By Sharon Weinberger
August 12, 2008 11:00:00 AM
Categories: Info War
Courtesy Of Wired Blog Network
Yesterday, I began a critique of Matt Armstrong's provocative essay on rethinking Smith-Mundt -- the act that is today interpreted as America's anti-propaganda law. He argues that the U.S. government should do away with restrictions that limit information campaigns intended to persuade foreign audiences from reaching Americans. Today, I continue that critique, by arguing that Matt, in his piece, is fundamentally confused about the current role of media and public affairs in a democratic society.
Sadly, he’s not alone, as I see an increasing number of government offices renaming public affairs positions as “strategic media” or "strategic communication" officers. Why is this bad? Because when a newspaper calls up a public affairs officer to find out the number of casualties in an IED attack, the answer should be a number (preferably accurate), not a carefully crafted statement about how well the war is going. The role of public affairs is to convey information, not messages, and anyone who forgets that fundamental role should reread the Pentagon’s “Principles of Information,” which dictates that the public affairs is “to expedite the flow of information to the public; propaganda has no place in DoD public affairs programs."
How did we, in the past, resolve that principle with the need to tell America's story to foreign audiences? Matt looks to historical examples to demonstrate that Smith-Mundt was never intended to uphold that difference. The act was not, he writes, to protect delicate American ears from our government’s own propaganda, rather it was to protect the corporate profits of media (Matt acknowledged the act was amended in later years precisely to prevent domestic propaganda, but for inexplicable reasons, he regards that change as an aberration, rather than as a natural outgrowth of public and government concerns about propaganda).
The concern after World War II, when Smith Mundt was first enacted, was that a government information agency would compete with, or even crowd out, private media, Matt argues. “In other words, American media wanted a non-compete agreement to protect its profits,” he writes. Matt’s suggestion that the profit motive—and not the first amendment—was the motive for restricting government press misses an important point: the two go hand-in-hand. It is the very fact that we have a free market in press and media that ensures its independence. And there are really two choices: either you earn a profit, or someone, such as the government, the Reverend Moon, or the communist party, foots the bill. Take your pick. Me, I’ll take capitalism, thank you.
Matt’s confusion of the issues is compounded at the end of the piece where he writes: “If preventing government advocacy and influence operations on the American public is the goal, Congress should limit appearances by the executive branch on the Sunday talk show circuit, implement campaign reforms, among other changes.”
But this fundamentally misses how the media works. Presenting the government’s view on TV is not the same thing as controlling how it’s presented, as is what's done with U.S. government programming. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld indeed argued his case on the morning talks shows, but he had no control over whether the stations chose to put on those with opposing views, or ask challenging questions, or even whether he was invited on at all.
Revising Smith-Mundt to reflect the realities of the 21st century is a smart move -- and in this Matt has an excellent point -- but the change, in my view, should be to to do away with the notion of “strategic communication,” not to bolster it. A well orchestrated government public affairs campaign that engages foreign media and treats foreign media with the same seriousness and integrity as it treats (or at least should treat) American media, would do more to bolster America's image abroad than, God forbid, another “Shared Values” television campaign.
Tomorrow, I will conclude this debate by arguing why, in my view, an expansion of strategic communication would only further undermine U.S. policy abroad.
Debating Domestic Propaganda, Part III
By Sharon Weinberger
August 13, 2008 4:10:00 PM
Categories: Info War
Courtesy Of Wired Blog Network
Some day, when it's more funny than disturbing, I will write about my brief stint as a Foreign Service Officer, where I was assigned to the public diplomacy section of the U.S. Embassy in Doha in the run up to the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Today, I'll just mention this experience in passing as the third part in a three-part series explaining why I respect -- but disagree -- with a good portion of Matt Armstrong's essay, where he argues that the U.S. government should take the "strategic communication" campaign to its own people.
In part one, I argue this is abhorrent to democracy; in part two, I explain why it would undermine the legitimate and valuable role of government public affairs; finally, as I note today, it ultimately wouldn't work.
Now, back to Doha, where as the Arabic world (in fact, the whole world) was trying to understand why the United States was about to invade Iraq, I, as the assistant public affairs officer at the U.S. Embassy in a country that is home to Al Jazeera, was being spammed with daily cables asking whether our embassy would be interested in having "jazz ambassadors" visit Qatar. Option two was a twenty year old "paper show" talking about NASA that could be displayed at local schools. It went downhill from there.
To the point: the U.S. government's current approach to “public diplomacy” is removed from reality, and I don't buy, as former Defense Secretary Rumsfeld argues, that establishing an entire agency is the way to solve the problem. The United States can’t get anyone to listen to Radio Sawa, and no one has come up with a plan for how they would make it any better. The U.S. can throw as much money as it wants at public diplomacy, but unless there is an idea of how to spend the money, the U.S. government can't compete with CNN, let alone Al Jazeera.
Why won't it work? Because a U.S. sponsored television or radio program with political or social content that would actually interest an audience in the Middle East would have to include frank and even critical discussions of U.S. policy that interests the target audience, such as U.S. support for Israel, the invasion of Iraq, and our relations with regimes in the region with less than democratic leanings. I don't see that lasting more than one session in Congress. Matt writes "Al-Qaeda increased their influence and reach with words, images, and actions," but Al Qaeda doesn't have a legislative branch. It doesn't have a judiciary, or even a public with voting rights.
Back at home, Matt also thinks the American public could use some government news programming. "Relying on the private media to engage and inform the American public is increasingly wishful thinking," he writes, raising the question of whether he thinks the government can do a better job. Matt's argument in the essay largely rests on the notion that Smith-Mundt evolved away from its post-World War II origins; but there's good reason for that.
The world has evolved, and he never explains why or how a combined domestic/foreign public diplomacy/strategic communication campaign would accomplish its objectives.
Finally, convincing foreign audiences of the righteousness of our policies is a noble goal, but there is the reality that sometimes our policies are not righteous. In a democratic society we accept that sometimes we fail, and the solution should be to change those policies, not "sell" them to foreign audiences that don't want to buy them.
How, though, can we communicate our policies to foreign audiences, when indeed we are in the right?
Communicating with foreign audiences is a worthy goal, but it's one that requires a different sort of investment: increasing the number of government officials proficient in Arabic (and other foreign languages), and making those officials available to Arabic-language media. It may also mean, eventually, reexamining the policies themselves.
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