By James Denselow
November 23, 2007 9:30 AM
Guardian
In recent months, Iraq has moved on to the backburner of world news. With no democratic or military milestone on the horizon and levels of violence dramatically reduced, some argue that the beleaguered country has turned a corner and is on the mend. These commentators point to the drop in deaths through bombings, the declining daily numbers of sectarian casualties and the thousands returning to their homes. Have General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker cracked the Iraqi conundrum and come up with a US "strategy for victory" that is worthy of its name?
...So what is happening in Iraq today and what role does Britain and the US have to play in the country over the next few years?
Professor Michael Clarke, newly installed director of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), answered this point saliently: "the US and Britain now merely want to withdraw from Iraq with honour; to leave behind a political order ... whose success or failure can be fairly judged to be up to the Iraqis themselves".
As I have written before, since President Bush has declared failure in Iraq "unacceptable", policymakers have set about redefining victory. Today, victory means the creation of circumstances for an honourable withdrawal. The British model in the south will likely be one day recreated, under a different US president, in the US-controlled zones.
In their four provinces in the south, the British decided right from the off to have as light a footprint as possible. While Bremer and the CPA were busy building the Iraq of their dreams from the Green Zone "emerald city", the Brits were bunkering down, talking to tribal leaders and wearing soft hats as they watched the "Basra cake" be divided among the competing warlords/new Iraqi democrats.
As the insurgency took off and the perception of the multinational forces (MNF) quickly changed from liberators to occupiers, the British found themselves pinned down in modern-day castles, as excellently told in the accounts of Rory Stewart, Mark Etherington and Dan Mills.
With an army a fraction of the size of the Americans and a conventional battle to be fought in Afghanistan, the British "exist strategy" rejected the "surge" option and instead pursued a programme of "Iraqisation", with far less concern as to what entity was left behind.
British commanders realised that as perceived occupiers the army was more part of the problem that the solution. When forces were based in Basra Palace, 90% of all violence was directed against them. Since their deployment to the airport, the violence has reduced ... by 90%. The fact that Basra has fallen under the control of warlords with no respect for human rights and who use assassins to consolidate their power is no more than an "Iraqi problem".
Similarly in al-Anbar province, once the HQ of the insurgency, former resistance fighters are benefiting from the devolution of power and money. The 70,000 Iraqi men in the "awakening movement" set up by tribal Sunni sheikhs is a local solution to the increasingly unique provincial identity born of the failure of the CPA's vision. In other words, after over four years in Iraq, the US has learned that if you can't beat them, join them. Much like the British did in the 1920s when, as Toby Dodge wrote, the RAF backed local tribes with airpower to enforce the UK supported Iraqi government.
What is so different about the US strategy today is that while Iraq is unlikely to disintegrate as a territorial entity (unless Turkey or Iran step up their involvement in the country dramatically) the actual political composition of the country that the US will one day leave is fragmented and divided. It can be described as a hyper-violent version of Lebanon, where politics takes place everywhere but in the parliament itself.
A state of this kind will be at the mercy of the regional players and the ebb and flow of agendas beyond those of the Iraqis themselves. No longer will Iraq be able to shape its region as it did in the past. Instead, local leaderships from Basra to Al-Anbar will have to find ways to operate within the dangerous parameters of this new "state" - the bastard child of a misconceived and ill-managed US operation.
No comments:
Post a Comment