How Humanitarianism Went To War

Human Rights and Wrongs

Has humanitarianism in its current form become part of the problem, rather than the solution?

By Michael Williams
Sunday October 26 2008 16.00 GMT
Courtesy Of The Guardian

Humanitarians are part of the problem, not part of the solution. So goes Conor Foley's argument in his well-written and thought-provoking book The Thin Blue Line: How Humanitarianism Went to War. Foley's book is an exceptional critique of humanitarian interventionism, in that it is written by a self-professed humanitarian. Conor has worked for Liberty, Amnesty and the United Nations in every global hotspot of the last decade ranging from the Balkans to Afghanistan via Africa and Asia. His work prompts one to sit down and really think about the issue. He goes far beyond the banal commentary of some left-wing writers who condemn every international intervention as US imperialism, providing us with a well-researched and thoughtful argument.

Throughout the 1990s, the idea of humanitarian intervention rapidly gained in popularity in a world where the balance of power was suddenly no more. The idea of spreading democracy and human rights has always been in line with America's self-created "manifest destiny". It was thus not hard for individuals and organisations to pull at the heartstrings of Washington politicians, as well as those in Whitehall and Berlin, to get democracies to stand up for human rights as defined by a liberal, educated western elite.

Foley contends, rather correctly, that this has set dangerous precedents. First of all, what right and responsibility do these various NGOs have in naming a conflict "genocide" or a "humanitarian disaster"? The case of Darfur, where the Save Darfur Coalition drastically exaggerated the nature of the conflict, so much so that the British Advertising Standards Authority ruled its adverts were "misleading" – one such example of an NGO bearing no responsibility for reckless policies. Even though they purport not to, humanitarians take sides in conflicts when in most every case from Rwanda to Uganda and the Balkans both sides have committed atrocities.

There is also the issue of the role humanitarians play in actual conflicts. Once on the ground, humanitarian organisations are often there promoting western values, although they proclaim to be neutral. In realty, very few modern day humanitarian organisations are neutral. Instead, they are multimandate. This means in addition to providing humanitarian assistance (food, shelter, etc) they also work on programmes promoting the rights of women, literacy for children and sex education. Most humanitarian organisations are run and supported by upper-middle class, educated, liberal, white, westerners unable to divorce themselves from their own cultural bias. Of course women in Afghanistan should be treated equally to men – and while we provide Afghans with food we are also going to get women into parliament. I (and Foley, I assume) believe in the rights of women, but one needs to keep in mind the cultural modernity of many of these countries where the west is involved. Western governments are always accused of imperialism, but far too few interrogate what is essentially humanitarian imperialism and Foley calls them out for it.

Finally and perhaps most importantly, there is the issue of humanitarianism and legitimacy. Has humanitarianism become a way to legitimise and justify our interventions in the affairs of other states for ulterior motives? Sadly, yes, in many cases. The difficulty of course is how do you divorce the two. With regard to Iraq, there was a blanket abuse of the humanitarian ideal to legitimise a patently illegitimate war. In Afghanistan the case is more difficult. The US went in to punish the perpetrators of 9/11, but there has been a humanitarian emergency in Afghanistan for the last decade (if not the last 30 years). Of course, the Bush administration never planned to develop Afghanistan, which is one of the reasons the mission has gone so poorly. And the US did not go to Afghanistan to relieve humanitarian suffering. From Kosovo to Africa and Asia, the last two decades are littered with humanitarian interventions, many of which might have done more harm that good.

Humanitarian organisations over the last two decades have helped to paradoxically rain down western missiles in the name of help and humanitarian ideals, and for this Foley holds them in contempt. Making matters worse, these organisations line up for government cash that further legitimises the conflicts especially in places like Iraq, even if they disagree with the focus or rationale for the intervention. Instead of challenging government about the legitimacy of their actions, they are complicit in the crime.

The Thin Blue Line is an unsettling book, because it thoughtfully challenges liberal, western notions of right and wrong, help and harm. For a generation that has become accustomed to the rather paradoxical argument of "humane warfare" this book will raise troubling questions. Given Barack Obama's firm belief in the UN's "right to protect" and the increasing probability he will be the next US president, this book could not be more timely. Has humanitarianism in its current form become part of the problem, rather than the solution? I don't know. But Foley has done a superb job in opening up the debate to the wider public.