Blame For Abu Ghraib Finally Lands At The Top

Editorial
Posted at 12:22 AM/ET, December 15, 2008
Courtesy Of USA Today

The military's attempt to blame a few "bad apples" for the infamous 2003 Abu Ghraib prison scandal in Iraq always looked like a coverup, and not a very creative one. How, after all, could Abu Ghraib guards and a few low-level commanders be solely responsible for using abusive interrogation practices when similar embarrassments were popping up at prisons in Afghanistan and at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba?

(Detained: At Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad, Iraq / 2003 AP photo)

But that was the story told by then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and he and the Pentagon brass stuck to it for four long years after evidence mounted that they were, in fact, at fault.

Now, finally, an authoritative bipartisan report by the Senate Armed Services Committee has concluded, by a 17-0 vote, that Rumsfeld and other top Bush administration officials bear direct responsibility for the abuses that so damaged the American interests.

The panel said in a report Thursday that the guards' tactics were the byproduct of policies spawned by a 2002 memo, signed by President Bush, declaring that the Geneva Conventions for humane treatment of detainees did not apply to enemy fighters in the war on terror. Rumsfeld followed on by approving aggressive interrogation techniques for Guantanamo, including removing prisoners' clothes and using dogs to threaten them. The military soon adopted similar practices for Afghanistan and Iraq. Not surprisingly, the Abu Ghraib guards used them.

No one can forget the photos revealed in 2004, showing grinning U.S. soldiers alongside a pyramid of hooded and naked Iraqi detainees and one detainee collared and leashed like a dog.

But much of the public has forgotten the aftermath, as Rumsfeld and others tried to suppress information and shift blame downward. A gaggle of low-ranking soldiers were charged, and some are serving prison terms. The most senior officer to be reprimanded was an Army Reserve brigadier general who commanded military police at Abu Ghraib. Maj. Gen. Antonio Taguba, whose investigation found that the abuse was "systemic and illegal," was, in his own words, "ostracized" and forced to resign. Higher-level officials got a pass.

The scandal led to changes, and abuse is less likely now. Even so, the report carries important lessons.

It underscores that these tactics are both cruel and unproductive: The abuses, the committee found, "damaged our ability to collect accurate intelligence that could save lives" and "strengthened the hand of our enemies." And it places responsibility, finally and unequivocally, where it belongs.

But there is another lesson. That is the enduring power of the Big Lie — the ability of those in power to deny what is obvious, pressure anyone attempting to tell the truth and go on as if nothing happened, unless someone like the senators exposes the truth.

That's nothing new in Washington, but it's another reminder to be skeptical of dubious claims by those with big megaphones.