(Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas (R), Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal (C) and Palestinian Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh walk inside the Grand Mosque in Mecca on February 9, 2007.) Suhaib Salem / EPA
Courtesy Of: Time Magazine
By ELAINE SHANNON/WASHINGTON
Friday, Feb. 09, 2007
HOME
Palestinians may still be celebrating the Mecca accord reached between rival factions of Hamas and Fatah to form a national unity government, but there is no such sentiment coming out of Washington. "Peace is not at hand," a senior U.S. official said today.
But while the Bush Administration may view the deal as a setback for the prospects of Middle East peace, many observers think it is really a setback for U.S. influence in the region — especially its goal of isolating Hamas.
...The Mecca talks, convened by Saudi King Abdullah, resulted in a Hamas pledge to "respect" previous Palestinian agreements to engage in peace talks with Israel. But Hamas leaders pointedly did not embrace Quartet demands that they concede Israel's right to exist and move toward a two-state solution.
Former U.S. Ambassador to Israel Martin Indyk, now director of the Brookings Institutions' Saban Center for Middle East Policy, argues that the Mecca accord is a "considerable embarrassment" for Rice and a setback for her hopes of brokering Israeli-Palestinian talks that will lay the groundwork for the establishment of a peaceful Palestinian state...
"This is not what the Administration had in mind," Indyk told TIME today. "They were expecting that Abu Mazen backed by Egypt and Saudi Arabia, would be moving into a process of excluding Hamas. They did not expect that Abu Mazen would compromise with Hamas. They didn't want him to compromise with Hamas, and they didn't think it was necessary."
The U.S. team, Indyk argues, failed to anticipate that Abbas would opt for "conciliation and cooperation rather than confrontation" with Hamas.
Moreover, Indyk says, the deal casts a shadow over the Administration's efforts to form a strong coalition with Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the other moderate Arab states on a range of issues, including not only the Israel-Palestinian issue but also opposing Iran's nuclear defiance and operations in Iraq, Lebanon and the Palestinian territories.
"They expected that Egypt and Saudi Arabia would play a different role," says Indyk."The Saudis had started off with a very hard line against Hamas but that policy shifted at the beginning of January. In a sense Abu Mazen, the Saudis and the Egyptians reached the decision it was better to cohabit with Hamas than confront them. They decided to step back from the brink and to make a variety of concessions."
Indyk also predicts increased tensions within the Quartet. While there's no daylight yet showing between the U.S. and the Europeans, he says, "Russia will see this as a license to deal with Hamas."
Courtesy Of: Time Magazine
By ELAINE SHANNON/WASHINGTON
Friday, Feb. 09, 2007
HOME
Palestinians may still be celebrating the Mecca accord reached between rival factions of Hamas and Fatah to form a national unity government, but there is no such sentiment coming out of Washington. "Peace is not at hand," a senior U.S. official said today.
But while the Bush Administration may view the deal as a setback for the prospects of Middle East peace, many observers think it is really a setback for U.S. influence in the region — especially its goal of isolating Hamas.
...The Mecca talks, convened by Saudi King Abdullah, resulted in a Hamas pledge to "respect" previous Palestinian agreements to engage in peace talks with Israel. But Hamas leaders pointedly did not embrace Quartet demands that they concede Israel's right to exist and move toward a two-state solution.
Former U.S. Ambassador to Israel Martin Indyk, now director of the Brookings Institutions' Saban Center for Middle East Policy, argues that the Mecca accord is a "considerable embarrassment" for Rice and a setback for her hopes of brokering Israeli-Palestinian talks that will lay the groundwork for the establishment of a peaceful Palestinian state...
"This is not what the Administration had in mind," Indyk told TIME today. "They were expecting that Abu Mazen backed by Egypt and Saudi Arabia, would be moving into a process of excluding Hamas. They did not expect that Abu Mazen would compromise with Hamas. They didn't want him to compromise with Hamas, and they didn't think it was necessary."
The U.S. team, Indyk argues, failed to anticipate that Abbas would opt for "conciliation and cooperation rather than confrontation" with Hamas.
Moreover, Indyk says, the deal casts a shadow over the Administration's efforts to form a strong coalition with Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the other moderate Arab states on a range of issues, including not only the Israel-Palestinian issue but also opposing Iran's nuclear defiance and operations in Iraq, Lebanon and the Palestinian territories.
"They expected that Egypt and Saudi Arabia would play a different role," says Indyk."The Saudis had started off with a very hard line against Hamas but that policy shifted at the beginning of January. In a sense Abu Mazen, the Saudis and the Egyptians reached the decision it was better to cohabit with Hamas than confront them. They decided to step back from the brink and to make a variety of concessions."
Indyk also predicts increased tensions within the Quartet. While there's no daylight yet showing between the U.S. and the Europeans, he says, "Russia will see this as a license to deal with Hamas."
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