How The US Has Gotten Into Wars

By Ed Rippy
5/27/02
Courtesy Of "Mind Spring"

In this article, sixth in a series about the US's so-called "war on terrorism," we examine the history of how the US (or the thirteen colonies) got into six wars (not all of them declared). We cannot delve into the entire context of each war, but focus on the events which "justified" new or increased US (or colonial) military response. They are (in chronological order): The Boston Massacre, the sinking of the Maine, the sinking of the Lusitania, the attack on Pearl Harbor, The Gulf of Tonkin "incident," and the invasion (by Iraq) of Kuwait. We also examine a plan (not carried out) to fabricate a set of "Cuban" attacks on the US and other countries to "justify" a US war on Cuba.

In four of the wars which actually happened, the prior events "justifying" them (the Boston Massacre, the attack on Pearl Harbor, The Gulf of Tonkin "incident," and the invasion of Kuwait) were set up, fabricated, or some combination of both. Even the sinkings of the Maine and Lusitania resulted from knowingly placing US troops or civilians at risk. It is clear that when certain elements of the US power elite decide on a war, they often manipulate international events and people's perceptions to get their way. More than once, these attacks have killed US (or colonial) troops, civilians, or both. Given this historical pattern, it would not be extraordinary if powerful elements in the US government set up and permitted the September 11 attacks on New York and Washington.

History, of course, is an interpretive art. None of these accounts can be taken as absolutely true or final. They are, however, the best evidence this writer has been able to find.

With all the lies and secrecy surrounding these events, it is impossible to say exactly who's pulling the strings. Even powerful people may feel forced to do things they would rather not and to lie about them. The author's intention is not to impute motives or assign blame, but to get closer to the truth of events, and to show how rarely things are what they seem.

Of course, it is not only the US which engages in such murderous duplicity. We examine US history here because we wish to understand the context of attacks on the US and ensuing US military actions.

THE BOSTON MASSACRE

The Boston Massacre, in which British soldiers fatally shot five colonists in Boston, was pivotal in the events leading up to the War of Independence between England and the colonies which later became the US. The Boston revolutionaries, led by Sam Adams, painted it as a cold-blooded slaughter of defenseless colonists revealing England as irremediably murderous and oppressive. They pointed to the massacre as proof that there was no alternative to war. But the historical evidence shows that the reality was not that simple:

"One morning shortly before that day [March 5, 1770], the citizens of Boston awoke to find the streets plastered with notices, signed by many of the soldiers garrisoned in the town, that the troops intended to attack the townspeople. This startling news threw the town into a ferment, for apparently few citizens doubted the genuineness of these papers. It is singular, nevertheless, that the soldiers should have given their plans away in this manner if they really contemplated an attack and that they signed their names to documents that might be used as damning evidence against them. These notices were doubtless forgeries made by Adams and his followers and posted during the night by the "Loyall Nine" [a secret group of revolutionary ringleaders] to produce an explosion that would sweep Boston clear of redcoats; for during the Massacre trials it is significant that the prosecution did not enter them as evidence of the soldiers' guilt. The events of the night of March 5 bear out this explanation of their origin. . . ."1

After British guards chased away a group of small boys who had been pelting them with snowballs,

"The square before the courthouse was soon filled with a swearing, turbulent mass of men, many of whom were armed with clubs, staves, and formidable pieces of jagged ice. . . . These stout cudgel-boys had beaten up so many redcoats that the sentry hastily summoned the main guard, which, led by Captain Preston of the Twenty-ninth Regiment, tumbled out eagerly for a fight. . . pellets of ice, sticks, and cudgels flew fast. . . . "

"Thus far, the soldiers had used their bayonets to keep the mob at bay and no patriot had suffered worse casualty than a smart rap on the shins. In spite of the hail of missiles the soldiers withheld their fire until the mob screamed that the "bloody-backed rascals" did not dare to shoot. The troops restrained themselves with difficulty from giving Adams's "Mohawks" [a revolutionary strike force which he had organized] a taste of powder and ball, but when one of them was knocked sprawling by a Patriot brickbat he recovered his gun and fired directly into the mob. Most of the soldiers likewise opened fire - at Captain Preston's order, many of the town's witnesses later testified, - and after they had emptied their guns five civilians had been killed or mortally wounded."

One of them, by common knowledge, "had led an army of thirty sailors armed with clubs in Cornhill [a district in Boston] on the night of March 5 and . . . it was chiefly his violent assault upon the troops that had caused bloodshed."2

"John Adams was convinced that the Massacre was an 'explosion which had been intentionally wrought up by designing men, who knew what they were aiming at better than the instruments employed.'"3

"Evidence was brought out at the trial which raised serious doubt in New England whether the Boston Massacre had not been precipitated by Sam Adams and the Sons of Liberty in a desperate effort to turn the troops out of the metropolis. Thirty-eight witnesses testified that there had been a civilian plot to attack the soldiers, and the defense put forward evidence proving the townspeople were the aggressors. . . ."

Presiding Judge Lynde told the jury, "'I feel myself deeply affected. . . that this affair turns out so much to the disgrace of every person concerned against him [Preston], and so much to the shame of the town in general.' Preston was promptly acquitted on the ground that there was not sufficient evidence that he had given the order to fire. Of the soldiers who had fired upon the mob, only two were found guilty of manslaughter, and their punishment was mitigated to burning on the hand. . . ."4

Although a Commissioner of Customs had been accused of firing on the crowd from the customhouse windows, all the Commissioners could prove they were miles away at the time, and the defense exposed the patriots' star witness to the alleged plot to murder civilians as a perjurer "whose falsehood had been encouraged by divers high Whigs. . . ."5

On his deathbed, one of the victims confessed "that the townspeople had been the aggressors and that the soldiers had fired in self-defense."6

"Like other Whig leaders after the Boston Massacre, Sam Adams painted war as glorious and fostered those 'generous and manly Sentiments, which usually attend a true military Spirit.' He was overjoyed to see how eagerly New Englanders cleaned their muskets and drilled in militia companies to prepare for the day when they should be compelled to fight for their liberties. Boston led the movement to build up a militia capable of holding its own against British regulars, and plans were laid to give the next army of British 'invaders' a warm reception."7

THE SINKING OF THE MAINE

Around the end of the 19th Century, Cuban rebels were warring against Spain for independence. Feelings ran high in the US favoring them. The press was pushing for war. Although the US government was negotiating for a settlement, the sinking of the Maine in Havana Harbor led to an outcry which swept the nation to war. Jerald Combs of San Francisco State University gives the background:

"In their battle for circulation in New York, the Pulitzer and Hearst newspapers tried to outdo one another with titillating horror stories about the war in Cuba. The most sensational episode in this battle of the 'yellow press' was the rescue of a daughter of a former Cuban official from her Spanish cell by a Hearst reporter, who naturally made the most of his scoop. Local newspapers were perhaps even more important than the big-city yellow press in stirring American emotions. Desperate for copy, they often printed verbatim the handouts from the Cuban junta's headquarters in New York.

"While the general public was enthusiastically for the rebels, the Cleveland and McKinley administrations were more interested in seeing the war come to an end regardless of the victor. They feared Spain might call in another major power to help put down the rebellion. The war was also hurting American trade and investments in the island. American exports to Cuba dropped from $20 million in 1894 to half of that in 1898. The fighting endangered some $50 million worth of American investments in Cuba."8

The Spanish military commander in Cuba, General Valeriano Weyler, herded the people from the countryside into camps where the army could more easily guard them from the rebels (and, of course, prevent them from aiding the rebels). Conditions were harsh and unsanitary, leading to hundreds of thousands of deaths. A new government came to power in Spain and recalled Weyler, provoking riots among Spanish loyalists. Worse, many of the military, which was supposed to keep order, joined the riots. Opposition arose in Spain as well. The Queen of Spain feared for her throne if she relinquished Cuba, and President McKinley shared her concerns. In all, it was a tough situation.

Then, the US intercepted a letter from the Spanish minister to the US, Enrique Dupuy de Lome, in which he called McKinley "weak and a bidder for the admiration of the crowd" and "a would-be politician who tries to leave a door open behind himself while keeping on good terms with the jingoes of his party." The letter advised negotiating with the US "even if only for effect."9

"Shortly after the de Lome letter, the American battleship Maine exploded in Havana harbor. McKinley unwisely and hastily had sent the Maine to Havana during the Weyler riots to show American desire for order in Cuba. When it sank, killing 266 of the 350 crew members aboard, it made American intervention in the Cuban revolution almost inevitable.

"While a naval board investigated the cause of the Maine explosion, McKinley tried one last time for a diplomatic solution. At his request, Congress appropriated $50 million for a defense fund that McKinley could use at his own discretion. [Stuart L.] Woodford [the US minister to Spain] said the appropriation stunned the Spanish government, and McKinley seemed to have considerable leverage to force a settlement. He lost much of his room to maneuver, however, when Redfield Proctor, a highly respected senator from Vermont, made an extraordinary speech on his return from an inspection of Cuba. In a calm and dispassionate voice, he recounted the horrendous scenes he had witnessed and confirmed the rumors that 200,000 Cubans had died in the reconcentration camps [which Weyler had set up]. His speech convinced many that Spain had lost control of Cuba; it could never win the struggle, but only draw out the bloody stalemate.

"The report of the American naval board on the sinking of the Maine reinforced the assumption that Spain had lost control; the board concluded that an external rather than an internal explosion had destroyed the ship. A floating mine was a more likely culprit than a boiler room accident. Although some of the more lurid newspapers and excitable politicians of the time implied that the Spanish had sunk the Maine, neither the naval board nor most American leaders accused the Spanish of deliberate sabotage. Yet Spain was responsible for the safety of ships in its harbors, and the Maine incident convinced almost all Americans of Spain's impotence to control the colony over which it claimed sovereignty."10

McKinley sent two telegrams and a special envoy to Spain demanding an end to the reconcentration camps and a cease-fire, with some rather convoluted language amounting to a demand for Cuban independence. After a long delay, Spain agreed to disband the camps and cease fire, but McKinley finally asked Congress for authorization to use force:

"The vast majority in Congress and the country were in favor of war, and many were criticizing the President for his procrastination. . . .

"Thus, McKinley led a united and enthusiastic nation to war. After the war, however, when McKinley's telegrams and Woodford's advice became public, it triggered a debate over the intervention that still continues among historians. Most concluded that the war had indeed been unnecessary, that a weak and vacillating president had bowed to partisan advantage and the war frenzy whipped up by an unscrupulous press."11

Since Spain also had a naval base in the Philippines, the Spanish-American War included an attack on the Spanish fleet there, which ultimately led to the US occupying those islands. Combs cites other historians who charge that the entire purpose of the war was to begin an empire:

"Using Cuban documents but citing rather thin evidence, [Philip S.] Foner claimed that the rebels had actually opposed American intervention and had wanted only arms and munitions. McKinley intervened not to help them, but to expand the American empire. Thus, Foner said, McKinley had purposely omitted a demand for Cuban independence in his ultimatum, refused to recognize the rebel government, and meant from the outset to use the war to take the Philippines. He intended his delays merely to provide time for military preparations. When he was ready, he sent the Maine to Havana to create an incident that would justify war [Combs cites Foner's 1972 book "The Spanish-Cuban-American War and the Birth of American Imperialism, 1895-1902"].12

THE SINKING OF THE LUSITANIA

The period leading up to the entry of the US into WW I was complex, with the new German military technology of U-boats, and Britain heavily dependent on military supplies from the US. There is much controversy around the sinking of the Lusitania, much of it inconclusive. Here we shall focus on what is not disputed, while briefly mentioning alternative theories.

The U-boats had been sinking ships from neutral countries, including the US, carrying war supplies to Britain. This was causing increasing tension. Combs summarizes:

"The British steamer Falaba went down, taking an American citizen with it. Another German submarine mistakenly torpedoed the American ship Gullflight. Wilson waited three weeks before protesting the Falaba incident and was still wrestling with the Gullflight issue when the destruction of the Lusitania abruptly ended his hesitation.

"The Lusitania was a giant British passenger liner carrying over 1,900 people from New York to England. On May 7, 1915, a German submarine torpedoed it off the coast of Ireland, and it sank within twenty minutes. Nearly 1,200 passengers drowned, including 124 Americans. The Germans had posted signs in New York warning people not to sail on the ship, and they correctly claimed that the vessel carried some arms and ammunition. Germany thus felt the sinking was justified. . . ."

"The accidental sinking of the British liner Arabic followed, taking the lives of two US citizens."13

Keith Allen has provided an overview of the writings on the sinking; we shall use it here.14 All following material is from this overview.

"Almost immediately after the outbreak of war Britain took measures that violated the traditional laws of blockade, including the expansion of the definition of 'contraband' to include all food and other traditionally exempt goods, the prolonged detention and search of neutral ships in British ports (as opposed to inspection at sea), and the announcement that the entire North Sea was a war zone and subject to mining. . . .

"On 4 February 1915 Germany announced a blockade policy that, like Britain's, was in violation of the traditional rules of war. She declared a war zone around the British Isles and announced that all enemy merchant ships in that area, armed and unarmed, were subject to destruction 'without its always being possible' to provide warning. International law clearly called for merchant ships to be warned, and their crews allowed to abandon ship, before they were sunk. . . ."

Many neutral ships carried supplies for belligerent countries. Traditional rules of naval warfare called for attacking vessels to warn unarmed or lightly armed merchant ships and give the people a chance to abandon the ships before sinking them. But the U-boats were so fragile that they could often be sunk by the armaments on many British merchantmen, or simply by being rammed.

"In the diplomatic wrangling over the German submarine campaign in 1915-1916, the United States Government persistently failed to acknowledge the validity of the German point that it was not reasonable to expect a submarine to endanger herself by giving warning to a merchantman that was likely to be armed and under orders to ram any U-boat encountered. . . .

"After the outbreak of war the Admiralty issued orders to merchant ships dictating resistance to U- boats when possible. The orders of 10 February 1915 directed merchant ships to escape when possible, but 'if a submarine comes up suddenly close ahead of you with obvious hostile intention, steer straight for her at your utmost speed. . .' Further instructions, issued ten days later, told armed steamers to open fire on a submarine even if it had not yet fired. . . . The Germans were well aware of these orders; although they were meant to be secret, copies were soon obtained from captured ships. . . .

"There were a number of instances of such resistance to U-boats before the sinking of Lusitania. . . ."

Some members of the US Congress tried to issue an official warning to people to avoid traveling on ships which were carrying military cargo, but President Wilson stopped the move.15

"LUSITANIA sailed with 4200 cases of Remington .303 rifle cartridges, a thousand rounds to a box, with 1250 cases of shrapnel shells, and with eighteen cases of fuzes."16

The German Embassy placed the following notice in US newspapers on 1 May 1915, the day the Cunarder sailed: "Travellers [sic] intending to embark on the Atlantic voyage are reminded that a state of war exists between Germany and her allies and Great Britain and her allies. . . travellers sailing in the war zone on ships of Great Britain or her allies do so at their own risk."

There are a number of contested theories about the sinking: that the Lusitania secretly carried a dozen six-inch guns, that she secretly carried a large cargo of smokeless gunpowder (which caused the second explosion), and that British naval authorities deliberately directed her into the U-boat's path to provoke an incident which would draw the US into the war. Others explain the second explosion as coal dust blowing up, or as a second torpedo. This writer has not seen any conclusive evidence, so we shall not discuss these further; those interested can find such discussion in Allen's work and consult his bibliography. Here we shall only note that it was clear that the liner might be a target and that President Wilson dissuaded Congress from officially warning US citizens from traveling aboard British ships. Although the US did not immediately enter the war, the sinking of the Lusitania turned the tide.17


THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR

There is no reasonable doubt that the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 was deliberately provoked and allowed to happen in order to generate US public support for entry into World War II. There is no conclusive proof that President Roosevelt knew or approved of this plan, although there is proof that his top naval advisors did, and plenty of evidence which is difficult to interpret in any way other than that FDR did too. Robert Stinnett, after seventeen years of archival research and personal interviews with US Navy cryptographers, published his book Day of Deceit in 2000. He gathered over 200,000 documents and interviews,18 many of which have never before been revealed, even to Congressional investigators. His research has revolutionized the history of the Pearl Harbor attack.

By the summer of 1940 Roosevelt's advisors had concluded that a German victory over England would threaten the US; Canada and much of South America, they were convinced, would soon follow if England fell. But polls showed that "a majority of Americans did not want the country involved in Europe's wars."19 If a Nazi takeover of Europe and much of the Americas were to be avoided, US public opinion would have to change. According to contemporary sources, Roosevelt shared this view: T. North Whitehead, British Prime Minister Churchill's advisor on US affairs, wrote to him in the fall of 1940 that "America is not in the bag. However, the President is engaged in carefully calculated steps to give us full assistance."20 Admiral James O. Richardson, then Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet, spent a long lunch with Roosevelt in the Oval Office, and later quoted him as saying that "sooner or later the Japanese would commit an overt act against the Unites States and the nation would be willing to enter the war. . . ."21 Campaigning against the isolationist Republican Wendell Willkie, FDR had promised, "Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars." But in private he added, "If somebody attacks us, then it isn't a foreign war, is it?"22 And after a second private meeting with the President, Richardson, still Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet, said, "I came away with the impression that, despite his spoken word, the President was fully determined to put the United States into the war."23 And even if Roosevelt neither knew nor approved of the plan to provoke Japan into an attack, he was concerned about the political effect of Pearl Harbor. Less than twelve hours after the attack, he met privately with CBS radio newsman Edward R. Murrow and William Donovan, then Roosevelt's Coordinator of Information and later founding head of the Office of Strategic Services, which ultimately became the CIA. According to Stinnett's research, "The President asked Murrow and Donovan whether they thought the attack was a clear case of a first Japanese move that would unite Americans behind a declaration of war against the Axis powers."24 However, whether or not Roosevelt saw war with the Axis as necessary, there is no doubt that his top advisors and naval staff planned and executed a series of events which ensured that the Japanese mounted a devastating surprise attack. As Lieutenant Commander Joseph Rochefort, one of the key figures in the plot, said afterwards: "It was a pretty cheap price to pay for unifying the country."25

Lieutenant Commander Arthur H. McCollum, head of the Far East desk of the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), was one of the nation's top experts on Japan. He prepared a memo for two of Roosevelt's most trusted military advisors which outlined an eight-step plan for provoking war with Japan. The memo read:

A. Make an arrangement with Britain for the use of British bases in the Pacific, particularly Singapore.

B. Make an arrangement with Holland for use of base facilities and acquisition of supplies in the Dutch East Indies [now Indonesia].

C. Give all possible aid to the Chinese government of Chiang Kai-shek.

D. Send a division of long-range heavy cruisers to the Orient, Philippines, or Singapore.

E. Send two divisions of submarines to the Orient.

F. Keep the main strength of the US Fleet, now in the Pacific, in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands.

G. Insist that the Dutch refuse to grant Japanese demands for undue economic concessions, particularly oil.

H. Completely embargo all trade with Japan, in collaboration with a similar embargo imposed by the British Empire.26

One recipient of the memo, Captain Dudley Knox, was chief of the ONI library. He forwarded the memo to Captain Walter Anderson, director of ONI, with the comment (to McCollum): "I concur in your courses of action."27 Almost every detail of each of the eight actions was carried out:

A. FDR's Chief of Naval Operations secured an agreement with the British government to use Rabaul's Simpson Harbor, a British possession in the South Pacific. The Japanese actually captured it before US forces could arrive, but the agreement had been made.28

B. FDR met with the Dutch Foreign Minister in March of 1941,29 and after the meeting the Dutch government restricted oil deliveries to Japan (and also required them to send their own tankers, making it more difficult to get the oil).30 Meanwhile, US, British, and Dutch radio operators shared intercepts of Japanese transmissions.31

C. The US increased military aid to China's Chiang Kai-shek and sent a US Army Commission to China.32

D. The US Navy sent cruisers into Japanese territorial waters; Roosevelt called these "pop-up" missions, and said, "I don't mind losing one or two cruisers, but do not take a chance on losing five or six."33

E. On or about November 12, 1940, twelve US submarines were sent to Manila.34

F. Roosevelt insisted that US warships be stationed in Hawaii. Vice Admiral James O. Richardson, then Commander in Chief of the US Fleet, protested loudly, saying that Hawaii lacked training facilities, adequate ammunition and fuel supplies, support craft such as tugs and repair ships, and overhaul facilities.35 FDR reorganized the Navy, forming the Pacific Fleet from the Hawaii-based ships. He removed Richardson and placed Admiral Husband Kimmel in charge of the newly-created fleet. He also promoted Captain Walter Anderson, Director of Naval Intelligence, to rear admiral and named him Commander [of] Battleships.36 We shall see that Anderson, by controlling the distribution of radio intercepts, made sure that Kimmel had almost no warning of the attack, although Naval Intelligence knew almost every detail as the Japanese fleet approached.

G. (See Item B above)

H. In July 1941, while Japanese diplomatic cables revealed that its government still hoped for a negotiated settlement with the US, FDR closed the Panama canal to Japanese shipping and seized Japanese assets in the United States. He also clamped a total embargo on all petroleum products and all metals37 - two crucial types of war supplies - which left the Japanese, still embroiled in China, dangerously exposed. Rochefort, commander of Station HYPO (the Navy radio intercept station in Hawaii) described the action thus: "We cut off their money, their fuel and trade. We were just tightening the screws on the Japanese. They could see no way of getting out except going to war."38

Contrary to decades of denial and cover-up, US intelligence services were able to intercept and decode almost all Japanese radio transmissions long before the war. The Japanese used two types of code: "Purple," for transmissions to and from embassies; and the "Kaigun Ango," a set of 29 military codes for ship movements and battle planning. Stinnett writes: "Their [the military codes'] solution emerged in the early fall of 1940, at about the same time Arthur McCollum's memorandum reached the Oval Office."39 Roosevelt followed developments closely: "About November 1, 1941, Roosevelt objected to the summaries of communications intelligence being brought to him by his naval aide Captain John Beardall. Instead he wanted to see the 'raw intercepts. . . .' On November 12, Beardall followed orders and began delivery of the 'raw intercepts' to FDR. . . . During the Pearl Harbor Joint Committee investigation, Beardall confirmed delivering the intercepts - which he termed Magic - to Roosevelt in the White House."40

The Navy never told Kimmel of its success in breaking the Japanese codes. "Had he been briefed, Kimmel could have requested that Purple [diplomatic] decryptions be sent to him from either Washington or Corregidor. But without the [decoding] machine, he did not have the capability to decode them. Ironically, the Army's monitor station on Hawaii, Station FIVE, was a principle interceptor of Purple code messages; the intercepts were forwarded immediately by radio to Washington, where they were decrypted on the Station US machine for the White House. Decryption was speedy. Most of Station FIVE's intercepts of Purple encoded messages were decoded on the Station US Purple machine and translated within a day's time, according to the White House route logs kept by Arthur McCollum." However, despite Kimmel's repeated requests for intelligence, "What information he got from Washington, for almost the entire time prior to the attack, did not provide him with a full understanding of Japan's intentions. By late July 1941, he had been cut off completely from the communications intelligence generated in Washington."41

Here is a timeline of the attack plans and the US maneuvers to ensure its success:

Late January 1941: A Peruvian minister leaked Japanese plans for an attack on Pearl Harbor to Max Bishop, Third Secretary at the US embassy in Tokyo. Stinnett quotes from a letter to him from Bishop: "Japanese military forces were planning, in the event of trouble with the United States, to attempt a surprise mass attack on Pearl Harbor using all their military resources."42 However, McCollum discounted this warning, telling Admiral Kimmel (commander of the Pacific Fleet), "The Division of Naval Intelligence places no credence in these rumors: Furthermore, based on known data regarding the present disposition and employment of Japanese naval and army forces, no move against Pearl Harbor appears imminent or planned for in the foreseeable future.'"43

March: Japan, dissatisfied with the unreliable reports from its existing spies in Honolulu, sent Ensign Takeo Yoshikawa there (under the name "Morimura"). US Naval Intelligence tapped his phone and intercepted many of his cable messages. Stinnet's research reveals, "Two dozen FBI and Navy documents dated before the attack link Morimura with espionage in Hawaii. According to these documents, senior American intelligence officials, including the President, knew of Morimura's espionage at the Honolulu consulate. His reports clearly pointed to Pearl Harbor as a prime target of Japanese military planners."44

November 17: "[US Ambassador to Japan Joseph Grew] again predicted a sudden military or naval action by Japan's armed forces. Grew was specific. He was referring not to China but to other areas available to Japan for a surprise attack. . . ."45

November 23 and 24: Kimmel held an exercise in the Pacific to prepare for a Japanese attack (although he had been denied intelligence, he was alert enough to see the possibility). His plans called for air patrols up to 300 miles from Hawaii, but Anderson curtailed them, saying that the planes couldn't carry enough fuel despite their official rating of a 745-mile range.46 A few days later, Kimmel also approved plans for a task force to search for enemy planes and submarines, but his superiors ordered him to use the ships to transport Army pursuit planes to Wake and Midway Islands instead.47

November 25: "After his morning intelligence briefing on November 25, Admiral Kimmel knew from reading Rochefort's [of Naval communication intelligence] communication summary that a large Japanese force of fleet subs and long-range patrol aircraft was heading eastward toward Hawaii from Japan. Kimmel had a right to be alarmed: Naval doctrine held that the presence of enemy submarines forecast a carrier attack. . . ."48

Kimmel and Rear Admiral Claude Bloch ordered Rochefort to alert Washington to the danger; however, Rochefort omitted crucial details, including mention of six aircraft carriers which were preparing to depart for Hawaii.

"The Kimmel-Bloch-Rochefort alert of November 25 is the only intelligence report generated by Station HYPO that can be linked to President Roosevelt. It can be traced by documentation from Hawaii to McCollum's office in the Navy Department. It received priority attention from the duty officer, Lieutenant Commander Ethelbert Watts, one of McCollum's assistants. A presidential monograph was prepared, numbered 65, and addressed; 'Aide to President - Show. . . .'"49

Army intelligence couriers sent the same message to Secretary of War Henry Stimson, who found it so important that he forwarded a copy (also on November 25) to the President for hand delivery. The next day he telephoned Roosevelt and asked whether he had received the dispatch. Roosevelt acted very shocked and denied seeing the message, but Stinnett sees this as "classic Washington distancing. His denial contradicts earlier orders he issued. On November 12, according to the congressional evidence, FDR directed that Beardall bring him every intercept. . . .

"FDR, an Assistant Secretary of the Navy in World War I, fully understood naval operational strategy and tactics, for he loved sailing, the Navy, and warships. Rochefort's assessment of a two-pronged attack aimed at America was not lost on Roosevelt. The might of the Japanese navy was on the move, heading for US territory in the Philippines, Wake Island, Guam, and Hawaii.

"Even after Stimson's phone call, FDR evaded answering Admiral Kimmel. Thirty-two hours went by. The Pacific Fleet commander was left dangling as Roosevelt tended to political matters."50

But Roosevelt seems to have known what was going on: "During a [November 25] meeting with his Cabinet, President Roosevelt announced that America might be in a shooting war with Japan in a few days."51

"Navy officials declared the North Pacific Ocean a 'vacant Sea' and ordered all US and allied shipping out of the waters. . . . Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner, War Plans officer of the United States Navy in 1941, explained the reasoning with a startling admission: 'We were prepared to divert traffic when we believed that war was imminent. We sent the traffic down via Torres Straight, so that the track of the Japanese task force would be clear of any traffic.'"52

November 26: US Secretary of State Cordell Hull delivered a "modus vivendi" letter to Japanese Ambassador Nomura. The letter demands that Japan renounce its war with China, renounce its Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy, and abandon its plans for Southeast Asian economic cooperation. Regarding this, Rochefort later said, "I believe sincerely that the November 26 message was an actual ultimatum the Japanese could not accept and their only alternative was to go to war." Roosevelt said, "I am not very hopeful and we must all be prepared for real trouble, possibly soon."53

November 27: Roosevelt authorized a war warning to be sent to all commanders. Rear Admiral Royal Ingersoll, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, sent a dispatch to the naval commands which read in part: "THIS DISPATCH IS TO BE CONSIDERED A WAR WARNING. . . . AN AGGRESSIVE MOVE BY JAPAN IS EXPECTED WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. . . ." However, Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations (who had been ill on the 27th), sent a revised message marked PRIORITY to naval commanders in the Pacific the next day which read, in part: "HOSTILE [Japanese] ACTION POSSIBLE AT ANY MOMENT X IF HOSTILITIES CANNOT REPEAT CANNOT BE AVOIDED THE UNITED STATES DESIRES THAT JAPAN COMMIT THE FIRST OVERT ACT X THIS POLICY SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT BE CONSTRUED AS RESTRICTING YOU TO A COURSE OF ACTION THAT MIGHT JEOPARDIZE YOUR DEFENSE . . . ." The dispatch continued: ". . . [You should] UNDERTAKE SUCH RECONAISSANCE AND OTHER MEASURES AS YOU DEEM NECESSARY BUT THESE MEASURES SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT SO AS NOT REPEAT NOT TO ALARM CIVIL POPULATION OR DISCLOSE INTENT X. . . ."54

But it was impossible to do much without alarming the civilian population or disclosing the intent. As Stinnett describes it,

"There was no way to hide the troop movement or fighters and bombers engaged in a massive air search. Hillside home sites above Honolulu looked down on all the Army posts as well as on Pearl Harbor. . . .

"[T]wo daily papers, the Advertiser and the Star-Bulletin, covered military activities with determination. Putting Oahu's troops on full alert would have been front-page news. Both newspapers owned broadcast stations in Honolulu. . . . Short saw only one military option: he placed his troops on a low-alert status, a sabotage/espionage watch that did little to actually raise the level of military readiness. . . .

"Just to be sure that Short didn't adopt a more aggressive response, Marshall's Adjutant General, Emory S. Adams, sent another message the next day. It pushed Short toward an anti-sabotage mode and away from the placement of troops on a full alert which the available intelligence had shown so clearly was needed: . . .

"PROTECTIVE MEASURES SHOULD BE CONFINED TO THOSE ESSENTIAL FOR SECURITY COMMA AVOIDING UNNECESSARY PUBLICITY AND ALARM STOP"55

November 28 - December 6: Allied radio intercept stations around the Pacific continued to receive and decode Japanese naval communications; seven of these confirm Japanese plans to start the war with an attack on Pearl Harbor.56

December 7: The Japanese Fleet attacked Pearl Harbor, killing 2,476 people (including civilians).57

December 11: Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes began the cover-up: he orders all intercepts placed in Navy vaults and says, "Destroy all [personal] notes or anything in writing." Two weeks after Japan surrendered, the Navy classified all intercepts TOP SECRET (even Congress couldn't see them).58


AND ONE THAT DIDN'T HAPPEN: OPERATION NORTHWOODS

On March 7 1962 the US Joint Chiefs of Staff decided that if "a credible internal revolt [in Cuba] is impossible of attainment during the next 9-10 months," the US would have to "develop a Cuban 'provocation' as justification for positive US military action."59 On March 13 they produced a plan for such a "provocation" and sent it to the Secretary of Defense. The (fabricated) provocations (they actually planned several) were to occur "within the time frame of the next few months."60 Investigative writer James Bamford, in the course of researching his book Body of Secrets, obtained the memo; it has been posted on the Website of the National Security Archive, a nonprofit archive of declassified US government documents at George Washington University.

The Pentagon's plan would "focus all efforts on a specific ultimate objective which would provide adequate justification for US military intervention. Such a plan would enable a logical build-up of incidents to be combined with other seemingly unrelated events to camouflage the ultimate objective and create the necessary impression of Cuban rashness and irresponsibility on a large scale, directed at other countries as well as the United States. . . . The desired resultant from the execution of this plan would be to place the United States in the apparent position of suffering defensible grievances from a rash and irresponsible government of Cuba and to develop an international image of a Cuban threat to peace in the Western Hemisphere."61

The "Annex to Appendix to Enclosure A" gives specifics:

"1. Since it would seem desirable to use legitimate provocation as the basis for US military intervention in Cuba a cover and deception plan . . . could be executed as an initial effort to provoke Cuban reactions. Harassment plus deceptive actions to convince the Cubans of imminent invasion would be emphasized. Our military posture throughout execution of the plan will allow a rapid change from exercise to intervention if Cuban response justifies.

"2. A series of well coordinated incidents will be planned to take place in and around Guantanamo [military base in Cuba] to give genuine appearance of being done by hostile Cuban forces."62

Such incidents were to include starting rumors by clandestine radio, landing allied Cuban expatriots (in Cuban military uniform) on the base to stage sabotage and attacks, starting riots, blowing up ammunition and burning aircraft inside the base, and sabotaging or sinking a ship in the harbor.63

The memo continues:

"3. A 'Remember the Maine' incident [note the contemporary reference to the explosion, whose origin remains unknown, as an attack on the US] could be arranged in several forms:

"a. We could blow up a US ship in Guantanamo Bay and blame Cuba.

"b. We could blow up a drone (unmanned) vessel anywhere in the Cuban waters. . . . The presence of Cuban planes or ships merely investigating the intent of the vessel could be fairly compelling evidence that the ship was taken under attack. . . . The US could follow up with an air/sea rescue operation covered by US fighters to 'evacuate' remaining members of the non-existent crew. Casualty lists in US newspapers would cause a helpful wave of national indignation.

"4. We could develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington. . . . We could foster attempts on lives of Cuban refugees in the United States even to the extent of wounding in instances to be widely publicized. Exploding a few plastic bombs in carefully chosen spots, the arrest of Cuban agents and the release of prepared documents substantiating Cuban involvement also would be helpful in projecting the idea of an irresponsible government."64

Even these scenarios did not exhaust the Joint Chiefs' creativity: they planned hostile "Cuban" actions against other countries as well. One would take advantage of "the sensitivity of the Dominican Air Force to intrusions within their national air space:"

"'Cuban' B-26 or C-46 type aircraft could make cane-burning raids at night. Soviet bloc incendiaries could be found. . . . Use of MIG type aircraft by US pilots could provide additional provocation. Harassment of civil air, attacks on surface shipping and destruction of US military drone aircraft by MIG type planes would be useful as complementary actions. . . . reasonable copies of the MIG could be produced from US resources in about three months."65

Just to flesh things out, "Hijacking attempts against civil air and surface craft should appear to continue as harassing measures condoned by the government of Cuba," and finally, the piece de resistance: "It is possible to create an incident which will demonstrate convincingly that a Cuban aircraft has attacked and shot down a chartered civil airliner. . . ." This "Cuban" shootdown would have involved chartering a CIA "proprietary" airplane (with agents as passengers) for a flight which would pass over Cuba. Once over international waters, the plane would secretly peel off and proceed to land at a secret CIA airfield where it would get a new tail number (disguising it as a different craft). Meanwhile, a duplicate but unmanned airplane would take its place in midair, to be blown up by remote control over Cuba - with appropriate pre-recorded calls for help and identifications of attacking Cuban MIGs.66

For whatever reason, the US government did not carry out this plan - but it shows once more how ready its military has been to use deceit to "justify" military action.

THE GULF OF TONKIN "INCIDENT"

The US bombing of North Vietnam began in response to reports, now known to be false, of a torpedo attack on a US radio (and radar) intelligence ship. The event sparked a major jump in the US war against the Vietcong. According to the US Naval Historical Center,

"Amid steadily rising tensions over North Vietnam's activities in Laos and South Vietnam, at the end of July 1964 USS Maddox entered the Gulf of Tonkin for a cruise along the North Vietnamese coast. As part of a general U.S. effort to collect intelligence in potential Far Eastern hot spots, this 'Desoto Patrol' was particularly focused on obtaining information that would support South Vietnamese coastal raids against North Vietnam. One of these had just taken place as Maddox began her mission.

"On the afternoon of 2 August 1964, while steaming well offshore in international waters, Maddox was attacked by three North Vietnamese motor torpedo boats. The destroyer maneuvered to avoid torpedoes and used her guns against her fast-moving opponents, hitting them all. In turn, she was struck in the after gun director by a single 14.5-millimeter machine gun bullet."

The Maddox called air support from a nearby carrier, and a plane sank one torpedo boat. President Johnson ordered the Maddox back to Tonkin Gulf a few days later, accompanied by the Turner Joy, a larger and newer destroyer:

"During the night of 4 August, while they were underway in the middle of the Tonkin Gulf, Maddox and Turner Joy detected speedy craft closing in. For some two hours the ships fired on radar targets and maneuvered vigorously amid electronic and visual reports of torpedoes.

"Though information obtained well after the fact indicates that there was actually no North Vietnamese attack that night, U.S. authorities were convinced at the time that one had taken place, and reacted by sending planes from the carriers Ticonderoga and Constellation to hit North Vietnamese torpedo boat bases and fuel facilites [sic]. A few days later, the U.S. Congess [sic] passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, which gave the Government authorization for what eventually became a full-scale war in Southeast Asia."67

Combs has this to add:

"The Pentagon Papers [a secret US government study which State Department consultant Daniel Ellsberg leaked to the press] revealed, among other things, the covert operations that had provoked the Tonkin Gulf incident and the contingency planning for bombing the North that Johnson had ordered even while he was running against Barry Goldw

ater in 1964 on a campaign of restraint in Vietnam."68

THE RAID ON HON ME

An account by an alleged participant in the covert operations preceding the "incident" gives more detail. In a magazine article Elton Manzione, one of the first US Navy SEALs, describes a raid on Hon Me Island in the Tonkin Gulf, about 175 miles north of the Demilitarized Zone in North Vietnamese waters. Manzione and another SEAL had orders to "advise" twenty South Vietnamese Marines in destroying a radar installation. The article notes that "Manzione's service records have been altered to suggest that he had never been in Vietnam."69 However, the military has altered records in other cases to deny covert operations: for example, Michael Ruppert reports that the US Navy altered Delmart Vreeland's personnel file to say that he had been discharged as a seaman for unsatisfactory performance in 1986, but that during an extradition hearing in Canada Vreeland's attorney called the Pentagon and confirmed that he was a Lieutenant still on active duty in Naval Intelligence with an office there.70 Manzione recounts the Hon Me raid:

"Five or six automatic weapons were wrapped in cloth, and placed in each raft, including some grease guns and some German G-3s. None of the weapons were current American. Three satchel charges - each one composed of eight pounds of C-4 explosives - were also put in each raft."

"'We paddle maybe eighty yards offshore - and I don't see the fucking radar installation! There's these four rubber rafts strung out maybe fifteen yards apart, and I'm looking, but I don't see anything! Van Lesser [the other SEAL] is on the raft anchoring the other end of the line of rafts; he paddles around and asks, 'Do you see the radar installation?' I say, 'No! I don't see a fucking thing! . . .' Elton and Van Lesser had been told they would be dropped as close to the radar station as possible. But that's not what happened . . . ."71

The Navy had dropped them at the wrong end of the two-and-a-half-mile-long island.

"Quickly the Americans decided to paddle around the island until they got a visual sighting of the radar installation; then, no matter where they were - if it looked like a good place to hit the beach - they'd hit the beach and go in the rest of the way on foot. . . ."

"'We're coming up from the south, and the radar station is around the point on the other side, and it sits up on a little high spot. We get there and that's when the shit hits the fan. They pop the fucking light on us and start shooting. . . . Hon Me is not just an island island, it's a military installation island.'"72 (Italics in original)

Shortly afterward Manzione heard about the alleged North Vietnamese attack on the Maddox and the Turner Joy, and recalled a friend telling him about the "black box" radar monitor on that ship.

"[T]he Maddox claimed to have been attacked by North Vietnamese torpedo boats, called in air support, and proceeded to engage in a full scale battle with figments created by false radar imagery. At no time on August 4th was the Maddox able to lock its radar onto surface targets. . . ."

"He remembered about his friend and the 'black box' on the Maddox. He realized that getting dumped on the wrong end of Hon Me Island was not an intelligence failure, but that the people running the show wanted the raiding party to be detected so the North Vietnamese would activate their early warning system, thus enabling the Maddox (which was only a few miles away) to 'fingerprint' the North Vietnamese radar frequencies, so these frequencies could be scrambled during the U.S. air attacks on August 5th. 'That's standard procedure for intelligence gathering operations,' Elton asserts."73

(Investigative reporter James Bamford confirms that the eavesdropping missions were standard and that the Turner Joy and Maddox "were cruising on just such missions, known as 'Desoto patrols,' in the Gulf of Tonkin in 1964. . . .")74

"[H]e [Manzione] came to see how he and Van Lesser and the twenty S[outh]V[ietnamese] Marines had served as the trigger mechanism in a pre-planned series of events designed to provoke the North Vietnamese.

"'But the most important thing I found out from my friend on the Maddox,' Elton says - noting that he received this information several years after the event - 'was that the "black box" - the communications receiving equipment - went on alert at 11:00 pm the night of July 30th, an hour before we went in! Meaning whoever was handling the whole operation was notified in advance and was preparing to monitor the North Vietnamese radar transmitters. [Italics in original]

"Considering that the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution had been prepared months before the 'incident' by McGeorge Bundy's staff as normal 'contingency planning,' Elton's experience confirms I. F. Stone's characterization of the Gulf of Tonkin incident as a 'question not just of decision-making in a crisis but of crisis-making to support a secretly prearranged decision . . . .' [Valentine and Manzione cite McNamara and Tonkin Bay: The Unanswered Questions, New York Review of Books, 28 March 1968, p. 11.]

"Through deception and high technology, the U.S. government managed to convince the public, the press, and the Congress that the Maddox and Turner Joy were the innocent victims of attacks by trigger happy North Vietnamese. . . ."75
Other sources corroborate the raid; for example, an article published by the US Naval Institute (not a government institution) reads (in part):

"In July 1964, Operational Plan 34A was taking off, but during the first six months of this highly classified program of covert attacks against North Vietnam, one after the other, missions failed, often spelling doom for the commando teams inserted into the North by boat and parachute.

"These secret intelligence-gathering missions and sabotage operations had begun under the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1961, but in January 1964, the program was transferred to the Defense Department under the control of a cover organization called the Studies and Observations Group (SOG). . . .

"Under cover of darkness, four boats (PTF-2, PTF-3, PTF-5, and PTF-6) left Da Nang [on July 30], racing north up the coast toward the demilitarized zone, then angling farther out to sea as they left the safety of South Vietnamese waters. About five hours later they neared their objective: the offshore islands of Hon Me and Hon Nieu."76

In late 2001 presidential historian Michael Beschloss published previously secret White House tapes revealing that

"[O]nly weeks after Congress gave him the authority to pursue the war in 1964, he privately acknowledged that the incident that inspired the resolution probably never happened.

"'When we got through with all the firing,' Johnson said ruefully to his secretary of defense, Robert S. McNamara, 'we concluded maybe they hadn't fired at all.'"

However, contemporary sources say that Johnson never wanted the war, but felt forced into it. According to a taped diary, Mrs. Lady Bird Johnson "heard her husband telling Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey, 'I'm not temperamentally equipped to be commander in chief,' because of his emotional involvement in every decision that could cost an American life. In fact, he asked at one point to be awakened whenever an American was killed in Vietnam, she reported early in the war."77


THE IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT

In February 1991, during the US bombing of Iraq, former US Attorney General Ramsey Clark went to Iraq to see for himself what was going on. Appalled, he set up a Commission of Inquiry for an international war crimes tribunal to document the US's violations of international law.

"[H]earings and meetings held in more than 30 U.S. cities took evidence from eyewitnesses, scholars, and experts. . . .

"Tens of thousands of people contributed and participated in the fact-gathering and educational process. This entailed the compilation of documents, clippings, photographs, books, and eyewitness testimony over a period of 10 months."78

The Tribunal found the Bush (Sr.) administration guilty of 19 violations of international law. Most of what follows is from the Commission's investigation.

The political background to Middle East conflicts in general revolves around the issue of "who controls the oil?" The author has briefly covered the military importance of oil in his earlier paper "Guns, Drugs, and Oil: The Realpolitik of the Afghan War, Part II."79 Seven US and British companies owned most of it until major oil-producing countries formed OPEC in 1960, but by 1975, Libya, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait had nationalized their oil industries. These governments began taking a much greater share of oil revenues. Perhaps it was this loss of direct control which prompted the US Senate's Energy and Natural Resources Committee to write that "A U.S. commitment to the defense of oil resources of the [Persian] Gulf and to political stability in the region constitutes one of the most vital and enduring interests of the United States."80 Part of maintaining this "political stability" was playing various Gulf states against each other. After Iranian revolutionaries overthrew the US-installed Shah, US client states suggested to Saddam Hussein (using intelligence reports from the US) that an Iraqi attack on Iran would quickly succeed, and convinced him to go to war. The bone of contention was the Shatt-al-Arab waterway, then under the joint control of Iran and Iraq.

The US had named Iraq as a terrorist-supporting state after its nationalization of oil in 1972, preventing US companies from selling it equipment or supplies which were judged to have potential military value. When Iraq went to war against Iran, however, the Reagan administration lifted these restrictions, permitting direct sales of "such 'dual-use' equipment as jeeps, helicopters, and Lockheed L-100 transports. The Agriculture Department extended $5 billion of credits to Iraq through a program meant for agricultural purposes only, that illegally funded many of these sales. Among the items sold to Iraq were 45 Bell helicopters originally built as troop carriers for the Shah's army."81 (We should note that while Iraq was blacklisted major recipients of US military aid such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia passed much of it along to Iraq.) The US aided Iraq in other ways, such as buying more oil from it and asking others to follow suit. Kuwait loaned over $30 billion to Hussein, and Saudi Arabia also loaned money.82

As soon as the war ended, Kuwait began pumping lots of oil, driving the price down to just over half its previous value. It had pushed its disputed border with Iraq north while Iraq was busy with the war, and on top of that it was tapping Iraqi oil by drilling at a slant (with equipment supplied by a US company). It also demanded repayment of its debt, a move which some Kuwaitis said would not have happened without US pressure. Iraq, with plummeting oil income and a war-ravaged economy, couldn't pay. Norman Schwarzkopf, soon to become a Gulf War celebrity, had regularly visited Kuwait's Crown Prince and Minister of Defense, and (then) US Director of Central Intelligence William Webster had met with Brigadier Fahd Ahmed, director general of Kuwait's State Security, before the war. Kuwaiti officials let it slip that they were confident of US backing.83 Clark cites John Pilger in the New Statesman saying that a May 1990 National Security Council report to President Bush named Iraq and its ruler as "the optimum contenders to replace the Warsaw Pact" as threats requiring military forces on a par with those of the Cold War.84

Hussein demanded a stop to slant drilling and overproduction; he also demanded border concessions, and compensation for the oil revenues lost in the price dive. Negotiations failed and Iraqi troops started moving to the border.

On July 24 1990, US warships joined ships from the United Arab Emirates in a "combined exercise" in the southern Gulf. The next day, Hussein asked US ambassador April Glaspie where the US stood on his dispute with Kuwait. She told him that it had no position on disputes between Arab states. On August 2, Iraq invaded.85 The same day, the US initiated, and the UN Security Council passed, a resolution condemning the invasion and setting a deadline of January 15 for Iraqi withdrawal.86

Hussein had planned to carry out a limited occupation and withdraw when Kuwait met his demands. But Washington said that he was massing troops for an invasion of Saudi Arabia (south of Kuwait) and pressured the Saudis to allow US troops there. Evidence for this, however, was lacking:

"Saudi diplomats did not believe there was any evidence of an imminent Iraqi invasion. Bob Woodward wrote in his book The Commmanders that. . . King Fahd sent a team across the Kuwaiti border to look for the Iraqi troops. The team came back empty-handed. 'There was no trace of Iraqi troops heading toward the kingdom,' Woodward wrote."87 Further, Russian commercial satellite photos didn't show any buildup or move toward Saudi Arabia, as reported by the St. Petersburg Times:

"'The Pentagon kept saying the bad guys were there, but we don't see anything to indicate an Iraqi force in Kuwait of even 20 percent the size the administration claimed,' said [satellite imaging expert] Peter Zimmerman, who served with the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency during the Reagan administration.

"A Soviet commercial satellite took a photo of Saudi Arabia on Sept 11 and a photo of Kuwait on Sept. 13. At the time the Defense Department was estimating there were as many as 250,000 Iraqi troops and 1,500 tanks in Kuwait. The photos were obtained by the St. Petersburg Times two weeks ago."

Earlier photos obtained by ABC news also showed few Iraqi troops in Kuwait, but didn't cover the whole country, so ABC didn't run the story. The Times bought a photo of the missing part of Kuwait, plus one of part of Saudi Arabia.

"While Iraqi troops cannot be seen, it is easy to spot the extensive American military presence at the Dhahran Airport in Saudi Arabia.

"'We could see five C-141s, one C-5A and four smaller transport aircraft, probably C-130s,' said Zimmerman. 'There is also a long line of fighters, F-111s or F-15s, on the ground. In the middle of the airfield are what could be camouflaged staging areas.

"'We didn't find anything of that sort anywhere in Kuwait. We don't see any tent cities, we don't see congregations of tanks, we don't see troop concentrations, and the main Kuwaiti air base appears deserted. It's five weeks after the invasion, and from what we can see, the Iraqi air force hasn't flown a single fighter to the most strategic air base in Kuwait.

"'There is no infrastructure to support large numbers of people. They have to use toilets, or the functional equivalent. They have to have food. They have to have water at the rate of several gallons per man per day. They have to have shelter. But where is it?'"

Another military photo analyst retained by the Times concurred.88

There is other evidence that Hussein's invasion was small-scale: Clark reports:

"[A]ccording to the January 20, 1992 U.S. News & World Report, . . . a U.S. intelligence officer reported from Kuwait that [Iraqi] Republican Guard troops were actually withdrawing from southern Kuwait back into Iraq. U.S. News's book on the war, Triumph Without Victory, quoted a CENTCOM [US Central Command] commander who said, 'We still have no hard evidence that [Hussein] ever intended to invade Saudi Arabia.'"89

But the Bush administration said otherwise:

"On August 7, White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater said, 'We believe that there is a very imminent threat to Saudi Arabia from the way that they [Iraqi troops] are positioned and located in Kuwait. . . .' [O]n September 11, Bush would tell Congress 120,000 Iraqi troops with 850 tanks had 'poured into Kuwait and moved south to threaten Saudi Arabia' by August 5."90

The Bush administration also exaggerated Iraqi progress toward making nuclear weapons.

"It was widely reported that Iraq was close to producing nuclear weapons, but the country lacked - among other things - the essential supply of plutonium. In April 1992, nuclear weapons experts reviewing a year's worth of inspection and analyses by the International Atomic Energy Agency decided Iraq had been at least three years away from developing a single atomic bomb."91

And in case this weren't enough, stories of Iraqi atrocities were fabricated:

"Testifying to the Congressional Human Rights Caucus on October 10, 1990, a 15-year-old girl introduced only as 'Nayirah' claimed that she had witnessed Iraqi soldiers taking babies from incubators and 'leaving them on the cold floor to die.' This story was quickly used by the Bush administration for its push toward war. Bush repeated it in numerous speeches, claiming 312 babies had died this way. Amnesty International reported the story as truth in a December 19, 1990 report.

"The story has been thoroughly discredited since the end of the conflict. It was later revealed that the witnesses who spoke before the Security Council and Congress did so under false names and identities. A 'Mr. Issah Ibrahim, the surgeon,' was really Ibraheem Behbehani, an orthodontist. Nayirah, the 15-year-old who testified that she was volunteering at the hospital when the atrocities allegedly occurred, turned out to be the daughter of the Kuwaiti ambassador to the United States, a fact known by the organizers of the October 10 hearing.

"Amnesty International retracted its support for the story in April 1991. In February 1992, Middle East Watch issued a report stating that the story was 'clearly wartime propaganda,' as were other stories of mass rape and torture by Iraqis."92

Having occupied Kuwait, Hussein wanted to negotiate a withdrawal in return for concessions. But the White House wouldn't hear of it, even though a Congressional summary of an Iraqi proposal concluded that a "diplomatic solution satisfactory to the interests of the United Sates may well have been possible since the earliest days of the invasion."93 Arab leaders as well felt that a negotiated solution was possible: Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak told US president George Bush, "I think Arab leaders are capable of finding a solution to this problem without any foreign interference at all." But pressure from Bush, (then) US Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, and US Ambassador Frank G. Wisner changed Mubarak's mind. The government-owned newspaper Al Ahram attacked the invasion in a banner headline in red ink: "TERRIFYING ARAB DISASTER" and called it "the blackest day in the history of the Arabs." Then Egypt spearheaded a condemnation of the invasion by the Arab League - which passed 14-7 even though such resolutions normally required unanimous agreement.94 Over objections from the US Treasury Department and the Office of Management and Budget, Bush forgave a $7.1 billion debt Egypt owed for arms purchases.95 Using the trumped-up threat of an Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia, the US obtained permission to send troops there.

"When the United States began its massive buildup in the Saudi desert, it took most Americans by surprise. The forces were far larger from the beginning than the public was told. The United States was able to fly warplanes from all over the world to more than 20 fully operative, hardened military airbases in Saudi Arabia - the bases that had been begun ten years before to facilitate the Rapid Deployment Force. Nine readied ports awaited U.S. warships. . . .

"Bush declared that the buildup was wholly defensive. Yet, from the beginning, news reports showed extensive planning by the United States for offensive military action. On August 11, when 40,000 troops were in the Gulf, the Los Angeles Times stated in an editorial, 'An anonymous Defense Department source is widely quoted as saying that contingency plans for the Persian Gulf could result in the insertion of up to 200,000 to 250,000 [U.S.] ground forces before it's all done. . . .'

"By September 4, 100,000 troops were in the Gulf, and that number doubled by mid-October. Then, with no material change in the crisis, on October 30 Bush again doubled U.S. troop levels to 400,000. He waited until immediately after the Congressional elections, however, to make this decision public.

"On December 29, President Bush directed General Schwarzkopf to begin his attack on Iraq on January 16 at 7:00 pm EST, the day after the UN deadline for withdrawal. And still the public was told that peace was possible."96

By mid-January the US had 540,000 troops in the Gulf and air or ground support from at least six other countries. In the early morning of January 17, "hundreds of missiles and bombs" pummeled Iraq. "Within an hour," writes Clark, "85 percent of all electric power generation throughout Iraq was destroyed. Several thousand bombing sorties cut the major arteries of the nation's vital services within 48 hours."97

US officials continued to demonize Hussein during the war, attributing huge oil spills caused by allied bombing to him:

"U.S. bombing purposely targeted oil tankers and storage facilities in the Gulf. Saudi scientists estimated that 30 percent of the oil spill was attributable to this bombing. Kuwaiti oil facilities on the shores of the Gulf also came under heavy attack. . . .

"The front page of the January 26 New York Times carried a photograph of an oil spill on the coast of northern Saudi Arabia. The article, which blamed Iraq, included a picture of a cormorant struggling in oil-clogged waters off the Gulf coast. In fact, these photographs showed an earlier oil spill that was caused by allied bombing. (Both U.S. and Saudi oil officials admitted this in a briefing.) Yet the Times prominently quoted President Bush, who said: 'Saddam Hussein continues to amaze the world. . . . Now he resorts to environmental damage. . . .'

"The government has also silenced anyone who might be in a position to expose the Pentagon's culpability. In January 1991, for example, when a team of researchers from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration went to the Gulf to investigate the spill, they were promptly ordered by Washington not to discuss their findings publicly." 98

At this writing, over eleven years later, Saddam Hussein still rules Iraq, and the US still has a major military presence in the Persian Gulf. There are rumblings of a US invasion to oust (or kill) Hussein.

Between 1941 and 1990, all the attacks (with the possible exception of the North Korean attack on the South in 1950) which have "justified" war by the US have been provoked or fabricated. It is clear that we must view official accounts of such attacks with much skepticism.

References:

1. John C. Miller, Sam Adams: Pioneer in Propaganda ( Stanford University Press, 1936) p. 178
2. ibid., pp. 179f
3. ibid., p. 186
4. ibid., p. 187
5. ibid., p. 188
6. ibid., p. 189
7. ibid., p. 191
8. Jerald A. Combs, The History of American Foreign Policy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1986) p. 142
9. ibid., p. 144
10. 10. ibid., pp. 144f
11. ibid., p. 146
12. ibid., p. 153
13. ibid., pp. 213f
14. Keith Allen, Lusitania Controversy (Part 1) (The World War I Document Archive.)
15. Allen, Lusitania Controversy (Part 2)
16. Allen, Lusitania Controversy (Part 3)
17. Allen, Lusitania Controversy (Part 4)
18. Robert B. Stinnett, Day of Deceit (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000) pp. xiiif
19. ibid., p. 7
20. ibid., p. 4
21. ibid., p. 11
22. ibid., p. 17
23. ibid., p. 18
24. ibid., p. 3
25. ibid., p. 203
26. ibid., p. 8
27. ibid., p. 9
28. ibid., pp. 321f
29. ibid., p. 322
30. ibid., pp. 42f
31. ibid., p. 42
32. ibid., p. 156
33. ibid., p. 9
34. ibid., p. 322
35. ibid., pp. 17f
36. ibid., p. 36
37. ibid., p. 120
38. ibid., p. 121
39. ibid., p. 22
40. ibid., p. 169
41. ibid., pp. 37f
42. ibid., p. 30
43. ibid., p. 32
44. ibid., pp. 91ff
45. ibid., p. 144
46. ibid., p. 150
47. ibid., p. 152
48. ibid., pp. 164f
49. ibid., p. 167
50. ibid., pp. 169f
51. ibid., p. 157
52. ibid., p. 144
53. ibid., p. 218
54. ibid., p. 171f
55. ibid., pp. 174ff
56. ibid., p. 203
57. ibid., p. 244
58. ibid., pp. 255f
59. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Memorandum For the Secretary of Defense, 3/13/62, p. 12. Reproduced on The National Security Archives Website.
60. ibid., p. 3
61. ibid., p. 5
62. ibid., p. 7
63. ibid., pp. 7f
64. ibid., pp. 8f
65. ibid., p. 9
66. ibid., pp. 10f
67. US Naval Historical Center, USS Maddox (DD-731), 1944-1972 - Actions in the Gulf of Tonkin, August 1964
68. Combs, The History of American Foreign Policy, p. 401
69. Doug Valentine and Elton Manzione, "The Raid on Hon Me," The National Reporter, Spring 1987, p. 22.
70. Michael Ruppert. "A White Night Talking Backwards".
71. Valentine and Manzione, "The Raid on Hon Me," p. 22
72. ibid., pp. 22f
73. ibid., p. 24
74. James Bamford, The Puzzle Palace (New York: Penguin Books 1983) p. 294.
75. Valentine and Manzione, "The Raid on Hon Me," p. 24
76. Dale Andrade and Kenneth Conboy, "The Secret Side of the Tonkin Gulf Incident," Naval History 8/99
77. David E. Sanger, "New Tapes Indicate Johnson Doubted Attack in Tonkin Gulf," The New York Times 11/6/01.
78. Ramsey Clark, The Fire This Time (New York: Thunder's Mouth Press, 1992) p. xvii
79. Ed Rippy, Guns, Drugs, and Oil: The Realpolitik of the Afghan War, Part 2
80. Clark, The Fire This Time, p. 8
81. ibid., p. 7
82. ibid., p. 6
83. ibid., pp. 14f
84. ibid., p. 23
85. ibid., p. 23
86. ibid., p. 35
87. ibid., pp. 27f
88. Jean Heller, "Photos don't show buildup," St. Petersburg Times, 1/6/91
89. Clark, The Fire This Time, p. 28
90. ibid., p. 28
91. ibid., pp. 30f
92. ibid., pp. 31f
93. ibid., p. 33
94. Jean Edward Smith, George Bush's War (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1992) pp. 74f
95. ibid., p. 147
96. Clark, The Fire This Time, pp. 35f
97. ibid., p. 37
98. ibid., p. 101