Syria's Regional Position Strengthens

Courtesy Of: Power and Interest News Report
April 9, 2007
PINR

During the past few weeks, new events demonstrated how Syria's position in the Middle East has strengthened since last year. Although the Bush administration has aimed to isolate Syria, there are new signals pointing in the opposite direction, such as the March bilateral talks in Iraq between the United States and Syria. Moreover, U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's recent trip to Damascus has been an important success for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad since it creates the image of Syria as an element of stability in the region.

In light of these changes, Syria appears to be modifying its foreign policy to demonstrate how it could play an important role in guaranteeing the stability of the Middle East. Syria is hoping that outside powers will recognize its vital interests -- Lebanon, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and Iraq -- and if they do so then Damascus will assist in stabilizing Iraq. If, however, its interests are not recognized, then Syria will resume brewing instability in the region.

Lebanon is a key point of disagreement within the Arab world. Saudi Arabia, and to a lesser degree Egypt, is backing Lebanon's Fuad Siniora-led government against Syria, the latter of which supports the groups that are attempting to cause the current government in Beirut to collapse.

Currently, Syria's moves in Lebanon are dictated by international contingencies, such as the upcoming elections in France. Assad wants to stall for time in order to delay a Lebanese vote on the establishment of a Hariri tribunal until after the departure of French President Jacques Chirac, one of Assad's main political enemies. Syria hopes that the next French president will take a softer line with Damascus. Therefore, for now Syria wants to keep the question of the tribunal in limbo.

In Lebanon, Syria's main interest is to regain leverage in the country in order to preserve and strengthen its regional status, especially within the Arab world. The Arab states, however, accuse Syria of being a "geopolitical instrument" in the hands of Iran, as Tehran is becoming an important concern for some of the Arab states, especially for Saudi Arabia.

On the Palestinian issue, Assad also wants to stall for time. He played the role of a mediator and used Damascus' influence over Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal in order to find an agreement on a national unity government. By pursuing this objective, Syria avoided being accused of attempting to foster instability in the region.

Again, however, Syria's interests have remained the same in regard to this conflict. It wishes to avoid an agreement between Israel and the Palestinians as long as no peace agreement is signed between Israel and Syria. By avoiding an agreement between Israel and the Palestinians, Damascus is able to use the Palestinians as leverage when it negotiates with Israel over the Golan Heights.

In Iraq, Syria is maneuvering itself along a precipice. Damascus has an interest in using the instability in Iraq as a tool to pressure the United States, especially in regard to supporting the Sunni insurgents there. Syria's calculations show that this approach is an instrument to convince Washington to let Syria achieve its other interests in the region.

These interests include: Washington's acceptance of Syrian influence over Lebanon; pressuring Israel to return the Golan Heights; assurances over the emergence of a united and non-aggressive Iraq; and, finally, certainty that Washington has dropped all plans to foster regime change in Damascus.

This Syrian policy, however, is full of risk. By fostering instability in Iraq, Syria increases the number of refugees fleeing Iraq to Syria. These refugees are a challenge for the government and this will remain so until security is established in Iraq. Moreover, an implosion of Iraq and its possible division would be dangerous to Syria's territorial integrity and internal stability. The creation of a Sunni Arab state in central Iraq, where many radical jihadist groups would find refuge, could end up as a direct menace to regime security in Damascus.

The Ba'athist government in Damascus is perceived as an enemy by many radical Sunni groups, both for its secular ideology and for the fact that Syria is led by an Alawite elite. The Alawites are a small and heterodox Islamic sect seen as a "heretic" movement by radical Salafi Sunnis.

Additionally, an independent Kurdistan in northern Iraq would encourage separatism among Syrian Kurds, who have been repressed for years by Damascus. Finally, an Iranian influenced Shi'a state in southern Iraq would be perceived as a threat to the regional balance and could affect the interests of Damascus negatively.

Indeed, despite its alliance with Iran, Syria does not want to see a further increase in Iran's regional power. The emergence of a state that could become a regional hegemon and polarize the regional system is not in Syria's interests.

Instead, Syria wants a more fluid and widespread distribution of power, which is ideal for Damascus since it would allow it to play a more effective role in the region.

Therefore, Syria's alliance with Iran is merely tactical, as well as are Syria's ties with the radical groups within the Middle East, such as Hezbollah and Hamas.

Assad has strengthened Syria's relations with these groups during the past few years with the aim of resisting the rising pressure placed on his regime in the wake of Rafiq Hariri's assassination.

If international pressure on Assad's government decreases, as it has during the past few weeks, Syria will probably pursue a more flexible and moderate approach toward the main issues of the region.

Nevertheless, Syria's interests have remained the same. If there is another attempt to isolate Syria, Damascus will again play the role of destabilizer, as was seen during the crisis in Lebanon last year.

If engagement with Syria continues, however, it is likely that Damascus will slacken its ties with Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah.

The Power and Interest News Report (PINR) is an independent organization that utilizes open source intelligence to provide conflict analysis services in the context of international relations. PINR approaches a subject based upon the powers and interests involved, leaving the moral judgments to the reader.