"Russia's New Initiatives In The Persian Gulf"

The Power and Interest News Report (PINR)
01 March 2007
PINR

...Russia's new attitude and its renewed sense of power have shaped its moves in the Middle East, particularly in the Persian Gulf, and are part of Russia's goal of playing a more important role within the international system. It does not mean a return to the Cold War era confrontation with the United States; rather, the institutional stabilization at home and Moscow's geopolitical reinforcement -- obtained through the often unscrupulous use of energy leverage in Russia's "near abroad" -- created the opportunity for Russia to again play a stronger part in world affairs.

Russia's Foreign Policy and the Renewed Importance of the Persian Gulf:

Russia's foreign policy toward the Middle East is a paradigmatic example of the "extreme" pragmatism that has characterized Putin's attitude toward global political affairs since his arrival at the Kremlin in 2000. Russian moves in the Middle East aim at establishing good relations with every regional player. Therefore, Putin seeks positive ties with Israel, Iran, Syria, and Egypt, trying to keep a balance among the different interests and perceptions of these actors. The recent trip to the Persian Gulf is another example of this attitude.

The Persian Gulf is clearly one of the most important areas for the global balance of power. It is still the most important region for world energy supplies, and it is the theater where an important geopolitical shift is emerging out of competition between the United States and Iran. For Russia, playing a primary role in this region represents an important element to its internal stability.

Since gaining power in 2000, Putin's main goal has been "rebuilding" the Russian state, which was threatened by powerful forces of disintegration, and to strengthen Moscow's hold in those areas of the country where Islam plays a fundamental role, especially in Chechnya and Tatarstan. Therefore, Putin is in search of a more effective role in the Gulf and in establishing friendly relations with countries such as Saudi Arabia that have an ideological and confessional influence over these groups. Demonstrating the importance of the relationship, the most significant Islamic political personality in Russia, Mintimer Shaimiev, the head of the Tatarstan republic, was part of the Russian delegation to the Middle East, even though Tatarstan's relations with Putin are not friendly.

Moscow's Goals in the Persian Gulf:

Many issues were discussed during the meetings, but the most important were economic and commercial relations, the state of the global energy market, and the nuclear issue. From an economic point of view, Russia has great interest in entering Middle Eastern markets, which could represent an important opportunity for Russian arms and energy firms. Strengthening its economic role in the region would strengthen its political influence over these countries.

The situation of the global energy market is a fundamental concern for Russia and this issue could represent an element of division between it and Saudi Arabia because they have two divergent approaches to the question. Both countries want to use energy as a geopolitical lever, but their aims in such a field are different. Saudi Arabia wants to raise its oil production in order to lower oil prices as an instrument to weaken Iran's emergence as a major regional power and to secure its relations with the West; by maintaining positive relations with the West, Saudi Arabia earns the protection of the United States and its allies. Russia, however, wants to maintain high oil prices because higher revenues in this field could permit Moscow to maintain its strong economic development and to offset the difficult process of modernizing its energy industry.

During the past few years, energy security has become an important weapon to secure geopolitical influence, and Moscow has used this weapon in order to reposition itself in the international system. Putin, therefore, wants to build an important net of relations with those actors in the global energy system that may have the possibility to influence energy prices.

With energy demand on the rise, Russia wants to use its position as a major energy producer of both oil and gas in order to regain geopolitical significance. Putin aims to contain the freedom of action of other producers in the energy market, as well as reduce the geopolitical options for Russian energy clients in search of diversifying their supplies. This is a policy not only aimed at Saudi Arabia, but also at Iran, Algeria, Nigeria and Qatar, which was the second stop on Putin's Middle East tour and has the third-largest natural gas reserves in the world after Russia and Iran. This is also the reason behind the idea of creating a "gas cartel" similar to O.P.E.C. This cartel was discussed in Doha but its fulfillment appears difficult because the gas market has different players than the oil market.

Finally, the idea of Putin helping Riyadh with nuclear power development was discussed during the meeting. All major regional players in the Middle East appear eager to gain nuclear energy capabilities. During the last few months, several announcements about this question have been made in the region, such as from Egypt and Turkey. Additionally, the six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council claim the right to develop nuclear power.

Therefore, Russia wants to exploit the opportunity to increase its regional involvement by giving support to those countries in search of nuclear energy. Putin, in a recent trip to Egypt, offered Russian nuclear knowledge to Cairo. The same offer was given to Saudi Arabia during Putin's meeting there. Moreover, Russia is one of the major diplomatic players involved in the Iranian nuclear dispute, as well as the development of Tehran's capabilities. [See: "The Risks Involved in Egypt's Quest for Nuclear Power"]

There are several motivations for Putin's activism in the nuclear diplomatic game within the Middle East. On the one hand, it is an instrument for gaining influence over the regional dynamics of an area where Russia, since the end of the Cold War, has suffered a loss of power. It is also a tool for the Kremlin to bind the countries that want to develop nuclear energy to Russia.

This is a very important point: by offering technical and logistic support for the construction of nuclear facilities, Russia will be able to create a relationship of technical, and consequently political, dependence in a fundamental sector among those countries that acquire nuclear knowledge from Moscow.

This is the Russian strategy toward Iran. It is possible that Moscow does not prefer a nuclear Iran because the relations between the two countries are complex and often their interests diverge in spite of the current friendly ties. Therefore, Russian support for Iran on the nuclear issue is instrumental: it represents a way to limit Iran's strategic independence, and it is an instrument of pressure in the overall confrontation with the United States.

The role of a "nuclear technology supplier" that Russia wants to play within this region is also an effort to show that Russia has the capability to represent an alternative for those regimes allied with the United States. To this point, during the past few months, Putin has visited Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which are the main Arab-Islamic allies of the United States in the region. Russia wants to use the troubles of the United States in Iraq and the perception that Washington's Middle East policy is weakening to erode the U.S. geopolitical position in the Middle East. [See: "Intelligence Brief: U.S. Moves to Implement the Surge Strategy"]

Further to this consideration, the selling of arms to the major players in the region is an instrument to place pressure on the United States. Moscow discussed selling 150 T-90 tanks, which is the most modern tank in the Russian army arsenal, and some multi-purpose helicopters, the Mi-17, with Saudi Arabia. Moreover, in January, Tehran acquired from Russia 29 Tor-M1 missile defense systems that will be used for the protection of military and civilian assets in Isfahan and Bushehr, which are two of the most important sites of Iran's nuclear activities. This system was successfully test fired on February 7 by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

This strategy, however, has several controversial points. Moscow's moves are conditioned on the difficult balance between its support for Iran and its desire to reinforce its relations with those Arab countries that perceive the rise of Tehran as a threat. Saudi Arabia is the Arab country most concerned about Iran, and its political moves are oriented to limit the regional growth of Tehran. [See: "Intelligence Brief: Tensions Increase Between Iran and Saudi Arabia"]

Serious obstacles, therefore, threaten to prevent Moscow from gaining its desired results on both fronts in the mid-term. Moreover, if the tensions between Iran and the rest of the Arab-Islamic states in the area increase, Russia's strategy could be affected strongly. Furthermore, despite its troubles, the United States is still the prominent power in the region. It will be extremely difficult for Moscow to replace Washington's role as the main ally of these countries. Although Moscow is attempting such a move, as long as the United States remains the hegemonic power in the region, and maintains a strong military presence in the Gulf area, this strategy will be difficult to realize.

Conclusion:

In recent years, Russia has acquired new confidence about its role in global affairs. Putin succeeded in reinforcing the state, which was threatened with disintegration, and in gaining renewed geopolitical influence in its near abroad by using its energy leverage. Russia is moving powerfully in other contexts to play a greater role in the global geopolitical system. Putin's recent trip to the Persian Gulf is an example of this. Russia's foreign policy is aimed at gaining a part of the influence it lost with the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The strengthening of relations with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states is part of Russia's strategy for achieving this goal. Russia wants to use its role as a weapon and energy supplier, as well as a supplier of nuclear technology, to enhance its relations with all the major regional actors involved in the balance of power. It wants to use its relations with these states to place pressure on its geopolitical competitors, especially the United States. This does not mean that Russia wants to support every aspiration of Iran or Saudi Arabia; instead, it means that Moscow will calibrate its support for these countries on the basis of its contextual geopolitical needs.

If, however, political tensions in the area continue to increase and the polarization between the major actors of the region mount, Moscow's attempt to become one of the Middle East's most influential players may encounter unexpected difficulties and force the Kremlin to adapt to the new situation tactically.

Report Drafted By:Dario Cristiani

The Power and Interest News Report (PINR) is an independent organization that utilizes open source intelligence to provide conflict analysis services in the context of international relations. PINR approaches a subject based upon the powers and interests involved, leaving the moral judgments to the reader.