Approaching The Taliban

By David Ignatius
Washington Post Writers Group
Updated: 11/04/08 6:36 AM
Courtesy Of The BuffaloNews

WASHINGTON — As U. S. and European officials ponder what to do about the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan, they are coming to a perhaps surprising conclusion: The simplest way to stabilize the country may be to negotiate a truce with the Taliban fundamentalists who were driven from power by the United States in 2001.

The question policymakers are pondering, in fact, isn’t whether to negotiate with the Taliban, but when. There’s a widespread view among Bush administration officials and U. S. military commanders that it’s too soon for serious talks, because any negotiation now would be from a position of weakness. Some argue for a U. S. troop buildup and an aggressive military campaign next year to secure Afghan population centers, followed by negotiations.

How the worm turns: A few years ago, it would have been unthinkable that the United States would consider any rapprochement with the Taliban militants who gave sanctuary to Osama bin Laden as he planned the devastating attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. But the painful experience of Iraq and Afghanistan has convinced many U. S. commanders that if you can take an enemy off the battlefield through negotiations, that’s better than getting pinned down in protracted combat.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates made the argument for negotiations with the Taliban bluntly on Oct. 9, during a meeting in Budapest with NATO allies who are wearying of the conflict. “There has to be ultimately — and I’ll underscore ultimately — reconciliation as part of a political outcome to this,” Gates told reporters. “That’s ultimately the exit strategy for all of us.”

Gen. David Petraeus, the new Centcom commander who has overall responsibility for the wars in both Iraq and Afghanistan, has made similar arguments.

He believes that the United States must work to separate the “reconcilables” among the Taliban from those who are allied with al-Qaida, and draw the moderates into the government. Petraeus successfully pursued that strategy with Sunni Muslim insurgents in Iraq — encouraging them to break with al-Qaida, and then forming alliances with them.

Petraeus believes that an effort to co-opt the Afghan insurgency should probably be accompanied by a stronger U. S. troop presence, just as it was in Iraq. But he argues that it’s a mistake to think that there’s a purely military solution in either country. “You can’t kill or capture your way out of this,” he explains.

At the end of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, Saudi King Abdullah met in Mecca with representatives of the Taliban and other Afghan insurgent groups headed by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Jalaluddin Haqqani. Afghanistan’s president, Hamid Karzai, who was represented in Mecca by his brother Qayoum Karzai, supported the Saudi mediation.

Karzai is said to have demanded that the Taliban’s leader, Mullah Omar, publicly renounce bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, as a condition for further talks. A Taliban representative took this demand to Omar in his hideout in Afghanistan and returned to Mecca with a positive answer, according to a source familiar with the talks.

Omar has sent the Saudis a list of seven demands of his own, according to this source. Among the items on the Taliban agenda are: a timetable for withdrawal of U. S. forces from Afghanistan; a role for Taliban representatives in provincial and national government; assimilation of Taliban fighters into the Afghan army; and amnesty for guerrillas who fought against the United States.