Negotiating With The Four Hardliners

If those who currently mistrust Syria, Iran, Hamas and Hizbullah were to actually embrace serious diplomatic negotiations based on the normal diplomatic toolkit of incentives and disincentives, progress is likely to happen

By Rami G. Khouri
First Published 2010-02-22
Courtesy Of Middle-East-Online

BEIRUT - Amidst the day-to-day and week-to-week waves of diplomatic activity that wash over the Middle East, a fascinating sub-theme continues to define some of the most important relationships involving key actors: How does one deal with countries like Syria and Iran, or with powerful movements like Hamas and Hizbullah? These four represent a semi-formal alliance that is defined primarily by common opposition and active resistance to American and Israeli positions in the region, and challenging some of the positions of conservative Arab regimes. They are usually seen among the American and Israeli mainstream as dangerous trouble-makers who have to be treated with force and threats, yet they consistently survive or ignore such pressure and hold their ground as pivotal actors who have to be dealt with.

The last decade has witnessed a series of American and European moves towards these four parties that includes the two opposite poles of engagement and isolation. The sanctions, threats and pressures that have been used by parties like the United States, the European Union, the UN Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency seem not to have achieved their main purpose of bringing about significant changes in the behavior of these Middle Eastern players (the only exception probably being a greater caution by Hizbullah and Hamas in purposely or inadvertently triggering new wars with Israel, given the massive destruction that ensued from the last two wars).

Several developments these days suggest that the old ways of sanctions and threats have not worked, and must be modified, particularly with Syria, whose true position, role and importance in the region are widely debated, and have been since the 3rd Millennium BC. Syria is the critical lynchpin among those who defy and resist the United States and Israel, but simultaneously the leaders in Damascus miss no opportunity to say they want a fair peace with Israel and good ties with the US.

Among the intriguing new developments these days are that the United States is sending its ambassador back to Damascus and has approved the sale of some aircraft spare parts to the Syrian national airline; the French are sending a high-level official delegation to Syria that is headed by the Prime Minister and includes dozens of business leaders eager to make deals; and, the reconfigured nature of Lebanese-Syrian rhetoric, if not relations. (Last week’s speeches at the fifth anniversary commemoration of the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik were remarkable for mentioning Syria almost exclusively in the rhetoric of wanting close and normal ties between sovereign neighbors.)

These and other developments indicate to many that Syria is no longer isolated but rather has regained its pivotal role in regional diplomacy. That is true to a large extent, but Syria also remains frustratingly unable to fully achieve most of its foreign policy goals, including resolving its conflict with Israel, restoring fully normal ties with major Western leaders, assuaging many Arab concerns that it consorts dangerously with Iran, and removing the suspicions of many in Lebanon and elsewhere that Syrians at some level had a hand in the Hariri murder.

The pivotal question that emerges from this situation is whether one continues to pressure Syria or negotiate seriously with it. Usually ignorant voices in the United States, mostly linked to pro-Israeli think tanks that are proxies for rightwing Israeli extremists, continue to call for sanctions and threats that would aim to keep Syria in a corner and thus force it to change its policies. The American administration seems more sensible, and has decided to resume full diplomatic interaction with Syria in order to be in a position to negotiate issues seriously, instead of using the child-like diplomatic equivalent of the playground bully who shoves around others or takes the ball and goes home if everyone else does not play by his rules.

The reason that we still have a serious debate about whether one “engages” or pressures actors like Iran, Syria, Hizbullah and Hamas is that this issue is usually addressed in isolation of the bigger conflict in which these four parties live their daily lives. This bigger conflict is not only about whether Arabs and Iranians are being asked to adhere to rules that Israel is exempt from, but -- in the eyes of many in this region -- whether the larger aim is to preserve American- and Israeli-led hegemonic dominance of the Middle East. Wild sentiments define both sides of this debate.

If pressure aims to change the policies of these four regional actors, without addressing the core issues that matter to them, it will inevitably fail, as it has for decades. If, on the other hand, those who mistrust these four regional hardliners actually embrace serious diplomatic negotiations based on the normal diplomatic toolkit of incentives and disincentives, progress that suits all is more likely to happen.

Rami G. Khouri is Editor-at-large of The Daily Star, and Director of the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut, in Beirut, Lebanon.

Copyright © 2010 Rami G. Khouri – distributed by Agence Global