More Strife In Store For Egypt

By Victor Kotsev
March 30, 2011
Courtesy Of "Asia Times Online"

TEL AVIV - "[There will be] no presidential candidate from the military establishment in upcoming presidential elections," a high-ranking Egyptian military officer assured Reuters two weeks ago. Yet the Egyptian army is gradually but firmly taking control of the country and asserting itself in issues ranging from domestic security to foreign policy.

Similarly, Muslim Brotherhood officials interviewed by CNN asserted that they "want to participate [in], not to dominate" the government, and have promised not to field a presidential candidate. With some reservations, the Brotherhood has backed the idea of a "secular government," and has elected to stay on the sidelines, even as many analysts doubt it will remain there long.

This is something rare and alarming. Neither of two main established forces in Egypt - the military and the Muslim Brotherhood, who have battled each other in different circumstances and ways ever since Gamal Abdel Nasser's 1952 military coup - wants to govern. It is unlikely that they have been infected with popular revolutionary fervor and have decided to throw out good old Machiavellian realpolitik for a utopian political model based on selflessness and broad social consensus. It is possible that one of them - specifically the military - is bluffing. Even more likely, however, is the possibility that they have both concluded that whoever assumes power is doomed.

This has a lot to do with economics. Even the International Monetary Fund, which otherwise painted a rosy picture of the protests and cautiously predicted long-term growth, acknowledged that the immediate future looked bleak. In his article Food and failed Arab states (Asia Times Online, February 1, 2011) David Goldman became one of the first to argue that a long-term upward trend in wheat prices is at the root of popular discontent in Egypt.

"It is unclear whether President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt will survive, or whether his nationalist regime will be replaced by an Islamist, democratic, or authoritarian state," Goldman writes, less than a week after the protests began. "What is certain is that it will be a failed state."

Politically, things don't look very good either. The popular enthusiasm is still strong: observers on the ground note an unprecedented level of social solidarity, a decline in sexual harassment of women, and a general atmosphere of hope and mutual support. However, at the current levels, change is not coming to Egypt nearly as quickly as the protesters may expect.

There are warning signs as well. Some reports indicate that there is also a lot of confusion, paranoia, and opportunism on the ground. According to others, despite the ouster of Mubarak, the old regime is very much alive and well.

Amira Hass, a prominent Israeli journalist with close ties to the Palestinians and the rest of the Arab world, reports from Cairo:

People are now talking about ‘the return of the bullies' - emissaries of the old order who are signaling that they don't intend to go quietly. A meeting between two friends is delayed: there are problems at the workplace of one of the women, which has to do with the opposition to Mubarak. Out of the blue, a swarm of thugs appears, bullying and threatening people. It's been going on for three days already. The phone call was light on details, but others too sense the presence of a real but hidden hand that is attempting to screw things up. There are undeciphered signals that evoke anxiety.

The military may want to divert the responsibility of governing, but it also appears set on holding on to "real" power. "What we see is that while Mubarak is gone, the military regime in which he served has dramatically increased its power," writes prestigious American think-tank Stratfor. 

The generals of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, now in charge of the country, all have ties to the old regime, and are unlikely to execute radical reform. They may be willing to reform the political system, to impose term limits on the presidency, and to relax the emergency laws that have been in place for the last 30 years, but they are unlikely to overturn their broad power base. 
The Egyptian military has integrated itself deeply into Egyptian political, economic, and social life. According to a report, former army officers have "penetrated the media, transportation, the education system, as well as social welfare organizations and humanitarian funds". They and the structures they govern were very much part of how Mubarak's regime functioned, and they are implicated in the creation of the "old order". It is hard to imagine them producing something radically different overnight. 

Moreover, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces shows power ambitions beyond the domestic front. According to a Stratfor report:

Coming out of its own political crisis, Egypt is experiencing a reawakening in the Arab world and appears eager to reassert its influence following years of insularity ... Cairo already has begun using its response to its domestic crisis to reclaim its influence in the Arab world amid regional unrest - the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces of Egypt has publicized the fact that Defense Minister Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi is actively advising high-risk regimes ... In the case of Libya, Egypt is trying to position itself as the regional power that the outside world must rely on to operate in the country.

Judging by all this, it is practically certain that the military will seek to control the next Egyptian government, and that it will be pulling the strings on a lot of, if not most, policies. However, it is also likely that it will choose to do so discreetly, from behind the scenes if possible, because of the danger of popular backlash. 

There are already periodic clashes between a core of committed protesters and soldiers - most recently last Saturday. So far the protests are not violent and not very widespread. But the situation is charged, and given the negative economic trends and the stagnant politics, a new explosion of popular anger is almost guaranteed. 

The Egyptian military is thus treading as carefully as possible. It is quite conceivable that it will try to reduce its public profile by propping up a civilian presidential candidate in hopes that the new government, rather than the military, will absorb the popular anger once disillusionment sets in. 

Incidentally, such a scenario could be acceptable to the Muslim Brotherhood as well, which does not deem itself ready to rule yet, is kept in check by the military, and is probably also worried about the popular discontent. Similarly to the military, the Brotherhood has deep roots inside Egyptian society. It has survived for a long time on the sidelines of politics, and can stay there for a while longer while waiting for the storm to pass. It likely calculates also that this time at least some of the anger will be directed at the army. 

Thus, it is increasingly possible that the third political force in the country, the secular democratic opposition, will get a chance to assume power after an initial transition. It is safe to both the military and the Muslim Brotherhood in that it is the most susceptible to popular mood swings. Its powerbase multiplied quickly, drawing on popular enthusiasm, but it can fade just as quickly, if its leaders fail popular expectations. Once that happens, the old power game between the Brotherhood and the military can resume. 

Notes 

1. An Interview with the Brotherhood, The Mantle, February 2.
2. IMF: Mideast protests could help foster long-term growth, Ha'aretz February 19. Egypt: Persecuting the stars! , Aharq Alawsat February 25. 

Victor Kotsev is a journalist and political analyst based in Tel Aviv. 

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