Nuclear Disarmament and Demilitarization

By Jacqueline Cabasso
International Peace Bureau (Denmark)

Indigenous peoples often remind us that we stand on the shoulders of those who came before us.

In that vein I’d like to especially honor and remember my beloved friend and mentor Janet Bloomfield, Chair of CND and a co-president of IPB, and Mayor Iccho Itoh of Nagasaki, recipient of the Sean MacBride Peace Prize, with Hiroshima Mayor Tadatoshi Akiba and Mayors for Peace in 2006. Both Janet and Mayor Itoh died tragically in April 2007.

I’d also like to honor and recognize the presence here of my personal and professional colleague – my life partner – John Burroughs, executive director of the Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy. I’d like to thank my parents, who are thinking of me today in California, for raising me with the values recognized by this award.

And, of course, I’d like to thank the International Peace Bureau for this amazing honor, which I proudly share with my colleagues at Western States Legal Foundation, the founding mothers and fathers of the Abolition 2000 Global Network to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons, and many others.

Earlier this week I was in Ypres, Belgium – a city that was attacked with chemical weapons and destroyed during World War I, for a meeting of the Mayors for Peace 2020 Vision Campaign Association. On Tuesday, Nov. 11, I had the opportunity to join the mayors delegation at a solemn ceremony held at the Menin Gate marking the 90th anniversary of the armistice that ended World War I -- sadly not, “the war to end all wars.” I was slightly shocked to hear on CNN that there are only 12 living veterans of that war, and was reminded of the axiom that those who don’t know their history are doomed to repeat it. To remedy this, the people of Ypres hold a memorial ceremony at the Menin Gate every single day. I also thought about the ever more urgent voices of the hibakusha – the remaining survivors of the U.S. atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki – who are growing increasingly concerned that nuclear weapons will be used again, and that no one will be left to warn about the impending hell on earth. The impassioned plea of the hibakusha, “Never Again!” should inform and inspire our commitment to work for the abolition of nuclear weapons sooner, rather than later.

I’d like to begin by quoting from Sean MacBride’s 1974 Nobel Peace Prize lecture, entitled The Imperatives of Survival.

“It is nearly with a feeling of despair that I come to your beautiful country and city to receive this hardly deserved honor. Despair partly because we are living in a world where war, violence, brutality and ever increasing armament dominate the thinking of humanity; but, more so, because humanity itself gives the appearance of having become numbed or terrified by its own impotence in the face of disaster.”

The often-quoted Gramsci line, “pessimism of the intellect; optimism of the will” is one of our mottos at Western States Legal Foundation. This dichotomy pretty much sums up my longevity as a peace activist, along with my strongly held belief that nonviolence is hope; nonviolence is the belief that change is possible.

Shortly after the U.S. atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, Mahatma Gandhi said:

“It has been suggested by American friends that the atom bomb will bring in Ahimsa [Non-violence] as nothing else can. It will, if it is meant that its destructive power will so disgust the world that it will turn away from violence for the time being. This is very like a man glutting himself with dainties [sweets] to the point of nausea and turning away from them, only to return with redoubled zeal after the affect of the nausea is well over.

Precisely in the manner will the world return to violence with renewed zeal after the effect of the disgust is worn out.

So far as I can see, the atomic bomb has deadened the finest feeling that has sustained mankind for ages…. The atom bomb brought an empty victory to the allied armies but it resulted for the time being in destroying the soul of Japan. What has happened to the soul of the destroying nation is yet too early to see....”

I think my generation has seen it very clearly. In his 1995 testimony before the International Court of Justice, Hiroshima Mayor Takashi Hiraoka told the Court:

“History is written by the victors. Thus, the heinous massacre that was Hiroshima has been handed down to us as a perfectly justified act of war. As a result, for over 50 years we have never directly confronted the full implications of this terrifying act for the future of the human race.”

Looking around the world today, we see the military legacy of the way in which World War II ended. Here are a few examples from 2008.

On January 22, the Guardian (UK) reported on a “radical” manifesto for NATO reform, prepared by top-ranking retired military officers and strategists from the U.S., Germany, Britain, France and the Netherlands. Though not an official government document, authors of the 150-page “blueprint” for restructuring the transatlantic military partnership, “Towards a Grand Strategy for an Uncertain World,” include General John Shalikashvili, former NATO commander in Europe.

The document, which reportedly was presented to the Pentagon and to NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, argues that, “The first use of nuclear weapons must remain in the quiver of escalation as the ultimate instrument to prevent the use of weapons of mass destruction.” And it calls for a shift from consensus decision-making in NATO to majority voting, thus ending national veto power in order to enable swifter action. We don’t know if this ominous document was discussed at the most recent NATO summit in Bucharest, but it may well appear on the agenda of NATO’s 60th anniversary meetings next year. This story did not appear in the U.S. press.

On May 9, 2008 Russia – with its new President, Dmitri Medvedev, and new Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin presiding – marked the 63rd anniversary of the Soviet defeat of the Nazis with a huge military parade in Red Square, the first such event since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The international CNN television coverage was very strange. On one hand, commentators played up the fact that this was the first such Russian military parade in 18 years. On the other hand, they derided the condition of Russia’s military hardware as “obsolete.” I wondered if the potential victims of those “outdated” weapons would agree. One commentator noted an exception for Russia’s nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missiles, which he described as the “most terrifying” of all weapons of mass destruction. While the television pundits stressed that Russia does not pose a military threat, I wondered who the intended audience was for this massive display of military might.

The previous day, the International Herald Tribune had reported that the United States plan to install missile interceptors on Polish soil was in danger of falling apart because of Poland’s increasing reluctance to accept the deal. This sounded like good news. Perhaps the new Polish government did not want to cooperate with expanding U.S. militarism. Unfortunately, that was not the case. To the contrary, the Polish government was insisting that the United States contribute financially – as much as $10 billion – to upgrade Poland’s armed forces. Why? The Polish defense minister explained that the U.S. missile shield was designed to protect parts of Europe against missiles fired from Iran. But Poland, now part of NATO, apparently felt that it needed Patriot air-defense missiles to defend itself against its old Cold War ally, Russia, which itself feels threatened by the U.S. anti-missile shield.

In August, after a year and a half of stalled talks, the U.S. and Poland suddenly signed the deal against the backdrop of the sudden military conflict between Russia and Georgia. The BBC reported that Russia’s deputy chief of general staff, General Anatoly Nogovitsyn had responded angrily at a Moscow press conference, declaring that U.S. plans for a missile base in Poland “cannot go unpunished.” Russia is considering arming its Baltic Fleet with nuclear warheads for the first time since the end of the Cold War. On October 2, Russia announced plans to deploy a new nuclear missile next year designed to penetrate anti-missile defenses and will build eight submarines to carry it. According to Colonel-General Vladimir Popovkin, head of armaments for the Russian armed forces, “As long as we are a nuclear power, no hotheads will venture to attack our country.” On November 5, President Medvedev announced that Russia would deploy conventionally armed ballistic missiles in Kaliningrad, in order to “neutralize” the perceived threat from U.S. missile interceptors in Poland and radars in the Czech Republic.

Also this year we have experienced sharply rising oil and food prices and food shortages around the world amidst symptoms of an unprecedented global economic collapse, and an inability to cope with natural disasters like the cyclone in Myanmar/Burma and the earthquake in China – much less global climate change. Yet rather than redirecting resources badly-needed to meet human and ecological needs, trends seem to be going in the opposite direction.

The Encarta Encyclopedia describes militarism as “advocacy of an ever-stronger military as a primary goal of society, even at the cost of other social priorities and liberties.” As disquieting as it may be, this definition accurately describes the trajectory of United States national security policy that the next U.S. President will inherit. And it is reflected in the national security policies of a growing number of other countries.

The United States military dominates the globe through its operation of 10 Unified Combatant Commands, overseeing a network of well over 700 foreign bases in more than 60 countries.

Global operations are coordinated by United States Strategic Command (StratCom) in the state of Nebraska. The Pentagon’s December 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) –contemporaneous with the expansion of StratCom’s mission to integrate conventional with nuclear war planning - underlines the fundamental policy and technological underpinnings for the Bush administration’s aggressive “preventive war” doctrine. The NPR expanded the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security policy, including the possible use of nuclear weapons in “immediate, potential, or unexpected contingencies” and called for indefinite retention of a large, modern, and diverse nuclear force. The NPR has served as the primary justification for each subsequent annual nuclear weapons budget request as well as the current “Complex Transformation” plan to modernize the U.S. nuclear weapons laboratories and manufacturing plants.

The policy of the nuclear weapon states, in particular the U.S., U.K. and France can be characterized as “fewer but newer,” and is increasingly “capacity-based.” These states cling to the notion of “deterrence,” but the “threat” they seek to deter is an unknown and uncertain future.

They claim that reductions in numbers from the insane heights of the Cold War constitute meaningful disarmament, but disarmament is not just about the numbers. Led by the U.S., they are modernizing and qualitatively improving their “enduring” nuclear arsenals – both warheads and delivery systems. StratCom Commander, General Kevin Chilton, told reporters this spring:

“As we look to the future – and I believe we are going to need a nuclear deterrent for this country for the remainder of this century, the 21st century – I think what we need is a modernized nuclear weapon to go with our modernized delivery platforms.”

A September 2008 Department of Defense report on the Air Force’s nuclear mission describes “the importance of nuclear deterrence” this way:

“Though our consistent goal has been to avoid actual weapons use, the nuclear deterrence is ‘used’ every day by assuring friends and allies, dissuading opponents from seeking peer capability to the United States, deterring attacks on the United States and its allies from potential adversaries, and providing the potential to defeat adversaries if deterrence fails.”

A detailed Air Force “Roadmap,” issued on October 24, 2008, just two weeks before the Presidential election, presents a detailed plan for “reinvigorating the Air Force nuclear enterprise.” The report concludes:

“Because of their immense destructive power, nuclear weapons, as recognized in the 2006 National Security Strategy, deter in a way that simply cannot be duplicated by other weapons. Additionally, the special nature of nuclear weapons demands precise performance across the Air Force nuclear enterprise, with no tolerance for complacency or shortcuts. In short, we will continue to fortify current operations, develop our people, and sustain and modernize current capabilities.”

In his terrible speech of March 2008, presenting France’s aptly-named new nuclear submarine, “Le Terrible,” in Cherbourg, French President Nikolai Sarkozy proclaimed: “Our nuclear deterrence protects us from any aggression against our vital interests emanating from a state – wherever it may come from and whatever form it may take.” 

Reflecting U.S. policy and the “Grand Strategy’s” proposed expansion of NATO’s concept of deterrence, he added: “It cannot be ruled out that an adversary might miscalculate the delimitation of our vital interests or our determination to safeguard them. In the framework of nuclear deterrence, it would be possible, in that event, to send a nuclear warning that would underscore our resolve. That would be aimed at reestablishing deterrence.”

Sarkozy explained how France’s nuclear policy will be integrated with UK and NATO security policies.

“Together with the United Kingdom, we have taken a major decision: It is our assessment that there can be no situation in which the vital interests of either of our two nations could be threatened without the vital interests of the other also being threatened.

As for the Atlantic Alliance, its security is also based on nuclear deterrence. British and French nuclear forces contribute to it.”

Only near the end of his speech did Sarkozy get to the subject of disarmament, pledging to reduce the number of French nuclear warheads to fewer than 300, but providing no details or timeline.

France’s nuclear partner, the UK, while also announcing cuts to its arsenal, is proceeding with plans to replace its Trident nuclear weapons system, while pursuing massive development of its Atomic Weapons Establishment at Aldermasten. In addition, and without Parliament’s agreement, the British government has endorsed the use of its Menwith Hill radar station for the U.S. missile defense system.

China, the only NPT Nuclear Weapon States to maintain a no first use policy, nevertheless plans to replace its sea-launched ballistic missiles. And China is massively expanding its military budget, which nearly doubled, from $62.5 billion in 2004, to $121.9 billion in 2006. To put this in context, in 2006 the United States spent $54 billion on its nuclear forces alone. That year Russia spent $70 billion on its military; the United Kingdon spent $55.4 billion; and France spent $54 billion. In 2008, it is estimated that the United States will spend $711 billion on its military – 48 percent of the world total! All of this is in the name of “national security.”

The recently ratified U.S.-India deal would provide India, a non-NPT party, with nuclear technology and materials that might enable it to further develop its weapons programs. Other non-NPT nuclear weapons states, Israel and Pakistan, are reportedly pursuing similar deals.

What is to be done? The answer is clear to ordinary people. We need to fundamentally redefine security. We must put universal human security and ecological sustainability at the heart of conflict resolution and prevention. We must divest precious resources from militarism and invest them instead in this new security paradigm.

The pursuit of nuclear energy has become a leading cause of conflict around the world due to the inherently dual use nature of the nuclear fuel cycle. We simply must phase out and move beyond nuclear power, as well as fossil fuels, if we are to achieve a world of human and ecological security.

I would like to highlight one bright spot in this rather dismal picture. I want to commend Germany for demonstrating bold leadership by establishing an International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA). At the invitation of the German government, representatives from countries met in Berlin this April to foster and promote the development of renewable energy worldwide, in response to the growing demand for energy and the necessity to address global warming. By promoting a cooperative approach to the development of clean renewable solar, tidal and wind power, IRENA provides a positive vision and a practical way forward for this energy “revolution.”

In her 1976 book, The Game of Disarmament, Alva Myrdal, a Swedish minister of disarmament and winner of the 1982 Nobel Peace Prize asked:

“How can we let the nationalistic security needs as defined and exaggerated by military and other vested interests misguide our societies? How can we allow secretiveness and falsifications of reality to motivate the continued arms race, with all the dangers and burdens thereof? The common man should demand honest accountability of the policymakers. He has the right to question their ethics.”
But at this moment in history, it seems that the common man and woman are largely unaware of the terrible price they have already paid for nuclear weapons and the nuclear dangers that are growing again. There is an urgent need for public education. Whether conducted formally, in schools and universities, or informally, in town halls and village squares, this education should promulgate a paradigm shift in the way security is commonly understood. Security must be no longer be defined in terms of “national” security based on military might. It should be redefined in terms of universal “human” security and sustainable environmental policies and practices.

This approach requires breaking the silences of history, emphasizing critical thinking, truth telling, good faith and reconciliation. In the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation it means facing the inextricable link between nuclear weapons and nuclear power; grappling with the relationship between nuclear and conventional military power; confronting the gross economic disparities between the wealthy elites and the vast majority of the human family, identifying and challenging those who benefit from nuclear weapons and militarism; and preparing for peace instead of war by teaching and reinforcing the importance of nonviolent conflict resolution at every level of society.

We need to find new and creative ways to:

• Promote the values, embodied in the United Nations Charter, of multilateralism, cooperation and diplomacy. It might be useful, in this context, to recall the Preamble to the United Nations Charter, which introduces the Charter as a collaboration between civil society and the governments of the world – almost as a “bottom up” initiative. It begins:

“We the Peoples of the United Nations, Determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war….”

• Stress the importance of good faith adherence to international law; keep your promises; work cooperatively with other nations to achieve objectives;

• Promote proactive conflict prevention, by anticipating sources of conflict, such as competition for energy resources, and working to address them though creative and practical means, such as IRENA;

• Promote a culture of peace, underscoring the values of nonviolence, tolerance, cooperation, democracy and critical thinking;

• Promote the redirection of resources to meet human needs and ensure ecological sustainability.

How will this paradigm shift come about? I don’t see it coming from the top. At best, elite initiatives like the Shultz-Kissinger editorials in the Wall Street Journal and British Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett’s call for cuts in the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, are appeals for “responsible” arms control in a world that seems to be spinning out of control. 

But they remain fundamentally rooted in the national security status quo.

One rather disquieting view of security without nuclear weapons was offered last year by Robert Einhorn, a Clinton administration nuclear policy expert and arms control advocate. “We should be putting far more effort into developing more effective conventional weapons,” he said. “It’s hard to imagine a president using nuclear weapons under almost any circumstance, but no one doubts our willingness to use conventional weapons.” This statement, unfortunately, is all too true. But an even more overpowering conventional military threat surely is not the desired outcome of the nuclear disarmament process. 

Moreover, how practical would that approach be?

How would countries with fewer economic resources - especially those on the “enemies” list -respond? Wouldn’t they have an incentive to maintain or acquire nuclear weapons to counter overwhelming conventional military superiority? And wouldn’t that, in turn, even further entrench U.S. determination to retain and modernize its own nuclear arsenal, thus pushing the “ultimate” elimination of nuclear weapons ever farther into the future? This conundrum is a challenge we cannot afford to ignore.

As Gandhi observed:

‘The moral to be legitimately drawn from the supreme tragedy of the bomb is that it will not be destroyed by counter-bombs even as violence cannot be by counter-violence. Mankind has to get out of violence only through non-violence. Hatred can be overcome only by love. Counter-hatred only increases the surface as well as the depth of hatred....”

And, he explained how social transformation will come from the bottom up.

“We have to make truth and non-violence not matters for mere individual practice, but for practice by groups and communities and nations…. [Before] general disarmament… commences… some nation will have to dare to disarm herself and take large risks. The level of non-violence in that nation, if that event happily comes to pass, will naturally have risen so high as to command universal respect. Her judgment will be unerring, her decisions firm, her capacity for heroic self-sacrifice will be great, and she will want to live as much for other nations as for herself.”

I’ve always thought that one of my strengths is a high tolerance for ambiguity. This requires an ability to hold contradictory truths at the same time. What’s called for is a straightforward, unambiguous demand for the global abolition of nuclear weapons. This suggests the need for immediate negotiations and a timebound framework. We need to expose and challenge the hypocrisy and contradictions inherent in the dominant narratives: while we’re committed to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, we must maintain the safety and reliability of our enduring stockpile; and, while we’re committed to a world without nuclear weapons (someday), as long as nuclear weapons exist, we will maintain a robust deterrent. (In other words, it’s regrettable, but as long as nuclear weapons exist…. nuclear weapons will exist!)

Non-governmental organizations are by definition not governments, and we should not confuse our role with that of governments. Our job is not to cut deals with governments or to ask for what we think we can get. Our job is to speak truth to power and to ask for what we really want.

Our demand, however, must be coupled with a clear-eyed recognition of the central role nuclear weapons continue to play in the National Security State, firmly in place since 1945, and a much deeper understanding of the powerful forces that have successfully perpetuated the nuclear weapons enterprise despite the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War nearly 20 years ago. And we must offer an alternative view of security, defined in universal human and environmentally sustainable terms, to replace the 20th century concept of “national” security, ensured through overwhelming military might.

In his famous 1963 speech, Martin Luther King, Jr. declared: “I have a dream that my four little children will one day live in a nation where they will not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their character.”

The election of Barack Obama as U.S. President indicates that a major step has been taken in achieving King’s dream – a major step that gives us great hope. Dr. King, however, did not stop at the dream. In his less well known, but perhaps even more important speech, “Beyond Vietnam; A Call to Conscience,” delivered April 4, 1967, exactly one year before his tragic assassination, King broke new ground, stating

“I am convinced that if we are to get on the right side of the world revolution, we as a nation must undergo a radical revolution of values. We must rapidly begin the shift from a thing-oriented society to a person-oriented society. When machines and computers, profit motives and property rights, are considered more important than people, the giant triplets of racism, extreme materialism, and militarism are incapable of being conquered.

A true revolution of values will soon cause us to question the fairness and justice of many of our past and present policies… A true revolution of values will soon look uneasily on the glaring contrast of poverty and wealth…

A true revolution of values will lay hand on the world order and say of war, ‘[t]his way of settling differences is not just’…. A nation that continues year after year to spend more money on military defense than on programs of social uplift is approaching spiritual death.

America, the richest and most powerful nation in the world, can well lead the way in this revolution of values. There is nothing except a tragic death wish to prevent us from reordering our priorities so that the pursuit of peace will take precedence over the pursuit of war. There is nothing except a tragic death wish to keep us from molding a recalcitrant status quo with bruised hands until we have fashioned it into a brotherhood.”

Hopefully, we are well on our way to achieving the dream. Now we must move “beyond Vietnam.”

With the global economy in collapse and the worldwide surge of hope in response to the election of Barak Obama as U.S. President, the time is ripe for another massive surge of public opinion – from the bottom up – calling for the abolition of nuclear weapons. But this time, we must understand that demanding nuclear disarmament is not enough, and that we can’t achieve it alone. This time we must insist that nuclear disarmament serve as the leading edge of a global trend towards demilitarization and redirection of military expenditures to meet human needs and save the environment.

On November 12, the Mayor of Ghent, Belgium presided over a joyful tree-planting ceremony to inaugurate a new “peace forest” near a country road just outside the city. 

School children carrying brightly colored paper cranes filled Hiroshima-Nagasakistraat, following behind a funky marching band. Posters bearing the articles of the International Declaration of Human Rights were mounted on poles along the side of the road. At the end, a new article (Article XXXI) had been proposed by the City of Ghent. It says: “All people worldwide have the duty to strive together for a (nuclear) weapon free world.”

Thanks again to IPB for this great honor. I look forward to working with you for peace and justice in a nuclear free world.

N. Korean Nukes: How Real Is The Threat?

BY ERIC TALMADGE
Associated Press
May 8, 5:06 AM EDT
Courtesy Of "Stars and Stripes"

TOKYO (AP) -- If getting international attention is North Korea's goal, then there is nothing quite like detonating a nuclear device to make your adversaries sit up and take notice. But experts say North Korea probably has a long way to go before it will be able to actually deploy a nuclear weapon.

While North Korea is adept at getting political mileage out of showy military displays, Pyongyang's attempts to show off its strength are, just as often, reminders of its weaknesses - and a nuclear test would likely fit that pattern.

Fears that such a test may be imminent were heightened last month, when North Korea marked an important anniversary with a long-range rocket launch. Its two previous tests came soon after such launches. Satellite imagery also suggested stepped-up activity at the North's Punggye-ri nuclear testing site.

Little progress at the site has been reported since, which could mean the activity was a ruse or the device is simply not ready yet. It also could mean that the new regime headed by Kim Jong Un, who assumed power after the death of his father in December, is having second thoughts about whether to risk international sanctions by forging ahead.

Sooner or later, however, a test is highly likely.

"The North Koreans clearly value the demonstration effect of nuclear and missile tests, even if the test is only partially successful," said Jeffrey Lewis, of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. "North Korea gets a tremendous amount of leverage from our fear that these weapons might work someday."

But he noted that Pyongyang failed miserably in its attempt to launch an ICBM-style rocket last month, then capped off a lavish military parade with the unveiling of a half-dozen ominous-looking new missiles that analysts now believe were low-quality mockups of a design that could never fly.

"They are trying to run before they can walk, with the predictable outcome of tripping," Lewis said.

A test could have two practical goals.

North Korea may be developing devices that use highly enriched uranium, instead of the harder-to-obtain plutonium it has relied on in the past. If so, it needs to try one out and see if it works. Either way, the North has to shrink its warheads down to fit them on a missile - so it needs to test that capability as well.

"There can be a huge difference between a nuclear explosive `device' and a weapon," said Ivan Oelrich, a nuclear weapons consultant and former head of strategic weapons at the Federation of American Scientists. "We have no idea how large North Korea's bombs are, or even whether they have anything that would be described as a `bomb.'"

North Korea's devices are likely along the lines of the first plutonium bomb the U.S. built - Fat Man, which was dropped on Nagasaki in 1945. That bomb was 3 meters (10 feet) long and weighed more than 4.5 tons.

Such a bomb could be loaded on a ship or an airplane, but without significant "miniaturization," which requires difficult technological redesigning, it would be useless as a missile payload.

"A weapon has to be light and compact, a more or less self-contained package," said Oelrich. "To fit on a missile, they would have to be less than a few hundred kilograms (about 600 pounds) and smaller than a cubic meter or two."

Though estimates vary, outside experts say the North has enough plutonium for about four to eight "simple" bombs, more if it can employ uranium. But, so far, North Korea's attempts to demonstrate it has mastered the technology - with tests in 2006 and 2009 - have not been entirely successful.

The first produced a yield of less than 1 kiloton of TNT, and the second was equivalent to only 4 kilotons, both quite small by nuclear standards, though some experts believe North Korea in the second test may have been trying out the smallest device it could put on a missile.

Success or failure, the tests provide an opportunity for North Korea's nuclear scientists to learn valuable lessons. That's why the international community has imposed harsh sanctions after each of its previous underground blasts. But turning those lessons into a viable weapon is no easy task.

"Testing a device underground is relatively easy, as one can initiate the test once everything is in order and verified to be ready," said Michael Elleman, of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. "A military or strategic nuclear weapon must be able to detonate on demand, with little forewarning."

Then there is the other problem - how to deliver it to a target.

South Korea and Japan - and the more than 70,000 U.S. troops based in those countries - are already within range of the North's Nodong weapon, which was test fired in 1993 and can travel up to 1,300 kilometers (800 miles) with a 1,200-kilogram (2,600-pound) payload.

If tipped with nuclear weapons, they would put millions of lives at risk.

But all of North Korea's long-range rocket launches have ended in failure, meaning it is 0-4 since 1998. That has led some experts to doubt whether North Korea, lacking in resources and expertise and hamstrung by stringent international trade sanctions, will ever succeed in fashioning an ICBM of its own.

© 2012 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. 

US Can’t Track Tons of Weapons-Grade Uranium, Plutonium

By Noah Shachtman
September 16, 2011 | 6:30 am
Courtesy Of "Wired Magazine"


President Obama has repeatedly said his top counterterrorism goal is to prevent terrorists from acquiring the building blocks to make nuclear or “dirty” bombs. In April of 2009, Obama announced a new international effort to “secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years.” Since then, the Department of Energy has dispatched scientists around the globe to collect hundreds of pounds of the stuff.

But according to a report from the Government Accountability Office (GAO), issued late last Friday afternoon to little fanfare, thousands of pounds of highly-enriched uranium and separated plutonium remain. American officials may never get a chance to ensure its security.

That’s because the U.S. can’t track or fully account for 5,900 pounds of “weapons usable” nuclear material that it once shipped overseas. Instead, U.S. officials have to rely on foreign governments’ assurances that the potentially cataclysmic stuff is safe. And when those officials occasionally visit the sites holding the nuclear material, nearly half the places “did not meet International Atomic Energy Agency security guidelines,” according to the GAO, Congress’ investigative arm.

“It’s amazing how completely cavalier the Department of Energy has been at tracking this. They’ve got nobody who worries about this on a day-to-day basis,” says Jeffrey Lewis, a nuclear weapons analyst at the Monterey Institute of International Studies (and occasional contributor to this blog).

The Energy Department, not surprisingly, has a different perspective. Foreign governments have pledged to report on the security of the their fissile material. There are international inspectors to keep those governments honest. And the GAO hasn’t reported that any uranium or plutonium has gone missing — just that certain guidelines may not have been yet.

“Between the International Atomic Energy Agency inspections and the reporting requirements, we think those safeguards are effective and internationally sanctioned,” Josh McConaha, a spokesman for the Energy Department’s National Nuclear Security Administration, tells Danger Room.

Starting in the Eisenhower administration, the U.S. sold 17,500 kilograms, or 38,5000 pounds, of fissile material overseas, mostly to help with civilian nuclear energy programs. Those sales came with conditions, however: countries had to keep the dangerous material safe; they couldn’t use it for weapons; and the U.S. had the option of taking back the radioactive stuff — someday, somehow.

But 12,400 of those 17,500 kilograms can’t be returned. It’s mostly in the hands — and reactors — of close allies like Germany, France, and Japan. 1,160 kilograms have been accounted for, and another 1,240 kg have been secured by the Energy Department’s “Global Threat Reduction Initiative,” an effort to covert nuclear power facilities from highly-enriched to low-enriched uranium, which is far less dangerous.

Still, don’t assume that just because the nuke material is at our friends’ houses means it is completely secure. One source familiar with the report’s development says, “If this was in some former Soviet republic, we’d be there in a heartbeat.” Some of America’s closest allies may be the ones with the poorest nuclear security precautions.

And there’s just one other problem. Subtracting all the nuke material that’s been accounted for and secured still leaves 2,700 kg — nearly three tons — outstanding. And that’s enough material to make dozens of nuclear weapons.

Where that uranium and plutonium is located — or, where it’s supposed to be located — the GAO report doesn’t say. That information was considered too sensitive to disclose in a public document, and was instead laid out in a classified report sent to Congress over the summer. But it’s worth noting that the U.S. currently has 27 so-called “Nuclear Cooperation Agreements” with 27 countries, from China to Ukraine to Colombia. America previously had similar deals with 11 other countries — including Israel, Pakistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, and Iran.

“Theoretically, we know [where the nuclear material is kept]. But we don’t have a good accounting of where it all is. We’re relying on them. We’re not, to coin a phrase, trusting but verifying,” the source says.

Occasionally, American inspectors will travel to these sites, to make sure these sites have the proper fences and surveillance gear needed to keep their nuclear material safe. The track record wasn’t particularly encouraging. Of those 55 visits conducted between 1994 and 2010, “physical protection teams found the sites met IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] security guidelines on 27 visits, did not meet IAEA security guidelines on 21 visits, and the results of 7 visits are unknown because the physical protection team was unable to assess the sites, or agency documentation was missing,” the report notes.

Partially, this alarming GAO report is an outgrowth of shifting standards. The U.S. is demanding more security and more accountability, to cope with a world in which terrorists have nuclear ambitions — and20 major atomic smugglers has been caught in the last two decades. Many countries haven’t caught up with those changes.

“The old way of doing business was: You bought it. We have some rights, but it’s fundamentally not our problem,” Lewis says. “Now, things are different.”

Photo: Wikimedia

Noah Shachtman is a contributing editor at Wired magazine, a nonresident fellow at the Brookings Institution and the editor of this little blog right here.
Follow @dangerroom on Twitter.

Loose Nukes: Real Threat?

Nose cone of Titan nuclear missile


By Felipe Umana,
August 17, 2011
Courtesy Of "Foreign Policy In Focus"

The illicit market of nuclear weapons and nuclear materials puts the world’s population at risk of an attack that could decimate cities and kill millions of people. A lone wolf might get a hold of fissile material, the technical knowledge to build an atomic weapon, or a nuclear weapon itself. Or a whole host of criminal agents – rogue scientists, opportunist civilians, thieves, terrorists, or even government officials – could obtain radioactive materials (or bombs themselves) through informal means. The illicit market of nuclear weapons and related materials spans a whole host of suppliers, middlemen, and buyers. Moreover, it involves almost every country in the world. In the cross-border movement of nuclear materials, from storage sites to transit stops and hubs and finally to points of reception, every stop is susceptible to the dangers of a nuclear accident.

Most instances of theft have occurred in Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the group of independent republics that originally formed part of the Soviet Union. The region’s low economic status after the end of the Cold War severely curtailed any intended improvement and upgrading of many research facilities and nuclear storage sites. Likewise, low salaries led to increased instances of theft by people seeking to sell machine parts and radioactive materials for money. The illicit trade of nuclear materials by the mid-1990s was well established, with plenty of suppliers and potential buyers. In 1996 alone there were more than 230 documented cases of unsuccessful trafficking in and from the CIS region. Some sources report that attempted transactions doubled in the 2000s from figures in the 1990s.

Yet, a nuclear attack by a belligerent actor who obtained materials through the black market is unlikely. The supply and demand for nuclear materials is not very robust, and the suppliers and buyers constitute a relatively limited black market. Potential nuclear suppliers face the difficulty of finding a buyer. States and the international community have also developed numerous deterrent methods to stop the trade. And non-state actors generally lack the nuclear know-how to put plans into practice.

Loose nukes are a frightening scenario. But they remain only a marginal threat.

Nuclear Containment

Actors seeking to acquire an atomic weapon – or the capability to produce one – generally do not have the essential training, knowledge, or materials. Nor do they generally have the necessary resources to achieve nuclear capabilities. In fact, for non-state actors, smuggling already-manufactured weapons or available materialsis the only practical way to go nuclear. Terrorist organizations like Aum Shinrikyo (now known as Aleph) and al-Qaeda are typically composed of men with little scientific training and ersatz scientific knowledge, if any. Unless they steal blueprints, these actors can't construct a usable fissile weapon. Moreover, it's not easy to move such sensitive materials around. Anatoly Bulochnikov, director of the Center for Export Controls in Moscow, contrasted nuclear materials with mundane goods: “[These items are] not potatoes, not something you can keep anywhere.” Another hindrance is a lack of steady funds and resources. Non-state actors simply don't have the money to purchase bomb-grade nuclear material (in 1991, a kilogram of enriched uranium went for $700,000), the means to enrich uranium, or the storage facilities to contain the material.

Without the money and resources, these belligerent actors must rely on smuggling and theft. But most stolen materials are not enough to make a bomb. Analyses of reported cases of nuclear material theft reveal that trafficking incidents normally involve scrap metal and small amounts of highly enriched radioactive elements. It takes at least 10 to 15 kilograms of highly enriched uranium, for example, to make a useable weapon. In reality, most thefts involve only grams of radioactive materials. Other instances of theft involve materials that cannot be applied to bomb-making, like low enriched or depleted uranium,suggesting that most of these robberies are the work of amateurs.

A second reason the illicit nuclear materials trade has not resulted in the creation of a useable nuclear weapon is the low probability of finding a buyer. Although not entirely impossible to find, since middlemen are found commonly throughout the network of this illegal market, buyers for these types of commodities are very specific and do not advertise openly. There has never been a successful recorded transaction between a buyer and a seller, other than police set-ups aimed at capturing would-be criminals. On a similar note, thieves who take unauthorized possession of nuclear materials are typically people without previous criminal records who only do it for the potential pecuniary gain. Because of their naiveté and lack of connections, newer criminals have less experience, and therefore, less of a chance of finding a nuclear buyer and sealing a deal. Examples of attempted business deals have diminished in the last three years, with fewer than 100 reported instances in 2009.

Lastly are a number of deterrent strategies that dissuade actors with atomic capability from selling the technology and know-how to buyers. One way to deter actors from trafficking radioactive materials across borders, for example, is to boost detection methods at major points of entry. The United States has installedradiation detectors at borders and ports of entry, with cities like Washington, DC and the borough of Manhattan getting increasing attention. Through 2006, there were 318,000 false-positive detections of radiation. Moreover, efforts to install detectors at highway weighing stations are also moving ahead. The widespread adoption of these radioactive detectors serves as a warning signal for those who wish to illicitly move these sensitive commodities.

Nuclear Deterrence

The threat of military, political, and economic repercussions from foreign actors provides another viable deterrent. For example, the existence of a nuclear weapon or the confirmed knowledge that a belligerent non-state actor has developed a feasible nuclear weapon can goad major world governments to join forces and unleash a rapid and strong military operation on the region where these non-state actors. Atomic weapons in the hands of terrorist organizations are likely to remain immobile (seeing as the proper resources to move and handle it carefully are likely absent or of low quality), so an allied military procedure from the world’s most powerful militaries could then aim to neutralize an entire organization. The complete annihilation of a group’s membership and hideouts is an extremely unattractive measure from the perspective of any terrorist organization. The country that hosts these organizations, deliberately or inadvertently, would face severe opprobrium if it did not deal with radicals within its own borders. Diplomatic and economic sanctions could similarly be used to dissuade these states from potentially aiding the belligerent non-state actors, while also restricting corruption tactics from diverting financial flows to radical groups. Even more importantly, sanctions could serve as punishment or discouragement against states seeking nuclear capabilities for an offensive atomic program. Iran, for instance, has faced a long history of economic sanctions, partly because of its nuclear program.

These aforementioned factors – namely a lack of scientific capability, the difficulty of finding a buyer, and deterrent methods in the forms of military, political, or economic punishments – paint an optimistic picture of the state of nuclear security in our contemporary world. But simply because real-world obstacles hinder nuclear trading does not mean that a nuclear incident or attack can't happen.

In order to combat the worrisome trade in nuclear materials, the United States should create and improve global partnerships aimed at dealing with the black market in nuclear materials. States with more resources should be encouraged to lend a hand to those who do not have the same financial resources. Government agencies should boost efforts at sharing information. The United States should also lobby for tighter export regulations in international forums, especially for items that fall under the trigger list, namely “dual-use” items that have other industrial uses or can be used in peaceful nuclear programs. The transfer and reception of many of these goods can be abused. Triggered spark gaps, for instance, are high-speed electrical switches used in lithotripters to help break up kidney stones. In large numbers, however, they can also be used to detonate nuclear weapons.

The United States should lobby for changes in outdated regulations in the transnational non-proliferation regime, such as the aforementioned trigger list or the failure of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to require members to share information on licenses. By helping out in the shaping more effective policies to fight the black market of nuclear weapons materials, the United States can contribute to making the world a safer, less nuclear-obsessed world.

Nukes No Longer Serve America's Interests

Former U.S. Ambassador Says

BY KAYLA DELEON
DECEMBER 5, 2010
Courtesy Of "The Cornell Daily Sun"



“We are entering a period where threatening unacceptable damage with nuclear weapons no longer seems like a rational foreign policy decision,” former U.S. Ambassador to Germany Richard Burt ’69 said at a lecture Thursday titled “The New Geopolitics and Why Nuclear Weapons No Longer Serve U.S. Interests.”

The lecture — sponsored by the Mario Einaudi Center for International Studies and the Caceres-Neuffer Foreign Affairs Society, among others — focused on the emergence of a new international system in which nuclear weapons could possibly be eliminated.

As the current U.S. Chair on the Global Zero campaign, which started in 2008, Burt helps lead an international effort to eliminate nuclear weapons. Burt began the lecture with a hopeful description of current interactions between nations, in which the key commodities are economics, technology and education.

“[In the past 20 years,] we have seen a steady transition to a different and new international system, a more open system, a more polycentric system with more points of power throughout the center,” Burt said. “One that is less based on military politics and more based on geo-economics.”

Previously, military power was the most important quality of a state in the international arena, Bert said. However, as globalization closes the gaps between countries, economic power is set to take center stage.

“Now, countries will be able to achieve their objectives without territorial acquisition because, in a globalized world economy, trade and economic investment will do the job,” Burt said.

However, Burt expressed concern regarding the “darker world” of rogue states, failing states and sub-state actors who are scrounging to establish nuclear status.

Due to the accessibility of nuclear technology, Burt warned that these “dark” countries, such as Iran, could be closer to attaining nuclear capabilities than the rest of the world knows.

“You don’t have to break the genetic code to figure out how to make a nuclear weapon. You can find plans on the Internet,” Burt said.

While the attainment of nuclear weapons by rogue nations is concerning, Burt emphasized that the issue could be resolved in the international system by eliminating the perceived legitimacy of using such weapons.

“Our goal should be to de-legitimize nuclear weapons in the same way that we have largely succeeded in de-legitimizing biological and chemical weapons,” Burt said.

As the lecture progressed, Burt stressed the necessity for the passage of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty — which would reduce the number of deployed nuclear weapons for both Russia and the U.S. to 1,550 — that is waiting to be considered in Congress. Burt served as a chief negotiator on the first START treaty in 1989.

“If we can’t get this rather modest existing treaty ratified, then all bets are off about the ability to pursue this ambitious two-decade goal of nuclear elimination,” Burt said.

Chris Slijk ’12, who attended the lecture, said he shared Burt’s concerns.

“It is important that the U.S. exerts pressures to achieve the elimination of nuclear weapons,” Slijk said.

In laying out his policy prescription, Burt added that the U.S. should follow up after the New START treaty is ratified and attempt to decrease the weapon count to 1,000. After the count is reduced to 1,000, Burt said, the U.S. may be able to involve China in the nuclear decrease and possibly collaborate with India as well.

Burt’s lecture concluded with a question and answer session, during which he responded to the concerns of an audience member about a possible reemergence of nuclear weapons after their elimination.

“The only way that this [nuclear elimination] would work is with an enforcement mechanism. If somebody cheats, they are going to have to have a price to pay,” Burt said.

Nevertheless, he remained optimistic regarding America’s ability to detect any upcoming nuclear powers.

“Nobody has ever developed a nuclear weapon and deployed it without being discovered first,” Burt said.