A Plan For Iran

By Harlan Ullman
May 14, 2008
Courtesy Of The WashingtonTimes

What to do about Iran and its nuclear ambitions remains at the top of George W. Bush's agenda. With President Bush visiting Israel this week to commemorate its 60th anniversary, this question surely will be discussed. Rumors still persist about a pre-emptive U.S. strike against Iranian nuclear facilities before the president leaves office.

And Sen. Hillary Clinton's threat to eviscerate Iran should it attack Israel with nuclear weapons brings bipartisan support to preventing Tehran from acquiring an atomic bomb — one of Sen. John McCain's stated objectives in his campaign for the presidency.

But suppose Iran acquired nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Would this be the catastrophe that many predict? Would a regional nuclear arms race inevitably follow with Saudi Arabia, Egypt and possibly Turkey pursuing their own weapons in self-defense? And would a Shia bomb somehow make its way to al Qaeda, Hezbollah or other terrorist organizations?

Before Addressing These Fears, A Few Facts Are In Order:

First, the only state ever to use a nuclear weapon in anger is the United States.

Second, states such as South Africa, Ukraine and Kazakhstan voluntarily gave up their nuclear weapons; states with nuclear weapons ambitions such as Brazil, Argentina and Libya did likewise. North Korea may join this club.

Third, in 1949 when Stalin got his bomb and in 1964 when Mao did the same, the rhetoric in the United States was similarly shrill and foreboding. Calls for pre-emptive strikes to destroy the fledgling capabilities were heard. And predictions of nuclear holocausts and disaster were plentiful. Fortunately, nothing happened and the Cold War ended without the dreaded mushroom cloud engulfing a single city.

Iran is not Red China or the Soviet Union. While we regarded both communist states at one time as riddles and enigmas — at least concerning the way their governments mysteriously operated — we seem to have as little understanding today about how the mullahs make their decisions especially on matters of war, peace and security. And for whatever reason, many Americans regard Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as unstable if not delusional — not the ideal combination for a country that might get nuclear weapons.

It is time for a sober assessment of Iran. In my opinion, without huge provocation, an attack against Iran's nascent nuclear facilities would be a strategic nightmare. Iranian nationalism would offer too many opportunities for retaliation from oil embargoes to fomenting revolution in the Gulf states. Clearly, no one wants Iran to acquire nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them. But assume Iran did.

The clergy that controls the country is highly conservative and perhaps radical. There is no sign, however, that they are suicidal anymore than the Soviet Union or Red China was. The mullahs also understand that if Iran were to nuke Israel first, it would kill at least as many Muslims as Jews and conceivably destroy Jerusalem. And for all his rants, Mr. Ahmadinejad's finger is a long way from any nuclear trigger.

Iran is also balanced by two proximate nuclear states — Israel and Pakistan. While Pakistan sees the threat as only from India, it still represents a Sunni bomb. These realities suggest that some form of balance of terror could avert nuclear war.

And while the Sunni Gulf states would rightly remain fearful of a nuclear weapon in the hands of the Shi'ites and Persians, there is no reason to believe that a deterrent shield could not be constructed for the region or that it would not work. Indeed, rather than build their own weapons, those states would probably find it easier to make an accommodation with the United States or other nuclear states for their defense against Iran.

To that end, the current nuclear weapons states — Britain, France, Russia, China, India, Pakistan and the U.S. — could form the basis for this deterrent shield, or at least some of them. Because the region is so vital, and not just for oil, the nuclear states could band together for several purposes. The first would be to offer some form of guarantees to defend the region.

A second would be to bring together all the nuclear states — including Israel and Iran — in serious discussions designed to prevent the use and spread of nuclear weapons. And finally, confidence-building measures might have utility in relieving tensions and even establishing potential solutions to the larger Arab-Israeli-Palestinian conflict by making both Israel and Iran parties to these talks.

It would be irresponsible if not insane to believe that a nuclear Iran is a good idea or will bring peace and stability. But if that nuclear contingency occurs, rather than fear-mongering or overreacting, the outcome need not be as dire as many assert or predict.

Harlan Ullman is a columnist for The Washington Times.