By Benjamin Tua – BRAZIL
First Published 2010-08-25
Courtesy Of "Middle-East-Online"
Speculation has spiked concerning the confrontation between Iran and the permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany over Iran’s nuclear program. At issue is whether the Obama administration’s measured policy of selective pressure and engagement with Tehran will create a dynamic that will unfreeze the deadlock between the two countries or the failure of sanctions and diplomacy to resolve the differences over the nuclear program will lead to Israeli and/or US military strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities. In this context, Shireen Hunter’s new book, Iran’s Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era: Resisting the New International Order(Praeger, 2010), is especially timely.
Hunter, a former Iranian diplomat, served in London and Geneva, and at the UN, between 1966 and 1978. She has an intimate feel for the nuances of Iranian foreign policy; and her book is a valuable, detailed critique of the Islamic Republic’s foreign relations since its founding in 1979.Swimming Against The Tide
Hunter tells us that Iran has hurt itself by not adjusting to the new international realities brought about by the collapse of the Soviet Union. The demise of the USSR, she argues, freed the West to toughen its policy towards Iran and caused countries such as Turkey to see Iran more as a rival than a partner in containing the Soviets. But her real point is that Iran cannot achieve its national goals as long as it continues to butt heads with the United States. Hunter considers Iranian foreign policy and diplomacy “astonishingly inept” and naïve; and she castigates the Iranian leadership for not realizing that Iran’s relations with the US “affect everything.”
Hunter notes that Iran pays a huge price for the tensions its nuclear program engenders with the United States. Tehran’s provocative tone towards Israel simply underscores the failure of Iranian elites to understand “the domestic political dynamics of US foreign policy.” It consolidates Israel’s view of Iran as an implacable foe that must be constrained at all costs, and leads it to seek to ensure that America will not engage with Iran.
Tied Up In Knots
Hunter also argues that Iran is a victim of its own diversity. The Islamic Revolution of 1979 shifted the balance of power and privileges to religious elements. However, it also revived deep-rooted pre-Islamic culture and identity. Those who lean toward the “Iranian pole” favor a more nationalistic and realist foreign policy than the Islamists. However, the tensions engendered by Iran’s historical experience have endowed Iran’s foreign policy with a measure of unrealism about the country’s international role and position not matched by its actual power and ability.
Moreover, personal rivalries and Iran’s complicated decision-making system make foreign policy formulation and decisions torturously complex and difficult. Thus, Hunter believes, the rivalry between President Ahmadinejad and the speaker of the parliament, as well as criticism from some reformist politicians, forced a delay in Iran’s acceptance of the October 2009 draft agreement with the five permanent UN Security Council members and Germany on the transfer of low-enriched uranium from Iran.
The Pragmatic Side
Despite the pervasive criticism, Hunter appears to be of two minds regarding Tehran’s diplomacy. She acknowledges that Iran has shown caution in many instances; and she gives many examples of Iranian pragmatism and sophistication in its diplomatic efforts.
Iran has cited close US-Israel ties as a reason for not having relations with Washington. However, Tehran has ignored Sino-Israeli relations, which include large arms sales to China. In fact, apart from the US and a few Western countries, Iran does not go out of its way to antagonize its interlocutors. Iran has played down the ideological factor in its relations with Turkey and in its outreach to its Arab neighbors, and has not retaliated against Pakistan despite attacks on Iranian officials in Pakistan and competition for influence in Afghanistan, where the two countries have backed different groups. Indeed, despite US support for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War, Tehran exercised moderation and outreach towards the US and has adopted a similar policy with respect to the US-led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Hunter notes instances where Iranian restraint seems to have paid off, as in Pakistani-Iranian intelligence cooperation. Also, Iran’s cautious policy toward the Caucasus and the Muslim-inhabited republics of the former Soviet Union helped stabilize Russo-Iranian relations.
The Broader Context
However, Hunter largely ignores developments which might help explain the thinking behind Iran’s policies that bring it into conflict with the US. In this category is the changing balance of forces in the Middle East, including the rise of Hezbollah and Hamas, and Israel’s increasing isolation in the region, as evidenced in part by its growing alienation from Turkey, which has moved closer to Iran. She underplays the importance of Iran’s relations with Syria and the Gulf states, and the Islamic Republic’s high standing with the Arab people – and with Muslims worldwide – because of its support for Hezbollah and the Palestinians.
Iran has calculated that the US is over-extended in the Middle East and that Israel’s policies are not sustainable over the longer term. Tehran seems to think that its current policies will position the country to take advantage of an emerging realignment of forces in the region and beyond, which will allow the country to serve as a bridge between Asia, the Middle East and Europe.
Unfolding Opportunities
The changed international and regional environment has created opportunities as well as new problems for Iran. The collapse of the Soviet Union, for example, opened up possibilities for Iran to develop ties with the former Soviet republics, with which it has historical, cultural and other ties; and it has allowed Iran to adjust its relations with Russia and Turkey.
Hunter also ignores the utility to Iran of the ambiguity surrounding its nuclear program. This uncertainty has helped induce the international community to begin to address the matter of Israel’s nuclear weapons. Iran’s nuclear policy also increases the pressure on both the Arab states and Israel to achieve a regional peace. A satisfactory settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict would diminish both the need for Israel to maintain a nuclear capability outside the International Atomic Energy Agency’s inspection regime and the motivation for others to develop their own programs.
Hunter discusses the involvement of Israel in the mid-eighties in the arms-to-Iran for US-hostages-in-Lebanon deal generally known as the Iran-Contra affair. However, she is silent about earlier contacts between Israel and the Islamic Republic regarding military sales. Iran and Israel have a considerable history of cooperation, and, in the event of a Palestinian-Israeli settlement, both sides could quickly change their attitudes to one another. Such a change also could occur in the context of an impending shift in US-Iranian relations.
Public attention normally focuses on President Ahmadinejad’s controversial comments on the Holocaust and Israel’s right to exist. However, Iran also has made more moderate statements regarding the Arab-Israeli peace process and Tehran’s readiness to accept a solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict that is acceptable to the Palestinians.
Finally, Hunter’s book would have benefited from additional discussion of how the United States might encourage the Iranian regime to continue to moderate and mature, as well as what role Iran might play in regional security arrangements. As Hunter points out, Iran has advanced several proposals in this regard.
Benjamin Tua, an independent analyst, is a retired US Foreign Service Officer. He served in Brazil, the former Soviet Union, Israel, Italy, Japan, and Lesotho.
No comments:
Post a Comment