the streets we saw a graffiti. It was written there: ‘Don’t hurt the Jews — but any Israeli you meet, kill him.’”

The Israeli embassy after it was ransacked by anti-shah protestors in 1979 (photo credit: screen shot 'Before the Revolution,' courtesy Journeyman Pictures)
The Israeli Embassy after it was ransacked by anti-shah protestors in 1979. (photo credit: screenshot from ‘Before the Revolution,’ courtesy Journeyman Pictures)
Nearly all Israelis left Iran before the Islamic Revolution was completed. The embassy and the El Al office were ransacked in mid-February, and soon after, on February 18, the last Israelis were smuggled out of the country with the help of the Americans.
Was Israel loathed even before the ayatollahs made it the Islamic Republic’s state doctrine? Experts differ.
The “vast majority of Iranians, who are Shiite Muslims, while not actively involved in anti-Israel activity, certainly identified with the Arab-Palestinian-Muslim camp and were not friends of Israel,” Ze’ev Maghen, a professor of Islamic history and expert on revolutionary Iran and Islamic fundamentalism, told The Times of Israel. Levin likewise said he had “always had the feeling that ordinary Iranians were not great Israel lovers.”
Menashri, on the other hand, asserted that he never sensed hostility to Israelis. On the contrary, he added, “being an Israeli made you more secure in many ways” before 1979, partially because people knew that the shah was a good friend of Israel. “We traveled all over the country; I always identified myself as an Israeli, and there was never a case or an incident in which I felt danger or lack of security.”
Iran’s 100,000 or so Jews, however, plainly felt deep unease about Khomeini’s rise, fearing a revolution taking religious colors was doomed to harm their community. Sixty thousand of them fled; today, there are only some 10,000-20,000 left, according to most estimates.
“For one thing, this was revolution against the shah and the Jews were considered to be friendly with the shah. So whoever is the friend of the shah is the enemy of the revolution,” Menashri said. “This was also a revolution against gaps in society, between rich and poor, and Iranian Jews were on the wrong side again, they were on the wealthier side.”
The young leaders of the community approached the supreme leader to explain to him that they were Jews but not Zionists. “Therefore the slogan, the official attitude, was: Jews are Iranian citizens and they are part of our movement; they are protected. Israelis and Zionists are totally bad,” Menashri explained.
And so it has remained: Israelis and Zionists “totally bad.” How different from those halycon days in the bubble under the shah.
"Before The Revolution"